12-log-analysis
Security log parsing, anomaly detection, SIEM query building, Sigma rule
Install / Use
npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill 12-log-analysisInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of 12-log-analysis
12-log-analysis scores 88/100 on our quality scale, 642nd of 1,094 Security skills we index.
Its SKILL.md is 15 KB long, well organised into 45 sections with 15 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
It has 441 GitHub stars, a meaningful sign that others use it.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so 12-log-analysis is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-01 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
No issues foundOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-07. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-07. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
12-log-analysis compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than 12-log-analysis; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12-log-analysis (this skill)by Masriyan | 88 | 441 | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| Agent-Reachby Panniantong | 100 | 112.8k | 10d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| headroomby headroomlabs-ai | 100 | 79.9k | today | CLAUDE.md |
| Claude-Code-Game-Studiosby Donchitos | 100 | 40.0k | 8d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| Scraplingby D4Vinci | 100 | 104.0k | today | MCP Server |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install 12-log-analysis?
- Run
npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill 12-log-analysis. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does 12-log-analysis work with?
- It is written for Claude Code, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is 12-log-analysis safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is 12-log-analysis still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so 12-log-analysis is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: Log Analysis & SIEM Integration description: Security log parsing, anomaly detection, SIEM query building, Sigma rule creation, and correlation rule development across Splunk, Elastic, QRadar, and Microsoft Sentinel version: 3.1.0 author: Masriyan tags: [cybersecurity, log-analysis, siem, splunk, elastic, sentinel, sigma, anomaly-detection, correlation]
Log Analysis & SIEM Integration
Purpose
Enable Claude to assist with security log analysis across all major platforms. Claude directly parses and analyzes log samples provided by the user, builds SIEM queries for any platform, creates Sigma rules for portable detection, develops correlation rules, and identifies anomalous patterns in log data.
Activation Triggers
This skill activates when the user asks about:
- Parsing Windows Event Logs, Linux syslog, or application logs
- Building Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL/EQL, QRadar AQL, or Sentinel KQL queries
- Creating Sigma rules for platform-agnostic detection
- Detecting anomalies or attack patterns in log data
- Building SIEM correlation rules for complex attack scenarios
- Converting queries between SIEM platforms
- Log source health monitoring and gap analysis
- Detecting lateral movement, privilege escalation, or persistence in logs
- EVTX analysis or Windows audit log review
Prerequisites
pip install pandas pyyaml python-dateutil
Platform tools:
Splunk— Splunk Web, SPL, and SOARElastic Stack— Kibana, KQL, EQLMicrosoft Sentinel— KQL, WorkbooksIBM QRadar— AQL, RulesSigma— Platform-agnostic rule formatpython-evtx— Parse Windows .evtx files without Windows
Core Capabilities
1. Log Parsing & Analysis
When the user pastes logs or provides log files:
Claude directly reads and analyzes logs to extract security-relevant events.
Windows Event Log — Critical Event IDs:
| Event ID | Log | Description | |----------|-----|-------------| | 4624 | Security | Successful logon — Logon Type 3 (network) is interesting | | 4625 | Security | Failed logon — track source IP for brute force | | 4648 | Security | Logon with explicit credentials (RunAs) | | 4688 | Security | New process created — needs CommandLine auditing enabled | | 4698 | Security | Scheduled task created | | 4702 | Security | Scheduled task updated | | 4720 | Security | User account created | | 4728/4732 | Security | Member added to security/local group | | 4768/4769 | Security | Kerberos TGT/TGS requested | | 4776 | Security | NTLM authentication | | 4946 | Security | Windows Firewall rule added | | 5140 | Security | Network share accessed | | 5145 | Security | Network share file access | | 7045 | System | New service installed | | 1102 | Security | Audit log cleared | | 4103/4104 | PowerShell | PowerShell module/script block logging |
Linux Log Analysis — Key Patterns:
# Failed SSH logins
grep "Failed password" /var/log/auth.log | awk '{print $1,$2,$3,$11}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
# Successful logins after failures (brute force success)
grep "Accepted password\|Accepted publickey" /var/log/auth.log
# Sudo usage
grep "sudo:" /var/log/auth.log | grep -v "session"
# Cron job execution
grep CRON /var/log/syslog
# New user creation
grep "useradd\|usermod" /var/log/auth.log
# Privilege escalation
grep "su\b" /var/log/auth.log
Log parsing script:
python scripts/log_parser.py --input /var/log/auth.log --format json --output parsed.json
python scripts/log_parser.py --input events.evtx --normalize ecs --output normalized.json
2. SIEM Query Library
When the user asks to build detection queries:
Splunk SPL — Attack Pattern Queries
// Brute force attack detection
index=windows EventCode=4625
| bin _time span=5m
| stats count as FailedLogins, values(Account_Name) as Accounts by src_ip, _time
| where FailedLogins > 20
| sort -FailedLogins
// Pass-the-Hash detection (Logon Type 3 with NTLM)
index=windows EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Authentication_Package=NTLM
| where NOT (Account_Name="ANONYMOUS LOGON" OR Account_Name="*$")
| stats count by Account_Name, Workstation_Name, src_ip
| where count > 1
// Lateral movement via PsExec / admin shares
index=windows EventCode=5145
| where (ShareName="\\\\*\\ADMIN$" OR ShareName="\\\\*\\C$")
AND RelativeTargetName="*PSEXESVC*"
| table _time, SubjectUserName, IpAddress, ShareName
// PowerShell encoded command execution
index=windows (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" EventCode=4104)
OR (EventCode=4688 CommandLine="*powershell*")
| search CommandLine IN ("*-EncodedCommand*", "*-enc *", "*-e *", "*-nop*",
"*DownloadString*", "*IEX*", "*Invoke-Expression*")
| table _time, ComputerName, User, CommandLine
// Scheduled task creation for persistence
index=windows EventCode=4698
| rex field=TaskContent "<Command>(?P<command>[^<]+)</Command>"
| where NOT match(command, "(?i)\\\\windows\\\\|\\\\microsoft\\\\|\\\\system32\\\\")
| table _time, ComputerName, SubjectUserName, TaskName, command
// LSASS memory access (credential dumping)
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*lsass.exe"
| where NOT (SourceImage IN
("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*",
"C:\\Program Files\\*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*"))
| table _time, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, CallTrace
// DCSync detection
index=windows EventCode=4662
(ObjectType="*domainDNS*" OR ObjectType="*19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9*")
(Properties="*Replicating Directory Changes All*" OR Properties="*1131f6ad*")
| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, "(?i)^.*\$$")
| table _time, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Properties
// Kerberoasting detection
index=windows EventCode=4769 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17
| where NOT (Account_Name="*$" OR Service_Name IN ("krbtgt", "kadmin/changepw"))
| stats count by Account_Name, Client_Address, Service_Name
| where count > 3
Microsoft Sentinel KQL — Queries
// Impossible Travel (logins from geographically impossible locations)
let TimeDelta = 2h;
SigninLogs
| where ResultType == 0 // Successful logins only
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| project UserPrincipalName, Location, TimeGenerated, IPAddress
| sort by UserPrincipalName asc, TimeGenerated asc
| serialize
| extend PreviousLogin = prev(TimeGenerated), PreviousLocation = prev(Location)
| where UserPrincipalName == prev(UserPrincipalName)
| extend TimeDiff = TimeGenerated - PreviousLogin
| where TimeDiff < TimeDelta and Location != PreviousLocation
| project UserPrincipalName, Location, PreviousLocation, TimeDiff, IPAddress
// Azure AD privilege escalation
AuditLogs
| where OperationName in ("Add member to role", "Add eligible member to role")
| extend TargetUser = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
| extend RoleAdded = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| where RoleAdded in ("Global Administrator", "Security Administrator",
"Exchange Administrator", "SharePoint Administrator")
| project TimeGenerated, TargetUser, RoleAdded,
InitiatedBy=tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
// Suspicious PowerShell activity
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4104
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ScriptBlockText has_any("IEX", "DownloadString", "EncodedCommand",
"WebClient", "Invoke-Expression", "bypass", "-nop")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, ScriptBlockText
| extend RiskScore = case(
ScriptBlockText has "IEX" and ScriptBlockText has "DownloadString", 10,
ScriptBlockText has "EncodedCommand", 7,
ScriptBlockText has "bypass", 5, 3)
| where RiskScore >= 5
| order by RiskScore desc
Elastic EQL — Sequence Detection
// Detect fileless malware execution chain
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
[process where event.type == "start" and
process.name in ("outlook.exe", "winword.exe", "excel.exe")]
[process where event.type == "start" and
process.name in ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")]
[network where network.direction == "egress" and
not network.destination.ip in ("127.0.0.0/8", "10.0.0.0/8", "192.168.0.0/16")]
// Ransomware detection: mass file extension changes + shadow copy deletion
sequence by host.name with maxspan=30m
[file where event.type == "creation" and
file.extension in ("locked", "encrypted", "crypted", "enc", "readme")]
[file where event.type == "creation" and
file.name in ("README.txt", "DECRYPT.txt", "HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt")]
[process where event.type == "start" and
process.command_line : "* delete shadows *"]
3. Anomaly Detection Methodology
When the user asks to detect anomalies in log data:
Statistical Anomaly Detection:
# Claude's approach to analyzing log data for anomalies:
import pandas as pd
from datetime import timedelta
# 1. Volume anomalies
# Calculate rolling average, flag if current > mean + 3*stddev
# 2. Time-based anomalies (off-hours activity)
# Business hours: Mon-Fri 08:00-18:00 local time
# Flag: admin activities on weekends, logins at 03:00 UTC
# 3. Never-before-seen entities
# - New admin account created
# - First-time login from country
# - New process never seen before
# - New domain in DNS queries
# 4. Impossible travel
# Calculate geographic distance / time delta
# Flag if impossible to travel physically in the time window
python scripts/anomaly_detector.py --logs parsed.json --baseline baseline.json --output anomalies.json
Anomaly Categories:
| Category | Indicators | |----------|-----------| | Volume spike | 10x normal event rate in 5 minutes | | Off-hours activity | Admin access at 03:00 local time | | New geography | Login from country with no prior history | | New process | First-ever execution of binary | | Large data transfer | Upload > 10x baseline for this user/system | | Silent log source | No events received in 30+ minutes | | Authentication pattern | Logon Type 3 from non-admin workstation |
4. Sigma Rule Development
When the user asks to create Sigma rules:
title: Credential Dumping via Procdump
id: e5eb5a27-4a98-4c34-8b39-1fbe552d2aa4
status: stable
description: Detects the use of ProcDump to dump LSASS memory for credential theft
author: SOC Analyst
date: 2025/05/28
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_tool:
Image|endswith:
- '\procdump.exe'
- '\procdump64.exe'
selection_lsass:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'lsass'
- '-ma 4' # PID 4 = System, sometimes used
selection_flags:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-accepteula'
- '-ma'
condition: selection_tool and (selection_lsass or selection_flags)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use by administrators for debugging (rare, should be investigated)
level: high
Sigma rule conversion to SIEM platforms:
# Install sigma-cli
pip install sigma-cli
# Convert to Splunk SPL
sigma convert -t splunk -p splunk_windows sigma_rule.yml
# Convert to Elastic KQL
sigma convert -t elasticsearch -p ecs_windows sigma_rule.yml
# Convert to Microsoft Sentinel KQL
sigma convert -t kusto sigma_rule.yml
5. Correlation Rule Development
When the user asks to create correlation rules for multi-event detection:
## Correlation Rule: Brute Force → Successful Login → Lateral Movement
**Trigger:**
Event 1: 4625 (Failed Login) × 20+ in 5 minutes (same source IP)
THEN Event 2: 4624 (Successful Login) from same source IP within 10 minutes
THEN Event 3: 5145 (Admin Share Access) from same host within 30 minutes
**Logic:**
Step 1: Bucket failed logins by source IP in 5-minute windows Step 2: If count > 20 → mark IP as "brute f
Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
