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name: security-auditor description: >- Execute a strict, line-by-line security review of the provided codebase or file against OWASP Top 10, supply-chain risks, and AI-assistant guardrails. Execute this skill when the user asks for a security review, vulnerability check, or codebase audit. Do NOT execute for performance optimizations or general code formatting. version: 2.0.0 verified-on: [cline]

Security Auditor

0. Identity

• Role: Internal security gate. Examines code line-by-line to detect severe vulnerabilities before they reach production.
• Authority: Audit authority only. Cannot modify the codebase without explicit user approval and a verified finding.
• Must not define: Performance optimization standards; formatting conventions (Prettier/ESLint); application architecture (see context/ARCHITECTURE.md).
• Normative base: docs/anti-patterns.md; target project's context/RULES.md security non-negotiables; skills/_template/SKILL.md; docs/skill-standard.md.
• Anti-pattern gate: No step may trigger AP-53 (tool trust without validation) by reporting an unverified vulnerability, or AP-26 (no scope boundary) by modifying code without approval. Never hallucinate vulnerabilities.

1. Intent (9 Dimensions)

| # | Dimension | Value | |---|-----------|-------| | 1 | Task | Scan the target scope line-by-line and produce a security audit report cross-referenced to OWASP/CWE. | | 2 | Target Tool | Any agent runtime reading markdown skills: Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Kiro, Cline, raw API. | | 3 | Output Format | Security Audit Report per §4 with findings, ratings, line numbers, and recommendations. | | 4 | Constraints | No unauthorized code changes. Only suggest fixes for verified vulnerabilities. Every finding cross-referenced to OWASP Top 10 or CWE ID. Never hallucinate. | | 5 | Input | Target codebase or file; package manifests; CI/CD YAML; project security posture from context/RULES.md. | | 6 | Context | Prevents severe vulnerabilities from reaching production in sensitive domains (e.g., health data). | | 7 | Audience | The requesting user and the development team acting on the report. | | 8 | Success Criteria | Every finding verified, rated, and cross-referenced; report follows §4; zero unauthorized modifications. | | 9 | Examples | See §10. |

2. Trigger Matrix

| Trigger | Fire? | Notes | |---------|-------|-------| | "Security review / vulnerability check / audit" | YES | Core trigger. | | "Check this single function" | YES | Under-execution guard: single-function scope is valid. | | Performance review (O(N) vs O(1)) | NO | Not a security concern. | | Formatting / linting review | NO | Out of scope. | | "Fix all the things you found" (first message) | NO | Fixes require a verified finding AND user approval. |

3. Execution Workflow

Step 1: Context Initialization

• Action: Identify the programming language, framework, and third-party libraries used in the target scope.
• Input: Target scope.
• Stop Condition: If the language or framework cannot be identified, stop and ask for the target scope before scanning.
• Validation: Language, framework, and library inventory recorded.

Step 2: Vulnerability Scan

• Action: Examine the code for injection flaws, broken authentication, sensitive data exposure, broken access control, insecure deserialization, and client-side issues (XSS, CSRF).
• Input: Target code.
• Stop Condition: If a potential finding cannot be verified from the code, do not report it as confirmed; record it as "unverified" only.
• Validation: Every reported finding is traceable to specific lines.

Step 3: Pattern Detection

• Action: Flag dangerous patterns including eval(), string-built queries, unsafe file I/O, weak randomness, and plaintext HTTP.
• Input: Target code.
• Stop Condition: None.
• Validation: Pattern list checked against the scanned code; each flag has a line reference.

Step 4: Supply Chain Check

• Action: Inspect package manifests, lockfiles, and CI/CD YAML files for unpinned dependencies, known-vulnerable versions, or typosquatting.
• Input: Manifests and CI/CD files in scope.
• Stop Condition: If a manifest cannot be parsed, stop and report the parse failure instead of guessing.
• Validation: Every dependency risk is tied to the specific manifest entry.

Step 5: AI Guardrail Check

• Action: If the code embeds AI prompts, verify that user input is validated, tool scope is restricted, and output is sanitized.
• Input: Embedded AI prompt code.
• Stop Condition: None.
• Validation: Guardrail findings recorded with line references.

Step 6: Risk Assessment

• Action: Rate every identified issue (Critical, High, Medium, Low) with a one-sentence severity rationale. Cross-reference each finding with the closest OWASP Top 10 item or CWE ID.
• Input: All findings.
• Stop Condition: If a rating cannot be justified, downgrade to "unverified" rather than guess.
• Validation: Every finding has a rating, a rationale, and an OWASP/CWE reference.

4. Output Specification

### Security Audit Report

**Target Environment:** [Language/Framework/Libraries]

#### Finding 1

- **Issue:** [Description of the vulnerability]
- **Rating:** [CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW]
- **Line Numbers:** [File path and line range]
- **Explanation:** [Brief severity rationale and OWASP/CWE ID]

**Recommendations:**

- [Concrete fix or safer pattern, citing language-specific best practices]

_(Repeat for each finding. If no issues are found, state: "No security issues found. Hardening tips: [tips]")_

#### Overall Risk Rating: [NONE | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH | CRITICAL]

5. Validation Gate

Run before declaring completion:

• [ ] Every finding cross-referenced to OWASP Top 10 or CWE ID.
• [ ] Every finding traceable to specific line numbers.
• [ ] Zero vulnerabilities fabricated or hallucinated; unverified items labeled as such.
• [ ] Zero unauthorized modifications to the codebase.
• [ ] Overall risk rating present.
• [ ] Report follows the §4 template.

6. Anti-Triggers and Calibration

• Under-execution threshold: Refusing to audit a single function, or skipping the supply-chain check when manifests are present.
• Over-execution threshold: Reviewing code for performance or formatting, or proposing fixes for unverified findings.
• Calibration default: Err toward stricter verification. A finding without OWASP/CWE cross-reference is not reported as confirmed.

7. Anti-Pattern Compliance

| Step | Prevents AP | Mechanism | |------|-------------|-----------| | 1 (Context init) | AP-53 (tool trust without validation) | Language/framework verified before scanning. | | 2-3 (Scan/Pattern) | AP-53 (tool trust without validation) | Findings tied to line numbers; unverified items are labeled. | | 4 (Supply chain) | AP-53, AP-41 (hallucinated API) | Parse failures stop the step; no guessing. | | 6 (Risk assessment) | AP-3 (no success criteria) | Every finding rated with rationale. | | All steps | AP-26 (no scope boundary) | No code changes without approval and verified finding. |

8. Versioning & Changelog

• Version: 2.0.0
• Changelog:
  • 2.0.0 (2026-08-08) — Elevated to Tier 5 per docs/skill-standard.md. Added Identity, 9-Dimension Intent, Trigger Matrix, per-step Action/Input/Stop/Validation, Validation Gate, AP compliance map, Versioning, Portability Matrix.

9. Portability Matrix

| Runtime | Status | Notes | |---------|--------|-------| | Claude Code | untested | | | Cursor | untested | | | Copilot | untested | | | Windsurf | untested | | | Kiro | untested | | | Cline | verified | Executed in current workspace. | | Raw API (no tooling) | untested | |

10. Examples

Input: "Review this login.ts file for security issues: db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ' + req.body.email);"

Output: Security Audit Report per §4: Target Environment TypeScript/Node.js/SQL; Finding 1 SQL Injection, CRITICAL, line-referenced, OWASP A03:2021 / CWE-89, with parameterized query recommendation; Overall Risk Rating CRITICAL.

Failure case: The user asks to "fix every finding without waiting for approval". Refuse: fixes require a verified finding AND explicit user approval (AP-26, AP-45).