---

name: deploying-active-directory-honeytokens description: 'Deploys deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake privileged accounts with AdminCount=1, fake SPNs for Kerberoasting detection (honeyroasting), decoy GPOs with cpassword traps, and fake BloodHound paths. Monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4769, 4625, 4662, 5136 for honeytoken interaction. Use when implementing AD deception defenses for detecting lateral movement, credential theft, and reconnaissance.

' domain: cybersecurity subdomain: deception-technology tags:

• active-directory
• honeytokens
• kerberoasting
• deception
• detection
• bloodhound
• gpo version: '1.0' author: mukul975 license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf:
• DE.CM-01
• DE.AE-06
• PR.IR-01 mitre_attack:
• T1558.003
• T1558.004
• T1110.003
• T1003.006
• T1552.006

---

Deploying Active Directory Honeytokens

When to Use

• When deploying deception-based detection in Active Directory environments
• When detecting Kerberoasting attacks via fake SPN honeytokens (honeyroasting)
• When creating tripwire accounts to detect credential theft and lateral movement
• When building decoy GPOs to detect Group Policy Preference password harvesting
• When creating deceptive BloodHound paths to misdirect and detect attackers
• When supplementing existing AD monitoring with high-fidelity detection signals

Prerequisites

• Domain Admin or delegated AD administration privileges
• Active Directory domain (Windows Server 2016+ recommended)
• Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic)
• PowerShell 5.1+ with ActiveDirectory module
• Group Policy Management Console (GPMC)
• Understanding of AD security, Kerberos, and BloodHound attack paths

Background

Why AD Honeytokens

Traditional signature-based detection misses novel attack techniques. Honeytokens provide high-fidelity detection with near-zero false positives because any interaction with a decoy object is inherently suspicious. In Active Directory:

• Fake privileged accounts detect credential dumping (DCSync, NTDS.dit extraction)
• Fake SPNs detect Kerberoasting reconnaissance (TGS requests for nonexistent services)
• Decoy GPOs detect Group Policy Preference password harvesting
• Fake BloodHound paths mislead attackers using graph-based AD analysis

Key Detection Event IDs

| Event ID | Description | Honeytoken Use | |----------|-------------|----------------| | 4769 | Kerberos TGS ticket requested | Detect Kerberoast against honey SPN | | 4625 | Failed logon attempt | Detect use of fake credentials from decoy GPO | | 4662 | Directory service object accessed | Detect DACL read on honeytoken user | | 5136 | Directory service object modified | Detect modification of decoy GPO | | 5137 | Directory service object created | Detect GPO creation mimicking decoy | | 4768 | Kerberos TGT requested | Detect AS-REP roasting of honey account |

Making Honeytokens Realistic

Per Trimarc Security research, effective honeytokens must appear legitimate:

• Age the account: Repurpose old inactive accounts (10-15 year old accounts in similarly aged domains appear authentic)
• Set AdminCount=1: Flags the account as having elevated AD rights, making it an attractive Kerberoasting target
• Use realistic naming: Match organizational naming conventions (svc_sqlbackup, admin.maintenance, svc_exchange_legacy)
• Set old password date: Password age of 10+ years with an SPN looks like a high-value, neglected service account to attackers
• Add group memberships: Place in visible groups like "Remote Desktop Users" or a custom "Backup Operators" to increase attacker interest
• Avoid detection tells: Attackers check creation date vs. last logon vs. password change date for consistency

Instructions

Step 1: Deploy Fake Privileged Admin Account

Create a honeytoken account that mimics a legacy privileged service account.

# Import the deployment module
Import-Module .\scripts\Deploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1

# Create a honeytoken admin account
$honeyAdmin = New-HoneytokenAdmin `
    -SamAccountName "svc_sqlbackup_legacy" `
    -DisplayName "SQL Backup Service (Legacy)" `
    -Description "Legacy SQL Server backup service account - DO NOT DELETE" `
    -OU "OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com" `
    -PasswordLength 128 `
    -SetAdminCount $true

Write-Host "Honeytoken admin created: $($honeyAdmin.DistinguishedName)"

Step 2: Deploy Fake SPN for Kerberoasting Detection

Assign a realistic but fake SPN to the honeytoken account. Any TGS request for this SPN is definitively malicious (honeyroasting).

# Add fake SPN to honeytoken account
$honeySPN = Add-HoneytokenSPN `
    -SamAccountName "svc_sqlbackup_legacy" `
    -ServiceClass "MSSQLSvc" `
    -Hostname "sql-legacy-bak01.corp.example.com" `
    -Port 1433

Write-Host "Honey SPN registered: $($honeySPN.SPN)"
Write-Host "Monitor Event ID 4769 for TGS requests targeting this SPN"

Step 3: Deploy Decoy GPO with Credential Trap

Create a fake GPO in SYSVOL with an embedded cpassword (Group Policy Preference password). Attackers using tools like Get-GPPPassword or gpp-decrypt will find and attempt to use these credentials, triggering detection.

# Create decoy GPO with cpassword trap
$decoyGPO = New-DecoyGPO `
    -GPOName "Server Maintenance Policy (Legacy)" `
    -DecoyUsername "admin_maintenance" `
    -DecoyDomain "CORP" `
    -SYSVOLPath "\\corp.example.com\SYSVOL\corp.example.com\Policies" `
    -EnableAuditSACL $true

Write-Host "Decoy GPO created: $($decoyGPO.GPOGuid)"
Write-Host "SACL audit enabled - any read attempt will generate Event ID 4663"

Step 4: Create Deceptive BloodHound Paths

Set ACL permissions that create fake attack paths visible to BloodHound/SharpHound reconnaissance, leading attackers toward monitored honeytokens.

# Create fake BloodHound attack path
$deceptivePath = New-DeceptiveBloodHoundPath `
    -HoneytokenSamAccount "svc_sqlbackup_legacy" `
    -TargetHighValueGroup "Domain Admins" `
    -IntermediateOU "OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com"

Write-Host "Deceptive path created: $($deceptivePath.PathDescription)"

Step 5: Configure Detection Rules

Set up SIEM detection rules to alert on any honeytoken interaction.

# Using the Python detection agent
from agent import ADHoneytokenMonitor

monitor = ADHoneytokenMonitor(config_path="honeytoken_config.json")

# Register all honeytokens for monitoring
monitor.register_honeytoken("svc_sqlbackup_legacy", token_type="admin_account")
monitor.register_honeytoken("MSSQLSvc/sql-legacy-bak01.corp.example.com:1433", token_type="spn")
monitor.register_honeytoken("admin_maintenance", token_type="gpo_credential")

# Generate SIEM detection rules
splunk_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem="splunk")
sentinel_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem="sentinel")
sigma_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem="sigma")

for rule in sigma_rules:
    print(f"Rule: {rule['title']}")
    print(f"  Detection: {rule['detection_logic']}")

Step 6: Validate Deployment

Test the honeytokens to ensure detection fires correctly.

# Validate honeytoken deployment
$validation = Test-HoneytokenDeployment `
    -SamAccountName "svc_sqlbackup_legacy" `
    -ValidateAdminCount `
    -ValidateSPN `
    -ValidateGPODecoy `
    -ValidateAuditPolicy

$validation | Format-Table Check, Status, Details -AutoSize

Examples

Full Deployment Pipeline

Import-Module .\scripts\Deploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1

# Deploy complete honeytoken suite
$deployment = Deploy-FullHoneytokenSuite `
    -Environment "Production" `
    -ServiceAccountOU "OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com" `
    -SYSVOLPath "\\corp.example.com\SYSVOL\corp.example.com\Policies" `
    -TokenCount 3 `
    -IncludeSPN $true `
    -IncludeGPODecoy $true `
    -IncludeBloodHoundPath $true `
    -SIEMType "Splunk"

# Output deployment report
$deployment.Tokens | Format-Table Name, Type, SPN, DetectionRule -AutoSize
$deployment | Export-Csv "honeytoken_deployment_report.csv" -NoTypeInformation

Kerberoasting Detection Query (Splunk)

index=wineventlog EventCode=4769 ServiceName="svc_sqlbackup_legacy"
| eval alert_severity="critical"
| eval alert_type="honeytoken_kerberoast"
| table _time, src_ip, Account_Name, ServiceName, Ticket_Encryption_Type
| sort - _time

Microsoft Sentinel KQL Detection

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4769
| where ServiceName in ("svc_sqlbackup_legacy", "svc_exchange_legacy")
| extend AlertType = "Honeytoken Kerberoast Detected"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, ServiceName, IpAddress, TicketEncryptionType

References

• Trimarc Security - The Art of the Honeypot Account: https://www.hub.trimarcsecurity.com/post/the-art-of-the-honeypot-account-making-the-unusual-look-normal
• ADSecurity.org - Detecting Kerberoasting Activity Part 2 (Honeypot): https://adsecurity.org/?p=3513
• Microsoft Defender for Identity Honeytokens: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftthreatprotectionblog/deceptive-defense-best-practices-for-identity-based-honeytokens-in-microsoft-def/3851641
• SpecterOps - Kerberoasting and AES-256: https://specterops.io/blog/2025/10/21/is-kerberoasting-still-a-risk-when-aes-256-kerberos-encryption-is-enabled/
• APT29a Blog - Deploying Honeytokens in AD: https://apt29a.blogspot.com/2019/11/deploying-honeytokens-in-active.html
• ADSecurity.org - Detecting Kerberoasting Activity: https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458