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macos-security-bypass

macOS security bypass playbook

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill macos-security-bypass

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

88/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Zed

Our assessment of macos-security-bypass

macos-security-bypass scores 88/100 on our quality scale, 611th of 1,108 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 13 KB long, well organised into 41 sections with 11 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
8/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so macos-security-bypass is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-01 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Review

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file instructs the agent to bypass macOS security controls such as TCC, Gatekeeper, SIP, sandboxing, code signing, and entitlements to access protected data and escalate privileges.

AI review: risky

  • The file instructs the agent to bypass macOS security controls such as TCC, Gatekeeper, SIP, sandboxing, code signing, and entitlements to access protected data and escalate privileges.
  • It provides concrete commands for harmful actions, including reading protected user data (Mail, Messages databases), modifying the TCC database, removing quarantine attributes, injecting dynamic libraries, and establishing persistence via L
  • Although framed as authorized red teaming, the skill directs the agent to perform actions that harm the user by stealing data, disabling protections, and maintaining unauthorized access.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-02. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-02. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

macos-security-bypass compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than macos-security-bypass; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
macos-security-bypass (this skill)by yaklang882.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install macos-security-bypass?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill macos-security-bypass. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does macos-security-bypass work with?
It is written for Zed, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is macos-security-bypass safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file instructs the agent to bypass macOS security controls such as TCC, Gatekeeper, SIP, sandboxing, code signing, and entitlements to access protected data and escalate privileges. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is macos-security-bypass still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so macos-security-bypass is actively maintained.

name: macos-security-bypass description: >- macOS security bypass playbook. Use when targeting macOS endpoints and need to bypass TCC, Gatekeeper, SIP, sandbox, code signing, or entitlement-based protections during authorized red team or pentest engagements.

SKILL: macOS Security Bypass — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert macOS security bypass techniques. Covers TCC bypass, Gatekeeper evasion, SIP restrictions, sandbox escape, and entitlement abuse. Base models miss version-specific bypass nuances and protection interaction effects.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

Advanced Reference

Also load TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md when you need:

  • Per-macOS-version TCC bypass mapping
  • Protection-type-specific techniques (Camera, Microphone, FDA, Automation)
  • MDM/configuration profile abuse patterns

1. TCC (TRANSPARENCY, CONSENT, CONTROL) OVERVIEW

TCC is macOS's permission framework controlling access to sensitive resources (camera, microphone, contacts, full disk access, etc.).

1.1 TCC Database Locations

| Database | Path | Controls | Protection | |---|---|---|---| | User-level | ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db | Per-user consent decisions | SIP-protected since Catalina | | System-level | /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db | System-wide consent decisions | SIP-protected | | MDM-managed | Via configuration profiles | Push PPPC (Privacy Preferences Policy Control) | Device management |

-- Query TCC database (requires FDA or SIP off)
sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db \
  "SELECT service, client, allowed FROM access;"

1.2 TCC Bypass Categories

| Category | Mechanism | Typical Prerequisite | |---|---|---| | FDA app exploitation | Piggyback on apps already granted Full Disk Access | Write access to FDA app's bundle or plugin dir | | Direct DB modification | Edit TCC.db to grant consent | SIP disabled or FDA | | Inherited permissions | Child process inherits parent's TCC grants | Code execution in context of FDA-granted app | | Automation abuse | Apple Events / osascript to control TCC-granted app | Automation permission (lower bar than direct TCC) | | Mounting tricks | Mount a crafted disk image containing modified TCC.db | Local access, pre-Ventura | | SQL injection in TCC | Malformed bundle IDs triggering SQL injection in TCC subsystem | CVE-2023-32364 and similar |

1.3 Known TCC Bypass Patterns

Terminal / iTerm FDA inheritance: Terminal.app granted FDA → any command run inherits FDA → read any file.

# If Terminal has FDA, this reads protected files directly
cat ~/Library/Mail/V*/MailData/Envelope\ Index
cat ~/Library/Messages/chat.db

Finder automation: Automate Finder (lower permission bar) to access files in protected locations.

tell application "Finder"
  set f to POSIX file "/Users/target/Library/Mail/V9/MailData/Envelope Index"
  duplicate f to desktop
end tell

System Preferences / System Settings injection: Inject into a process that already has TCC permissions by writing to its Application Scripts folder.

MDM profile abuse: PPPC profiles can pre-approve TCC permissions. Rogue MDM enrollment or compromised MDM server → push PPPC payload.


2. GATEKEEPER BYPASS

Gatekeeper blocks unsigned or unnotarized apps from executing. Core enforcement depends on the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute.

2.1 Quarantine Attribute Removal

# Check quarantine attribute
xattr -l /path/to/app
# Output: com.apple.quarantine: 0083;...

# Remove quarantine (requires write access)
xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/app
# Recursive for app bundles
xattr -rd com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app

2.2 Bypass Techniques

| Technique | How It Works | macOS Version | |---|---|---| | xattr -d removal | Remove quarantine before execution | All (requires local access) | | App translocation bypass | Apps in certain locations skip translocation | Pre-Catalina | | Archive tools that strip quarantine | Some unarchiver apps don't propagate quarantine | Varies by tool | | Unsigned code in signed bundle | Notarized app bundles with unsigned nested helpers | Pre-Ventura (CVE-2022-42821) | | Safari auto-extract + open | Downloaded ZIP auto-extracted, app opened before quarantine fully applied | Safari-specific, patched | | ACL abuse | com.apple.quarantine can be blocked by ACLs set before download | Requires pre-positioning | | Disk image (DMG) tricks | DMG mounted from network share may not carry quarantine | Network share context | | BOM (Bill of Materials) bypass | Crafted BOM in pkg skips quarantine for extracted files | CVE-2022-22616 |

2.3 Gatekeeper Check Flow

App launched
│
├── com.apple.quarantine attribute present?
│   ├── No → execute (no Gatekeeper check)
│   └── Yes ↓
│
├── Code signature valid?
│   ├── No → block
│   └── Yes ↓
│
├── Notarized (stapled ticket or online check)?
│   ├── No → block (Catalina+)
│   └── Yes → execute
│
└── User override? (right-click → Open → confirm)
    └── Bypasses Gatekeeper once for this app

3. SIP (SYSTEM INTEGRITY PROTECTION)

SIP restricts root from modifying protected system locations, loading unsigned kernel extensions, and debugging system processes.

3.1 SIP-Protected Locations

/System/
/usr/ (except /usr/local/)
/bin/
/sbin/
/var/ (selected subdirs)
/Applications/ (pre-installed Apple apps)

3.2 SIP Status & Configuration

csrutil status              # Check SIP status
csrutil disable             # Recovery Mode only
csrutil enable --without fs # Partial disable (risky)

3.3 Entitlements That Bypass SIP

| Entitlement | Effect | |---|---| | com.apple.rootless.install | Write to SIP-protected paths | | com.apple.rootless.install.heritable | Child processes inherit SIP bypass | | com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory | JIT/unsigned code in memory | | com.apple.private.security.clear-library-validation | Load unsigned libraries |

3.4 Historical SIP Bypasses

| CVE | macOS | Technique | |---|---|---| | CVE-2021-30892 (Shrootless) | Monterey pre-12.0.1 | system_installd + post-install script in signed pkg | | CVE-2022-22583 | Monterey pre-12.2 | packagekit + mount point manipulation | | CVE-2022-46689 (MacDirtyCow) | Ventura pre-13.1 | Race condition on copy-on-write, overwrite SIP files | | CVE-2023-32369 (Migraine) | Ventura pre-13.4 | Migration Assistant TCC/SIP bypass via systemmigrationd | | CVE-2024-44243 | Sequoia pre-15.2 | StorageKit daemon exploitation |


4. SANDBOX ESCAPE

macOS sandboxing (App Sandbox, via sandbox-exec or entitlements) restricts app access to filesystem, network, and IPC.

4.1 Office Sandbox Escape Patterns

| Vector | Description | |---|---| | Open/Save dialog abuse | User grants file access via dialog → macro reads/writes beyond sandbox | | ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ persistence | Some sandbox profiles allow writing LaunchAgent plists | | Login Items manipulation | Add login item pointing to payload outside sandbox | | Shared container exploitation | Multiple apps sharing the same App Group container |

4.2 IPC-Based Escape

| IPC Mechanism | Escape Vector | |---|---| | XPC Services | Connect to privileged XPC service with insufficient client validation | | Mach Ports | Obtain send right to privileged task port | | Apple Events | Automate unsandboxed app to perform actions | | Distributed Notifications | Signal unsandboxed helper to execute payload | | Pasteboard | Write payload to pasteboard, have unsandboxed app consume it |

4.3 Browser Sandbox

  • Chromium: Multi-process model, renderer is sandboxed, browser process is not
  • Safari: WebContent process sandboxed, parent Safari process has more privileges
  • Exploit chain: renderer RCE → sandbox escape (via IPC bug to browser process) → system access

5. CODE SIGNING & ENTITLEMENTS

5.1 Inspecting Signatures and Entitlements

codesign -dv --verbose=4 /path/to/app       # Signature details
codesign -d --entitlements :- /path/to/app   # Dump entitlements
security cms -D -i /path/to/mobileprovision  # Provisioning profile

# Verify signature validity
codesign --verify --deep --strict /path/to/app
spctl --assess --type execute /path/to/app   # Gatekeeper assessment

5.2 Entitlement Abuse for Privilege Escalation

| Entitlement | Abuse Scenario | |---|---| | com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation | Load attacker dylib into entitled process | | com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables | DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES injection | | com.apple.security.get-task-allow | Attach debugger, inject code | | com.apple.security.cs.debugger | Debug any process | | com.apple.private.apfs.revert-to-snapshot | Revert APFS snapshots, bypass modifications |

5.3 Hardened Runtime Bypass

Hardened Runtime prevents: DYLD env vars, debugging, unsigned memory execution. Bypasses:

  • Find entitled apps that weaken Hardened Runtime (disable-library-validation)
  • Exploit JIT-entitled apps (browsers, VMs) for unsigned code execution
  • Use get-task-allow entitled debug builds left in production

5.4 Library Validation Bypass

Library validation ensures only Apple-signed or same-team-signed dylibs load.

# Find apps with library validation disabled
codesign -d --entitlements :- /Applications/*.app/Contents/MacOS/* 2>/dev/null | \
  grep -l "disable-library-validation"

6. PERSISTENCE AFTER BYPASS

| Method | Location | Survives Reboot | Notes | |---|---|---|---| | LaunchAgent | ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ | Yes | User-level, runs at login | | LaunchDaemon | /Library/LaunchDaemons/ | Yes | Root-level, runs at boot | | Login Items | ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/ | Yes | Visible in System Settings | | Cron | crontab -e | Yes | Often overlooked by defenders | | Dylib hijack | Writable dylib search path | Yes | Triggered when target app launches | | Folder Action | ~/Library/Scripts/Folder Action Scripts/ | Yes | Triggers on folder events |


7. macOS SECURITY BYPASS DECISION TREE

Target is macOS endpoint
│
├── Need to execute untrusted binary?
│   ├── Quarantine attribute present?
│   │   ├── Yes → xattr -d com.apple.quarantine (§2.1)
│   │   └── No → execute directly
│   └── Gatekeeper still blocks?
│       ├── Signed but not notarized → right-click → Open override
│       └── Unsigned → embed in signed bundle or use archive tricks (§2.2)
│
├── Need access to TCC-protected resources?
│   ├── FDA-granted app available?
│   │   ├── Yes → exploit FDA app context (§1.3)
│   │   └── No ↓
│   ├── Automation permission obtainable?
│   │   ├── Yes → Apple Events to TCC-granted app (§1.3)
│   │   └── No ↓
│   ├── SIP disabled?
│   │   ├── Yes → direct TCC.db modification (§1.2)
│   │   └── No → check version-specific TCC bypass (→ TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md)
│   └── MDM present?
│       └── Compromised MDM → push PPPC profile (§1.3)
│
├── Need to bypass SIP?
│   ├── Check macOS version → historical SIP CVE? (§3.4)
│   ├── Find entitled Apple binary → piggyback SIP-bypass entitlement (§3.3)
│   └── Recovery Mode access? → csrutil disable (§3.2)
│
├── Need sandbox escape?
│   ├── Office macro context → dialog/LaunchAgent tricks (§4.1)
│   ├── XPC service with weak validation → IPC escape (§4.2)
│   └── Browser context → renderer → sandbox escape chain (§4.3)
│
├── Need to inject into signe

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars2.3k
CategorySecurity
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

Languages

CSS

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions