56 skills found · Page 1 of 2
NUS-HPC-AI-Lab / InfoBatchLossless Training Speed Up by Unbiased Dynamic Data Pruning
aai-institute / PyDVLpyDVL is a library of stable implementations of algorithms for data valuation and influence function computation
BAAI-DCAI / Dataset PruningDataset pruning for ImageNet and LAION-2B.
Classic298 / Prune Open Webui🧹 An automizable or interactive pruning tool for Open WebUI: clean up orphaned files, old chats, inactive users, stale vector data and more!
princeton-nlp / Edge Pruning[NeurIPS 2024 Spotlight] Code and data for the paper "Finding Transformer Circuits with Edge Pruning".
rgeirhos / Dataset Pruning MetricsMetrics for "Beyond neural scaling laws: beating power law scaling via data pruning " (NeurIPS 2022 Outstanding Paper Award)
gszfwsb / Data WhispererCode for ACL 2025 Main paper "Data Whisperer: Efficient Data Selection for Task-Specific LLM Fine-Tuning via Few-Shot In-Context Learning".
MMorafah / Sub FedAvgPersonalized Federated Learning by Structured and Unstructured Pruning under Data Heterogeneity
Linxyhaha / DEALRecData-efficient Fine-tuning for LLM-based Recommendation (SIGIR'24)
jihoontack / GradNCPLearning Large-scale Neural Fields via Context Pruned Meta-Learning (NeurIPS 2023)
iurada / Px Ntk PruningOfficial repository of our work "Finding Lottery Tickets in Vision Models via Data-driven Spectral Foresight Pruning" accepted at CVPR 2024
Valdecy / C4.5C4.5 Algorithm - A Decision Tree for Numerical and Categorical Data that can Handle Missing Values and Pruning Methods
Roll920 / CURLPyTorch Implementation of CURL-Neural Network Pruning with Residual-Connections and Limited-Data
deepeshmittal / AI PacMan ProjectsImplemented various AI algorithms in Pac-Man projects developed by UC Berkeley. Implemented informed/blind state-space search using search algorithms like BFS, DFS, UCS and A* algorithm with heuristic calculation. Designed an algorithm for reflex agent, minimax and alpha-beta pruning. Reinforcement Learning using MDP (Value Iteration and Policy Evaluation) - Implemented Markov Decision process using Value iteration in the Pacman World. Designed perceptron classifier for data classification. Developed applications using python. http://ai.berkeley.edu/project_overview.html
zhangxin-xd / Dataset Pruning TDDSThe official implementation of paper "Spanning Training Progress: Temporal Dual-Depth Scoring (TDDS) for Enhanced Dataset Pruning" （CVPR 2024）
scikit-learn-contrib / FastcanA fast canonical-correlation-based search algorithm for feature selection, system identification, data pruning, etc.
uvhw / Bitcoin FoundationBitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System Satoshi Nakamoto satoshin@gmx.com www.bitcoin.org Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. 1. Introduction Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model. Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non- reversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need. A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments over a communications channel without a trusted party. What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes. 1 2. Transactions We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership. Transaction Hash Transaction Hash Transaction Hash Owner 1's Public Key Owner 2's Public Key Owner 3's Public Key Owner 0's Signature Owner 1's Signature The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for double spending. After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent. The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank. We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any earlier transactions. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don't care about later attempts to double-spend. The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to be aware of all transactions. In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and decided which arrived first. To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the first received. 3. Timestamp Server The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it. Hash Hash Owner 2's Signature Owner 1's Private Key Owner 2's Private Key Owner 3's Private Key Block Item Item ... 2 Block Item Item ... Verify Verify Sign Sign 4. Proof-of-Work To implement a distributed timestamp server on a peer-to-peer basis, we will need to use a proof- of-work system similar to Adam Back's Hashcash [6], rather than newspaper or Usenet posts. The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the hash begins with a number of zero bits. The average work required is exponential in the number of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash. For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the block until a value is found that gives the block's hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it. The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added. To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they're generated too fast, the difficulty increases. 5. Network The steps to run the network are as follows: 1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes. 2) Each node collects new transactions into a block. 3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block. 4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes. 5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent. 6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash. Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof- of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one. 3 Block Nonce Tx Tx ... Block Nonce Tx Tx ... Prev Hash Prev Hash New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and realizes it missed one. 6. Incentive By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them. The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended. The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees. If the output value of a transaction is less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee that is added to the incentive value of the block containing the transaction. Once a predetermined number of coins have entered circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely inflation free. The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth. 7. Reclaiming Disk Space Once the latest transaction in a coin is buried under enough blocks, the spent transactions before it can be discarded to save disk space. To facilitate this without breaking the block's hash, transactions are hashed in a Merkle Tree [7][2][5], with only the root included in the block's hash. Old blocks can then be compacted by stubbing off branches of the tree. The interior hashes do not need to be stored. Block Hash0 Hash1 Hash2 Hash3 Tx0 Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Block Header (Block Hash) Prev Hash Nonce Root Hash Hash01 Hash23 Block Block Header (Block Hash) Prev Hash Nonce Root Hash Hash01 Hash23 Hash2 Hash3 Tx3 Transactions Hashed in a Merkle Tree After Pruning Tx0-2 from the Block A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes. If we suppose blocks are generated every 10 minutes, 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2MB per year. With computer systems typically selling with 2GB of RAM as of 2008, and Moore's Law predicting current growth of 1.2GB per year, storage should not be a problem even if the block headers must be kept in memory. 4 8. Simplified Payment Verification It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it, and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it. Longest Proof-of-Work Chain Block Header Block Header Block Header Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce Prev Hash Nonce Merkle Root Merkle Root Merkle Root Hash01 Hash23 Merkle Branch for Tx3 Hash2 Hash3 Tx3 As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification. 9. Combining and Splitting Value Although it would be possible to handle coins individually, it would be unwieldy to make a separate transaction for every cent in a transfer. To allow value to be split and combined, transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs. Normally there will be either a single input from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender. It should be noted that fan-out, where a transaction depends on several transactions, and those transactions depend on many more, is not a problem here. There is never the need to extract a complete standalone copy of a transaction's history. 5 Transaction In Out In ... ... 10. Privacy The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were. Traditional Privacy Model Identities Transactions New Privacy Model Identities Transactions As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner. 11. Calculations We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate an alternate chain faster than the honest chain. Even if this is accomplished, it does not throw the system open to arbitrary changes, such as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged to the attacker. Nodes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them. An attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back money he recently spent. The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a Binomial Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its lead by +1, and the failure event is the attacker's chain being extended by one block, reducing the gap by -1. The probability of an attacker catching up from a given deficit is analogous to a Gambler's Ruin problem. Suppose a gambler with unlimited credit starts at a deficit and plays potentially an infinite number of trials to try to reach breakeven. We can calculate the probability he ever reaches breakeven, or that an attacker ever catches up with the honest chain, as follows [8]: p = probability an honest node finds the next block q = probability the attacker finds the next block qz = probability the attacker will ever catch up from z blocks behind Trusted Third Party q ={ 1 if p≤q} z q/pz if pq 6 Counterparty Public Public Given our assumption that p > q, the probability drops exponentially as the number of blocks the attacker has to catch up with increases. With the odds against him, if he doesn't make a lucky lunge forward early on, his chances become vanishingly small as he falls further behind. We now consider how long the recipient of a new transaction needs to wait before being sufficiently certain the sender can't change the transaction. We assume the sender is an attacker who wants to make the recipient believe he paid him for a while, then switch it to pay back to himself after some time has passed. The receiver will be alerted when that happens, but the sender hopes it will be too late. The receiver generates a new key pair and gives the public key to the sender shortly before signing. This prevents the sender from preparing a chain of blocks ahead of time by working on it continuously until he is lucky enough to get far enough ahead, then executing the transaction at that moment. Once the transaction is sent, the dishonest sender starts working in secret on a parallel chain containing an alternate version of his transaction. The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block and z blocks have been linked after it. He doesn't know the exact amount of progress the attacker has made, but assuming the honest blocks took the average expected time per block, the attacker's potential progress will be a Poisson distribution with expected value: = z qp To get the probability the attacker could still catch up now, we multiply the Poisson density for each amount of progress he could have made by the probability he could catch up from that point: ∞ ke−{q/pz−k ifk≤z} ∑k=0 k!⋅ 1 ifkz Rearranging to avoid summing the infinite tail of the distribution... z ke− z−k 1−∑k=0 k! 1−q/p Converting to C code... #include <math.h> double AttackerSuccessProbability(double q, int z) { double p = 1.0 - q; double lambda = z * (q / p); double sum = 1.0; int i, k; for (k = 0; k <= z; k++) { double poisson = exp(-lambda); for (i = 1; i <= k; i++) poisson *= lambda / i; sum -= poisson * (1 - pow(q / p, z - k)); } return sum; } 7 Running some results, we can see the probability drop off exponentially with z. q=0.1 z=0 P=1.0000000 z=1 P=0.2045873 z=2 P=0.0509779 z=3 P=0.0131722 z=4 P=0.0034552 z=5 P=0.0009137 z=6 P=0.0002428 z=7 P=0.0000647 z=8 P=0.0000173 z=9 P=0.0000046 z=10 P=0.0000012 q=0.3 z=0 P=1.0000000 z=5 P=0.1773523 z=10 P=0.0416605 z=15 P=0.0101008 z=20 P=0.0024804 z=25 P=0.0006132 z=30 P=0.0001522 z=35 P=0.0000379 z=40 P=0.0000095 z=45 P=0.0000024 z=50 P=0.0000006 Solving for P less than 0.1%... P < 0.001 q=0.10 z=5 q=0.15 z=8 q=0.20 z=11 q=0.25 z=15 q=0.30 z=24 q=0.35 z=41 q=0.40 z=89 q=0.45 z=340 12. Conclusion We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism. 8 References [1] W. Dai, "b-money," http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998. [2] H. Massias, X.S. Avila, and J.-J. Quisquater, "Design of a secure timestamping service with minimal trust requirements," In 20th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, May 1999. [3] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "How to time-stamp a digital document," In Journal of Cryptology, vol 3, no 2, pages 99-111, 1991. [4] D. Bayer, S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping," In Sequences II: Methods in Communication, Security and Computer Science, pages 329-334, 1993. [5] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Secure names for bit-strings," In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 28-35, April 1997. [6] A. Back, "Hashcash - a denial of service counter-measure," http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf, 2002. [7] R.C. Merkle, "Protocols for public key cryptosystems," In Proc. 1980 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society, pages 122-133, April 1980. [8] W. Feller, "An introduction to probability theory and its applications," 1957. 9
BlockchainLabs / AeonAbout: AEON was launched on 6.6.2014 at 6:00 PM UTC, with no premine or instamine. AEON is for people who want to pay and live freely, who want to be part of the cryptocurrency revolution and want to try something new. It is based on the CryptoNote protocol and uses the CryptoNight-Lite[1] algorithm, and features: - True anonymity & data protection - Untraceable payments uses ring signature - Unlinkable transactions with random data by the sender - Blockchain analysis resistant - CPU/GPU mining, ASIC-resistant Roadmap April 26, 2015 - new roadmap announced Mobile-friendly PoW and block time (released) GUI wallet (in progress) 32-bit and ARM support (released, but requires low memory footprint below) Low memory footprint (in progress) Signature trimming Blockchain pruning (test release available) Multisig and payment channels (instant payments) Development Team: Lead developer: smooth Release engineering, Q/A, support: Arux Other roles: open (PM smooth) Original developer (as Monero fork): anonymous Bounties: None currently open. You can send donations for the AEON bounty fund and development. Code: AEON address: WmsSWgtT1JPg5e3cK41hKXSHVpKW7e47bjgiKmWZkYrhSS5LhRemNyqayaSBtAQ6517eo5PtH9wxHVmM78JDZSUu2W8PqRiNs View Key: 71bf19a7348ede17fa487167710dac401ef1556851bfd36b76040facf051630b Specifications: PoW algorithm: CryptoNight-Lite[1] Max supply: ~18.4 million[2] Block reward: Smoothly varying using the formula (M−A) / (218) / (1012) where M = 264 −1 and A = supply mined to date.[3] Block time: 240 seconds[3] Difficulty: Retargets at every block RPC-bind-port: 11180 P2P-bind-port: 11181 Downloads: Current release 0.9.6.0 (source code, 64 bit Windows binaries) bootstrap for linux-x64 (by community member Phantas 2016-03-10) bootstrap for Windows-x64 (by community member Phantas 2016-03-11) bootstrap for OS X (by community member sammy007 2015-08-08) GUI for Windows 0.2.3 (by community member h0g0f0g0, src.zip, sha1) Instructions to compile on Windows (provided by community member cryptrol): see bottom of this post Recommended: Use caution with community-provided downloads, check reputation and scan for malware Recommended: Use the --donate option when starting the daemon to donate a portion of your computer power to support the project and the network Links & Resources: Trading: - Bittrex - AEON/BTC - Cryptopia - AEON/BTC (also has DOGE and LTC pairs) - OTC thread - AEON/XMR - Speculation thread (moderated by americanpegasus) Pools: - http://52.8.47.33:8080 - Arux's personal pool (2% fee) - http://98.238.231.31:9000 - The Cryptophilanthropist (2% fee) Block Explorers: - Chainradar - Minergate Community: - Reddit - Steem - Twitter - IRC channel #aeon @ Freenode (Webchat Link) Dead Links / Outdated: cryptocointalk white paper Mining: 1. Compile from source code. 2. Launch aeond and wait until it is synchronized. 3. Launch simplewallet --generate-new-wallet=wallet_name.bin --pass=12345 4. Start mining from the wallet using start_mining command Windows Compilation: (provided by community member cryptrol) Compile steps for Windows x64 using MSVC First of all let's get all the tools we need : - Download and install Microsoft Visual Studio Community 2013 (It's a free version of visual studio with some license limitations). You can uncheck the web development tools and SQL tools since you won't use them for building AEON. This will take time to download and install and you will have to reboot upon completion. - Download and install cMake for windows from : http://www.cmake.org/download/ (Win32 install) - Download Boost 1.57 from http://www.boost.org/users/download/ , use the zip or 7zip archive and extract. You can use c:\boost_1_57_0 since this is what I am using for this steps. - Download and install Github for Windows from https://windows.github.com/ (This also includes a Git shell that we will use later). Now the nasty part compile & build time ! - Build Boost : Open a command line and type : Code: > cd c:\boost_1_57_0 > bootstrap.bat > b2 --toolset=msvc variant=release link=static threading=multi runtime-link=static address-model=64 - Open the Git Shell (or Git bash) depending what you downloaded previously and do. Code: > git clone https://github.com/aeonix/aeon.git > cd aeon > mkdir build > cd build > cmake -G "Visual Studio 12 Win64" -DBOOST_ROOT=c:\boost_1_57_0 -DBOOST_LIBRARYDIR=c:\boost_1_57_0\stage\lib .. > MSBuild Project.sln /p:Configuration=release /m You should now find the exe files under build/src/release . Aeon isn't a cryptocurrency. It's a lifestyle. It's about polished perfection, attained by breaking the rules with calculated mastery of the art. It's about respecting history and pushing innovation forward at the same time. It's about more than just math: it's a vision of a world where luxury is the same as entry-level, and the limits are the heavens themselves. If you're just buying Aeon to get rich, don't even bother. Aeon needs more than just the next wave of crypto speculators: we're looking for the truly elite. But if you think you have what it takes to redefine global finance and discover new magnitudes of wealth in the process... Well, Aeon is ready for you. Are you ready for Aeon?
heru299 / Script Copy-? Print this help message and exit -alertnotify=<cmd> Execute command when a relevant alert is received or we see a really long fork (%s in cmd is replaced by message) -assumevalid=<hex> If this block is in the chain assume that it and its ancestors are valid and potentially skip their script verification (0 to verify all, default: 0000000000000000000b9d2ec5a352ecba0592946514a92f14319dc2b367fc72, testnet: 000000000000006433d1efec504c53ca332b64963c425395515b01977bd7b3b0, signet: 0000002a1de0f46379358c1fd09906f7ac59adf3712323ed90eb59e4c183c020) -blockfilterindex=<type> Maintain an index of compact filters by block (default: 0, values: basic). If <type> is not supplied or if <type> = 1, indexes for all known types are enabled. -blocknotify=<cmd> Execute command when the best block changes (%s in cmd is replaced by block hash) -blockreconstructionextratxn=<n> Extra transactions to keep in memory for compact block reconstructions (default: 100) -blocksdir=<dir> Specify directory to hold blocks subdirectory for *.dat files (default: <datadir>) -blocksonly Whether to reject transactions from network peers. Automatic broadcast and rebroadcast of any transactions from inbound peers is disabled, unless the peer has the 'forcerelay' permission. RPC transactions are not affected. (default: 0) -conf=<file> Specify path to read-only configuration file. Relative paths will be prefixed by datadir location. (default: bitcoin.conf) -daemon Run in the background as a daemon and accept commands -datadir=<dir> Specify data directory -dbcache=<n> Maximum database cache size <n> MiB (4 to 16384, default: 450). In addition, unused mempool memory is shared for this cache (see -maxmempool). -debuglogfile=<file> Specify location of debug log file. Relative paths will be prefixed by a net-specific datadir location. (-nodebuglogfile to disable; default: debug.log) -includeconf=<file> Specify additional configuration file, relative to the -datadir path (only useable from configuration file, not command line) -loadblock=<file> Imports blocks from external file on startup -maxmempool=<n> Keep the transaction memory pool below <n> megabytes (default: 300) -maxorphantx=<n> Keep at most <n> unconnectable transactions in memory (default: 100) -mempoolexpiry=<n> Do not keep transactions in the mempool longer than <n> hours (default: 336) -par=<n> Set the number of script verification threads (-8 to 15, 0 = auto, <0 = leave that many cores free, default: 0) -persistmempool Whether to save the mempool on shutdown and load on restart (default: 1) -pid=<file> Specify pid file. Relative paths will be prefixed by a net-specific datadir location. (default: bitcoind.pid) -prune=<n> Reduce storage requirements by enabling pruning (deleting) of old blocks. This allows the pruneblockchain RPC to be called to delete specific blocks, and enables automatic pruning of old blocks if a target size in MiB is provided. This mode is incompatible with -txindex and -rescan. Warning: Reverting this setting requires re-downloading the entire blockchain. (default: 0 = disable pruning blocks, 1 = allow manual pruning via RPC, >=550 = automatically prune block files to stay under the specified target size in MiB) -reindex Rebuild chain state and block index from the blk*.dat files on disk -reindex-chainstate Rebuild chain state from the currently indexed blocks. When in pruning mode or if blocks on disk might be corrupted, use full -reindex instead. -settings=<file> Specify path to dynamic settings data file. Can be disabled with -nosettings. File is written at runtime and not meant to be edited by users (use bitcoin.conf instead for custom settings). Relative paths will be prefixed by datadir location. (default: settings.json) -startupnotify=<cmd> Execute command on startup. -sysperms Create new files with system default permissions, instead of umask 077 (only effective with disabled wallet functionality) -txindex Maintain a full transaction index, used by the getrawtransaction rpc call (default: 0) -version Print version and exit Connection options: -addnode=<ip> Add a node to connect to and attempt to keep the connection open (see the `addnode` RPC command help for more info). This option can be specified multiple times to add multiple nodes. -asmap=<file> Specify asn mapping used for bucketing of the peers (default: ip_asn.map). Relative paths will be prefixed by the net-specific datadir location. -bantime=<n> Default duration (in seconds) of manually configured bans (default: 86400) -bind=<addr>[:<port>][=onion] Bind to given address and always listen on it (default: 0.0.0.0). Use [host]:port notation for IPv6. Append =onion to tag any incoming connections to that address and port as incoming Tor connections (default: 127.0.0.1:8334=onion, testnet: 127.0.0.1:18334=onion, signet: 127.0.0.1:38334=onion, regtest: 127.0.0.1:18445=onion) -connect=<ip> Connect only to the specified node; -noconnect disables automatic connections (the rules for this peer are the same as for -addnode). This option can be specified multiple times to connect to multiple nodes. -discover Discover own IP addresses (default: 1 when listening and no -externalip or -proxy) -dns Allow DNS lookups for -addnode, -seednode and -connect (default: 1) -dnsseed Query for peer addresses via DNS lookup, if low on addresses (default: 1 unless -connect used) -externalip=<ip> Specify your own public address -forcednsseed Always query for peer addresses via DNS lookup (default: 0) -listen Accept connections from outside (default: 1 if no -proxy or -connect) -listenonion Automatically create Tor onion service (default: 1) -maxconnections=<n> Maintain at most <n> connections to peers (default: 125) -maxreceivebuffer=<n> Maximum per-connection receive buffer, <n>*1000 bytes (default: 5000) -maxsendbuffer=<n> Maximum per-connection send buffer, <n>*1000 bytes (default: 1000) -maxtimeadjustment Maximum allowed median peer time offset adjustment. Local perspective of time may be influenced by peers forward or backward by this amount. (default: 4200 seconds) -maxuploadtarget=<n> Tries to keep outbound traffic under the given target (in MiB per 24h). Limit does not apply to peers with 'download' permission. 0 = no limit (default: 0) -networkactive Enable all P2P network activity (default: 1). Can be changed by the setnetworkactive RPC command -onion=<ip:port> Use separate SOCKS5 proxy to reach peers via Tor onion services, set -noonion to disable (default: -proxy) -onlynet=<net> Make outgoing connections only through network <net> (ipv4, ipv6 or onion). Incoming connections are not affected by this option. This option can be specified multiple times to allow multiple networks. -peerblockfilters Serve compact block filters to peers per BIP 157 (default: 0) -peerbloomfilters Support filtering of blocks and transaction with bloom filters (default: 0) -permitbaremultisig Relay non-P2SH multisig (default: 1) -port=<port> Listen for connections on <port>. Nodes not using the default ports (default: 8333, testnet: 18333, signet: 38333, regtest: 18444) are unlikely to get incoming connections. -proxy=<ip:port> Connect through SOCKS5 proxy, set -noproxy to disable (default: disabled) -proxyrandomize Randomize credentials for every proxy connection. This enables Tor stream isolation (default: 1) -seednode=<ip> Connect to a node to retrieve peer addresses, and disconnect. This option can be specified multiple times to connect to multiple nodes. -timeout=<n> Specify connection timeout in milliseconds (minimum: 1, default: 5000) -torcontrol=<ip>:<port> Tor control port to use if onion listening enabled (default: 127.0.0.1:9051) -torpassword=<pass> Tor control port password (default: empty) -upnp Use UPnP to map the listening port (default: 0) -whitebind=<[permissions@]addr> Bind to the given address and add permission flags to the peers connecting to it. Use [host]:port notation for IPv6. Allowed permissions: bloomfilter (allow requesting BIP37 filtered blocks and transactions), noban (do not ban for misbehavior; implies download), forcerelay (relay transactions that are already in the mempool; implies relay), relay (relay even in -blocksonly mode, and unlimited transaction announcements), mempool (allow requesting BIP35 mempool contents), download (allow getheaders during IBD, no disconnect after maxuploadtarget limit), addr (responses to GETADDR avoid hitting the cache and contain random records with the most up-to-date info). Specify multiple permissions separated by commas (default: download,noban,mempool,relay). Can be specified multiple times. -whitelist=<[permissions@]IP address or network> Add permission flags to the peers connecting from the given IP address (e.g. 1.2.3.4) or CIDR-notated network (e.g. 1.2.3.0/24). Uses the same permissions as -whitebind. Can be specified multiple times. Wallet options: -addresstype What type of addresses to use ("legacy", "p2sh-segwit", or "bech32", default: "bech32") -avoidpartialspends Group outputs by address, selecting all or none, instead of selecting on a per-output basis. Privacy is improved as an address is only used once (unless someone sends to it after spending from it), but