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subdomain-takeover

Subdomain takeover detection and exploitation playbook

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill subdomain-takeover

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

86/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of subdomain-takeover

subdomain-takeover scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 747th of 1,108 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 10 KB long, well organised into 22 sections with 8 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
29/30
Structure
20/20
Description
8/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so subdomain-takeover is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-03 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Review

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file is a skill the agent will follow and it gives concrete exploitation commands such as `aws s3 mb s3://sub.target.com`, `heroku create`, and registering expired domains to claim victim resources.

AI review: risky

  • The file is a skill the agent will follow and it gives concrete exploitation commands such as `aws s3 mb s3://sub.target.com`, `heroku create`, and registering expired domains to claim victim resources.
  • It instructs the agent to perform actual takeovers with harmful impact: cookie theft, OAuth token interception, email interception (MX takeover), issuing TLS certs, and SPF/DKIM spoofing.
  • While it includes some defensive notes, the bulk of the playbook is step-by-step offensive exploitation (CNAME/NS/MX takeover) against third-party domains, not merely detection or authorized self-testing.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-01. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

subdomain-takeover compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than subdomain-takeover; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
subdomain-takeover (this skill)by yaklang862.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install subdomain-takeover?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill subdomain-takeover. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does subdomain-takeover work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is subdomain-takeover safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file is a skill the agent will follow and it gives concrete exploitation commands such as aws s3 mb s3://sub.target.com, heroku create, and registering expired domains to claim victim resources. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is subdomain-takeover still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so subdomain-takeover is actively maintained.

name: subdomain-takeover description: >- Subdomain takeover detection and exploitation playbook. Use when targets have dangling CNAME/NS/MX records pointing to deprovisioned cloud resources, expired third-party services, or unclaimed SaaS tenants that an attacker can register to serve content under the victim's domain.

SKILL: Subdomain Takeover — Detection & Exploitation Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Covers CNAME/NS/MX takeover, per-provider fingerprint matching, claim procedures, and defensive monitoring. Base models often confuse "CNAME exists" with "takeover possible" — the key is whether the resource behind the CNAME is unclaimed and claimable.

0. RELATED ROUTING


1. CORE CONCEPT

Subdomain takeover occurs when:

  1. sub.target.com has a DNS record (CNAME, NS, A) pointing to an external service
  2. The external resource is no longer provisioned (deleted S3 bucket, removed Heroku app, etc.)
  3. The attacker can register/claim that exact resource name on the provider
  4. The attacker now controls content served under sub.target.com

Impact: cookie theft (parent domain cookies), OAuth token interception, phishing under trusted domain, CORS bypass, CSP bypass via whitelisted subdomain.


2. DETECTION METHODOLOGY

2.1 CNAME Enumeration

1. Collect subdomains (amass, subfinder, assetfinder, crt.sh, SecurityTrails)
2. Resolve DNS for each:
   dig CNAME sub.target.com +short
3. For each CNAME → check if the CNAME target returns NXDOMAIN or a provider error
4. Match error response against fingerprint table (Section 3)

2.2 Key Signals

| Signal | Meaning | |---|---| | CNAME → xxx.s3.amazonaws.com + HTTP 404 "NoSuchBucket" | S3 bucket deleted, claimable | | CNAME → xxx.herokuapp.com + "No such app" | Heroku app deleted | | CNAME → xxx.github.io + 404 "There isn't a GitHub Pages site here" | GitHub Pages unclaimed | | NXDOMAIN on the CNAME target domain itself | Target domain expired or never existed | | CNAME → provider but HTTP 200 with default parking page | May or may not be claimable — verify |

2.3 Automated Tools

| Tool | Purpose | |---|---| | subjack | Automated CNAME takeover checking | | nuclei -t takeovers/ | Nuclei takeover detection templates | | can-i-take-over-xyz (GitHub) | Reference for which services are vulnerable | | dnsreaper | Multi-provider takeover scanner | | subzy | Fast subdomain takeover verification |


3. SERVICE PROVIDER FINGERPRINT TABLE

| Provider | CNAME Pattern | Fingerprint (HTTP Response) | Claimable? | |---|---|---|---| | AWS S3 | *.s3.amazonaws.com / *.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com | NoSuchBucket (404) | Yes — create bucket with matching name | | GitHub Pages | *.github.io | There isn't a GitHub Pages site here (404) | Yes — create repo + enable Pages | | Heroku | *.herokuapp.com / *.herokudns.com | No such app | Yes — create app with matching name | | Azure | *.azurewebsites.net / *.cloudapp.azure.com / *.trafficmanager.net | Various default pages, NXDOMAIN | Yes — register matching resource | | Shopify | *.myshopify.com | Sorry, this shop is currently unavailable | Yes — create shop, add custom domain | | Fastly | CNAME to Fastly edge | Fastly error: unknown domain | Yes — add domain to Fastly service | | Pantheon | *.pantheonsite.io | 404 Site Not Found with Pantheon branding | Yes | | Tumblr | *.tumblr.com (custom domain CNAME) | There's nothing here / Whatever you were looking for doesn't exist | Yes | | WordPress.com | CNAME to *.wordpress.com | Do you want to register | Yes — claim domain in WP.com | | Zendesk | *.zendesk.com | Help Center Closed / Zendesk branding on error | Yes — create matching subdomain | | Unbounce | *.unbouncepages.com | The requested URL was not found | Yes | | Ghost | *.ghost.io | 404 Not Found Ghost error | Yes | | Surge.sh | *.surge.sh | project not found | Yes | | Fly.io | CNAME to *.fly.dev | Fly.io default 404 | Yes |


4. TAKEOVER PROCEDURE — COMMON PROVIDERS

4.1 AWS S3

1. Confirm: curl -s http://sub.target.com → "NoSuchBucket"
2. Extract bucket name from CNAME (e.g., sub.target.com.s3.amazonaws.com → bucket = "sub.target.com")
3. aws s3 mb s3://sub.target.com --region <region>
4. Upload index.html proving control
5. Enable static website hosting

4.2 GitHub Pages

1. Confirm: curl -s https://sub.target.com → "There isn't a GitHub Pages site here"
2. Create GitHub repo (any name)
3. Add CNAME file containing "sub.target.com"
4. Enable GitHub Pages in repo settings
5. Wait for DNS propagation (GitHub verifies CNAME match)

4.3 Heroku

1. Confirm: curl -s http://sub.target.com → "No such app"
2. heroku create <app-name-from-cname>
3. heroku domains:add sub.target.com
4. Deploy proof-of-concept page

5. NS TAKEOVER — HIGH SEVERITY

NS takeover is far more dangerous than CNAME takeover: you control all DNS resolution for the zone.

How It Happens

target.com NS → ns1.expireddomain.com
                 ↓
attacker registers expireddomain.com
                 ↓
attacker now controls ALL DNS for target.com
(A records, MX records, TXT records — everything)

Detection

1. Enumerate NS records: dig NS target.com +short
2. Check each NS domain: whois ns1.example.com → is the domain expired or available?
3. Also check: dig A ns1.example.com → NXDOMAIN/SERVFAIL?
4. Subdelegated zones: check NS for sub.target.com specifically

Impact

  • Full domain takeover (serve any content, intercept email, issue TLS certs via DNS-01)
  • Issue DV certificates from any CA using DNS challenge
  • Modify SPF/DKIM/DMARC → send authenticated email as target

6. MX TAKEOVER — EMAIL INTERCEPTION

When MX records point to deprovisioned mail services:

target.com MX → mail.deadservice.com (service discontinued)

If attacker can claim mail.deadservice.com or the mail tenant:

  • Receive password reset emails
  • Intercept sensitive communications
  • Potentially reset accounts that use email-based auth

Common Scenario

Expired Google Workspace / Microsoft 365 tenant → MX still points to Google/Microsoft → attacker creates new tenant and claims the domain.


7. WILDCARD DNS RISKS

If *.target.com has a wildcard CNAME to a claimable service:

  • Every undefined subdomain is vulnerable
  • anything.target.com can be taken over
  • Massively increases attack surface

Detection: dig A random1234567.target.com — if it resolves, wildcard exists.


8. DETECTION & EXPLOITATION DECISION TREE

Subdomain discovered (sub.target.com)?
├── Resolve DNS records
│   ├── Has CNAME → external service?
│   │   ├── HTTP response matches known fingerprint? (Section 3)
│   │   │   ├── YES → Attempt claim on provider (Section 4)
│   │   │   │   ├── Claim successful → TAKEOVER CONFIRMED
│   │   │   │   └── Claim blocked (name reserved, region locked) → document, try variations
│   │   │   └── NO → Service active, no takeover
│   │   └── CNAME target NXDOMAIN?
│   │       ├── Target is a registrable domain? → Register it → full control
│   │       └── Target is a subdomain of active provider → check provider claim process
│   │
│   ├── Has NS records → external nameserver?
│   │   ├── NS domain expired/available? → Register → FULL ZONE TAKEOVER
│   │   └── NS domain active → no takeover
│   │
│   ├── Has MX → external mail service?
│   │   ├── Mail service deprovisioned/claimable? → Claim tenant → EMAIL INTERCEPTION
│   │   └── Active mail service → no takeover
│   │
│   └── Has A record → IP address?
│       ├── IP belongs to elastic cloud (AWS EIP, Azure, GCP)?
│       │   ├── IP unassigned? → Claim IP → serve content
│       │   └── IP assigned to another customer → no takeover
│       └── IP belongs to dedicated server → no takeover
│
└── Post-takeover impact assessment
    ├── Shared cookies with parent domain? → Session hijacking
    ├── CORS trusts *.target.com? → Cross-origin data theft
    ├── CSP whitelists *.target.com? → XSS via taken-over subdomain
    ├── OAuth redirect_uri allows sub.target.com? → Token theft
    └── Can issue TLS cert for sub.target.com? → Full MITM

9. DEFENSE & REMEDIATION

| Action | Priority | |---|---| | Remove DNS records when deprovisioning cloud resources | Critical | | Monitor CNAME targets for NXDOMAIN responses | High | | Use DNS monitoring tools (SecurityTrails, DNSHistory) | High | | Claim/reserve resource names before deleting DNS records | High | | Audit NS delegations — ensure NS domains are owned and renewed | Critical | | Avoid wildcard CNAMEs to third-party services | Medium | | Implement Certificate Transparency monitoring | Medium |


10. TRICK NOTES — WHAT AI MODELS MISS

  1. CNAME ≠ takeover: A CNAME to S3 that returns 403 (bucket exists, private) is NOT vulnerable. Only NoSuchBucket (404) is.
  2. Region matters for S3: Bucket names are global, but website endpoints are regional. Try matching the region from the CNAME.
  3. GitHub Pages verification: GitHub added domain verification — org-verified domains cannot be claimed by others. Check if target uses this.
  4. Edge cases: Some providers (e.g., Cloudfront) require specific distribution configuration, not just domain claiming.
  5. Second-order takeover: sub.target.com CNAME → other.target.com CNAME → dead-service.com — the chain must be followed fully.
  6. SPF subdomain takeover: If SPF includes include:sub.target.com and you take over sub.target.com, you can modify its SPF TXT record to authorize your mail server → send spoofed email as target.com.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars2.3k
CategorySecurity
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

Languages

CSS

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions