23 skills found
shesek / Btproofbtproof.com - trusted digital timestamping on the bitcoin blockchain
mabuware / GitTrustedTimestampsTrusted Timestamping for git repositories using RFC3161 and RFC5816 token
bjornedstrom / TimmyUse some TLS servers for trusted timestamping
qrdate / QrdateTrusted timestamps that you can physically include in photos, videos and live streams using QR codes and audible data signals.
Merovius / NotaryUse roughtime as a trusted timestamp agent
clocklock / Go Rfc3161Trusted Timestamping with RFC 3161 for golang
uvhw / Bitcoin FoundationBitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System Satoshi Nakamoto satoshin@gmx.com www.bitcoin.org Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. 1. Introduction Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model. Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non- reversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need. A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments over a communications channel without a trusted party. What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes. 1 2. Transactions We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership. Transaction Hash Transaction Hash Transaction Hash Owner 1's Public Key Owner 2's Public Key Owner 3's Public Key Owner 0's Signature Owner 1's Signature The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for double spending. After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent. The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank. We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any earlier transactions. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don't care about later attempts to double-spend. The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to be aware of all transactions. In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and decided which arrived first. To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the first received. 3. Timestamp Server The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it. Hash Hash Owner 2's Signature Owner 1's Private Key Owner 2's Private Key Owner 3's Private Key Block Item Item ... 2 Block Item Item ... Verify Verify Sign Sign 4. Proof-of-Work To implement a distributed timestamp server on a peer-to-peer basis, we will need to use a proof- of-work system similar to Adam Back's Hashcash [6], rather than newspaper or Usenet posts. The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the hash begins with a number of zero bits. The average work required is exponential in the number of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash. For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the block until a value is found that gives the block's hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it. The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added. To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they're generated too fast, the difficulty increases. 5. Network The steps to run the network are as follows: 1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes. 2) Each node collects new transactions into a block. 3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block. 4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes. 5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent. 6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash. Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof- of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one. 3 Block Nonce Tx Tx ... Block Nonce Tx Tx ... Prev Hash Prev Hash New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and realizes it missed one. 6. Incentive By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them. The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended. The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees. If the output value of a transaction is less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee that is added to the incentive value of the block containing the transaction. Once a predetermined number of coins have entered circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely inflation free. The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth. 7. Reclaiming Disk Space Once the latest transaction in a coin is buried under enough blocks, the spent transactions before it can be discarded to save disk space. To facilitate this without breaking the block's hash, transactions are hashed in a Merkle Tree [7][2][5], with only the root included in the block's hash. Old blocks can then be compacted by stubbing off branches of the tree. The interior hashes do not need to be stored. Block Hash0 Hash1 Hash2 Hash3 Tx0 Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Block Header (Block Hash) Prev Hash Nonce Root Hash Hash01 Hash23 Block Block Header (Block Hash) Prev Hash Nonce Root Hash Hash01 Hash23 Hash2 Hash3 Tx3 Transactions Hashed in a Merkle Tree After Pruning Tx0-2 from the Block A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes. If we suppose blocks are generated every 10 minutes, 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2MB per year. With computer systems typically selling with 2GB of RAM as of 2008, and Moore's Law predicting current growth of 1.2GB per year, storage should not be a problem even if the block headers must be kept in memory. 4 8. Simplified Payment Verification It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it, and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it. Longest Proof-of-Work Chain Block Header Block Header Block Header Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce Merkle Root Merkle Root Merkle Root Hash01 Hash23 Merkle Branch for Tx3 Hash2 Hash3 Tx3 As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification. 9. Combining and Splitting Value Although it would be possible to handle coins individually, it would be unwieldy to make a separate transaction for every cent in a transfer. To allow value to be split and combined, transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs. Normally there will be either a single input from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender. It should be noted that fan-out, where a transaction depends on several transactions, and those transactions depend on many more, is not a problem here. There is never the need to extract a complete standalone copy of a transaction's history. 5 Transaction In Out In ... ... 10. Privacy The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were. Traditional Privacy Model Identities Transactions New Privacy Model Identities Transactions As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner. 11. Calculations We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate an alternate chain faster than the honest chain. Even if this is accomplished, it does not throw the system open to arbitrary changes, such as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged to the attacker. Nodes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them. An attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back money he recently spent. The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a Binomial Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its lead by +1, and the failure event is the attacker's chain being extended by one block, reducing the gap by -1. The probability of an attacker catching up from a given deficit is analogous to a Gambler's Ruin problem. Suppose a gambler with unlimited credit starts at a deficit and plays potentially an infinite number of trials to try to reach breakeven. We can calculate the probability he ever reaches breakeven, or that an attacker ever catches up with the honest chain, as follows [8]: p = probability an honest node finds the next block q = probability the attacker finds the next block qz = probability the attacker will ever catch up from z blocks behind Trusted Third Party q ={ 1 if p≤q} z q/pz if pq 6 Counterparty Public Public Given our assumption that p > q, the probability drops exponentially as the number of blocks the attacker has to catch up with increases. With the odds against him, if he doesn't make a lucky lunge forward early on, his chances become vanishingly small as he falls further behind. We now consider how long the recipient of a new transaction needs to wait before being sufficiently certain the sender can't change the transaction. We assume the sender is an attacker who wants to make the recipient believe he paid him for a while, then switch it to pay back to himself after some time has passed. The receiver will be alerted when that happens, but the sender hopes it will be too late. The receiver generates a new key pair and gives the public key to the sender shortly before signing. This prevents the sender from preparing a chain of blocks ahead of time by working on it continuously until he is lucky enough to get far enough ahead, then executing the transaction at that moment. Once the transaction is sent, the dishonest sender starts working in secret on a parallel chain containing an alternate version of his transaction. The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block and z blocks have been linked after it. He doesn't know the exact amount of progress the attacker has made, but assuming the honest blocks took the average expected time per block, the attacker's potential progress will be a Poisson distribution with expected value: = z qp To get the probability the attacker could still catch up now, we multiply the Poisson density for each amount of progress he could have made by the probability he could catch up from that point: ∞ ke−{q/pz−k ifk≤z} ∑k=0 k!⋅ 1 ifkz Rearranging to avoid summing the infinite tail of the distribution... z ke− z−k 1−∑k=0 k! 1−q/p Converting to C code... #include <math.h> double AttackerSuccessProbability(double q, int z) { double p = 1.0 - q; double lambda = z * (q / p); double sum = 1.0; int i, k; for (k = 0; k <= z; k++) { double poisson = exp(-lambda); for (i = 1; i <= k; i++) poisson *= lambda / i; sum -= poisson * (1 - pow(q / p, z - k)); } return sum; } 7 Running some results, we can see the probability drop off exponentially with z. q=0.1 z=0 P=1.0000000 z=1 P=0.2045873 z=2 P=0.0509779 z=3 P=0.0131722 z=4 P=0.0034552 z=5 P=0.0009137 z=6 P=0.0002428 z=7 P=0.0000647 z=8 P=0.0000173 z=9 P=0.0000046 z=10 P=0.0000012 q=0.3 z=0 P=1.0000000 z=5 P=0.1773523 z=10 P=0.0416605 z=15 P=0.0101008 z=20 P=0.0024804 z=25 P=0.0006132 z=30 P=0.0001522 z=35 P=0.0000379 z=40 P=0.0000095 z=45 P=0.0000024 z=50 P=0.0000006 Solving for P less than 0.1%... P < 0.001 q=0.10 z=5 q=0.15 z=8 q=0.20 z=11 q=0.25 z=15 q=0.30 z=24 q=0.35 z=41 q=0.40 z=89 q=0.45 z=340 12. Conclusion We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism. 8 References [1] W. Dai, "b-money," http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998. [2] H. Massias, X.S. Avila, and J.-J. Quisquater, "Design of a secure timestamping service with minimal trust requirements," In 20th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, May 1999. [3] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "How to time-stamp a digital document," In Journal of Cryptology, vol 3, no 2, pages 99-111, 1991. [4] D. Bayer, S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping," In Sequences II: Methods in Communication, Security and Computer Science, pages 329-334, 1993. [5] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Secure names for bit-strings," In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 28-35, April 1997. [6] A. Back, "Hashcash - a denial of service counter-measure," http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf, 2002. [7] R.C. Merkle, "Protocols for public key cryptosystems," In Proc. 1980 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society, pages 122-133, April 1980. [8] W. Feller, "An introduction to probability theory and its applications," 1957. 9
bwesterb / AtumdPost-quantum trusted time-stamping server
marigold-dev / TzstampTrusted timestamping on the Tezos blockchain.
Nixy1234 / Dfdfd# All paths in this configuration file are relative to Dynmap's data-folder: minecraft_server/dynmap/ # All map templates are defined in the templates directory # To use the HDMap very-low-res (2 ppb) map templates as world defaults, set value to vlowres # The definitions of these templates are in normal-vlowres.txt, nether-vlowres.txt, and the_end-vlowres.txt # To use the HDMap low-res (4 ppb) map templates as world defaults, set value to lowres # The definitions of these templates are in normal-lowres.txt, nether-lowres.txt, and the_end-lowres.txt # To use the HDMap hi-res (16 ppb) map templates (these can take a VERY long time for initial fullrender), set value to hires # The definitions of these templates are in normal-hires.txt, nether-hires.txt, and the_end-hires.txt # To use the HDMap low-res (4 ppb) map templates, with support for boosting resolution selectively to hi-res (16 ppb), set value to low_boost_hi # The definitions of these templates are in normal-low_boost_hi.txt, nether-low_boost_hi.txt, and the_end-low_boost_hi.txt # To use the HDMap hi-res (16 ppb) map templates, with support for boosting resolution selectively to vhi-res (32 ppb), set value to hi_boost_vhi # The definitions of these templates are in normal-hi_boost_vhi.txt, nether-hi_boost_vhi.txt, and the_end-hi_boost_vhi.txt # To use the HDMap hi-res (16 ppb) map templates, with support for boosting resolution selectively to xhi-res (64 ppb), set value to hi_boost_xhi # The definitions of these templates are in normal-hi_boost_xhi.txt, nether-hi_boost_xhi.txt, and the_end-hi_boost_xhi.txt deftemplatesuffix: lowres # Map storage scheme: only uncommoent one 'type' value # filetree: classic and default scheme: tree of files, with all map data under the directory indicated by 'tilespath' setting # sqlite: single SQLite database file (this can get VERY BIG), located at 'dbfile' setting (default is file dynmap.db in data directory) # mysql: MySQL database, at hostname:port in database, accessed via userid with password # mariadb: MariaDB database, at hostname:port in database, accessed via userid with password # postgres: PostgreSQL database, at hostname:port in database, accessed via userid with password storage: # Filetree storage (standard tree of image files for maps) type: filetree # SQLite db for map storage (uses dbfile as storage location) #type: sqlite #dbfile: dynmap.db # MySQL DB for map storage (at 'hostname':'port' in database 'database' using user 'userid' password 'password' and table prefix 'prefix' #type: mysql #hostname: localhost #port: 3306 #database: dynmap #userid: dynmap #password: dynmap #prefix: "" components: - class: org.dynmap.ClientConfigurationComponent - class: org.dynmap.InternalClientUpdateComponent sendhealth: true sendposition: true allowwebchat: true webchat-interval: 5 hidewebchatip: false trustclientname: false includehiddenplayers: false # (optional) if true, color codes in player display names are used use-name-colors: false # (optional) if true, player login IDs will be used for web chat when their IPs match use-player-login-ip: true # (optional) if use-player-login-ip is true, setting this to true will cause chat messages not matching a known player IP to be ignored require-player-login-ip: false # (optional) block player login IDs that are banned from chatting block-banned-player-chat: true # Require login for web-to-server chat (requires login-enabled: true) webchat-requires-login: false # If set to true, users must have dynmap.webchat permission in order to chat webchat-permissions: false # Limit length of single chat messages chatlengthlimit: 256 # # Optional - make players hidden when they are inside/underground/in shadows (#=light level: 0=full shadow,15=sky) # hideifshadow: 4 # # Optional - make player hidden when they are under cover (#=sky light level,0=underground,15=open to sky) # hideifundercover: 14 # # (Optional) if true, players that are crouching/sneaking will be hidden hideifsneaking: false # If true, player positions/status is protected (login with ID with dynmap.playermarkers.seeall permission required for info other than self) protected-player-info: false # If true, hide players with invisibility potion effects active hide-if-invisiblity-potion: true # If true, player names are not shown on map, chat, list hidenames: false #- class: org.dynmap.JsonFileClientUpdateComponent # writeinterval: 1 # sendhealth: true # sendposition: true # allowwebchat: true # webchat-interval: 5 # hidewebchatip: false # includehiddenplayers: false # use-name-colors: false # use-player-login-ip: false # require-player-login-ip: false # block-banned-player-chat: true # hideifshadow: 0 # hideifundercover: 0 # hideifsneaking: false # # Require login for web-to-server chat (requires login-enabled: true) # webchat-requires-login: false # # If set to true, users must have dynmap.webchat permission in order to chat # webchat-permissions: false # # Limit length of single chat messages # chatlengthlimit: 256 # hide-if-invisiblity-potion: true # hidenames: false - class: org.dynmap.SimpleWebChatComponent allowchat: true # If true, web UI users can supply name for chat using 'playername' URL parameter. 'trustclientname' must also be set true. allowurlname: false # Note: this component is needed for the dmarker commands, and for the Marker API to be available to other plugins - class: org.dynmap.MarkersComponent type: markers showlabel: false enablesigns: false # Default marker set for sign markers default-sign-set: markers # (optional) add spawn point markers to standard marker layer showspawn: true spawnicon: world spawnlabel: "Spawn" # (optional) layer for showing offline player's positions (for 'maxofflinetime' minutes after logoff) showofflineplayers: false offlinelabel: "Offline" offlineicon: offlineuser offlinehidebydefault: true offlineminzoom: 0 maxofflinetime: 30 # (optional) layer for showing player's spawn beds showspawnbeds: false spawnbedlabel: "Spawn Beds" spawnbedicon: bed spawnbedhidebydefault: true spawnbedminzoom: 0 spawnbedformat: "%name%'s bed" # (optional) Show world border (vanilla 1.8+) showworldborder: true worldborderlabel: "Border" - class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent type: chat allowurlname: false - class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent type: chatballoon focuschatballoons: false - class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent type: chatbox showplayerfaces: true messagettl: 5 # Optional: set number of lines in scrollable message history: if set, messagettl is not used to age out messages #scrollback: 100 # Optional: set maximum number of lines visible for chatbox #visiblelines: 10 # Optional: send push button sendbutton: false - class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent type: playermarkers showplayerfaces: true showplayerhealth: true # If true, show player body too (only valid if showplayerfaces=true showplayerbody: false # Option to make player faces small - don't use with showplayerhealth smallplayerfaces: false # Optional - make player faces layer hidden by default hidebydefault: false # Optional - ordering priority in layer menu (low goes before high - default is 0) layerprio: 0 # Optional - label for player marker layer (default is 'Players') label: "Players" #- class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent # type: digitalclock - class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent type: link - class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent type: timeofdayclock showdigitalclock: true #showweather: true # Mouse pointer world coordinate display - class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent type: coord label: "Location" hidey: false show-mcr: false show-chunk: false # Note: more than one logo component can be defined #- class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent # type: logo # text: "Dynmap" # #logourl: "images/block_surface.png" # linkurl: "http://forums.bukkit.org/threads/dynmap.489/" # # Valid positions: top-left, top-right, bottom-left, bottom-right # position: bottom-right #- class: org.dynmap.ClientComponent # type: inactive # timeout: 1800 # in seconds (1800 seconds = 30 minutes) # redirecturl: inactive.html # #showmessage: 'You were inactive for too long.' #- class: org.dynmap.TestComponent # stuff: "This is some configuration-value" # Treat hiddenplayers.txt as a whitelist for players to be shown on the map? (Default false) display-whitelist: false # How often a tile gets rendered (in seconds). renderinterval: 1 # How many tiles on update queue before accelerate render interval renderacceleratethreshold: 60 # How often to render tiles when backlog is above renderacceleratethreshold renderaccelerateinterval: 0.2 # How many update tiles to work on at once (if not defined, default is 1/2 the number of cores) tiles-rendered-at-once: 2 # If true, use normal priority threads for rendering (versus low priority) - this can keep rendering # from starving on busy Windows boxes (Linux JVMs pretty much ignore thread priority), but may result # in more competition for CPU resources with other processes usenormalthreadpriority: true # Save and restore pending tile renders - prevents their loss on server shutdown or /reload saverestorepending: true # Save period for pending jobs (in seconds): periodic saving for crash recovery of jobs save-pending-period: 900 # Zoom-out tile update period - how often to scan for and process tile updates into zoom-out tiles (in seconds) zoomoutperiod: 30 # Control whether zoom out tiles are validated on startup (can be needed if zoomout processing is interrupted, but can be expensive on large maps) initial-zoomout-validate: true # Default delay on processing of updated tiles, in seconds. This can reduce potentially expensive re-rendering # of frequently updated tiles (such as due to machines, pistons, quarries or other automation). Values can # also be set on individual worlds and individual maps. tileupdatedelay: 30 # Tile hashing is used to minimize tile file updates when no changes have occurred - set to false to disable enabletilehash: true # Optional - hide ores: render as normal stone (so that they aren't revealed by maps) #hideores: true # Optional - enabled BetterGrass style rendering of grass and snow block sides #better-grass: true # Optional - enable smooth lighting by default on all maps supporting it (can be set per map as lighting option) smooth-lighting: true # Optional - use world provider lighting table (good for custom worlds with custom lighting curves, like nether) # false=classic Dynmap lighting curve use-brightness-table: true # Optional - render specific block names using the textures and models of another block name: can be used to hide/disguise specific # blocks (e.g. make ores look like stone, hide chests) or to provide simple support for rendering unsupported custom blocks block-alias: # "minecraft:quartz_ore": "stone" # "diamond_ore": "coal_ore" # Default image format for HDMaps (png, jpg, jpg-q75, jpg-q80, jpg-q85, jpg-q90, jpg-q95, jpg-q100, webp, webp-q75, webp-q80, webp-q85, webp-q90, webp-q95, webp-q100), # Note: any webp format requires the presence of the 'webp command line tools' (cwebp, dwebp) (https://developers.google.com/speed/webp/download) # # Has no effect on maps with explicit format settings image-format: jpg-q90 # If cwebp or dwebp are not on the PATH, use these settings to provide their full path. Do not use these settings if the tools are on the PATH # For Windows, include .exe # #cwebpPath: /usr/bin/cwebp #dwebpPath: /usr/bin/dwebp # use-generated-textures: if true, use generated textures (same as client); false is static water/lava textures # correct-water-lighting: if true, use corrected water lighting (same as client); false is legacy water (darker) # transparent-leaves: if true, leaves are transparent (lighting-wise): false is needed for some Spout versions that break lighting on leaf blocks use-generated-textures: true correct-water-lighting: true transparent-leaves: true # ctm-support: if true, Connected Texture Mod (CTM) in texture packs is enabled (default) ctm-support: true # custom-colors-support: if true, Custom Colors in texture packs is enabled (default) custom-colors-support: true # Control loading of player faces (if set to false, skins are never fetched) #fetchskins: false # Control updating of player faces, once loaded (if faces are being managed by other apps or manually) #refreshskins: false # Customize URL used for fetching player skins (%player% is macro for name) skin-url: "http://skins.minecraft.net/MinecraftSkins/%player%.png" # Control behavior for new (1.0+) compass orientation (sunrise moved 90 degrees: east is now what used to be south) # default is 'newrose' (preserve pre-1.0 maps, rotate rose) # 'newnorth' is used to rotate maps and rose (requires fullrender of any HDMap map - same as 'newrose' for FlatMap or KzedMap) compass-mode: newnorth # Triggers for automatic updates : blockupdate-with-id is debug for breaking down updates by ID:meta # To disable, set just 'none' and comment/delete the rest render-triggers: - blockupdate #- blockupdate-with-id #- lightingupdate - chunkpopulate - chunkgenerate #- none # Title for the web page - if not specified, defaults to the server's name (unless it is the default of 'Unknown Server') #webpage-title: "My Awesome Server Map" # The path where the tile-files are placed. tilespath: web/tiles # The path where the web-files are located. webpath: web # The path were the /dynmapexp command exports OBJ ZIP files exportpath: export # The network-interface the webserver will bind to (0.0.0.0 for all interfaces, 127.0.0.1 for only local access). # If not set, uses same setting as server in server.properties (or 0.0.0.0 if not specified) #webserver-bindaddress: 0.0.0.0 # The TCP-port the webserver will listen on. webserver-port: 8123 # Maximum concurrent session on internal web server - limits resources used in Bukkit server max-sessions: 30 # Disables Webserver portion of Dynmap (Advanced users only) disable-webserver: false # Enable/disable having the web server allow symbolic links (true=compatible with existing code, false=more secure (default)) allow-symlinks: true # Enable login support login-enabled: false # Require login to access website (requires login-enabled: true) login-required: false # Period between tile renders for fullrender, in seconds (non-zero to pace fullrenders, lessen CPU load) timesliceinterval: 0.0 # Maximum chunk loads per server tick (1/20th of a second) - reducing this below 90 will impact render performance, but also will reduce server thread load maxchunkspertick: 200 # Progress report interval for fullrender/radiusrender, in tiles. Must be 100 or greater progressloginterval: 100 # Parallel fullrender: if defined, number of concurrent threads used for fullrender or radiusrender # Note: setting this will result in much more intensive CPU use, some additional memory use. Caution should be used when # setting this to equal or exceed the number of physical cores on the system. #parallelrendercnt: 4 # Interval the browser should poll for updates. updaterate: 2000 # If nonzero, server will pause fullrender/radiusrender processing when 'fullrenderplayerlimit' or more users are logged in fullrenderplayerlimit: 0 # If nonzero, server will pause update render processing when 'updateplayerlimit' or more users are logged in updateplayerlimit: 0 # Target limit on server thread use - msec per tick per-tick-time-limit: 50 # If TPS of server is below this setting, update renders processing is paused update-min-tps: 18.0 # If TPS of server is below this setting, full/radius renders processing is paused fullrender-min-tps: 18.0 # If TPS of server is below this setting, zoom out processing is paused zoomout-min-tps: 18.0 showplayerfacesinmenu: true # Control whether players that are hidden or not on current map are grayed out (true=yes) grayplayerswhenhidden: true # Set sidebaropened: 'true' to pin menu sidebar opened permanently, 'pinned' to default the sidebar to pinned, but allow it to unpin #sidebaropened: true # Customized HTTP response headers - add 'id: value' pairs to all HTTP response headers (internal web server only) #http-response-headers: # Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "my-domain.com" # X-Custom-Header-Of-Mine: "MyHeaderValue" # Trusted proxies for web server - which proxy addresses are trusted to supply valid X-Forwarded-For fields trusted-proxies: - "127.0.0.1" - "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1" joinmessage: "%playername% joined" quitmessage: "%playername% quit" spammessage: "You may only chat once every %interval% seconds." # format for messages from web: %playername% substitutes sender ID (typically IP), %message% includes text webmsgformat: "&color;2[WEB] %playername%: &color;f%message%" # Control whether layer control is presented on the UI (default is true) showlayercontrol: true # Enable checking for banned IPs via banned-ips.txt (internal web server only) check-banned-ips: true # Default selection when map page is loaded defaultzoom: 0 defaultworld: world defaultmap: flat # (optional) Zoom level and map to switch to when following a player, if possible #followzoom: 3 #followmap: surface # If true, make persistent record of IP addresses used by player logins, to support web IP to player matching persist-ids-by-ip: true # If true, map text to cyrillic cyrillic-support: false # Messages to customize msg: maptypes: "Map Types" players: "Players" chatrequireslogin: "Chat Requires Login" chatnotallowed: "You are not permitted to send chat messages" hiddennamejoin: "Player joined" hiddennamequit: "Player quit" # URL for client configuration (only need to be tailored for proxies or other non-standard configurations) url: # configuration URL #configuration: "up/configuration" # update URL #update: "up/world/{world}/{timestamp}" # sendmessage URL #sendmessage: "up/sendmessage" # login URL #login: "up/login" # register URL #register: "up/register" # tiles base URL #tiles: "tiles/" # markers base URL #markers: "tiles/" # Snapshot cache size, in chunks snapshotcachesize: 500 # Snapshot cache uses soft references (true), else weak references (false) soft-ref-cache: true # Player enter/exit title messages for map markers # # Processing period - how often to check player positions vs markers - default is 1000ms (1 second) #enterexitperiod: 1000 # Title message fade in time, in ticks (0.05 second intervals) - default is 10 (1/2 second) #titleFadeIn: 10 # Title message stay time, in ticks (0.05 second intervals) - default is 70 (3.5 seconds) #titleStay: 70 # Title message fade out time, in ticks (0.05 seocnd intervals) - default is 20 (1 second) #titleFadeOut: 20 # Enter/exit messages use on screen titles (true - default), if false chat messages are sent instead #enterexitUseTitle: true # Set true if new enter messages should supercede pending exit messages (vs being queued in order), default false #enterReplacesExits: true # Set to true to enable verbose startup messages - can help with debugging map configuration problems # Set to false for a much quieter startup log verbose: false # Enables debugging. #debuggers: # - class: org.dynmap.debug.LogDebugger # Debug: dump blocks missing render data dump-missing-blocks: false
mquandalle / ChronosTrusted timestamp on top of ethereum
ludeus / Trusted TimestampsImport of https://d-mueller.de/blog/dealing-with-trusted-timestamps-in-php-rfc-3161/
rsvp / VictorVictor, verifier in cryptography, publicly issues free trusted TIMESTAMP of file hash information embedded into a blockchain.
lipidity / NotaryTrusted timestamping server
pelle / Timecert MerbTrusted third party timestamping service
bwesterb / Go AtumGo client for the post-quantum Atum time-stamping service
pelle / TimeCertTrusted third party timestamping service
Magicking / FakturSmart contract component of the trusted timestamping faktur system
periodicpoint / Seed FluxOpen e-science, workflow for collaborative academic writing, versioning, reviewing, research data management, time stamping and open access publishing
skzap / SteemtimeTrusted Timestamp API using steem blockchain
