Bug Bounty Intelligence: MCP Server

AI-powered smart contract security analysis for AI agents and developers.

Drawn from a corpus of 27,681 submitted findings across 105 Sherlock and Code4rena contests. Cost: $5 USDC on Base (eip155:8453) via x402. Free tool: list_vulnerability_patterns, no payment needed.

list_vulnerability_patterns' acceptance-rate numbers are computed only from the subset where results could be exactly reconciled against Sherlock's own published outcomes: 1,032 findings across 10 contests. We'd rather show fewer, verified numbers than a bigger set we can't stand behind. See METHODOLOGY.md for exactly why, and how to reproduce it.

Free dataset: no server, no MCP, no payment

vulnerability-acceptance-rates.json is the same data list_vulnerability_patterns serves, as a static file. No API call, no account, no network dependency at all. Download it, or copy it into your own tool's rule set. CC0 licensed, use it however you want, credit optional.

curl -sO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/holistis/bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp/main/vulnerability-acceptance-rates.json

If you're building a local-first / offline security scanner and the paid scan_contract tool below isn't a fit for your project's architecture, this file might still be useful on its own.

Just want pattern search, nothing paid? Use 3ilm-mcp instead

3ilm-mcp is a smaller, free-only MCP server built from the same verified dataset. It has no paid tier at all, just pattern search (search_vulnerabilities, get_pattern_details, list_patterns). Use this repo (bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp) if you also want the paid scan_contract full-repo scan; use 3ilm-mcp if you only ever wanted the free lookup tools and prefer the lighter package.

Two more tools in the same Al-Mizaan toolkit, for the rest of the workflow: al-mizaan-judge is a local CLI that pressure-tests a candidate finding through the same 7-gate framework before you submit it, and DeFi Signal API exposes the same vuln-search/bug-intel routes as a pay-per-call HTTP API for anyone who wants this outside MCP.

Benchmark: vs Slither

See the full benchmark →

On 3FLabs/grunt (ERC-4626 + Morpho vaults, 218 contracts): Slither reports 27 "High" findings. After analysis: 24 are in lib/solady (out-of-scope dependency with known Slither false positive patterns), and 3 are EIP-712 design patterns. False positive rate: 100%.

Bug Bounty Intelligence scopes to src/ only and filters through the Al-Mizaan 7-gate framework before reporting anything.

We also reported a related divide-before-multiply pattern on the same lib/solady code directly to the Slither project: crytic/slither#3039. A maintainer merged a fix for part of it (crytic/slither#3040); see BENCHMARK.md for the honest scope of what that fix does and doesn't cover, we overclaimed in the original report.

What it does

Submit a public GitHub repo containing Solidity smart contracts. Receive a full vulnerability report within 24 hours, powered by the Al-Mizaan v3 analysis framework.

Tools

| Tool | Description | Cost | |------|-------------|------| | scan_contract | Submit repo for security analysis | $5 USDC | | get_scan_report | Poll status and get report URL | Free | | list_vulnerability_patterns | Show acceptance rates from exact-reconciled Sherlock contests | Free |

Quick start (Claude Desktop / Claude Code)

Add to your claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "bug-bounty-intelligence": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp@latest"]
    }
  }
}

Or run directly:

npx -y bug-bounty-intelligence-mcp@latest

Payment

If scan_contract returns PAYMENT REQUIRED, send exactly $5 USDC on Base to the address shown, then retry. Payment = acceptance of service terms.

x402 info:

• Network: Base mainnet (eip155:8453)
• Amount: 5,000,000 (= 5 USDC, 6 decimals)
• Asset: 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (USDC)
• Wallet: 0x015Eb036560216B3051339061FF68A207E0fe88f

The wallet address can change. Always pay the address scan_contract actually returns in its PAYMENT REQUIRED response, not a copy of this README. This document is updated when the address changes, but the live tool response is the source of truth.

Example session

> list_vulnerability_patterns({ protocol_type: "LENDING" })

Vulnerability patterns for LENDING protocols (from Sherlock audit findings, exact-reconciled contests only):

oracle-manipulation      36% accepted (131 cases)
liquidation              29% accepted (14 cases)
staleness                49% accepted (174 cases)
rounding                 40% accepted (63 cases)
flash-loan               46% accepted (13 cases)
access-control           47% accepted (74 cases)

> scan_contract({ repo_url: "https://github.com/myprotocol/contracts", protocol_type: "LENDING" })

PAYMENT REQUIRED to start the scan.

Amount:  5.00 USDC
Network: Base mainnet (eip155:8453)
Pay to:  0x015Eb036560216B3051339061FF68A207E0fe88f
Asset:   USDC — 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913

After paying, retry scan_contract with the same repo_url.

Sample scan output

Real scan of sherlock-audit/2025-03-crestal-network (Derivatives protocol, 29 contracts):

Summary: 0 Critical  |  1 High  |  0 Medium  |  0 Low
Analyzed: 29 contracts  |  Model: qwen2.5:7b  |  Duration: 25min

FINDING #1 — HIGH
Title:    Owner Can Arbitrarily Set Payment Addresses
File:     Blueprint.sol
Functions: setCreateAgentTokenCost, setUpdateCreateAgentTokenCost,
           addPaymentAddress, removePaymentAddress
Category: ACCESS

Description:
  The owner can arbitrarily set payment addresses and costs without
  any external validation or timelock.

Attack path:
  An attacker with ownership calls setCreateAgentTokenCost or
  addPaymentAddress to modify fees or redirect user payments to
  an attacker-controlled wallet.

Impact:
  Extremely high costs (griefing) or redirection of user funds.

Recommendation:
  Implement a governance mechanism or timelock to restrict fee
  and address changes.

Confidence: 0.90 (CONFIRMED by Al-Mizaan validation)

About the analysis

The Al-Mizaan v3 framework checks 7 gates:

1. Code reading (literal, not docs)
2. Reachability chain (entry to exploit)
3. Threat model (who can trigger it)
4. Invariant breach (what rule is violated)
5. Protocol intent (was this intended?)
6. Impact (real financial damage)
7. Formal proof (reproducible PoC)

Only findings that survive all 7 gates are reported.

Service info

• API endpoint: https://wazir-x402.duckdns.org/api/bug-intel
• Terms: https://wazir-x402.duckdns.org/terms
• Delivery: within 24h
• Source code: deleted after analysis

Support this project

This is a free, open-source MCP server maintained in my spare time. If it caught something useful before you shipped, tips are welcome and appreciated (never expected):

0xdffcC75a674257be6FE1b5549FE52e8f8a6A3A5A (USDC, Base)