Justin Roosch
Comprehensive compliance and security self-assessment for AI agents. 14-check framework producing a structured threat model + compliance report with RED/AMBER/GREEN ratings across security, governance, EU AI Act readiness, oversight quality, and NIST alignment domains.
Install / Use
npx skills add LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills --skill agent-self-assessmentInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of Justin Roosch
Justin Roosch scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 752nd of 1,108 Security skills we index.
Its SKILL.md is 26 KB long, well organised into 31 sections with 1 code example: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,149 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 4 months ago. That is recent enough to be usable, but agent tooling moves fast, so check the instructions against your agent's current version.
- Our last check on 2026-11-03 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 98/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
No issues foundOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-30. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-30. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
Justin Roosch compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than Justin Roosch; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Justin Roosch (this skill)by LeoYeAI | 86 | 2.1k | 4mo ago | SKILL.md |
| taste-skillby Leonxlnx | 100 | 116.8k | 8d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| Agent-Reachby Panniantong | 100 | 112.3k | 8d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| Claude-Code-Game-Studiosby Donchitos | 100 | 39.7k | 7d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| Scraplingby D4Vinci | 100 | 103.6k | 2d ago | MCP Server |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install Justin Roosch?
- Run
npx skills add LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills --skill "Justin Roosch". The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does Justin Roosch work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is Justin Roosch safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 98/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is Justin Roosch still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 4 months ago. That is recent enough to be usable, but agent tooling moves fast, so check the instructions against your agent's current version.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: Agent Compliance & Security Assessment version: 2.3.0 description: > Comprehensive compliance and security self-assessment for AI agents. 14-check framework producing a structured threat model + compliance report with RED/AMBER/GREEN ratings across security, governance, EU AI Act readiness, oversight quality, and NIST alignment domains. Includes automation bias detection, audit trail reasoning checks, extraterritorial scope assessment, and Zero Trust posture evaluation. Designed for the August 2026 EU AI Act deadline. author: name: Justin Roosch url: https://github.com/roosch269 license: MIT-0 tags:
- security
- compliance
- eu-ai-act
- nist
- self-assessment
- threat-model
- agent-safety
- audit
- governance
- transparency
- risk-classification
- zero-trust keywords:
- agent security posture
- EU AI Act compliance
- NIST AI agent standards
- Article 50 transparency
- Article 14 human oversight
- agent threat model
- security checklist
- agent hardening
- AI governance
- Zero Trust AI
- agent accountability metadata: openclaw: emoji: "🛡️" minVersion: "1.0.0"
Agent Compliance & Security Assessment v2.3
Free. Open. Run it yourself.
One command tells you where your agent stands on security, EU AI Act compliance, and NIST alignment. 14 checks, 5 domains, RAG-rated report.
How to activate: Tell your agent: "Read SKILL.md and run the agent compliance assessment"
14 checks across 5 domains:
- 🔒 Security (Checks 1–6): Decision boundaries, audit trail, credentials, plane separation, economic accountability, memory safety
- 🏛️ EU AI Act (Checks 7–9): Transparency (Art. 50), risk classification (Art. 6), human oversight (Art. 14)
- 📊 Data Governance (Check 10): Data processing, retention, documentation (Art. 10, 12)
- 🛡️ Oversight Quality (Checks 11–13): Automation bias resistance, audit trail reasoning, extraterritorial scope
- 🔐 Trust Architecture (Check 14): Zero Trust posture for agentic AI (NIST-aligned)
EU AI Act enforcement is underway. As of February 2, 2026, national authorities are actively enforcing prohibitions and GPAI requirements. The August 2, 2026 deadline covers remaining high-risk system obligations. Only 8 of 27 EU member states have designated competent authorities — the compliance gap is real. 4 months remaining.
NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative launched February 2026, establishing formal security standards for autonomous AI agents. This assessment aligns with both EU and US frameworks.
What This Skill Does
This skill instructs the agent to inspect its own configuration and produce an honest compliance report. It reads local files, checks environment structure, and reviews tool and skill setup.
What This Skill Does NOT Do
- ❌ Does not exfiltrate credentials, keys, or secrets
- ❌ Does not send data to external servers
- ❌ Does not modify any files or configuration
- ❌ Does not install software or change system state
- ❌ Does not execute shell commands — all checks are read-only file inspection
- ❌ All checks are passive inspection of the agent's own setup
Scope Constraints (enforceable)
Files the agent SHOULD inspect (allowlist):
- Configuration files:
AGENTS.md,SOUL.md,TOOLS.md,CLAUDE.md(read content for policy review) - Environment file:
.env(check existence and gitignore status only — never read values) - Audit logs:
audit/directory (check structure and recency of entries — not sensitive content) - Memory files:
memory/directory (check for injection patterns only) - Skills directory:
skills/or.claude/skills/(list installed skills)
Files the agent MUST NOT read:
- Private keys, keystores, or certificate files
- Environment file VALUES (only check if the file exists and is excluded from version control)
- Session transcripts or conversation logs
- Any file outside the agent's own workspace
Output constraints:
- The report MUST be generated as a local text output only
- The report MUST NOT be sent to external URLs, APIs, or webhooks
- Credential values MUST be redacted as
[REDACTED]— only existence is reported, never values - The report SHOULD be saved to the agent's own audit log if one exists
How to Run
When invoked, perform the following fourteen checks against your actual current configuration — not hypothetically. Use file reads and tool introspection. Then output the report.
Do not skip checks. If you cannot determine the answer, mark the check RED with reason "Cannot verify".
🔒 SECURITY DOMAIN (Checks 1–6)
Check 1: Decision Boundaries
Question: Can external input trigger consequential actions directly, without a gate or approval step?
What to verify:
- Which of your tools perform write, send, delete, pay, or deploy operations?
- Is there a human-in-the-loop gate before any of these fire?
- Can an incoming message cause a consequential action without a gate?
- Are decision boundaries documented (e.g., in AGENTS.md or a policy file)?
Scoring:
- 🟢 GREEN — All consequential actions require explicit gate; boundaries documented
- 🟡 AMBER — Gates exist but not all paths covered, or documentation missing
- 🔴 RED — Direct ingress-to-action path exists with no gate; or cannot verify
Check 2: Audit Trail
Question: Is there an append-only, tamper-evident log of consequential actions?
What to verify:
- Does an audit log file or directory exist?
- Is it append-only with a structured format (e.g., NDJSON)?
- Does each entry include: timestamp, action type, actor, target, summary?
- Is there hash chaining or integrity verification?
- Is the log actively being written to (check recency of last entry)?
Scoring:
- 🟢 GREEN — Log exists, append-only, integrity-checked, recently written
- 🟡 AMBER — Log exists but missing integrity checks, or sparse entries
- 🔴 RED — No audit log; or log is mutable with no integrity mechanism
Check 3: Credential Scoping
Question: Are secrets scoped to their domain? Can a credential for domain A be accessed by domain B?
What to verify:
- Are credentials stored in environment variables or encrypted keystores (not hardcoded in source)?
- Is each credential documented with its intended scope?
- Are any credentials shared across unrelated services?
- Are credential files properly permission-restricted?
Scoring:
- 🟢 GREEN — Each credential scoped to one domain; inventory documented; files permission-restricted
- 🟡 AMBER — Credentials present but not fully documented; minor scope ambiguity
- 🔴 RED — Cross-domain credentials; credentials in plaintext or world-readable files; no inventory
Check 4: Plane Separation
Question: Is the ingress plane (receiving inputs) isolated from the action plane (executing operations)?
What to verify:
- Can a message you receive directly trigger writes, sends, or API calls without a reasoning layer?
- Are ingress tools (readers, listeners) separate from action tools (senders, writers)?
- Is there a documented separation policy?
- Does untrusted content (e.g., prompt injection in messages) have a path to trigger actions?
Scoring:
- 🟢 GREEN — Ingress and Action planes explicitly separated; injection mitigated; policy documented
- 🟡 AMBER — Separation mostly in place but some shared paths or no explicit policy
- 🔴 RED — Ingress-to-Action with no separation; injection in untrusted content can trigger actions
Check 5: Economic Accountability
Question: Are financial operations traceable, receipted, and bounded?
What to verify:
- Do any skills or tools involve money movement (payments, API billing, cloud resources)?
- Is there a spending limit or budget cap configured?
- Does every payment produce a settlement receipt in the audit log?
- Is there escrow for agent-to-agent commerce?
- Can the agent autonomously spend without any ceiling?
Scoring:
- 🟢 GREEN — Spending limits set; transactions receipted; escrow used for agent-to-agent; accountability clear
- 🟡 AMBER — Payments possible but missing receipts, no spending cap, or no escrow
- 🔴 RED — Unbounded autonomous spending; no receipts; no accountability mechanism
Check 6: Memory Safety
Question: Is agent memory isolated from untrusted imports? Can external content corrupt agent state?
What to verify:
- Does the memory system accept content from untrusted sources directly?
- Are imported artifacts provenance-tracked (source, timestamp, hash)?
- Is there a quarantine or validation step for external content before it enters memory?
- Are memory files reviewed for embedded prompt injection?
Scoring:
- 🟢 GREEN — All imports provenance-tracked; no direct untrusted-to-memory path; injection scanning active
- 🟡 AMBER — Some imports tracked but not all; no systematic quarantine
- 🔴 RED — Untrusted content written directly to memory; no provenance tracking; no injection scanning
🏛️ EU AI ACT READINESS (Checks 7–9)
Reference: Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 — enforcement began 2 February 2026 (prohibitions + GPAI). High-risk system obligations apply from 2 August 2026.
Check 7: Transparency (Article 50)
Question: Does the agent clearly identify itself as an AI system to users it interacts with?
What to verify:
- When the agent posts messages, comments, or content — does it disclose it is AI-operated?
- Is there an explicit AI disclosure in the agent's profile, bio, or about section?
- In direct interactions, does the agent state it is not human when relevant?
- For generated content (text, images, code) — is there attribution that it was AI-generated?
- Is there a documented transparency policy?
EU AI Act reference:
Article 50(1): Providers shall ensure that AI systems intended to interact directly with natural persons are designed and developed in such a way that the natural persons concerned are informed that they are interacting with an AI system.
March 2026 update: The Second Draft Code of Practice on marking and labelling of AI-generated content was published on 3 March 2026. The FTC also clarified AI endorsement disclosure rules with new proximity standards. Both strengthen the case for proactive disclosure.
Scoring:
- 🟢 GREEN — AI disclosure present in all interaction channels; transparency policy documented; generated content attributed
- 🟡 AMBER — Disclosure present in some channels but not all; or no formal policy
- 🔴 RED — No AI disclosure; agent presents as human; no transparency policy
Check 8: Risk Classification (Articles 6, 9)
Question: Has the agent assessed its own risk category under the EU AI Act?
What to verify:
- Is the agent's risk category documented? (Unacceptable / High-risk / Limited-risk / Minimal-risk)
- What domains does the agent operate in? (Employment, finance, law enforcement, education, critical infrastructure → likely high-risk)
- If high-risk: is there a conformity assessment documented?
- If limited-risk: are transparency obligations met (Check 7)?
- Is there a risk register or assessment document?
EU AI Act reference:
Article 6: Classification rules for high-risk AI systems Article 9: Risk management system (for high-risk systems)
Risk category guidance:
- High-risk: Agent makes decisions affecting employment, creditworthiness, law enforcement, education access, essential services
- Limited-risk: Agent interacts with people, generates content, processes emotions
- Minimal-risk: Internal tools, code assistants, personal productivity agents
Scoring:
- 🟢 GREEN — Risk category assessed and documented; appropriate measures in place for category
- 🟡 AMBER — Risk category acknowledged but not formally documented; measures partially implemented
- 🔴 RED — No risk assessment performed; agent operating in potentially high-risk domain without classificatio
Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
