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name: stride-analysis-patterns description: Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.

STRIDE Analysis Patterns

Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.

When to Use This Skill

• Starting new threat modeling sessions
• Analyzing existing system architecture
• Reviewing security design decisions
• Creating threat documentation
• Training teams on threat identification
• Compliance and audit preparation

Core Concepts

1. STRIDE Categories

S - Spoofing       → Authentication threats
T - Tampering      → Integrity threats
R - Repudiation    → Non-repudiation threats
I - Information    → Confidentiality threats
    Disclosure
D - Denial of      → Availability threats
    Service
E - Elevation of   → Authorization threats
    Privilege

2. Threat Analysis Matrix

| Category | Question | Control Family | | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | -------------- | | Spoofing | Can attacker pretend to be someone else? | Authentication | | Tampering | Can attacker modify data in transit/rest? | Integrity | | Repudiation | Can attacker deny actions? | Logging/Audit | | Info Disclosure | Can attacker access unauthorized data? | Encryption | | DoS | Can attacker disrupt availability? | Rate limiting | | Elevation | Can attacker gain higher privileges? | Authorization |

Templates and detailed worked examples

Full template library lives in references/details.md. Read that file when you need concrete templates for this skill.

Best Practices

Do's

• Involve stakeholders - Security, dev, and ops perspectives
• Be systematic - Cover all STRIDE categories
• Prioritize realistically - Focus on high-impact threats
• Update regularly - Threat models are living documents
• Use visual aids - DFDs help communication

Don'ts

• Don't skip categories - Each reveals different threats
• Don't assume security - Question every component
• Don't work in isolation - Collaborative modeling is better
• Don't ignore low-probability - High-impact threats matter
• Don't stop at identification - Follow through with mitigations