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iDharshan / ML Based Vehicle Predictive Maintenance System With Real Time VisualizationAI-driven predictive maintenance for vehicles using GBM models on real-time sensor data. Proactive fleet management, cost reduction, and efficient transportation enabled by forecasting maintenance needs and part failure probabilities through a web application interface.
Mdshobu / Liberty House Club Whitepaper# Liberty House Club **A Parallel Binance Chain to Enable Smart Contracts** _NOTE: This document is under development. Please check regularly for updates!_ ## Table of Contents - [Motivation](#motivation) - [Design Principles](#design-principles) - [Consensus and Validator Quorum](#consensus-and-validator-quorum) * [Proof of Staked Authority](#proof-of-staked-authority) * [Validator Quorum](#validator-quorum) * [Security and Finality](#security-and-finality) * [Reward](#reward) - [Token Economy](#token-economy) * [Native Token](#native-token) * [Other Tokens](#other-tokens) - [Cross-Chain Transfer and Communication](#cross-chain-transfer-and-communication) * [Cross-Chain Transfer](#cross-chain-transfer) * [BC to BSC Architecture](#bc-to-bsc-architecture) * [BSC to BC Architecture](#bsc-to-bc-architecture) * [Timeout and Error Handling](#timeout-and-error-handling) * [Cross-Chain User Experience](#cross-chain-user-experience) * [Cross-Chain Contract Event](#cross-chain-contract-event) - [Staking and Governance](#staking-and-governance) * [Staking on BC](#staking-on-bc) * [Rewarding](#rewarding) * [Slashing](#slashing) - [Relayers](#relayers) * [BSC Relayers](#bsc-relayers) * [Oracle Relayers](#oracle-relayers) - [Outlook](#outlook) # Motivation After its mainnet community [launch](https://www.binance.com/en/blog/327334696200323072/Binance-DEX-Launches-on-Binance-Chain-Invites-Further-Community-Development) in April 2019, [Binance Chain](https://www.binance.org) has exhibited its high speed and large throughput design. Binance Chain’s primary focus, its native [decentralized application](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decentralized_application) (“dApp”) [Binance DEX](https://www.binance.org/trade), has demonstrated its low-latency matching with large capacity headroom by handling millions of trading volume in a short time. Flexibility and usability are often in an inverse relationship with performance. The concentration on providing a convenient digital asset issuing and trading venue also brings limitations. Binance Chain's most requested feature is the programmable extendibility, or simply the [Smart Contract](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_contract) and Virtual Machine functions. Digital asset issuers and owners struggle to add new decentralized features for their assets or introduce any sort of community governance and activities. Despite this high demand for adding the Smart Contract feature onto Binance Chain, it is a hard decision to make. The execution of a Smart Contract may slow down the exchange function and add non-deterministic factors to trading. If that compromise could be tolerated, it might be a straightforward idea to introduce a new Virtual Machine specification based on [Tendermint](https://tendermint.com/core/), based on the current underlying consensus protocol and major [RPC](https://docs.binance.org/api-reference/node-rpc.html) implementation of Binance Chain. But all these will increase the learning requirements for all existing dApp communities, and will not be very welcomed. We propose a parallel blockchain of the current Binance Chain to retain the high performance of the native DEX blockchain and to support a friendly Smart Contract function at the same time. # Design Principles After the creation of the parallel blockchain into the Binance Chain ecosystem, two blockchains will run side by side to provide different services. The new parallel chain will be called “**Binance Smart Chain**” (short as “**BSC**” for the below sections), while the existing mainnet remains named “**Binance Chain**” (short as “**BC**” for the below sections). Here are the design principles of **BSC**: 1. **Standalone Blockchain**: technically, BSC is a standalone blockchain, instead of a layer-2 solution. Most BSC fundamental technical and business functions should be self-contained so that it can run well even if the BC stopped for a short period. 2. **Ethereum Compatibility**: The first practical and widely-used Smart Contract platform is Ethereum. To take advantage of the relatively mature applications and community, BSC chooses to be compatible with the existing Ethereum mainnet. This means most of the **dApps**, ecosystem components, and toolings will work with BSC and require zero or minimum changes; BSC node will require similar (or a bit higher) hardware specification and skills to run and operate. The implementation should leave room for BSC to catch up with further Ethereum upgrades. 3. **Staking Involved Consensus and Governance**: Staking-based consensus is more environmentally friendly and leaves more flexible option to the community governance. Expectedly, this consensus should enable better network performance over [proof-of-work](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_work) blockchain system, i.e., faster blocking time and higher transaction capacity. 4. **Native Cross-Chain Communication**: both BC and BSC will be implemented with native support for cross-chain communication among the two blockchains. The communication protocol should be bi-directional, decentralized, and trustless. It will concentrate on moving digital assets between BC and BSC, i.e., [BEP2](https://github.com/binance-chain/BEPs/blob/master/BEP2.md) tokens, and eventually, other BEP tokens introduced later. The protocol should care for the minimum of other items stored in the state of the blockchains, with only a few exceptions. # Consensus and Validator Quorum Based on the above design principles, the consensus protocol of BSC is to fulfill the following goals: 1. Blocking time should be shorter than Ethereum network, e.g. 5 seconds or even shorter. 2. It requires limited time to confirm the finality of transactions, e.g. around 1-min level or shorter. 3. There is no inflation of native token: BNB, the block reward is collected from transaction fees, and it will be paid in BNB. 4. It is compatible with Ethereum system as much as possible. 5. It allows modern [proof-of-stake](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_stake) blockchain network governance. ## Proof of Staked Authority Although Proof-of-Work (PoW) has been recognized as a practical mechanism to implement a decentralized network, it is not friendly to the environment and also requires a large size of participants to maintain the security. Ethereum and some other blockchain networks, such as [MATIC Bor](https://github.com/maticnetwork/bor), [TOMOChain](https://tomochain.com/), [GoChain](https://gochain.io/), [xDAI](https://xdai.io/), do use [Proof-of-Authority(PoA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_authority) or its variants in different scenarios, including both testnet and mainnet. PoA provides some defense to 51% attack, with improved efficiency and tolerance to certain levels of Byzantine players (malicious or hacked). It serves as an easy choice to pick as the fundamentals. Meanwhile, the PoA protocol is most criticized for being not as decentralized as PoW, as the validators, i.e. the nodes that take turns to produce blocks, have all the authorities and are prone to corruption and security attacks. Other blockchains, such as EOS and Lisk both, introduce different types of [Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS)](https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/DPoS) to allow the token holders to vote and elect the validator set. It increases the decentralization and favors community governance. BSC here proposes to combine DPoS and PoA for consensus, so that: 1. Blocks are produced by a limited set of validators 2. Validators take turns to produce blocks in a PoA manner, similar to [Ethereum’s Clique](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-225) consensus design 3. Validator set are elected in and out based on a staking based governance ## Validator Quorum In the genesis stage, a few trusted nodes will run as the initial Validator Set. After the blocking starts, anyone can compete to join as candidates to elect as a validator. The staking status decides the top 21 most staked nodes to be the next validator set, and such an election will repeat every 24 hours. **BNB** is the token used to stake for BSC. In order to remain as compatible as Ethereum and upgradeable to future consensus protocols to be developed, BSC chooses to rely on the **BC** for staking management (Please refer to the below “[Staking and Governance](#staking-and-governance)” section). There is a **dedicated staking module for BSC on BC**. It will accept BSC staking