may result in slightly higher fees as suboptimal coin selection may result due to the added limitation (default: 0 (always enabled for wallets with "avoid_reuse" enabled)) -changetype What type of change to use ("legacy", "p2sh-segwit", or "bech32"). Default is same as -addresstype, except when -addresstype=p2sh-segwit a native segwit output is used when sending to a native segwit address) -disablewallet Do not load the wallet and disable wallet RPC calls -discardfee=<amt> The fee rate (in BTC/kB) that indicates your tolerance for discarding change by adding it to the fee (default: 0.0001). Note: An output is discarded if it is dust at this rate, but we will always discard up to the dust relay fee and a discard fee above that is limited by the fee estimate for the longest target -fallbackfee=<amt> A fee rate (in BTC/kB) that will be used when fee estimation has insufficient data. 0 to entirely disable the fallbackfee feature. (default: 0.00) -keypool=<n> Set key pool size to <n> (default: 1000). Warning: Smaller sizes may increase the risk of losing funds when restoring from an old backup, if none of the addresses in the original keypool have been used. -maxapsfee=<n> Spend up to this amount in additional (absolute) fees (in BTC) if it allows the use of partial spend avoidance (default: 0.00) -mintxfee=<amt> Fees (in BTC/kB) smaller than this are considered zero fee for transaction creation (default: 0.00001) -paytxfee=<amt> Fee (in BTC/kB) to add to transactions you send (default: 0.00) -rescan Rescan the block chain for missing wallet transactions on startup -spendzeroconfchange Spend unconfirmed change when sending transactions (default: 1) -txconfirmtarget=<n> If paytxfee is not set, include enough fee so transactions begin confirmation on average within n blocks (default: 6) -wallet=<path> Specify wallet path to load at startup. Can be used multiple times to load multiple wallets. Path is to a directory containing wallet data and log files. If the path is not absolute, it is interpreted relative to <walletdir>. This only loads existing wallets and does not create new ones. For backwards compatibility this also accepts names of existing top-level data files in <walletdir>. -walletbroadcast Make the wallet broadcast transactions (default: 1) -walletdir=<dir> Specify directory to hold wallets (default: <datadir>/wallets if it exists, otherwise <datadir>) -walletnotify=<cmd> Execute command when a wallet transaction changes. %s in cmd is replaced by TxID and %w is replaced by wallet name. %w is not currently implemented on windows. On systems where %w is supported, it should NOT be quoted because this would break shell escaping used to invoke the command. -walletrbf Send transactions with full-RBF opt-in enabled (RPC only, default: 0) ZeroMQ notification options: -zmqpubhashblock=<address> Enable publish hash block in <address> -zmqpubhashblockhwm=<n> Set publish hash block outbound message high water mark (default: 1000) -zmqpubhashtx=<address> Enable publish hash transaction in <address> -zmqpubhashtxhwm=<n> Set publish hash transaction outbound message high water mark (default: 1000) -zmqpubrawblock=<address> Enable publish raw block in <address> -zmqpubrawblockhwm=<n> Set publish raw block outbound message high water mark (default: 1000) -zmqpubrawtx=<address> Enable publish raw transaction in <address> -zmqpubrawtxhwm=<n> Set publish raw transaction outbound message high water mark (default: 1000) -zmqpubsequence=<address> Enable publish hash block and tx sequence in <address> -zmqpubsequencehwm=<n> Set publish hash sequence message high water mark (default: 1000) Debugging/Testing options: -debug=<category> Output debugging information (default: -nodebug, supplying <category> is optional). If <category> is not supplied or if <category> = 1, output all debugging information. <category> can be: net, tor, mempool, http, bench, zmq, walletdb, rpc, estimatefee, addrman, selectcoins, reindex, cmpctblock, rand, prune, proxy, mempoolrej, libevent, coindb, qt, leveldb, validation. -debugexclude=<category> Exclude debugging information for a category. Can be used in conjunction with -debug=1 to output debug logs for all categories except one or more specified categories. -help-debug Print help message with debugging options and exit -logips Include IP addresses in debug output (default: 0) -logthreadnames Prepend debug output with name of the originating thread (only available on platforms supporting thread_local) (default: 0) -logtimestamps Prepend debug output with timestamp (default: 1) -maxtxfee=<amt> Maximum total fees (in BTC) to use in a single wallet transaction; setting this too low may abort large transactions (default: 0.10) -printtoconsole Send trace/debug info to console (default: 1 when no -daemon. To disable logging to file, set -nodebuglogfile) -shrinkdebugfile Shrink debug.log file on client startup (default: 1 when no -debug) -uacomment=<cmt> Append comment to the user agent string Chain selection options: -chain=<chain> Use the chain <chain> (default: main). Allowed values: main, test, signet, regtest -signet Use the signet chain. Equivalent to -chain=signet. Note that the network is defined by the -signetchallenge parameter -signetchallenge Blocks must satisfy the given script to be considered valid (only for signet networks; defaults to the global default signet test network challenge) -signetseednode Specify a seed node for the signet network, in the hostname[:port] format, e.g. sig.net:1234 (may be used multiple times to specify multiple seed nodes; defaults to the global default signet test network seed node(s)) -testnet Use the test chain. Equivalent to -chain=test. Node relay options: -bytespersigop Equivalent bytes per sigop in transactions for relay and mining (default: 20) -datacarrier Relay and mine data carrier transactions (default: 1) -datacarriersize Maximum size of data in data carrier transactions we relay and mine (default: 83) -minrelaytxfee=<amt> Fees (in BTC/kB) smaller than this are considered zero fee for relaying, mining and transaction creation (default: 0.00001) -whitelistforcerelay Add 'forcerelay' permission to whitelisted inbound peers with default permissions. This will relay transactions even if the transactions were already in the mempool. (default: 0) -whitelistrelay Add 'relay' permission to whitelisted inbound peers with default permissions. This will accept relayed transactions even when not relaying transactions (default: 1) Block creation options: -blockmaxweight=<n> Set maximum BIP141 block weight (default: 3996000) -blockmintxfee=<amt> Set lowest fee rate (in BTC/kB) for transactions to be included in block creation. (default: 0.00001) RPC server options: -rest Accept public REST requests (default: 0) -rpcallowip=<ip> Allow JSON-RPC connections from specified source. Valid for <ip> are a single IP (e.g. 1.2.3.4), a network/netmask (e.g. 1.2.3.4/255.255.255.0) or a network/CIDR (e.g. 1.2.3.4/24). This option can be specified multiple times -rpcauth=<userpw> Username and HMAC-SHA-256 hashed password for JSON-RPC connections. The field <userpw> comes in the format: <USERNAME>:<SALT>$<HASH>. A canonical python script is included in share/rpcauth. The client then connects normally using the rpcuser=<USERNAME>/rpcpassword=<PASSWORD> pair of arguments. This option can be specified multiple times -rpcbind=<addr>[:port] Bind to given address to listen for JSON-RPC connections. Do not expose the RPC server to untrusted networks such as the public internet! This option is ignored unless -rpcallowip is also passed. Port is optional and overrides -rpcport. Use [host]:port notation for IPv6. This option can be specified multiple times (default: 127.0.0.1 and ::1 i.e., localhost) -rpccookiefile=<loc> Location of the auth cookie. Relative paths will be prefixed by a net-specific datadir location. (default: data dir) -rpcpassword=<pw> Password for JSON-RPC connections -rpcport=<port> Listen for JSON-RPC connections on <port> (default: 8332, testnet: 18332, signet: 38332, regtest: 18443) -rpcserialversion Sets the serialization of raw transaction or block hex returned in non-verbose mode, non-segwit(0) or segwit(1) (default: 1) -rpcthreads=<n> Set the number of threads to service RPC calls (default: 4) -rpcuser=<user> Username for JSON-RPC connections -rpcwhitelist=<whitelist> Set a whitelist to filter incoming RPC calls for a specific user. The field <whitelist> comes in the format: <USERNAME>:<rpc 1>,<rpc 2>,...,<rpc n>. If multiple whitelists are set for a given user, they are set-intersected. See -rpcwhitelistdefault documentation for information on default whitelist behavior. -rpcwhitelistdefault Sets default behavior for rpc whitelisting. Unless rpcwhitelistdefault is set to 0, if any -rpcwhitelist is set, the rpc server acts as if all rpc users are subject to empty-unless-otherwise-specified whitelists. If rpcwhitelistdefault is set to 1 and no -rpcwhitelist is set, rpc server acts as if all rpc users are subject to empty whitelists. -server Accept command line and JSON-RPC commands ~ $
hunterlang / Weaksup Subset SelectionSubset selection / data pruning for weak supervision
