45 skills found · Page 1 of 2
crowdsecurity / CrowdsecCrowdSec - the open-source and participative security solution offering crowdsourced protection against malicious IPs and access to the most advanced real-world CTI.
SecurityRiskAdvisors / VECTRVECTR is a tool that facilitates tracking of your red and blue team testing activities to measure detection and prevention capabilities across different attack scenarios
sublime-security / Sublime RulesSublime rules for email attack detection, prevention, and threat hunting.
Minotaur-OPSEC / OSINTMachineGuideStep-by-step guide to building a custom machine for OSINT activities. The Basic Package includes a robust LINUX system strengthening process, Tor browser setup, firewall installation, rotating proxy configuration, and advanced attack prevention measures.
t3l3machus / CVE 2023 22960This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass the credentials brute-force prevention mechanism of the Embedded Web Server (interface) of more than 60 Lexmark printer models. This issue affects both username-password and PIN authentication.
ivanfratric / RopguardRuntime Prevention of Return-Oriented Programming Attacks
yourabi / Django Banishdjango-banish is a Django middleware app to banish user agents by IP address or User Agent Header. It also supports basic abuse prevention by automatically banning users if they exceed a certain number of requests per minute, which is likely some form of attack or attempted denial of service.
ByteLeMani / Ctf ProxyAn Intrusion Prevention System for Attack-Defense CTFs
ejfrancis / Brute Force BlockAutomatic brute force attack prevention class with PHP. Stores all failed login attempts site-wide in database.
Bala-0630 / Early Stage Behavioral Detection Prevention Of Ransomware Attacks On Devices No description available
BlockchainLabs / SpreadCoinSpreadCoin October 5, 2014 Introduction In proof-of-work cryptocurrencies new coins are generated by the network through the process of mining. One of the purposes of mining is to protect network from double spending attacks and history rewriting. Miners generate new blocks and check contents of the blocks generated by other peers for conformation to the network rules. However, many miners now delegate all the checking work crucial to cryptocurrency security to pools. This means that pool operators do not have any large hashing power but have control over generation of new blocks. This brings unnecessary centralization to otherwise decentralized system. Controlling more than 50% of mining power allows to perform double-spending attacks with 100% chance of success but even with less than 50% control it is possible to perform attacks which have chances to succeed1 . The core idea of SpreadCoin is to prevent creation of pools and thus make mining more decentralized and the whole system more secure. Pool Prevention In pooled mining miners perform only the work which is necessary to fulfill the proof-of-work requirements and pools take care of block generation and broadcasting and distribute reward among miners according to the shares they submit. In this scheme miner has two alternatives: 1. Solo mining. In this case miner cannot send shares to the pool because they will not be accepted. 2. Pooled mining. Miner’s shares will be accepted by the pool but in the case miner will actually generate a new block its reward will go to the pool which will redistribute it to all miners. This allows organization of pools because miners has no way to cheat and steal generated money. To prevent creation of pools we must remove this possibility so that if pool will be created than miner can mine in a pool, submit shares as usual and get reward for them but in the case of actually finding a block miner can send it directly to the network instead of the pool and get full reward for it. In SpreadCoin mining is organized in such way that miner must know the following things: 1. Private key corresponding to the coinbase transaction. 2. Whole block, not only its header. This ensures that miner can broadcast mined block and spend coins generated in that block. It may seem that it is necessary to know only the private key to spend coinbase transaction. If two conflicting transactions will appear on the network then the one that was broadcasted first will have much higher probability to be included in a block because each peer remembers and retransmits only the first one of the conflicting transactions. If both miner and pool know private key but only pool knows the content of the block than pool can generate and broadcast spending transaction earlier than miner. If both miner 1 Double-spending. Bitcoin Wiki. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Double-spending and pool know content of the block than miner will be the first one who can broadcast block and spending transaction. To prove knowledge of the private key and whole block there are two new fields in the block header: MinerSignature and hashWholeBlock. MinerSignature is a digital signature of all fields of the block header except for the hashWholeBlock. Changing any information in the block requires regeneration of this signature which means that it is necessary to recalculate it during each iteration of the mining process. This implies that miner must be able to sign any arbitrary data. hashWholeBlock is a SHA-256 hash of the block data arranged as follows: Padding ensures that there is no incentive to mine empty blocks without transactions. Padding values are computed using simple algorithm which initializes last 32 bytes (8 uint32) with hashPrevBlock and then goes backward and computes remaining uint32 values using the following recursive formula: 𝐼𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖+3 ∙ 𝐼𝑖+7. This algorithm ensures that there is no efficient way to compute padding values on the fly during hash computation which otherwise could potentially give some advantage to mine empty blocks in certain computing environments. It is important that block is hashed twice. If it was hashed only once then pool could hash the beginning of the block and send resulting hash state to the miners. Each miner would then modify some information in the end of the block and recalculate the hash based on the known state without actual knowledge about what is contained in the beginning of the block. Appending block data to itself make it necessary to know the whole block to recalculate hashWholeBlock. Pool may detect and ban cheating miners. However, many miners may still prefer to cheat so that pool will be completely unusable for honest miners. Miners that have low probability of finding a block will get more profit by stealing reward for accidentally found block even if pool will ban them thereafter. Miners that have enough mining power to find blocks consistently can still connect to a pool and submit shares for some time but steal the first found block. This way they can get both reward for their shares and the actual mined block. Given all this it is expected that no one will create a pool. But even if someone will than it can be countered by releasing stealing miner software which many miners will switch to. Compact Transactions SpreadCoin as well as Bitcoin uses ECDSA signatures. Each address in Bitcoin is a hash of an ECDSA public key. To spend coins sent to an address it is necessary to provide public key matching to that hash and a signature. This results in 139 or 107 bytes for each transaction input script (scriptSig) depending on Block Padding MAX_BLOCK_SIZE Block Padding whether compact public key is used. However, it is possible to recover public key from the signature2 which means that it is not necessary to provide it in transaction input. Together with using compact representation of the signature3 it allows to reduce size of transaction input script from 139 or 107 bytes in Bitcoin to 67 bytes in SpreadCoin. Recovering public key has almost no extra CPU cost compared to the usual signature verification process used in Bitcoin. This is important because the CPU cost of ECDSA signature verification is a bottleneck for Bitcoin transaction processing. Usual output script (scriptPubKey) in Bitcoin looks as follows: OP_DUP OP_HASH160 5bd18804e4bb43a4bb8b6bc88408970bafaf4a38 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG In SpreadCoin the semantics of the OP_CHECKSIG instruction was changed to checking signature by hash of the public key (it recovers public key and compares its hash with the provided one). This results in a much simpler script in SpreadCoin: 5bd18804e4bb43a4bb8b6bc88408970bafaf4a38 OP_CHECKSIG This results in additional minor space saving because this script is 3 bytes smaller. Smooth Supply Block reward in Bitcoin is computed using the following formula: 𝑅ℎ = 𝑅0 ∙ 2 −⌊ ℎ 𝑝 ⌋ , where ℎ – block height, 𝑝 – reward halving period, 𝑅0 – initial reward, 𝑅ℎ – reward for block ℎ, ⌊ ⌋ – floor function. This method results in abrupt reward changes near halving points. SpreadCoin uses simple linear interpolation between halving points to make reward decrease much smother. This is achieved by modifying reward using the following formula: 𝑅ℎ ′ = 4 3 (𝑅ℎ − 𝑅ℎ ∙ ℎ mod 𝑝 2𝑝 ). SpreadCoin uses 𝑝 = 2 ∙ 106 as its reward halving period. 2 ECDSA Signatures allow recovery of the public key. Bitcoin Forum. https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=6430.0%29%3F 3 Why the signature is always 65 (1+32+32) bytes long? Bitcoin Stack Exchange. https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/12554/why-the-signature-is-always-65-13232-bytes-long | NO YEAR 2106 PROBLEM The time stamp field in the block header is now 64 bit instead of 32 bit (Bitcoin) so that much farther date times are possible (>Year 2106) Upcoming features that are in development and will be introduced over the next weeks and months: SERVICENODES A servicenode is a node which runs continuously (24/7) on a server and which provides services within the spreadcoin network. You have to pay a collateral to be able to install a servernode (in return your servicenode will earn a steady income). This collateral is determined by a free market price discovery. (No fix collateral. The price is allowed to fluctuate over time.) COMPETITIVE COLLATERAL Furthermore, to introduce a competitive nature to the servicenodes there will only ever be a limited number of allowed servicenodes worldwide. Since the collateral isn't set in stone, but the amount of servicenodes is fixed, the price of a servicenode will be determined by the participants themselves. It is expected that the price will vary widely over time, which exposes it to the same market forces that hashrate and currency value are exposed to too. SERVICE APPS There are a number of decentralized applications that will run on servicenodes. Most likely those apps will include: 1) "Spread the message" (an in-wallet encrypted messaging system, which allows you to send a message to an SPR address) 2) "Spread the Search" (A decentralized search engine that lets the servicenodes crawl and map the entire internet.) . SPREADX11 SpreadX11 is different from plain X11 by introducing a sophisticated pool prevention mechanism. With SpreadX11 every block header contains additional information (MinerSignature and hashWholeBlock). With the help of this information the protocol ensures that the miner of a new block is always also the first one to know the content of the whole block and the private key to spend the coinbase transaction. (contrary to pool mining where the pool operator is the first one to know those things) So when a miner finds a block, he must himself sign and transmit the block to the network (like solo mining), instead of having a pool handle this for him. This effectively prevents pools by making their rules non-enforceable, since any miner in any assumed pool can always just steal the block reward instead of following the rules set up by the pool. COMPACT TRANSACTIONS SpreadCoin uses a more compact representation for signatures in transactions. SpreadCoin as well as Bitcoin uses ECDSA signatures. While bitcoin keeps a copy of the public key of the corresponding signature around, SpreadCoin ommits this by recovering the public key on the fly directly from the signature. This way it is not necessary to keep the public key of every ECDSA signature in the blockchain, so this leads to *smaller transactions and hence a smaller blockchain (at the cost of a few CPU cycles more). (*reduction in size of transaction from 139 or 107 bytes in Bitcoin to 67 bytes in SpreadCoin.) SMOOTH HALVING Unlike Bitcoin, there are no abrupt reward halvings in SpreadCoin. Block reward is smoothly decreasing over time. UNIQUE DESIGN WITH IN-WALLET VANITYGEN One of the first apps to be built into the wallet is the vanity generator (or vanity gen) which allows anyone to create personalised payment addresses. The easy to use wallet lets you search through trillions of payment addresses allowing you to find one or multiple vanity addresses, which are then stored safely along with the private keys on your own computer - and nowhere else. Searching using the vanity gen is probabilistic, so the amount of time required to find your chosen address patterns depends on how complex the pattern is, the speed of your computer, and a little bit of luck. You can use the vanity gen for a bit of fun, to make your address standout from the crowd or to create a link to a brand, business or other organisation. You can even search for addresses that others might be willing to buy from you. SpreadCoin is a new cryptocurrency which is more decentralized than Bitcoin. It prevents centralization of hashing power in pools, which is one of the main concerns of Bitcoin security. SpreadCoin was fairly launched on 29 July 2014, 9:00 UTC with no premine.
c-goosen / AI Prompt CtfAgentic LLM CTF to test prompt injection attacks and preventions
shgew / Cs Firewall Bouncer DockerA dockerized version of https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer
naveenrj98 / Security Attacks VANETDetection adn Prevention of Security attack in VANET simulation using SUMO, NS3
AswinBarath / Sql Injection And PreventionDemonstrates SQL injection attacks using malicious SQL queries and SQL prevention techniques.
abhishekpatel-lpu / CICIDS 2017 Intrution Detection Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) are the most important defense tools against the sophisticated and ever-growing network attacks. Due to the lack of reliable test and validation datasets, anomaly-based intrusion detection approaches are suffering from consistent and accurate performance evolutions. Our evaluations of the existing eleven datasets since 1998 show that most are out of date and unreliable. Some of these datasets suffer from the lack of traffic diversity and volumes, some do not cover the variety of known attacks, while others anonymize packet payload data, which cannot reflect the current trends. Some are also lacking feature set and metadata. CICIDS2017 dataset contains benign and the most up-to-date common attacks, which resembles the true real-world data (PCAPs). It also includes the results of the network traffic analysis using CICFlowMeter with labeled flows based on the time stamp, source, and destination IPs, source and destination ports, protocols and attack (CSV files). Also available is the extracted features definition. Generating realistic background traffic was our top priority in building this dataset. We have used our proposed B-Profile system (Sharafaldin, et al. 2016) to profile the abstract behavior of human interactions and generates naturalistic benign background traffic. For this dataset, we built the abstract behaviour of 25 users based on the HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols. The data capturing period started at 9 a.m., Monday, July 3, 2017 and ended at 5 p.m. on Friday July 7, 2017, for a total of 5 days. Monday is the normal day and only includes the benign traffic. The implemented attacks include Brute Force FTP, Brute Force SSH, DoS, Heartbleed, Web Attack, Infiltration, Botnet and DDoS. They have been executed both morning and afternoon on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.
oasm-platform / Oasm AssistantSmart assistant for threat monitoring, attack prevention, and web protection.
rudra00434 / Ransomware ShieldAI powered Ransomware and malware detection & network security Analysis prevention of Man-in-the-middle attack powered by AI threat explainer
AdityaBhatt3010 / The Art Of Wi Fi Hacking Protection With Aircrack NgA comprehensive guide to hacking and securing Wi-Fi networks using Aircrack-ng, covering practical attack techniques, encryption vulnerabilities, and prevention strategies.
rgconrad514 / SQLServerLoginMonitorBrute force attack prevention for remotely accessible SQL Server databases using PowerShell and Windows Task Scheduler API
