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cvss-scoring

Produces CVSS v4.0 vector strings from plain-text vulnerability descriptions by systematically evaluating base metrics

Install / Use

npx skills add trailofbits/skills --skill cvss-scoring

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

92/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of cvss-scoring

cvss-scoring scores 92/100 on our quality scale, 386th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 35%).

Its SKILL.md is 15 KB long, well organised into 17 sections with 3 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 7,225 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
18/20
Description
12/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so cvss-scoring is actively maintained.
  • It is released under the CC-BY-SA-4.0 license; check its terms before commercial use.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-11-16. Automated pattern scan on 2026-11-15. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

cvss-scoring compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than cvss-scoring; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
cvss-scoring (this skill)by trailofbits927.2k54d agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install cvss-scoring?
Run npx skills add trailofbits/skills --skill cvss-scoring. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does cvss-scoring work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is cvss-scoring safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is CC-BY-SA-4.0-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is cvss-scoring still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so cvss-scoring is actively maintained.

name: cvss-scoring description: "Produces CVSS v4.0 vector strings from plain-text vulnerability descriptions by systematically evaluating base metrics. Use when scoring a vulnerability, generating a CVSS vector, or estimating severity." allowed-tools:

  • Read

CVSS v4.0 Vector Scoring

Produce a CVSS v4.0 vector string from a plain-text vulnerability description, plus a FIRST.org calculator link with that vector already applied, which is where the numeric score comes from. Do NOT attempt to compute the numeric score.

When to Use

  • Scoring a vulnerability finding for a security audit report
  • Generating a CVSS v4.0 vector from a bug description
  • Comparing relative severity of multiple findings
  • The user asks "what's the CVSS for this?" or "score this vulnerability"

When NOT to Use

  • CVSS v3.1 is explicitly requested (use the organization's CVSS v3.1 scoring guide instead)
  • The description is too vague to assess any metric (ask for clarification first)
  • The input does not describe an exploitable security weakness (see Input Validation below)
  • Scoring risk (CVSS measures intrinsic severity, not deployment-specific risk)
  • Computing the numeric score (direct the user to the FIRST.org calculator)

Input Validation

Run these checks before scoring any metric. If any check fails, address it before proceeding.

1. Is this a vulnerability? A CVSS vector is meaningful only for exploitable security weaknesses. If the input describes a code-quality issue, design concern, or finding with no security impact, refuse and respond:

This description does not appear to describe an exploitable vulnerability. CVSS measures the severity of security weaknesses; it does not apply to {category}. If you believe there is an exploitable impact, restate the description in terms of attacker capability and re-run.

Do not fabricate metrics to satisfy the request.

2. Does the input use CVSS v3.1 vocabulary? Watch for Scope (now removed), User Interaction: Required, or the unprefixed CIA triad. If detected, surface the version mismatch explicitly in the output before translating:

Input uses CVSS v3.1 vocabulary; translating to v4.0 semantics. The following mappings were applied: {list}.

Do not translate silently.

Rationalizations to Reject

These are common scoring errors. Reject this reasoning when you encounter it:

  • "Network accessible means AV:N" -- AV measures the furthest distance from which the attack can launch, not whether the component is on a network. A privilege escalation on a network service is still AV:L if the attacker needs local shell access.
  • "It's serious so all impacts are High" -- Each impact metric (VC/VI/VA/SC/SI/SA) must be independently justified. An RCE that gives code execution has VI:H (attacker can modify arbitrary data/code) but not necessarily VC:H (unless data is actually exposed) or VA:H (unless the attacker can crash or deny the service).
  • "A dependency is a subsequent system" -- Component relationships do not define the system boundary. A dedicated database or an application using a vulnerable library can be part of the same vulnerable system; counting that impact again in SC/SI/SA inflates severity.
  • "No mention of subsequent systems means SC/SI/SA are all None" -- Identify the vulnerable system boundary and consider supported impacts outside it. If that boundary or an external impact is unclear, explain the uncertainty and flag the chosen value with [ASSUMED].
  • "Default to worst case when uncertain" -- CVSS v4.0 requires reasonable worst case, not absolute worst case. When uncertain, choose the most defensible value and flag it with [ASSUMED].
  • "AC:H because there are prerequisites" -- In v4.0, AC measures evasion of security-enhancing mechanisms (ASLR, DEP). Prerequisites like specific configurations or race conditions belong in AT, not AC. This is the most common v3.1-to-v4.0 migration error.
  • "UI:R maps to UI:P or UI:A" -- v4.0 split v3.1's Required into Passive and Active. Passive means involuntary interaction (browsing a page). Active means the user must consciously perform a specific action (installing software, changing a setting, clicking through a warning). Don't default to Active.

Input Handling

The input is plain text describing a vulnerability. It may contain severity, difficulty, implementation specifics, exploitation scenarios, and remediation recommendations.

Before scoring any metric, extract and list all security-relevant facts:

  1. What is the vulnerable component? (software, library, service, device)
  2. How is it accessed? (network service, local binary, physical device, adjacent network)
  3. What privileges does the attacker need? (unauthenticated, user-level, admin)
  4. What does the attacker achieve? (read data, modify data, execute code, crash service, escalate privileges)
  5. What is the vulnerable system boundary, including components serving its function? Are systems outside that boundary affected?
  6. Are there prerequisites or conditions for exploitation? (specific config, race condition, on-path position)
  7. Is user interaction required? If so, what kind?
  8. Is there information about exploit maturity? (PoC available, actively exploited, unreported)

This fact extraction prevents anchoring bias from emotional language in the description.

If any exploitability metric (AV, AC, AT, PR, UI) cannot be confidently determined from the description, ask the user the fact-extraction questions above before proceeding. These five metrics drive most of the score and are the highest-impact place for a wrong guess. Do not default-and-flag them silently.

If an impact metric (VC/VI/VA/SC/SI/SA) is ambiguous, state the ambiguity, explain which values are plausible and why, choose the most defensible default, and flag it with [ASSUMED] in the output.

Scoring Workflow

Score metrics in this exact order. For each metric, read the detailed definitions in the metrics reference.

Phase 1: Exploitability Metrics

Evaluate these 5 metrics based on the extracted facts:

1. Attack Vector (AV): N / A / L / P

  • Network: exploitable remotely via network stack (HTTP, TCP, DNS)
  • Adjacent: requires same LAN, Bluetooth, WiFi, or logical subnet
  • Local: requires local access (shell, file drop, terminal emulation)
  • Physical: requires physically touching/manipulating the device

2. Attack Complexity (AC): L / H

  • Low (default): no security mechanisms to evade
  • High: must bypass ASLR, DEP, or obtain target-specific secrets
  • NOTE: race conditions and specific configs go in AT, not AC (v4.0 change from v3.1)

3. Attack Requirements (AT): N / P

  • None: no special deployment conditions needed
  • Present: requires specific configuration, race condition, on-path position, or other deployment-dependent condition
  • This metric is NEW in v4.0 -- it absorbs conditions that v3.1 lumped into AC

4. Privileges Required (PR): N / L / H

  • None: unauthenticated
  • Low: basic user account
  • High: admin or elevated privileges

5. User Interaction (UI): N / P / A

  • None: no user action needed
  • Passive: user does something involuntary (visits a page, receives a message)
  • Active: user must consciously perform a specific action (install software, click through warning, change a setting)
  • v4.0 split v3.1's "Required" into Passive and Active -- choose carefully

Phase 2: Vulnerable System Impact

These measure impact within the vulnerable system. Establish its boundary using FIRST's system-of-interest model: computing logic with a coherent function and set of security policies. Components designed exclusively to serve that system belong inside it, such as a dedicated database or an embedded library and its consuming application. Score impacts to those components in VC/VI/VA.

6. Confidentiality (VC): H / L / N

  • High: total loss -- all data in the vulnerable system exposed
  • Low: some data exposed but attacker lacks control over what/how much
  • None: no confidentiality impact

7. Integrity (VI): H / L / N

  • High: total loss -- attacker can modify any data in the vulnerable system
  • Low: limited modification possible
  • None: no integrity impact

8. Availability (VA): H / L / N

  • High: sustained or persistent total loss, or partial loss with a direct, serious consequence (e.g., preventing new connections while existing connections remain available)
  • Low: reduced performance or interrupted availability without a direct, serious consequence; repeated exploitation cannot completely deny service
  • None: no availability impact

Phase 3: Subsequent System Impact

These measure impact to systems outside the vulnerable system boundary. This replaces v3.1's Scope metric.

A dependency, data flow, or trust relationship alone does not make a component a subsequent system. Identify a separate system outside the boundary and the impact exploitation causes there; do not count the same within-system impact again in SC/SI/SA. A user's browser affected by web-application XSS or other guests compromised through a hypervisor vulnerability can be subsequent systems.

9. Subsequent Confidentiality (SC): H / L / N

10. Subsequent Integrity (SI): H / L / N

11. Subsequent Availability (SA): H / L / N

If the description gives no indication of subsequent system impact, default to N but flag with [ASSUMED]. Common cases where subsequent impact is non-None:

  • XSS: SC:L, SI:L (browser is a subsequent system). UI depends on whether normal browsing triggers the payload (P) or the user must navigate to an attacker-crafted resource (A) -- not on stored vs. reflected.
  • VM escape: SC:H, SI:H, SA:H (host/other VMs are subsequent systems)
  • DNS poisoning: SI:H, SA:H (downstream resolvers are subsequent systems)
  • Compromised auth server: consider SC:H, SI:H for affected relying services outside the vulnerable system boundary

Phase 4: Optional Metrics

Threat -- Exploit Maturity (E): Include ONLY if the description provides evidence.

  • Attacked (A): known active exploitation or exploit toolkits available
  • Proof-of-Concept (P): public PoC code exists, no known attacks
  • Unreported (U): no public PoC, no known attacks
  • Not Defined (X): no information available (default -- omit from vector)

Environmental metrics: Include only when the source description provides relevant context — i.e., the auditor states the deployed environment's CIA requirements (CR/IR/AR) or describes a compensating control that changes a base metric (modified base: MAV/MAC/MAT/MPR/MUI/MVC/MVI/MVA/MSC/MSI/MSA). Otherwise omit and note: "Environmental metrics omitted -- add if the target environment's CIA requirements differ from defaults."

Supplemental metrics: Include only when the source description provides relevant context — i.e., the finding describes a safety impact (S), recovery characteristic (R), or automation potential (AU). These are informational and do not affect the numeric score. Otherwise omit and note: "Supplemental metrics omitted -- add for communication purposes if needed."

See the Vector String section below for canonical ordering when these are included.

Output Format

Present the output in three parts:

Part 1: Metric Justification Table

| Metric | Value | Justification |
|--------|-------|---------------|
| AV     | N     | Exploitable via HTTP API without local access |
| AC     | L     | No security mechanisms to evade |
| AT     | N     | No deployment-specific conditions required |
| PR     | N     | Unauthenticated endpoint |
| UI     | N     | No user interaction needed |
| VC     | H     | Attacker gains read access to all application data |
| VI     | H     | Attacker can modify arbitrary records |
| VA     | N     | No availability impact observed |
| SC     | N     | No evidence of downstream system impact [ASSUMED] |
| SI     | N     | No evidence

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars7.2k
CategorySecurity
Updated1mo ago
Forks615

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions