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windows-boundaries

Use when crossing a Windows security boundary or escaping a sandbox — kernel/user crossing (win32k/dxgkrnl UAF CVE-2025-24983), BYOVD kernel R/W, UAC/COM elevation, AppContainer/LPAC & Chromium-Mojo sandbox escape (CVE-2025-2783), PPL bypass, RPC/ALPC & named-pipe impersonation

Install / Use

npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill windows-boundaries

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

84/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of windows-boundaries

windows-boundaries scores 84/100 on our quality scale, 841st of 1,096 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 8.8 KB long, split into 7 sections with 1 code example: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

It has 377 GitHub stars, a meaningful sign that others use it.

Substance
29/30
Structure
15/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
11/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated 14 days ago, so windows-boundaries is actively maintained.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands.

Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-05. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

windows-boundaries compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than windows-boundaries; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
windows-boundaries (this skill)by hypnguyen12098437714d agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong10090.8k19d agoCLAUDE.md
headroomby headroomlabs-ai10074.4ktodayCLAUDE.md
Scraplingby D4Vinci10085.7ktodayMCP Server
crawl4aiby unclecode10084.8k9d agoMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install windows-boundaries?
Run npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill windows-boundaries. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does windows-boundaries work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is windows-boundaries safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is windows-boundaries still maintained?
The repository was last updated 14 days ago, so windows-boundaries is actively maintained.

name: windows-boundaries description: Use when crossing a Windows security boundary or escaping a sandbox — kernel/user crossing (win32k/dxgkrnl UAF CVE-2025-24983), BYOVD kernel R/W, UAC/COM elevation, AppContainer/LPAC & Chromium-Mojo sandbox escape (CVE-2025-2783), PPL bypass, RPC/ALPC & named-pipe impersonation metadata: type: offensive phase: exploitation tools: WinDbg, OleViewDotNet, NtObjectManager, PrintSpoofer, GodPotato, PPLBlade, UACME, loldrivers, Sysmon mitre: TA0004 kill_chain: phase: [exploit, install] step: [4, 5] attck_tactics: [TA0002, TA0004, TA0005] attck_techniques: [T1068, T1211, T1548.002, T1134.001, T1134.002, T1543.003, T1559, T1112, T1003.001, T1014] depends_on: [privesc-windows, exploit-development] feeds_into: [red-team-ops, edr-evasion] inputs: [sandbox_config, kernel_info, foothold_token] outputs: [boundary_escape, elevated_access, kernel_rw_primitive, system_token] references:

  • references/kernel-user-boundary.md
  • references/byovd-kernel-rw.md
  • references/integrity-uac-com.md
  • references/sandbox-appcontainer-escape.md
  • references/ppl-protected-process.md
  • references/rpc-alpc-boundary.md scripts:
  • scripts/enum_boundaries.ps1
  • scripts/ioctl_fuzzer.py
  • scripts/byovd_kernel_rw.c
  • scripts/uac_com_elevate.cpp
  • scripts/sandbox_escape_probe.py
  • scripts/ppl_byovdll.c
  • scripts/named_pipe_impersonate.c

Windows Security Boundaries

When to Activate

  • Planning a privilege-escalation path that crosses a Windows security boundary (integrity level, AppContainer/LPAC, PPL, or the kernel/user line)
  • Sandbox-escape research: browser renderer (Chromium/Edge Mojo), Office WebView, packaged apps, AppContainer/LPAC brokers
  • Reaching Ring 0 via win32k/dxgkrnl bugs or BYOVD for a kernel read/write primitive
  • Defeating PPL to dump LSASS or tamper with EDR self-defense
  • Going from a SeImpersonate service account to SYSTEM via RPC/ALPC/named-pipe abuse
  • UAC bypass (Medium → High) via auto-elevating COM or registry hijack

Boundary stack (high → low): VTL1 (Secure Kernel/Cred Guard) > Ring 0 (ntoskrnl/win32k/drivers) > Ring 3: System > High > Medium > Low > AppContainer/LPAC. PPL is an orthogonal wall guarding LSASS/EDR even from SYSTEM.

Technique Map

| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script | |-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------| | win32k / dxgkrnl UAF → kernel R/W → token steal | T1068 | CWE-416 | references/kernel-user-boundary.md | scripts/ioctl_fuzzer.py | | Driver IOCTL abuse (METHOD_NEITHER arb-R/W) | T1068 | CWE-781 | references/kernel-user-boundary.md | scripts/ioctl_fuzzer.py | | BYOVD load + MSR/LSTAR or phys R/W → SYSTEM | T1068, T1543.003 | CWE-1188 | references/byovd-kernel-rw.md | scripts/byovd_kernel_rw.c | | BYOVD EDR-kill (callback nulling) | T1562.001, T1014 | CWE-1188 | references/byovd-kernel-rw.md | scripts/byovd_kernel_rw.c | | UAC bypass — ICMLuaUtil elevated COM moniker | T1548.002 | CWE-269 | references/integrity-uac-com.md | scripts/uac_com_elevate.cpp | | UAC bypass — fodhelper HKCU registry hijack | T1548.002, T1112 | CWE-269 | references/integrity-uac-com.md | scripts/uac_com_elevate.cpp | | AppContainer/LPAC broker abuse / cap over-grant | T1211 | CWE-668 | references/sandbox-appcontainer-escape.md | scripts/sandbox_escape_probe.py | | Chromium/Edge Mojo IPC sandbox escape | T1211 | CWE-501 | references/sandbox-appcontainer-escape.md | scripts/sandbox_escape_probe.py | | Named-object / symbolic-link squatting | T1211 | CWE-59 | references/sandbox-appcontainer-escape.md | scripts/sandbox_escape_probe.py | | PPL bypass — BYOVDLL (old signed DLL into PPL) | T1003.001, T1211 | CWE-426 | references/ppl-protected-process.md | scripts/ppl_byovdll.c | | PPL bypass — live-dump / WER / Protection-clear | T1003.001, T1562.001 | CWE-269 | references/ppl-protected-process.md | scripts/byovd_kernel_rw.c | | RPC server spoof / endpoint squat (PhantomRPC) | T1559, T1134.001 | CWE-287 | references/rpc-alpc-boundary.md | scripts/named_pipe_impersonate.c | | Named-pipe client impersonation (Potato family) | T1134.002, T1134.001 | CWE-294 | references/rpc-alpc-boundary.md | scripts/named_pipe_impersonate.c | | Host boundary posture enumeration | T1082 | CWE-693 | (all) | scripts/enum_boundaries.ps1 |

Quick Start

:: 0. Map the host's boundary posture -> pick the right primitive
powershell -ep bypass -File scripts/enum_boundaries.ps1
::    reports: integrity, AppContainer, SeImpersonate/SeDebug, HVCI, driver blocklist,
::    LSASS RunAsPPL, drivers loaded from user-writable paths, named-pipe count.

:: 1. From a sandbox (renderer/packaged app): rank escape vectors
python scripts/sandbox_escape_probe.py

:: 2. Medium -> High: UAC bypass (no file dropped via COM moniker)
uac_com_elevate.exe com "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c whoami /groups > C:\poc.txt"

:: 3. SeImpersonate present -> SYSTEM via PhantomRPC endpoint squat
whoami /priv | findstr SeImpersonate
named_pipe_impersonate.exe \\.\pipe\W32TIME "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"
w32tm /resync                          :: triggers the SYSTEM client to connect

:: 4. Need Ring 0: map a driver's IOCTLs, then BYOVD kernel R/W -> token steal
python scripts/ioctl_fuzzer.py --device RTCore64 --map
byovd_kernel_rw.exe C:\test\driver.sys token

:: 5. Dump LSASS under PPL without a driver (BYOVDLL / CNG KSP)
ppl_byovdll.exe register C:\stage\vuln_ncryptprov.dll GhostKsp
ppl_byovdll.exe trigger  GhostKsp

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

| Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma / EDR) | OPSEC note | |-----------|-----------------|--------------------------|------------| | win32k/dxgkrnl exploit | Bugcheck EID 1001 ref win32k/dxgkrnl; process token flips to S-1-5-18 with no service genealogy | Sigma on bugchecks + token anomaly; ETW Microsoft-Windows-Win32k | Prefer data-only token copy over CFG/CET-fighting control-flow hijack; missed race = loud bugcheck | | BYOVD | Sysmon EID 6 driver load from user-writable path; 7045/4697 kernel service; EDR telemetry goes silent | Sigma on unusual driver path + known-bad hashes (loldrivers.io); driver-load-time window | Use un-blocklisted/HVCI-compatible driver; restore LSTAR/callbacks; DeleteService + del .sys | | UAC bypass (COM/fodhelper) | Sysmon EID 13 write to HKCU ms-settings\Shell\Open\command; dllhost /Processid:{3E5FC7F9..} spawning shell | Elastic/ManageEngine ICMLuaUtil + fodhelper rules | Rotate to a less-known AutoElevate CLSID; don't spawn cmd from dllhost; clean HKCU tree | | Sandbox escape | Renderer/GPU process spawning cmd/powershell/rundll32; Mojo handle-transfer anomalies | Sigma on browser child-process; patch-posture alert (Edge<134.0.3124.93) | Stay in-process post-escape (IPC layer is an EDR blind spot); symlink squat is mostly dead post-2017 | | PPL bypass | Old keyiso/ncryptprov version loaded in lsass (EID 7); EID 10 lsass read; Cryptography\Providers write; live-dump | Sigma on DLL version-mismatch + GrantedAccess to lsass | Driverless (BYOVDLL/WER/live-dump) avoids BYOVD noise; restore Protection byte; obfuscate dumps | | RPC/ALPC impersonation | 4624 logon type 9 (Advapi); SYSTEM child of service-acct parent; RPC_S_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE (EID 1) | Elastic named-pipe impersonation rule; ETW RPC + high impersonation level | PhantomRPC endpoint squat blends w/ admin triggers (w32tm/gpupdate); RevertToSelf + close pipe |

Deep Dives

  • references/kernel-user-boundary.md — Ring 3→Ring 0 via win32k/dxgkrnl UAF (CVE-2025-24983, CVE-2025-62573, CVE-2025-55224, CVE-2025-62221, CVE-2026-26132), driver IOCTL surface, kernel R/W → EPROCESS token steal / Protection clear / PreviousMode, modern no-PTE-self-map constraint, KDP/HVCI considerations.
  • references/byovd-kernel-rw.md — Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver: load signed driver, MSR-LSTAR vs physical-memory primitives (CVE-2025-8061), EDRKillShifter / Qilin driver rotation, 2025-2026 driver+CVE catalog, blocklist/HVCI bypass, driver-load detection.
  • references/integrity-uac-com.md — integrity model, appinfo/autoElevate internals, fodhelper (UACME 33) + ICMLuaUtil/CMSTPLUA (UACME 41), 2025 IEditionUpgradeManager bypass, finding new AutoElevate COM classes, T1548.002 ITW campaigns.
  • references/sandbox-appcontainer-escape.md — AppContainer/LPAC model + capabilities, broker abuse (WinRT XmlDocument), Chromium/Edge Mojo escapes (CVE-2025-2783 ForumTroll, CVE-2025-4609 ipcz), symbolic-link/RtlIsSandboxToken mitigation, 3-bug renderer chain.
  • references/ppl-protected-process.md — PS_PROTECTION/signer levels, BYOVDLL "Ghost in the PPL" (CVE-2023-28229/36906, BCryptRegisterProvider), NtSystemDebugControl live-dump (Win11 23H2), WER dump, kernel Protection-clear, PPLBlade, Credential Guard hard stop.
  • references/rpc-alpc-boundary.md — named-pipe client impersonation primitive, ALPC SQoS/RequiredServerSid, PhantomRPC server-spoof/endpoint-squat (2026, unpatched), Potato family (PrintSpoofer/GodPotato/SigmaPotato), WER ALPC LPE, NtObjectManager enumeration.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars377
CategorySecurity
Updated14d ago
Forks65

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions