name: container-k8s-escape description: Use when breaking out of a container or escalating inside Kubernetes — runc/BuildKit CVEs, privileged/capability/cgroup misconfig escapes, NVIDIA GPU toolkit escape, K8s RBAC abuse, kubelet RCE, ingress/admission-controller RCE, node-to-cluster pivot metadata: type: offensive phase: exploit-install-actions tools: kubectl, crictl, runc, deepce, cdk, kube-hunter, peirates, amicontained, trufflehog, falco, kubeletctl, nsenter mitre: [T1611, T1610, T1613, T1552.001, T1552.007, T1078.001, T1068, T1496] kill_chain: phase: [exploit, install, actions] step: [4, 5, 7] attck_tactics: [TA0002, TA0004, TA0005, TA0006, TA0008] attck_techniques: [T1611, T1610, T1613, T1609, T1552.001, T1552.007, T1078.001, T1068, T1496, T1610] depends_on: [recon-osint, cloud-security, vulnerability-analysis] feeds_into: [cloud-security, red-team-ops, privesc-linux, active-directory-attack] inputs: [container_context, k8s_service_account, kubeconfig, node_access, registry_push_access] outputs: [host_root_shell, node_compromise, stolen_sa_tokens, cluster_admin, attack_path, escape_finding] references:

• references/runtime-cve-escapes.md
• references/privileged-misconfig-escape.md
• references/nvidia-gpu-escape.md
• references/k8s-rbac-escalation.md
• references/ingress-admission-attacks.md
• references/node-host-pivot.md scripts:
• scripts/escape_enum.sh
• scripts/runc_cwd_escape.py
• scripts/release_agent_escape.sh
• scripts/nvidiascape_build.sh
• scripts/k8s_rbac_audit.py
• scripts/kubelet_exec.py

Container Breakout & Kubernetes Escape

When to Activate

• You have code execution inside a container/pod and want to break out to the host node
• Auditing a Kubernetes cluster for RBAC privilege-escalation and lateral-movement paths
• Assessing runc/containerd/BuildKit/Docker runtime versions against known escape CVEs
• A pod is privileged, has dangerous capabilities, hostPath/hostPID/hostNetwork, or a mounted docker.sock
• Attacking GPU/AI workloads using the NVIDIA Container Toolkit
• Testing ingress-nginx / admission-controller exposure for unauthenticated RCE
• Post-escape: pivoting from one node to full cluster takeover (kubelet, SA tokens, etcd, cloud IMDS)
• Building Falco/Sigma detections for container-escape behavior (defensive validation)

Technique Map

| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script | |-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------| | runc working-dir fd leak escape (Leaky Vessels, CVE-2024-21626) | T1611 | CWE-403 | references/runtime-cve-escapes.md | scripts/runc_cwd_escape.py | | runc masked-path / /dev/null symlink escape (CVE-2025-31133) | T1611 | CWE-367 | references/runtime-cve-escapes.md | scripts/runc_cwd_escape.py | | runc /dev/console bind-mount + LSM bypass (CVE-2025-52565/52881) | T1611 | CWE-363 | references/runtime-cve-escapes.md | scripts/escape_enum.sh | | BuildKit cache/teardown symlink escape (CVE-2024-23651/52/53) | T1611 | CWE-59 | references/runtime-cve-escapes.md | scripts/escape_enum.sh | | Privileged / CAP_SYS_ADMIN cgroup release_agent escape | T1611 | CWE-269 | references/privileged-misconfig-escape.md | scripts/release_agent_escape.sh | | core_pattern host-side code exec on crash | T1611 | CWE-269 | references/privileged-misconfig-escape.md | scripts/release_agent_escape.sh | | hostPID + nsenter into PID 1 namespace | T1611 | CWE-668 | references/privileged-misconfig-escape.md | scripts/escape_enum.sh | | Mounted docker.sock / containerd.sock host takeover | T1610 | CWE-668 | references/privileged-misconfig-escape.md | scripts/escape_enum.sh | | hostPath / mount → write host filesystem | T1611 | CWE-22 | references/privileged-misconfig-escape.md | scripts/escape_enum.sh | | NVIDIAScape LD_PRELOAD OCI-hook escape (CVE-2025-23266) | T1611 | CWE-426 | references/nvidia-gpu-escape.md | scripts/nvidiascape_build.sh | | NVIDIA CT TOCTOU mount escape (CVE-2024-0132 / CVE-2025-23359) | T1611 | CWE-367 | references/nvidia-gpu-escape.md | scripts/nvidiascape_build.sh | | K8s RBAC privesc (verb/wildcard/escalate, SA token theft) | T1078.001 | CWE-269 | references/k8s-rbac-escalation.md | scripts/k8s_rbac_audit.py | | nodes/proxy GET → kubelet WebSocket exec RCE | T1609 | CWE-863 | references/k8s-rbac-escalation.md | scripts/kubelet_exec.py | | Anonymous/authed kubelet API exec on :10250 | T1609 | CWE-306 | references/k8s-rbac-escalation.md | scripts/kubelet_exec.py | | IngressNightmare unauth RCE (CVE-2025-1974 + annotation chain) | T1190 | CWE-94 | references/ingress-admission-attacks.md | scripts/escape_enum.sh | | Node → cluster pivot (etcd, IMDS, SA-token harvest) | T1613 | CWE-552 | references/node-host-pivot.md | scripts/escape_enum.sh |

Quick Start

# 0. Enumerate the container/pod context: caps, mounts, sockets, runtime versions, K8s creds
bash scripts/escape_enum.sh                 # run INSIDE the target container

# 1. Runtime-CVE path: detect vulnerable runc/BuildKit and run the cwd-fd escape (CVE-2024-21626)
python3 scripts/runc_cwd_escape.py --probe                       # try fd 7,8,9 -> host /
python3 scripts/runc_cwd_escape.py --cmd 'id; cat /etc/shadow'   # via docker -w or k8s revshell

# 2. Misconfig path: privileged / CAP_SYS_ADMIN -> cgroup release_agent host code exec
bash scripts/release_agent_escape.sh -c 'id > /tmp/escape_out'   # reads host PID list / runs cmd

# 3. GPU path: build a malicious image for NVIDIAScape (CVE-2025-23266)
bash scripts/nvidiascape_build.sh --cmd 'id; cat /etc/shadow' --tag evil-gpu:latest

# 4. K8s RBAC: audit who can escalate / reach the kubelet (needs a kubeconfig or in-pod SA token)
python3 scripts/k8s_rbac_audit.py --kubeconfig ~/.kube/config --dangerous

# 5. nodes/proxy or open kubelet -> exec into any pod on the node
python3 scripts/kubelet_exec.py --node 10.0.0.5 --pod kube-system/etcd-master \
        --container etcd --cmd 'cat /var/lib/etcd/...' --token "$SA_TOKEN"

Recommended tooling: deepce / cdk / amicontained (in-container recon), peirates (K8s pivot), kube-hunter (cluster scan), kubeletctl (kubelet API), crictl (post-escape node control), falco (defensive validation of every technique below).

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

| Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma/EDR/Falco) | OPSEC note | |-----------|-----------------|------------------------------|------------| | runc cwd-fd escape (CVE-2024-21626) | container process cwd under /proc/self/fd/N; getcwd ENOENT errors; host-path access from pid1 | Falco Container Drift/unexpected host-fs read; alert on runtime < runc 1.1.12 | No new files needed; works via -w/cwd only — very quiet, but lands on real host fs | | runc 2025 trio (masked-path/console) | symlink swap of /dev/null or /dev/pts/N; RW open of /proc/sysrq-trigger/core_pattern | Falco "Write below /proc/sys"/sysrq; mount race anomalies | Symlink swap is a timing race; on failure may crash host (sysrq) — loud | | release_agent / core_pattern | mount of cgroup/cgroup2; write to */release_agent or /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern | Falco Detect release_agent File Container Escapes; Sigma on write to core_pattern | Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN+mount; release_agent is cgroup-v1 only | | nsenter / hostPID | nsenter --target 1; process entering host mount/pid ns | Falco "nsenter" / proc.name=nsenter in container; ATT&CK T1611 | hostPID is visible in pod spec; nsenter is a strong IOC | | docker.sock abuse | /var/run/docker.sock mounted; curl --unix-socket create privileged container | Falco "Docker socket access by unexpected proc"; new privileged container event | Spawns a new privileged container — visible to docker/containerd events | | NVIDIAScape (CVE-2025-23266) | image ENV LD_PRELOAD=/proc/self/cwd/*.so; nvidia hook loads .so from container fs | Falco shared-lib load by nvidia-ctk/hook from container path | Needs only image push + run; no kernel bug — image scan catches the ENV | | nodes/proxy → kubelet exec | WebSocket GET to kubelet /exec//run on :10250; no API-server audit entry | Runtime/L7 only — invisible to API audit & GuardDuty; monitor kubelet access log | Bypasses API-server audit & admission entirely — extremely stealthy | | K8s RBAC privesc / SA-token theft | read of /var/run/secrets/.../token; can-i probes; bind to cluster-admin | API audit create rolebindings/escalate; Falco Read SA token | kubectl auth can-i probing is logged at API server | | IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974) | AdmissionReview with injected NGINX directive; .so loaded from /proc/<pid>/fd | Sysdig/Falco "IngressNightmare"; shared-lib load from /proc in nginx | Code runs during nginx -t validation; controller SA grabs all-namespace secrets |

Deep Dives

• references/runtime-cve-escapes.md — runc CVE-2024-21626 (working-dir fd leak), the Nov-2025 runc trio (CVE-2025-31133/52565/52881 masked-path & /dev/console), and the BuildKit Leaky Vessels CVEs, with full PoCs and version matrices.
• references/privileged-misconfig-escape.md — --privileged/capability escapes: cgroup-v1 release_agent, core_pattern, hostPID+nsenter, mounted docker/containerd sockets, and hostPath// mounts, with complete scripts.
• references/nvidia-gpu-escape.md — NVIDIAScape (CVE-2025-23266 LD_PRELOAD OCI-hook) and the CVE-2024-0132 / CVE-2025-23359 TOCTOU mount escapes in the NVIDIA Container Toolkit; build-and-run PoCs.
• references/k8s-rbac-escalation.md — RBAC privilege escalation (wildcards, escalate/bind, pods/exec, impersonation), SA-token harvest, the nodes/proxy GET → kubelet WebSocket exec RCE, and open kubelet :10250.
• references/ingress-admission-attacks.md — IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974 + the annotation-injection chain), admission-webhook abuse, and how a controller SA leads to cluster-wide secret theft.
• references/node-host-pivot.md — post-escape playbook: from one node to the whole cluster — etcd looting, kubelet/crictl, SA-token mining across pods, cloud IMDS role theft, and the defensive counterweight.