from BNB holders and calculate the highest staked node set. Upon every UTC midnight, BC will issue a verifiable `ValidatorSetUpdate` cross-chain message to notify BSC to update its validator set. While producing further blocks, the existing BSC validators check whether there is a `ValidatorSetUpdate` message relayed onto BSC periodically. If there is, they will update the validator set after an **epoch period**, i.e. a predefined number of blocking time. For example, if BSC produces a block every 5 seconds, and the epoch period is 240 blocks, then the current validator set will check and update the validator set for the next epoch in 1200 seconds (20 minutes). ## Security and Finality Given there are more than ½\*N+1 validators are honest, PoA based networks usually work securely and properly. However, there are still cases where certain amount Byzantine validators may still manage to attack the network, e.g. through the “[Clone Attack](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.10244.pdf)”. To secure as much as BC, BSC users are encouraged to wait until receiving blocks sealed by more than ⅔\*N+1 different validators. In that way, the BSC can be trusted at a similar security level to BC and can tolerate less than ⅓\*N Byzantine validators. With 21 validators, if the block time is 5 seconds, the ⅔\*N+1 different validator seals will need a time period of (⅔\*21+1)*5 = 75 seconds. Any critical applications for BSC may have to wait for ⅔\*N+1 to ensure a relatively secure finality. However, besides such arrangement, BSC does introduce **Slashing** logic to penalize Byzantine validators for **double signing** or **inavailability**, which will be covered in the “Staking and Governance” section later. This Slashing logic will expose the malicious validators in a very short time and make the “Clone Attack” very hard or extremely non-beneficial to execute. With this enhancement, ½\*N+1 or even fewer blocks are enough as confirmation for most transactions. ## Reward All the BSC validators in the current validator set will be rewarded with transaction **fees in BNB**. As BNB is not an inflationary token, there will be no mining rewards as what Bitcoin and Ethereum network generate, and the gas fee is the major reward for validators. As BNB is also utility tokens with other use cases, delegators and validators will still enjoy other benefits of holding BNB. The reward for validators is the fees collected from transactions in each block. Validators can decide how much to give back to the delegators who stake their BNB to them, in order to attract more staking. Every validator will take turns to produce the blocks in the same probability (if they stick to 100% liveness), thus, in the long run, all the stable validators may get a similar size of the reward. Meanwhile, the stakes on each validator may be different, so this brings a counter-intuitive situation that more users trust and delegate to one validator, they potentially get less reward. So rational delegators will tend to delegate to the one with fewer stakes as long as the validator is still trustful (insecure validator may bring slashable risk). In the end, the stakes on all the validators will have less variation. This will actually prevent the stake concentration and “winner wins forever” problem seen on some other networks. Some parts of the gas fee will also be rewarded to relayers for Cross-Chain communication. Please refer to the “[Relayers](#relayers)” section below. # Token Economy BC and BSC share the same token universe for BNB and BEP2 tokens. This defines: 1. The same token can circulate on both networks, and flow between them bi-directionally via a cross-chain communication mechanism. 2. The total circulation of the same token should be managed across the two networks, i.e. the total effective supply of a token should be the sum of the token’s total effective supply on both BSC and BC. 3. The tokens can be initially created on BSC in a similar format as ERC20 token standard, or on BC as a BEP2, then created on the other. There are native ways on both networks to link the two and secure the total supply of the token. ## Native Token BNB will run on BSC in the same way as ETH runs on Ethereum so that it remains as “native token” for both BSC and BC. This means, in addition to BNB is used to pay most of the fees on Binance Chain and Binance DEX, BNB will be also used to: 1. pay “fees“ to deploy smart contracts on BSC 2. stake on selected BSC validators, and get corresponding rewards 3. perform cross-chain operations, such as transfer token assets across BC and BSC ### Seed Fund Certain amounts of BNB will be burnt on BC and minted on BSC during its genesis stage. This amount is called “Seed Fund” to circulate on BSC after the first block, which will be dispatched to the initial BC-to-BSC Relayer(described in later sections) and initial validator set introduced at genesis. These BNBs are used to pay transaction fees in the early stage to transfer more BNB from BC onto BSC via the cross-chain mechanism. The BNB cross-chain transfer is discussed in a later section, but for BC to BSC transfer, it is generally to lock BNB on BC from the source address of the transfer to a system-controlled address and unlock the corresponding amount from special contract to the target address of the transfer on BSC, or reversely, when transferring from BSC to BC, it is to lock BNB from the source address on BSC into a special contract and release locked amount on BC from the system address to the target address. The logic is related to native code on BC and a series of smart contracts on BSC. ## Other Tokens BC supports BEP2 tokens and upcoming [BEP8 tokens](https://github.com/binance-chain/BEPs/pull/69), which are native assets transferrable and tradable (if listed) via fast transactions and sub-second finality. Meanwhile, as BSC is Ethereum compatible, it is natural to support ERC20 tokens on BSC, which here is called “**BEP2E**” (with the real name to be introduced by the future BEPs,it potentially covers BEP8 as well). BEP2E may be “Enhanced” by adding a few more methods to expose more information, such as token denomination, decimal precision definition and the owner address who can decide the Token Binding across the chains. BSC and BC work together to ensure that one token can circulate in both formats with confirmed total supply and be used in different use cases. ### Token Binding BEP2 tokens will be extended to host a new attribute to associate the token with a BSC BEP2E token contract, called “**Binder**”, and this process of association is called “**Token Binding**”. Token Binding can happen at any time after BEP2 and BEP2E are ready. The token owners of either BEP2 or BEP2E don’t need to bother about the Binding, until before they really want to use the tokens on different scenarios. Issuers can either create BEP2 first or BEP2E first, and they can be bound at a later time. Of course, it is encouraged for all the issuers of BEP2 and BEP2E to set the Binding up early after the issuance. A typical procedure to bind the BEP2 and BEP2E will be like the below: 1. Ensure both the BEP2 token and the BEP2E token both exist on each blockchain, with the same total supply. BEP2E should have 3 more methods than typical ERC20 token standard: * symbol(): get token symbol * decimals(): get the number of the token decimal digits * owner(): get **BEP2E contract owner’s address.** This value should be initialized in the BEP2E contract constructor so that the further binding action can verify whether the action is from the BEP2E owner. 2. Decide the initial circulation on both blockchains. Suppose the total supply is *S*, and the expected initial circulating supply on BC is *K*, then the owner should lock S-K tokens to a system controlled address on BC. 3. Equivalently, *K* tokens is locked in the special contract on BSC, which handles major binding functions and is named as **TokenHub**. The issuer of the BEP2E token should lock the *K* amount of that token into TokenHub, resulting in *S-K* tokens to circulate on BSC. Thus the total circulation across 2 blockchains remains as *S*. 4. The issuer of BEP2 token sends the bind transaction on BC. Once the transaction is executed successfully after proper verification: * It transfers *S-K* tokens to a system-controlled address on BC. * A cross-chain bind request package will be created, waiting for Relayers to relay. 5. BSC Relayers will relay the cross-chain bind request package into **TokenHub** on BSC, and the corresponding request and information will be stored into the contract. 6. The contract owner and only the owner can run a special method of TokenHub contract, `ApproveBind`, to verify the binding request to mark it as a success. It will confirm: * the token has not been bound; * the binding is for the proper symbol, with proper total supply and decimal information; * the proper lock are done on both networks; 10. Once the `ApproveBind` method has succeeded, TokenHub will mark the two tokens are bounded and share the same circulation on BSC, and the status will be propagated back to BC. After this final confirmation, the BEP2E contract address and decimals will be written onto the BEP2 token as a new attribute on BC, and the tokens can be transferred across the two blockchains bidirectionally. If the ApproveBind fails, the failure event will also be propagated back to BC to release the locked tokens, and the above steps can be re-tried later. # Cross-Chain Transfer and Communication Cross-chain communication is the key foundation to allow the community to take advantage of the dual chain structure: * users are free to create any tokenization, financial products, and digital assets on BSC or BC as they wish * the items on BSC can be manually and programmingly traded and circulated in a stable, high throughput, lighting fast and friendly environment of BC * users can operate these in one UI and tooling ecosystem. ## Cross-Chain Transfer The cross-chain transfer is the key communication between the two blockchains. Essentially the logic is: 1. the `transfer-out` blockchain will lock the amount from source owner addresses into a system controlled address/contracts; 2. the `transfer-in` blockchain will unlock the amount from the system controlled address/contracts and send it to target addresses. The cross-chain transfer package message should allow the BSC Relayers and BC **Oracle Relayers** to verify: 1. Enough amount of token assets are removed from the source address and locked into a system controlled addresses/contracts on the source blockchain. And this can be confirmed on the target blockchain. 2. Proper amounts of token assets are released from a system controlled addresses/contracts and allocated into target addresses on the target blockchain. If this fails, it can be confirmed on source blockchain, so that the locked token can be released back (may deduct fees). 3. The sum of the total circulation of the token assets across the 2 blockchains are not changed after this transfer action completes, no matter if the transfer succeeds or not.  The architecture of cross-chain communication is as in the above diagram. To accommodate the 2 heteroid systems, communication handling is different in each direction. ## BC to BSC Architecture BC is a Tendermint-based, instant finality blockchain. Validators with at least ⅔\*N+1 of the total voting power will co-sign each block on the chain. So that it is practical to verify the block transactions and even the state value via **Block Header** and **Merkle Proof** verification. This has been researched and implemented as “**Light-Client Protocol**”, which are intensively discussed in [the Ethereum](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Light-client-protocol) community, studied and implemented for [Cosmos inter-chain communication](https://github.com/cosmos/ics/blob/a4173c91560567bdb7cc9abee8e61256fc3725e9/spec/ics-007-tendermint-client/README.md). BC-to-BSC communication will be verified in an “**on-chain light client**” implemented via BSC **Smart Contracts** (some of them may be **“pre-compiled”**). After some transactions and state change happen on BC, if a transaction is defined to trigger cross-chain communication,the Cross-chain “**package**” message will be created and **BSC Relayers** will pass and submit them onto BSC as data into the "build-in system contracts". The build-in system contracts will verify the package and execute the transactions if it passes the verification. The verification will be guaranteed with the below design: 1. BC blocking status will be synced to the light client contracts on BSC from time to time, via block header and pre-commits, for the below information: * block and app hash of BC that are signed by validators * current validatorset, and validator set update 2. the key-value from the blockchain state will be verified based on the Merkle Proof and information from above #1. After confirming the key-value is accurate and trustful, the build-in system contracts will execute the actions corresponding to the cross-chain packages. Some examples of such packages that can be created for BC-to-BSC are: 1. Bind: bind the BEP2 tokens and BEP2E 2. Transfer: transfer tokens after binding, this means the circulation will decrease (be locked) from BC and appear in the target address balance on BSC 3. Error Handling: to handle any timeout/failure event for BSC-to-BC communication 4. Validatorset update of BSC To ensure no duplication, proper message sequence and timely timeout, there is a “Channel” concept introduced on BC to manage any types of the communication. For relayers, please also refer to the below “Relayers” section. ## BSC to BC Architecture BSC uses Proof of Staked Authority consensus protocol, which has a chance to fork and requires confirmation of more blocks. One block only has the signature of one validator, so that it is not easy to rely on one block to verify data from BSC. To take full advantage of validator quorum of BC, an idea similar to many [Bridge ](https://github.com/poanetwork/poa-bridge)or Oracle blockchains is adopted: 1. The cross-chain communication requests from BSC will be submitted and executed onto BSC as transactions. The execution of the transanction wil emit `Events`, and such events can be observed and packaged in certain “**Oracle**” onto BC. Instead of Block Headers, Hash and Merkle Proof, this type of “Oracle” package directly contains the cross-chain information for actions, such as sender, receiver and amount for transfer. 2. To ensure the security of the Oracle, the validators of BC will form anothe quorum of “**Oracle Relayers**”. Each validator of the BC should run a **dedicated process** as the Oracle Relayer. These Oracle Relayers will submit and vote for the cross-chain communication package, like Oracle, onto BC, using the same validator keys. Any package signed by more than ⅔\*N+1 Oracle Relayers’ voting power is as secure as any block signed by ⅔\*N+1 of the same quorum of validators’ voting power. By using the same validator quorum, it saves the light client code on BC and continuous block updates onto BC. Such Oracles also have Oracle IDs and types, to ensure sequencing and proper error handling. ## Timeout and Error Handling There are scenarios that the cross-chain communication fails. For example, the relayed package cannot be executed on BSC due to some coding bug in the contracts. **Timeout and error handling logics are** used in such scenarios. For the recognizable user and system errors or any expected exceptions, the two networks should heal themselves. For example, when BC to BSC transfer fails, BSC will issue a failure event and Oracle Relayers will execute a refund on BC; when BSC to BC transfer fails, BC will issue a refund package for Relayer to relay in order to unlock the fund. However, unexpected error or exception may still happen on any step of the cross-chain communication. In such a case, the Relayers and Oracle Relayers will discover that the corresponding cross-chain channel is stuck in a particular sequence. After a Timeout period, the Relayers and Oracle Relayers can request a “SkipSequence” transaction, the stuck sequence will be marked as “Unexecutable”. A corresponding alerts will be raised, and the community has to discuss how to handle this scenario, e.g. payback via the sponsor of the validators, or event clear the fund during next network upgrade. ## Cross-Chain User Experience Ideally, users expect to use two parallel chains in the same way as they use one single chain. It requires more aggregated transaction types to be added onto the cross-chain communication to enable this, which will add great complexity, tight coupling, and maintenance burden. Here BC and BSC only implement the basic operations to enable the value flow in the initial launch and leave most of the user experience work to client side UI, such as wallets. E.g. a great wallet may allow users to sell a token directly from BSC onto BC’s DEX order book, in a secure way. ## Cross-Chain Contract Event Cross-Chain Contract Event (CCCE) is designed to allow a smart contract to trigger cross-chain transactions, directly through the contract code. This becomes possible based on: 1. Standard system contracts can be provided to serve operations callable by general smart contracts; 2. Standard events can be emitted by the standard contracts; 3. Oracle Relayers can capture the standard events, and trigger the corresponding cross-chain operations; 4. Dedicated, code-managed address (account) can be created on BC and accessed by the contracts on the BSC, here it is named as **“Contract Address on BC” (CAoB)**. Several standard operations are implemented: 1. BSC to BC transfer: this is implemented in the same way as normal BSC to BC transfer, by only triggered via standard contract. The fund can be transferred to any addresses on BC, including the corresponding CAoB of the transfer originating contract. 2. Transfer on BC: this is implemented as a special cross-chain transfer, while the real transfer is from **CAoB** to any other address (even another CAoB). 3. BC to BSC transfer: this is implemented as two-pass cross-chain communication. The first is triggered by the BSC contract and propagated onto BC, and then in the second pass, BC will start a normal BC to BSC cross-chain transfer, from **CAoB** to contract address on BSC. A special note should be paid on that the BSC contract only increases balance upon any transfer coming in on the second pass, and the error handling in the second pass is the same as the normal BC to BSC transfer. 4. IOC (Immediate-Or-Cancel) Trade Out: the primary goal of transferring assets to BC is to trade. This event will instruct to trade a certain amount of an asset in CAoB into another asset as much as possible and transfer out all the results, i.e. the left the source and the traded target tokens of the trade, back to BSC. BC will handle such relayed events by sending an “Immediate-Or-Cancel”, i.e. IOC order onto the trading pairs, once the next matching finishes, the result will be relayed back to BSC, which can be in either one or two assets. 5. Auction Trade Out: Such event will instruct BC to send an auction order to trade a certain amount of an asset in **CAoB** into another asset as much as possible and transfer out all the results back to BSC at the end of the auction. Auction function is upcoming on BC. There are some details for the Trade Out: 1. both can have a limit price (absolute or relative) for the trade; 2. the end result will be written as cross-chain packages to relay back to BSC; 3. cross-chain communication fees may be charged from the asset transferred back to BSC; 4. BSC contract maintains a mirror of the balance and outstanding orders on CAoB. No matter what error happens during the Trade Out, the final status will be propagated back to the originating contract and clear its internal state. With the above features, it simply adds the cross-chain transfer and exchange functions with high liquidity onto all the smart contracts on BSC. It will greatly add the application scenarios on Smart Contract and dApps, and make 1 chain +1 chain > 2 chains. # Staking and Governance Proof of Staked Authority brings in decentralization and community involvement. Its core logic can be summarized as the below. You may see similar ideas from other networks, especially Cosmos and EOS. 1. Token holders, including the validators, can put their tokens “**bonded**” into the stake. Token holders can **delegate** their tokens onto any validator or validator candidate, to expect it can become an actual validator, and later they can choose a different validator or candidate to **re-delegate** their tokens<sup>1</sup>. 2. All validator candidates will be ranked by the number of bonded tokens on them, and the top ones will become the real validators. 3. Validators can share (part of) their blocking reward with their delegators. 4. Validators can suffer from “**Slashing**”, a punishment for their bad behaviors, such as double sign and/or instability. 5. There is an “**unbonding period**” for validators and delegators so that the system makes sure the tokens remain bonded when bad behaviors are caught, the responsible will get slashed during this period. ## Staking on BC Ideally, such staking and reward logic should be built into the blockchain, and automatically executed as the blocking happens. Cosmos Hub, who shares the same Tendermint consensus and libraries with Binance Chain, works in this way. BC has been preparing to enable staking logic since the design days. On the other side, as BSC wants to remain compatible with Ethereum as much as possible, it is a great challenge and efforts to implement such logic on it. This is especially true when Ethereum itself may move into a different Proof of Stake consensus protocol in a short (or longer) time. In order to keep the compatibility and reuse the good foundation of BC, the staking logic of BSC is implemented on BC: 1. The staking token is BNB, as it is a native token on both blockchains anyway 2. The staking, i.e. token bond and delegation actions and records for BSC, happens on BC. 3. The BSC validator set is determined by its staking and delegation logic, via a staking module built on BC for BSC, and propagated every day UTC 00:00 from BC to BSC via Cross-Chain communication. 4. The reward distribution happens on BC around every day UTC 00:00. ## Rewarding Both the validator update and reward distribution happen every day around UTC 00:00. This is to save the cost of frequent staking updates and block reward distribution. This cost can be significant, as the blocking reward is collected on BSC and distributed on BC to BSC validators and delegators. (Please note BC blocking fees will remain rewarding to BC validators only.) A deliberate delay is introduced here to make sure the distribution is fair: 1. The blocking reward will not be sent to validator right away, instead, they will be distributed and accumulated on a contract; 2. Upon receiving the validator set update into BSC, it will trigger a few cross-chain transfers to transfer the reward to custody addresses on the corresponding validators. The custody addresses are owned by the system so that the reward cannot be spent until the promised distribution to delegators happens. 3. In order to make the synchronization simpler and allocate time to accommodate slashing, the reward for N day will be only distributed in N+2 days. After the delegators get the reward, the left will be transferred to validators’ own reward addresses. ## Slashing Slashing is part of the on-chain governance, to ensure the malicious or negative behaviors are punished. BSC slash can be submitted by anyone. The transaction submission requires **slash evidence** and cost fees but also brings a larger reward when it is successful. So far there are two slashable cases. ### Double Sign It is quite a serious error and very likely deliberate offense when a validator signs more than one block with the same height and parent block. The reference protocol implementation should already have logic to prevent this, so only the malicious code can trigger this. When Double Sign happens, the validator should be removed from the Validator **Set** right away. Anyone can submit a slash request on BC with the evidence of Double Sign of BSC, which should contain the 2 block headers with the same height and parent block, sealed by the offending validator. Upon receiving the evidence, if the BC verifies it to be valid: 1. The validator will be removed from validator set by an instance BSC validator set update Cross-Chain update; 2. A predefined amount of BNB would be slashed from the **self-delegated** BNB of the validator; Both validator and its delegators will not receive the staking rewards. 3. Part of the slashed BNB will allocate to the submitter’s address, which is a reward and larger than the cost of submitting slash request transaction 4. The rest of the slashed BNB will allocate to the other validators’ custody addresses, and distributed to all delegators in the same way as blocking reward. ### Inavailability The liveness of BSC relies on everyone in the Proof of Staked Authority validator set can produce blocks timely when it is their turn. Validators can miss their turn due to any reason, especially problems in their hardware, software, configuration or network. This instability of the operation will hurt the performance and introduce more indeterministic into the system. There can be an internal smart contract responsible for recording the missed blocking metrics of each validator. Once the metrics are above the predefined threshold, the blocking reward for validator will not be relayed to BC for distribution but shared with other better validators. In such a way, the poorly-operating validator should be gradually voted out of the validator set as their delegators will receive less or none reward. If the metrics remain above another higher level of threshold, the validator will be dropped from the rotation, and this will be propagated back to BC, then a predefined amount of BNB would be slashed from the **self-delegated** BNB of the validator. Both validators and delegators will not receive their staking rewards. ### Governance Parameters There are many system parameters to control the behavior of the BSC, e.g. slash amount, cross-chain transfer fees. All these parameters will be determined by BSC Validator Set together through a proposal-vote process based on their staking. Such the process will be carried on BC, and the new parameter values will be picked up by corresponding system contracts via a cross-chain communication. # Relayers Relayers are responsible to submit Cross-Chain Communication Packages between the two blockchains. Due to the heterogeneous parallel chain structure, two different types of Relayers are created. ## BSC Relayers Relayers for BC to BSC communication referred to as “**BSC Relayers**”, or just simply “Relayers”. Relayer is a standalone process that can be run by anyone, and anywhere, except that Relayers must register themselves onto BSC and deposit a certain refundable amount of BNB. Only relaying requests from the registered Relayers will be accepted by BSC. The package they relay will be verified by the on-chain light client on BSC. The successful relay needs to pass enough verification and costs gas fees on BSC, and thus there should be incentive reward to encourage the community to run Relayers. ### Incentives There are two major communication types: 1. Users triggered Operations, such as `token bind` or `cross chain transfer`. Users must pay additional fee to as relayer reward. The reward will be shared with the relayers who sync the referenced blockchain headers. Besides, the reward won't be paid the relayers' accounts directly. A reward distribution mechanism will be brought in to avoid monopolization. 2. System Synchronization, such as delivering `refund package`(caused by failures of most oracle relayers), special blockchain header synchronization(header contains BC validatorset update), BSC staking package. System reward contract will pay reward to relayers' accounts directly. If some Relayers have faster networks and better hardware, they can monopolize all the package relaying and leave no reward to others. Thus fewer participants will join for relaying, which encourages centralization and harms the efficiency and security of the network. Ideally, due to the decentralization and dynamic re-election of BSC validators, one Relayer can hardly be always the first to relay every message. But in order to avoid the monopolization further, the rewarding economy is also specially designed to minimize such chance: 1. The reward for Relayers will be only distributed in batches, and one batch will cover a number of successful relayed packages. 2. The reward a Relayer can get from a batch distribution is not linearly in proportion to their number of successful relayed packages. Instead, except the first a few relays, the more a Relayer relays during a batch period, the less reward it will collect. ## Oracle Relayers Relayers for BSC to BC communication are using the “Oracle” model, and so-called “**Oracle Relayers**”. Each of the validators must, and only the ones of the validator set, run Oracle Relayers. Each Oracle Relayer watches the blockchain state change. Once it catches Cross-Chain Communication Packages, it will submit to vote for the requests. After Oracle Relayers from ⅔ of the voting power of BC validators vote for the changes, the cross-chain actions will be performed. Oracle Replayers should wait for enough blocks to confirm the finality on BSC before submitting and voting for the cross-chain communication packages onto BC. The cross-chain fees will be distributed to BC validators together with the normal BC blocking rewards. Such oracle type relaying depends on all the validators to support. As all the votes for the cross-chain communication packages are recorded on the blockchain, it is not hard to have a metric system to assess the performance of the Oracle Relayers. The poorest performer may have their rewards clawed back via another Slashing logic introduced in the future. # Outlook It is hard to conclude for Binance Chain, as it has never stopped evolving. The dual-chain strategy is to open the gate for users to take advantage of the fast transferring and trading on one side, and flexible and extendable programming on the other side, but it will be one stop along the development of Binance Chain. Here below are the topics to look into so as to facilitate the community better for more usability and extensibility: 1. Add different digital asset model for different business use cases 2. Enable more data feed, especially DEX market data, to be communicated from Binance DEX to BSC 3. Provide interface and compatibility to integrate with Ethereum, including its further upgrade, and other blockchain 4. Improve client side experience to manage wallets and use blockchain more conveniently ------ [1]: BNB business practitioners may provide other benefits for BNB delegators, as they do now for long term BNB holders.
SOYJUN / Application With Raw IP SocketsOverview For this assignment you will be developing an application that uses raw IP sockets to ‘walk’ around an ordered list of nodes (given as a command line argument at the ‘source’ node, which is the node at which the tour was initiated), in a manner similar to the IP SSRR (Strict Source and Record Route) option. At each node, the application pings the preceding node in the tour. However, unlike the ping code in Stevens, you will be sending the ping ICMP echo request messages through a SOCK_RAW-type PF_PACKET socket and implementing ARP functionality to find the Ethernet address of the target node. Finally, when the ‘walk’ is completed, the group of nodes visited on the tour will exchange multicast messages. Your code will consist of two process modules, a ‘Tour’ application module (which will implement all the functionality outlined above, except for ARP activity) and an ARP module. The following should prove to be useful reference material for the assignment: Sections 21.2, 21.3, 21.6 and 21.10, Chapter 21, on Multicasting. Sections 27.1 to 27.3, Chapter 27, on the IP SSRR option. Sections 28.1 to 28.5, Chapter 28, on raw sockets, the IP_HDRINCL socket option, and ping. Sections 15.5, Chapter 15, on Unix domain SOCK_STREAM sockets. Figure 29.14, p. 807, and the corresponding explanation on p. 806, on filling in an IP header when the IP_HDRINCL socket option is in effect. The Lecture Slides on ARP & RARP (especially Section 4.4, ARP Packet Format, and the Figure 4.3 it includes). The link http://www.pdbuchan.com/rawsock/rawsock.html contains useful code samples that use IP raw sockets and PF_PACKET sockets. Note, in partcular, the code “icmp4_ll.c” in Table 2 for building an echo request sent through a PF_PACKET SOCK_RAW socket. The VMware environment You will be using the same vm1 , . . . . . , vm10 nodes you used for Assignment 3. However, unlike Assignment 3, you should use only interfaces eth0 and their associated IP addresses and ignore the other Ethernet interfaces that nodes have (interfaces eth0 make vm1 , . . . . . , vm10 look as if they belong to the same Ethernet LAN segment IP network 130.245.156.0/24). Note that, apart from the primary IP addresses associated with interfaces eth0, some nodes might also have one or more alias IP addresses associated with their interface eth0. Tour application module specifications The application will create a total of four sockets: two IP raw sockets, a PF_PACKET socket and a UDP socket for multicasting. We shall call the two IP raw sockets the ‘rt ’ (‘route traversal’) and ‘pg ’ (‘ping’) sockets, respectively. The rt socket should have the IP_HDRINCL option set. You will only be receiving ICMP echo reply messages through the pg socket (and not sending echo requests), so it does not matter whether it has the IP_HDRINCL option set or not. The pg socket should have protocol value (i.e., protocol demultiplexing key in the IP header) IPPROTO_ICMP. The rt socket should have a protocol value that identifies the application - i.e., some value other than the IPPROTO_XXXX values in /usr/include/netinet/in.h. However, remember that you will all be running your code using the same root account on the vm1 , . . . . . , vm10 nodes. So if two of you happen to choose the same protocol value and happen to be running on the same vm node at the same time, your applications will receive each other’s IP packets. For that reason, try to choose a protocol value for your rt socket that is likely to be unique to yourself. The PF_PACKET socket should be of type SOCK_RAW (not SOCK_DGRAM). This socket should have a protocol value of ETH_P_IP = 0x0800 (IPv4). The UDP socket for multicasting will be discussed below. Note that, depending on how you choose to bind that socket, you might actually need to have two UDP sockets for multicast communication – see bottom of p. 576, Section 21.10. Your application will, of course, have to be running on every vm node that is included in the tour. When evoking the application on the source node, the user supplies a sequence of vm node names (not IP addresses) to be visited in order. This command line sequence starts with the next node to be visited from the source node (i.e., it does not start with the source node itself). The sequence can include any number of repeated visits to the same node. For example, suppose that the source node is vm3 and the executable is called badr_tour : [root@vm3/root]# badr_tour vm2 vm10 vm4 vm7 vm5 vm2 vm6 vm2 vm9 vm4 vm7 vm2 vm6 vm5 vm1 vm10 vm8 (but note that the tour does not necessarily have to visit every vm node; and the same node should not appear consequentively in the tour list – i.e., the next node on the tour cannot be the current node itself). The application turns the sequence into a list of IP addresses for source routing. It also adds the IP address of the source node itself to the beginning of the list. The list thus produced will be carried as the payload of an IP packet, not as a SSRR option in the packet header. It is our application which will ensure that every node in the sequence is visited in order, not the IP SSRR capability. The source node should also add to the list an IP multicast address and a port number of its choice. It should also join the multicast group at that address and port number on its UDP socket. The TTL for outgoing multicasts should be set to 1. The application then fills in the header of an IP packet, designating itself as the IP source, and the next node to be visited as the IP destination. The packet is sent out on the rt socket. Note that on Linux, all the fields of the packet header must be in network byte order (Stevens, Section 28.3, p. 737, the fourth bullet point). When filling in the packet header, you should explicitly fill in the identification field (recall that, with the IP_HDRINCL socket option, if the identification field is given value 0, then the kernel will set its value). Try to make sure that the value you choose is likely to be unique to yourself (for reasons similar to those explained with respect to the IPPROTO_XXXX in 1. above). When a node receives an IP packet on its rt socket, it should first check that the identification field carries the right value (this implies that you will hard code your choice of identification field value determined in item 2 above in your code). If the identification field value does not check out, the packet is ignored. For a valid packet : Print out a message along the lines of: <time> received source routing packet from <hostname> <time> is the current time in human-readable format (see lines 19 & 20 in Figure 1.9, p. 14, and the corresponding explanation on p. 14f.), and <hostname> is the host name corresponding to the source IP address in the header of the received packet. If this is the first time the node is visited, the application should use the multicast address and port number in the packet received to join the multicast group on its UDP socket. The TTL for outgoing multicasts should be set to 1. The application updates the list in the payload, so that the next node in the tour can easily identify what the next hop from itself will be when it receives the packet. How you do this I leave up to you. You could, for example, include as part of the payload a pointer field into the list of nodes to be visited. This pointer would then be updated to the next entry in the list as the packet progresses hop by hop (see Figure 27.1 and the associated explanation on pp. 711-712). Other solutions are, of course, possible. The application then fills in a new IP header, designating itself as the IP source, and the next node to be visited as the IP destination. The identification field should be set to the same value as in the received packet. The packet is sent out on the rt socket. The node should also initiate pinging to the preceding node in the tour (the IP address of which it should pick up from the header of the received packet). However, unlike the Stevens ping code, it will be using the SOCK_RAW-type PF_PACKET socket of item 1 above to send the ICMP echo request messages. Before it can send echo request messages, the application has to call on the ARP module you will implement to get the Ethernet address of this preceding / ‘target’ node; this call is made using the API function areq which you will also implement (see sections ARP module specifications & API specifications below). Note that ARP has to be evoked every time the application wants to send out an echo request message, and not just the first time. An echo request message has to be encapsulated in a properly-formulated IP packet, which is in turn encapsulated in a properly-formulated Ethernet frame transmitted out through the PF_PACKET socket ; otherwise, ICMP at the source node will not receive it. You will have to modify Stevens’ ping code accordingly, specifically, the send_v4 function. In particular, the Ethernet frame must have a value of ETH_P_IP = 0x0800 (IPv4 – see <linux/if_ether.h>) in the frame type / ‘length’ field ; and the encapsulated IP packet must have a value of IPPROTO_ICMP = 0x01 (ICMPv4 – see <netinet_in.h>) in its protocol field. You should also simplify the ping code in its entirety by stripping all the ‘indirection’ IPv4 / IPv6 dual-operability paraphernalia and making the code work just for IPv4. Also note that the functions host_serv and freeaddrinfo, together with the associated structure addrinfo (see Sections 11.6, 11.8 & 11.11), in Figures 27.3, 27.6 & 28.5 ( pp. 713, 716 & 744f., respectively) can be replaced by the function gethostbyname and associated structure hostent (see Section 11.3) where needed. Also, there is no ‘-v’ verbose option, so this too should be stripped from Stevens’ code. When a node is ready to start pinging, it first prints out a ‘PING’ message similar to lines 32-33 of Figure 28.5, p. 744. It then builds up ICMP echo request messages and sends them to the source node every 1 second through the PF_PACKET socket. It also reads incoming echo response messages off the pg socket, in response to which it prints out the same kind of output as the code of Figure 28.8, p. 748. If this node and its preceding node have been previously visited in that order during the tour, then pinging would have already been initiated from the one to the other in response to the first visit, and nothing further should nor need be done during second and subsequent visits. In light of the above, note that once a node initiates pinging, it needs to read from both its rt and pg sockets, necessitating the use of the select function. As will be clear from what follows below, the application will anyway be needing also to simultaneously monitor its UDP socket for incoming multicast datagrams. When the last node on the tour is reached, and if this is the first time it is visited, it joins the multicast group and starts pinging the preceding node (if it is not already doing so). After a few echo replies are received (five, say), it sends out the multicast message below on its UDP socket (i.e., the node should wait about five seconds before sending the multicast message) : <<<<< This is node vmi . Tour has ended . Group members please identify yourselves. >>>>> where vmi is the name (not IP address) of the node. The node should also print this message out on stdout preceded, on the same line, by the phrase: Node vmi . Sending: <then print out the message sent>. Each node vmj receiving this message should print out the message received preceded, on the same line, by the phrase: Node vmj . Received <then print out the message received>. Each such node in step a above should then immediately stop its pinging activity. The node should then send out the following multicast message: <<<<< Node vmj . I am a member of the group. >>>>> and print out this message preceded, on the same line, by the phrase: Node vmj . Sending: <then print out the message sent>. Each node receiving these second multicast messages (i.e., the messages that nodes – including itself – sent out in step c above) should print each such message out preceded, on the same line, by the phrase: Node vmk . Received: <then print out the message received>. Reading from the socket in step d above should be implemented with a 5-second timeout. When the timeout expires, the node should print out another message to the effect that it is terminating the Tour application, and gracefully exit its Tour process. Note that under Multicast specifications, the last node in the tour, which sends out the End of Tour message, should itself receive a copy of that message and, when it does, it should behave exactly as do the other nodes in steps a. – e. above. ARP module specifications Your executable is evoked with no command line arguments. Like the Tour module, it will be running on every vm node. It uses the get_hw_addrs function of Assignment 3 to explore its node’s interfaces and build a set of <IP address , HW address> matching pairs for all eth0 interface IP addresses (including alias IP addresses, if any). Write out to stdout in some appropriately clear format the address pairs found. The module creates two sockets: a PF_PACKET socket and a Unix domain socket. The PF_PACKET should be of type SOCK_RAW (not type SOCK_DGRAM) with a protocol value of your choice (but not one of the standard values defined in <linux/if_ether.h>) which is, hopefully, unique to yourself. This value effectively becomes the protocol value for your implementation of ARP. Because this protocol value will be carried in the frame type / ‘length’ field of the Ethernet frame header (see Figure 4.3 of the ARP & RARP handout), the value chosen should be not less than 1536 (0x600) so that it is not misinterpreted as the length of an Ethernet 802.3 frame. The Unix domain socket should be of type SOCK_STREAM (not SOCK_DGRAM). It is a listening socket bound to a ‘well-known’ sun_path file. This socket will be used to communicate with the function areq that is implemented in the Tour module (see the section API specifications below). In this context, areq will act as the client and the ARP module as the server. The ARP module then sits in an infinite loop, monitoring these two sockets. As ARP request messages arrive on the PF_PACKET socket, the module processes them, and responds with ARP reply messages as appropriate. The protocol builds a ‘cache’ of matching <IP address , HW address> pairs from the replies (and requests – see below) it receives. For simplicity, and unlike the real ARP, we shall not implement timing out mechanisms for these cache entries. A cache entry has five parts: (i) IP address ; (ii) HW address ; (iii) sll_ifindex (the interface to be used for reaching the matching pair <(i) , (ii)>) ; (iv) sll_hatype ; and (v) a Unix-domain connection-socket descriptor for a connected client (see the section API specifications below for the latter three). When an ARP reply is being entered in the cache, the ARP module uses the socket descriptor in (v) to send a reply to the client, closes the connection socket, and deletes the socket descriptor from the cache entry. Note that, like the real ARP, when an ARP request is received by a node, and if the request pertains to that receiving node, the sender’s (see Figure 4.3 of the ARP & RARP handout) <IP address, HW address> matching pair should be entered into the cache if it is not already there (together, of course, with (iii) sll_ifindex & (iv) sll_hatype), or updated if need be if such an entry already exists in the cache. If the ARP request received does not pertain to the node receiving it, but there is already an entry in that receiving node's cache for the sender’s <IP address, HW address> matching pair, that entry should be checked and updated if need be. If there is no such entry, no action is taken (in particular, and unlike the case above, no new entry should be made in the receiving node's cache of the sender’s <IP address, HW address> matching pair if such an entry does not already exist). ARP request and reply messages have the same format as Figure 4.3 of the ARP & RARP handout, but with an extra 2-byte identification field added at the beginning which you fill with a value chosen so that it has a high probability of being unique to yourself. This value is to be echoed in the reply message, and helps to act as a further filter in case some other student happens to have fortuitously chosen the same value as yourself for the protocol parameter of the ARP PF_PACKET. Values in the fields of our ARP messages must be in network byte order. You might find the system header file <linux/if_arp.h> useful for manipulating ARP request and reply messages, but remember that our version of these messages have an extra two-byte field as mentioned above. Your code should print out on stdout, in some appropriately clear format, the contents of the Ethernet frame header and ARP request message you send. As described in Section 4.4 of the ARP & RARP handout, the node that responds to the request should, in its reply message, swap the two sender addresses with the two target addresses, as well as, of course, echo back the extra identification field sent with the request. The protocol at this responding node should print out, in an appropriately clear format, both the request frame (header and ARP message) it receives and the reply frame it sends. Similarly, the node that sent the request should print out the reply frame it receives. Finally, recall that the node issuing the request sends out a broadcast Ethernet frame, but the responding node replies with a unicast frame. API specifications The API is for communication between the Tour process and the ARP process. It consists of a single function, areq, implemented in the Tour module. areq is called by send_v4 function of the application every time the latter want to send out an ICMP echo request message: int areq (struct sockaddr *IPaddr, socklen_t sockaddrlen, struct hwaddr *HWaddr); IPaddr contains the primary or alias IPaddress of a ‘target’ node on the LAN for which the corresponding hardware address is being requested. hwaddr is a new structure (and not a pre-existing type) modeled on the sockaddr_ll of PF_PACKET; you will have to declare it in your code. It is used to return the requested hardware address to the caller of areq : structure hwaddr { int sll_ifindex; /* Interface number */ unsigned short sll_hatype; /* Hardware type */ unsigned char sll_halen; /* Length of address */ unsigned char sll_addr[8]; /* Physical layer address */ }; areq creates a Unix domain socket of type SOCK_STREAM and connects to the ‘well-known’ sun_path file of the ARP listening socket. It sends the IP address from parameter IPaddr and the information in the three fields of parameter HWaddr to ARP. It then blocks on a read awaiting a reply from ARP. This read should be backed up by a timeout since it is possible that no reply is received for the request. If a timeout occurs, areq should close the socket and return to its caller indicating failure (through its int return value). Your application code should print out on stdout, in some appropriately clear format, a notification every time areq is called, giving the IP address for which a HW address is being sought. It should similarly print out the result when the call to areq returns (HW address returned, or failure). When the ARP module receives a request for a HW address from areq through its Unix domain listening socket, it first checks if the required HW address is already in the cache. If so, it can respond immediately to the areq and close the Unix domain connection socket. Else : it makes an ‘incomplete’ entry in the cache, consisting of parts (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) ; puts out an ARP request message on the network on its PF_PACKET socket; and starts monitoring the areq connection socket for readability – if the areq client closes the connection socket (this would occur in response to a timeout in areq), ARP deletes the corresponding incomplete entry from the cache (and ignores any subsequent ARP reply from the network if such is received). On the other hand, if ARP receives a reply from the network, it updates the incomplete cache entry, responds to areq, and closes the connection socket.
uvhw / Bitcoin FoundationBitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System Satoshi Nakamoto satoshin@gmx.com www.bitcoin.org Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. 1. Introduction Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model. Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non- reversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need. A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments over a communications channel without a trusted party. What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes. 1 2. Transactions We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership. Transaction Hash Transaction Hash Transaction Hash Owner 1's Public Key Owner 2's Public Key Owner 3's Public Key Owner 0's Signature Owner 1's Signature The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for double spending. After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent. The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank. We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any earlier transactions. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don't care about later attempts to double-spend. The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to be aware of all transactions. In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and decided which arrived first. To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the first received. 3. Timestamp Server The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it. Hash Hash Owner 2's Signature Owner 1's Private Key Owner 2's Private Key Owner 3's Private Key Block Item Item ... 2 Block Item Item ... Verify Verify Sign Sign 4. Proof-of-Work To implement a distributed timestamp server on a peer-to-peer basis, we will need to use a proof- of-work system similar to Adam Back's Hashcash [6], rather than newspaper or Usenet posts. The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the hash begins with a number of zero bits. The average work required is exponential in the number of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash. For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the block until a value is found that gives the block's hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it. The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added. To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they're generated too fast, the difficulty increases. 5. Network The steps to run the network are as follows: 1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes. 2) Each node collects new transactions into a block. 3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block. 4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes. 5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent. 6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash. Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof- of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one. 3 Block Nonce Tx Tx ... Block Nonce Tx Tx ... Prev Hash Prev Hash New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and realizes it missed one. 6. Incentive By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them. The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended. The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees. If the output value of a transaction is less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee that is added to the incentive value of the block containing the transaction. Once a predetermined number of coins have entered circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely inflation free. The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth. 7. Reclaiming Disk Space Once the latest transaction in a coin is buried under enough blocks, the spent transactions before it can be discarded to save disk space. To facilitate this without breaking the block's hash, transactions are hashed in a Merkle Tree [7][2][5], with only the root included in the block's hash. Old blocks can then be compacted by stubbing off branches of the tree. The interior hashes do not need to be stored. Block Hash0 Hash1 Hash2 Hash3 Tx0 Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Block Header (Block Hash) Prev Hash Nonce Root Hash Hash01 Hash23 Block Block Header (Block Hash) Prev Hash Nonce Root Hash Hash01 Hash23 Hash2 Hash3 Tx3 Transactions Hashed in a Merkle Tree After Pruning Tx0-2 from the Block A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes. If we suppose blocks are generated every 10 minutes, 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2MB per year. With computer systems typically selling with 2GB of RAM as of 2008, and Moore's Law predicting current growth of 1.2GB per year, storage should not be a problem even if the block headers must be kept in memory. 4 8. Simplified Payment Verification It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it, and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it. Longest Proof-of-Work Chain Block Header Block Header Block Header Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce Merkle Root Merkle Root Merkle Root Hash01 Hash23 Merkle Branch for Tx3 Hash2 Hash3 Tx3 As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification. 9. Combining and Splitting Value Although it would be possible to handle coins individually, it would be unwieldy to make a separate transaction for every cent in a transfer. To allow value to be split and combined, transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs. Normally there will be either a single input from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender. It should be noted that fan-out, where a transaction depends on several transactions, and those transactions depend on many more, is not a problem here. There is never the need to extract a complete standalone copy of a transaction's history. 5 Transaction In Out In ... ... 10. Privacy The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were. Traditional Privacy Model Identities Transactions New Privacy Model Identities Transactions As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner. 11. Calculations We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate an alternate chain faster than the honest chain. Even if this is accomplished, it does not throw the system open to arbitrary changes, such as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged to the attacker. Nodes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them. An attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back money he recently spent. The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a Binomial Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its lead by +1, and the failure event is the attacker's chain being extended by one block, reducing the gap by -1. The probability of an attacker catching up from a given deficit is analogous to a Gambler's Ruin problem. Suppose a gambler with unlimited credit starts at a deficit and plays potentially an infinite number of trials to try to reach breakeven. We can calculate the probability he ever reaches breakeven, or that an attacker ever catches up with the honest chain, as follows [8]: p = probability an honest node finds the next block q = probability the attacker finds the next block qz = probability the attacker will ever catch up from z blocks behind Trusted Third Party q ={ 1 if p≤q} z q/pz if pq 6 Counterparty Public Public Given our assumption that p > q, the probability drops exponentially as the number of blocks the attacker has to catch up with increases. With the odds against him, if he doesn't make a lucky lunge forward early on, his chances become vanishingly small as he falls further behind. We now consider how long the recipient of a new transaction needs to wait before being sufficiently certain the sender can't change the transaction. We assume the sender is an attacker who wants to make the recipient believe he paid him for a while, then switch it to pay back to himself after some time has passed. The receiver will be alerted when that happens, but the sender hopes it will be too late. The receiver generates a new key pair and gives the public key to the sender shortly before signing. This prevents the sender from preparing a chain of blocks ahead of time by working on it continuously until he is lucky enough to get far enough ahead, then executing the transaction at that moment. Once the transaction is sent, the dishonest sender starts working in secret on a parallel chain containing an alternate version of his transaction. The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block and z blocks have been linked after it. He doesn't know the exact amount of progress the attacker has made, but assuming the honest blocks took the average expected time per block, the attacker's potential progress will be a Poisson distribution with expected value: = z qp To get the probability the attacker could still catch up now, we multiply the Poisson density for each amount of progress he could have made by the probability he could catch up from that point: ∞ ke−{q/pz−k ifk≤z} ∑k=0 k!⋅ 1 ifkz Rearranging to avoid summing the infinite tail of the distribution... z ke− z−k 1−∑k=0 k! 1−q/p Converting to C code... #include <math.h> double AttackerSuccessProbability(double q, int z) { double p = 1.0 - q; double lambda = z * (q / p); double sum = 1.0; int i, k; for (k = 0; k <= z; k++) { double poisson = exp(-lambda); for (i = 1; i <= k; i++) poisson *= lambda / i; sum -= poisson * (1 - pow(q / p, z - k)); } return sum; } 7 Running some results, we can see the probability drop off exponentially with z. q=0.1 z=0 P=1.0000000 z=1 P=0.2045873 z=2 P=0.0509779 z=3 P=0.0131722 z=4 P=0.0034552 z=5 P=0.0009137 z=6 P=0.0002428 z=7 P=0.0000647 z=8 P=0.0000173 z=9 P=0.0000046 z=10 P=0.0000012 q=0.3 z=0 P=1.0000000 z=5 P=0.1773523 z=10 P=0.0416605 z=15 P=0.0101008 z=20 P=0.0024804 z=25 P=0.0006132 z=30 P=0.0001522 z=35 P=0.0000379 z=40 P=0.0000095 z=45 P=0.0000024 z=50 P=0.0000006 Solving for P less than 0.1%... P < 0.001 q=0.10 z=5 q=0.15 z=8 q=0.20 z=11 q=0.25 z=15 q=0.30 z=24 q=0.35 z=41 q=0.40 z=89 q=0.45 z=340 12. Conclusion We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism. 8 References [1] W. Dai, "b-money," http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998. [2] H. Massias, X.S. Avila, and J.-J. Quisquater, "Design of a secure timestamping service with minimal trust requirements," In 20th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, May 1999. [3] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "How to time-stamp a digital document," In Journal of Cryptology, vol 3, no 2, pages 99-111, 1991. [4] D. Bayer, S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping," In Sequences II: Methods in Communication, Security and Computer Science, pages 329-334, 1993. [5] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Secure names for bit-strings," In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 28-35, April 1997. [6] A. Back, "Hashcash - a denial of service counter-measure," http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf, 2002. [7] R.C. Merkle, "Protocols for public key cryptosystems," In Proc. 1980 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society, pages 122-133, April 1980. [8] W. Feller, "An introduction to probability theory and its applications," 1957. 9
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