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macos-permissions

Diagnoses TCC denials, Local Network access and stuck Keychain dialogs: Full Disk Access, Screen Recording, Microphone, Camera, Accessibility, Automation. Use for repeated prompts, background-only LaunchAgent/uv failures, broken grants or FDA automation (权限弹窗 / 授权了没用 / 完全磁盘访问 / 本地网络权限).

Install / Use

npx skills add daymade/claude-code-skills --skill macos-permissions

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

83/100

Category

Automation

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of macos-permissions

macos-permissions scores 83/100 on our quality scale, 2209th of 2,780 Automation skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 5.3 KB long, split into 7 sections with 1 code example: a solid amount of guidance for an agent.

With 1,426 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
26/30
Structure
15/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
13/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so macos-permissions is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-07 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-03. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-03. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

macos-permissions compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than macos-permissions; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
macos-permissions (this skill)by daymade831.4k53d agoSKILL.md
taste-skillby Leonxlnx100116.8k8d agoCLAUDE.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k9d agoCLAUDE.md
rufloby ruvnet10081.9ktodayCLAUDE.md
Claude-Code-Game-Studiosby Donchitos10039.7k7d agoCLAUDE.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install macos-permissions?
Run npx skills add daymade/claude-code-skills --skill macos-permissions. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does macos-permissions work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is macos-permissions safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is macos-permissions still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so macos-permissions is actively maintained.

name: macos-permissions description: >- Diagnoses and repairs macOS TCC dialogs and silent denials: Full Disk Access, Screen Recording, Microphone, Camera, Accessibility, Automation. Use for recurring prompts, LaunchAgent/uv jobs that fail only in background, broken grants, or automating Full Disk Access (权限弹窗 / 授权了没用 / 完全磁盘访问). Checks requester and grants first. Not for launchd design (macos-watchdog) or app permission UX (developing-ios-apps).

macOS Permissions (TCC)

macOS gates per-app, per-resource access through TCC (Transparency, Consent, Control). TCC records permission decisions in its databases and controls what a process can do. Several common traps need different fixes:

| Trap | Symptom | Fix lives in | |---|---|---| | Wrong subject granted | Dialog names python3.11/2.1.232/node; you granted that but it still prompts | The attribution trap below | | Grant doesn't survive | Worked, then a binary/uv/CLI update → prompt returns | references/uv-fda-trap.md | | Silent denial | Feature "unavailable", no dialog, grant looks ON | references/tcc-mechanics.md § auth_value | | Can't read TCC.db | Permission denied reading the DB; need FDA to diagnose FDA | references/tcc-mechanics.md § SIP |

The attribution trap

The name in the dialog does not prove who to grant. macOS attributes a request to the responsible process in the process tree, but displays the name of the accessing executable — and for an unsigned binary with no bundle (uv-managed python, per-version CLI, node helpers) that display name is just the last path component, which changes with every version. Granting the displayed name is the mistake that costs the most rounds.

Before touching System Settings, inspect the request and any readable grant state:

# 1. Who is actually requesting — the responsible process in the attribution chain
/usr/bin/log show --last 30m --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.TCC"' --info --debug \
  | grep -E 'from Sub:|responsible=|accessing=' | tail -20

# 2. Grant candidates, if this terminal can read the system database
sudo -n sqlite3 '/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db' \
  "select service, client, auth_value from access where service='kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles' and client like '%<name>%';"

Use from Sub: to identify a candidate requester, then verify its exact path and a real protected read before choosing what to authorize. An unreadable TCC.db leaves grant state unknown; its FDA bootstrap is in references/tcc-mechanics.md.

Decision tree

| The situation is… | Go to | |---|---| | User asks to complete Full Disk Access repair automatically, or a background job needs protected files | references/automated-full-disk-access.md (reuse a verified existing grant first; otherwise drive System Settings and read back) | | Dialog reappears after clicking Allow; or a LaunchAgent / uv run job prompts every few minutes | references/uv-fda-trap.md (identify the requester; follow the automated repair route before adding a grant) | | Need the full kTCCService catalog, schema, auth_value/auth_reason semantics, tccutil | references/tcc-mechanics.md | | Reading TCC.db gives "Permission denied" | references/tcc-mechanics.md § SIP and the FDA bootstrap | | A granted permission silently stopped working after an update | references/tcc-mechanics.md § common failure modes (toggle off/on, or tccutil reset <Service> <bundle-id>) | | Grant won't stick for Automation / Apple Events | references/tcc-mechanics.md — BOTH controller AND target need the grant |

Core rules (each from a real incident)

  • Dialog name ≠ responsible process. from Sub: in the TCC log is the requester; the title is the accessing binary's basename and it drifts with versions. Grant by the real path. (2026-09-19: a uv FDA dialog showed python3.11; authorizing python, changing session type, and pinning the version all failed because the requester was ~/.local/bin/uv.)
  • Grants are keyed to the exact binary path, not identity. An unsigned executable (uv-managed python, per-version CLI, node helper) is a new app to TCC every time its path changes. This is why "worked yesterday, prompts today" after any update. Same root cause as Claude Code issues #74234 / #84948 / #86706.
  • "0 hits / can't catch it" is an instrument problem, not a conclusion. fs_usage can emit 0 bytes on some machines; short-lived processes fall between log time windows; an empty grep file looks identical to a real zero. To pin which operation triggers a prompt, use in-process sys.addaudithook to log open events aligned to the tccd timestamp — not fs_usage.
  • SIP protects the system TCC.db read-only. You cannot INSERT/UPDATE a grant from the command line — authorization must go through the GUI. auth_value is readable, writable is not.
  • After granting, restart the requesting process. Grants are read at launch; a running process keeps its old (denied) state until relaunched.

Scope

This skill owns permission diagnosis and repair. It does not own: building an app's permission-onboarding UX (app-development work, out of scope here), launchd job design (macos-watchdog), or disk cleanup (macos-cleaner) — those link here when they hit a TCC wall.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars1.4k
CategoryAutomation
Updated1mo ago
Forks219

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions