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cloud-security

Use when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse

Install / Use

npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill cloud-security

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

86/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of cloud-security

cloud-security scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 716th of 1,096 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 9.0 KB long, well organised into 13 sections with 1 code example: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

It has 377 GitHub stars, a meaningful sign that others use it.

Substance
29/30
Structure
17/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
11/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated 14 days ago, so cloud-security is actively maintained.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands.

Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-05. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

cloud-security compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than cloud-security; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
cloud-security (this skill)by hypnguyen12098637714d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k12d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k12d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100130.2k13d agoSKILL.md
ui-ux-pro-maxby nextlevelbuilder100130.2k13d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install cloud-security?
Run npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill cloud-security. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does cloud-security work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is cloud-security safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is cloud-security still maintained?
The repository was last updated 14 days ago, so cloud-security is actively maintained.

name: cloud-security description: Use when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse metadata: type: offensive phase: exploitation tools: pacu, cloudfox, scoutsuite, prowler, trivy, kubectl, aws-cli, az-cli, gcloud, peirates, mkat, azurehound, roadtools, stratus-red-team, kube-bench mitre: [T1078.004, T1552.005, T1098.001, T1528, T1611, T1548] kill_chain: phase: [recon, exploit] step: [1, 4] attck_tactics: [TA0043, TA0001, TA0004, TA0008, TA0006] attck_techniques: [T1078.004, T1552.005, T1552.007, T1098.001, T1098.003, T1528, T1606.002, T1611, T1610, T1134.001, T1548, T1538] depends_on: [recon-osint] feeds_into: [exploit-development, active-directory-attack, advanced-redteam] inputs: [cloud_config, iam_policies, kubeconfig, ci_cd_config] outputs: [cloud_misconfig_list, finding_record, attack_path, stolen_credentials] references:

  • references/aws-iam-privesc.md
  • references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md
  • references/azure-entra-attacks.md
  • references/gcp-attacks.md
  • references/kubernetes-container-escape.md
  • references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md scripts:
  • scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py
  • scripts/imds_harvester.py
  • scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py
  • scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py
  • scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py
  • scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py

Cloud Security & Attack

When to Activate

  • Cloud penetration test / red team against AWS, Azure (Entra ID), or GCP
  • IAM / identity privilege escalation and cross-account or cross-tenant pivoting
  • Compromised web app or SSRF reachable from cloud compute — harvest metadata credentials
  • Kubernetes / container assessment, node breakout, cluster takeover
  • CI/CD and IaC review: Terraform state, OIDC federation trust policies, pipeline secrets
  • Post-exploitation: secret extraction, lateral movement, persistence in cloud control plane

Technique Map

| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script | |-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------| | AWS IAM privesc (CreatePolicyVersion, PassRole, AttachPolicy) | T1098.001 | CWE-269 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py | | AWS sts:AssumeRoot member-account escalation | T1078.004 | CWE-269 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py | | Cross-account confused deputy / missing ExternalId | T1078.004 | CWE-441 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py | | IMDS / metadata SSRF credential theft (AWS/Azure/GCP) | T1552.005 | CWE-918 | references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py | | EKS node creds → IRSA / Pod Identity pivot | T1552.007 | CWE-668 | references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py | | Entra device-code phishing → PRT / device join | T1528 | CWE-287 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py | | FOCI refresh-token family abuse | T1550.001 | CWE-613 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py | | Azure Managed Identity / App-Admin → SP escalation | T1098.001 | CWE-269 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py | | GCP actAs + resource create impersonation chain | T1078.004 | CWE-269 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py | | GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator token chains | T1528 | CWE-269 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py | | Vertex AI P4SA / Ray head-node escalation | T1078.004 | CWE-732 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py | | Container escape (runc Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626) | T1611 | CWE-668 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | - | | IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974) cluster takeover | T1190 | CWE-94 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py | | K8s RBAC privesc (pods/exec, token mount, node proxy) | T1078 | CWE-269 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py | | Terraform state secret extraction | T1552.001 | CWE-312 | references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py | | OIDC federation trust-policy abuse (GitHub/TF Cloud) | T1199 | CWE-441 | references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |

Quick Start

# --- 0. Identify where you are ---
aws sts get-caller-identity                       # AWS
az account show && az ad signed-in-user show      # Azure
gcloud auth list && gcloud config get-value project  # GCP

# --- 1. AWS: enumerate then map privesc paths ---
python3 scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py --profile compromised --json paths.json
cloudfox aws --profile compromised all-checks      # alt: broad inventory
pacu  # > run iam__enum_permissions ; run iam__privesc_scan

# --- 2. SSRF / metadata: harvest creds from a reachable compute target ---
python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --ssrf "https://app/fetch?url=" --provider aws
python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --local --provider azure --resource https://vault.azure.net/

# --- 3. Azure Entra: device-code phish for tokens (authorized phishing only) ---
python3 scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py --resource https://graph.microsoft.com \
    --client-id 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e   # Auth Broker -> PRT path

# --- 4. GCP: build the service-account impersonation graph ---
python3 scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py --project TARGET --out gcp_graph.json

# --- 5. Kubernetes: what can this token do, and can we break out? ---
python3 scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py --kubeconfig ./kubeconfig
kubectl auth can-i --list ; peirates

# --- 6. CI/CD + IaC: audit federation trust + dump state secrets ---
python3 scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --profile compromised
aws s3 cp s3://tf-state/prod/terraform.tfstate - | jq '.. | .password? // empty'

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

| Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma / EDR / cloud) | OPSEC note | |-----------|-----------------|---------------------------------|------------| | IAM privesc API calls | CloudTrail CreatePolicyVersion, AttachUserPolicy, CreateLoginProfile | Alert on IAM write by non-IAM-admin principal; GuardDuty PrivilegeEscalation:IAMUser/* | Use existing admin sessions; avoid bulk enum that trips anomaly detection | | sts:AssumeRoot | CloudTrail AssumeRoot (regional only) | Elastic "AssumeRoot by Rare User and Member Account" (new-terms rule) | Rare-event detection fires on first use per (principal, member account) | | IMDS SSRF | VPC flow to 169.254.169.254 from web tier; STS use from new ASN | GuardDuty UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration* (creds used off-instance) | Use creds from same egress IP where possible; creds expire — refresh fast | | Entra device-code phish | Sign-in logs authenticationProtocol=deviceCode; Auth Broker client 29d9ed98-...; new device registration | Sentinel device-code anomaly; CA "block device code flow" | Tokens valid even after password reset; device-join = MFA-resistant persistence | | GCP impersonation | GenerateAccessToken / generateAccessToken in Admin Activity + Data Access logs | Alert on impersonation by principal lacking a documented chain | Requires Data Access (DATA_READ) audit logs enabled to see token minting | | Container escape (runc) | New process from /proc/self/fd/* cwd; host binary writes; nsenter in container | Falco Container escape/Drop and execute new binary; runc ≤1.1.11 inventory | Overwrites host runc → noisy; prefer read-only host FS read for stealth | | IngressNightmare | NGINX ingress pod loads .so from /proc; outbound from controller | Falco/Sysdig "IngressNightmare" shared-lib load; ingress-nginx < 1.11.5/1.12.1 | Exploit hits admission webhook (often internal-only) — low external noise | | OIDC trust abuse | CloudTrail AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from unexpected sub/repo | Alert on web-identity assume with mismatched aud/sub; RCP block | Wildcard sub (org:foo*) still exploitable; no creds needed |

Deep Dives

  • references/aws-iam-privesc.md — Classic + 2024 IAM escalation chains, sts:AssumeRoot, cross-account confused deputy / ExternalId, Cognito, secrets harvesting; detection per API.
  • references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md — IMDSv1/v2 mechanics, SSRF bypasses, Azure & GCP metadata token theft, EKS node-cred → IRSA/Pod Identity lateral movement.
  • references/azure-entra-attacks.md — Storm-2372 device-code → PRT → device-join chain, FOCI token families, Managed Identity abuse, Application Administrator → service principal → Global Admin.
  • references/gcp-attacks.md — actAs + resource-create impersonation, serviceAccountTokenCreator chains, Cloud Functions takeover, Vertex AI ModeLeak/P4SA/Ray escalation.
  • references/kubernetes-container-escape.md — runc Leaky Vessels (CVE-2024-21626), privileged/hostPID/Docker-socket escapes, IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974), RBAC primitives, kubelet/etcd.
  • references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md — Terraform state secret extraction, OIDC federation trust-policy abuse (GitHub Actions / Terraform Cloud), pipeline secret theft, RCP/SCP defenses.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars377
CategorySecurity
Updated14d ago
Forks65

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions
cloud-security — Universal Skill: Install & Safety Check | SkillAgent