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hunt-sharepoint

Hunt Microsoft SharePoint Server (2013/2016/2019/Subscription Edition) on-prem farms — anonymous endpoint enumeration, version disclosure, legacy SOAP login bypass (Authentication.asmx), ToolShell precondition chain (CVE-2025-53770), SafeControl reflection enumeration via Picker.aspx, NTLM Type-2 AD…

Install / Use

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-sharepoint

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

96/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of hunt-sharepoint

hunt-sharepoint scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 150th of 1,111 Security skills we index (top 14%).

Its SKILL.md is 31 KB long, well organised into 19 sections with 7 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 5,198 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so hunt-sharepoint is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-29. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

hunt-sharepoint compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than hunt-sharepoint; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
hunt-sharepoint (this skill)by elementalsouls965.2k26d agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install hunt-sharepoint?
Run npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-sharepoint. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does hunt-sharepoint work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is hunt-sharepoint safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is hunt-sharepoint still maintained?
The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so hunt-sharepoint is actively maintained.

name: hunt-sharepoint description: Hunt Microsoft SharePoint Server (2013/2016/2019/Subscription Edition) on-prem farms — anonymous endpoint enumeration, version disclosure, legacy SOAP login bypass (Authentication.asmx), ToolShell precondition chain (CVE-2025-53770), SafeControl reflection enumeration via Picker.aspx, NTLM Type-2 AD topology disclosure, custom-branding module discovery, EoL farm permanent-CVE-window exploitation, FormDigest anonymous issuance, file-extension blocklist NOT-an-oracle pattern, custom-zone Forms auth bridging on-prem AD. Use when target has SharePoint headers (SPRequestGuid, X-MS-InvokeApp, X-SharePointHealthScore, MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices) or paths (/_layouts/15/, /_vti_bin/, /_api/, /_catalogs/). sources: github, authorized-engagement report_count: 1

Crown Jewel Targets

SharePoint Server (on-prem) is one of the richest enterprise attack surfaces in 2025-2026 bug bounty / red-team work. Three forces converge:

  1. End-of-life unpatched code paths. SharePoint Server 2013 reached extended-support EoL on 2023-04-11 (final build 15.0.5545.1000 / KB5002381). Every SharePoint CVE published after that date is permanently unpatched on SP2013 farms. SP2016 reaches EoL 2026-07-14; SP2019 reaches EoL 2026-07-14 (next 2 months as of May 2026); only SP Subscription Edition is currently in active support.
  2. CVE-2025-53770 / 53771 "ToolShell" — July 2025 emergency-out-of-band patch chain for SPE / SP2019 / SP2016. The vulnerable code path (anonymous /_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit + anonymous __REQUESTDIGEST + unencrypted ViewState) is present in SP2013 too and will never receive a fix.
  3. Custom branded login pages forget legacy SOAP login. /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx with the Login SOAP op is the SharePoint equivalent of WordPress XMLRPC bypass — accepts native Forms credentials anonymously with no rate limit on most farms even when the branded UI has lockout.

Highest-value SharePoint targets:

  • SP2013 farms still on the public internet — every CVE since April 2023 is unpatched. Critical-severity findings.
  • Dealer / partner / supplier portals built on SharePoint by enterprise integrators (German VW group, a enterprise system integrator, etc.) — high-impact business data, often nested inside corporate AD trees.
  • SharePoint farms with anonymous Forms-auth zones — Authentication.asmx becomes anonymously brute-forceable.
  • SharePoint inside corporate AD parent forests — NTLM Type-2 leak (see hunt-ntlm-info) discloses the parent forest membership.
  • Telerik-integrated SharePoint installations — additional deserialization sinks on top of SP's own.

Asset types that pay most: internet-reachable SP Server (any version) > SP Online with custom solutions hooks > intranet SP only after VPN compromise.


Attack Surface Signals

Response-header fingerprints (any one is sufficient — usually multiple co-occur):

SPRequestGuid: <GUID>                           (always — anonymous and authenticated)
X-MS-InvokeApp: 1; RequireReadOnly              (SharePoint web request)
X-SharePointHealthScore: 0                      (SharePoint specific)
SPIisLatency: <ms>                              (SharePoint internal timing)
SPRequestDuration: <ms>                         (SharePoint request duration)
MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices: 15.0.0.0      (often stripped by ELB — but if present, exact version)
X-Forms_Based_Auth_Required: <login URL>        (Forms-auth zone indicator)
X-Forms_Based_Auth_Return_Url: <return URL>     (Forms-auth zone indicator)
X-MSDAVEXT_Error: 917656; Access denied...      (WebDAV extension active)
DAV: 1, 2                                       (WebDAV verbs supported)
Set-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...               (always — IIS session)
Set-Cookie: FedAuth=...; rtFa=...               (claims-mode auth)
Set-Cookie: WSS_FullScreenMode=...              (SharePoint UI mode)

URL / path fingerprints:

/_layouts/15/                  (SP2013+ layouts root — SP2010 used /_layouts/ without the 15)
/_layouts/14/                  (legacy SP2010 — almost EoL since 2020-10-13)
/_layouts/16/                  (some SP2019 / SPE)
/_vti_bin/                     (FrontPage-RPC + SOAP services)
/_vti_pvt/                     (FrontPage-RPC config — usually 403)
/_vti_inf.html                 (almost always anonymous; contains FPVersion banner)
/_api/                         (modern REST API)
/_api/$metadata                (OData metadata — often anonymous + large)
/_api/contextinfo              (FormDigest issuer — POST only)
/_catalogs/                    (site catalogs: masterpage, wp, lt, theme, solutions)
/_catalogs/users/simple.aspx   (user list — usually 403)
/_layouts/15/start.aspx        (anonymous landing — leaks version)
/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx     (web part editor — ToolShell sink)
/_layouts/15/Picker.aspx       (people/list picker — SafeControl recon)
/_layouts/15/download.aspx     (SP-internal file resolver — NOT outbound SSRF)
/_layouts/15/Authenticate.aspx (forms-auth redirector)
/_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx      (logout)
/_layouts/15/error.aspx        (error page — anonymous)
/_layouts/15/AccessDenied.aspx (denied page — anonymous)
/_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=core    (resource bundle leak)
/_layouts/15/<Customer>/       (custom-branding modules — see Methodology step 8)
/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx  (THE legacy login bypass — see hunt-auth-bypass Legacy-Protocol Matrix)
/_vti_bin/SharedAccess.asmx    (often anon-readable)
/_vti_bin/lists.asmx           (auth-required on hardened farms)
/_vti_bin/sites.asmx           (auth-required on hardened farms)
/_vti_bin/sts/                 (Security Token Service — usually 302 to error)
/sites/<name>/                 (site collections)
/personal/<user>/              (MySite / OneDrive-for-Business)

Body signals (in HTML responses):

<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft SharePoint" />
RegisterSod("...","/_layouts/15/...");                    (Script-on-demand registration)
var g_initUrl='';                                          (start.aspx MDS state)
__REQUESTDIGEST                                            (CSRF token — leaks even to anon if endpoint mis-configured)
__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED=""                                    (Sign-only ViewState — see hunt-aspnet)
"LibraryVersion":"15.0.X.XXXX"                             (in _api/contextinfo response)
Version:15, webPermMasks:{High:0,Low:                      (in start.aspx body)
HelpWindowKey('WSSEndUser_troubleshooting                  (anonymous error.aspx body)

Tech-stack signals:

  • Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0 + paths starting with /_layouts/15/ → SharePoint 2013/2016/2019/SE
  • AWS ELB / ALB in front of SharePoint → cross-node ViewState MAC issues possible (see hunt-aspnet)
  • WWW-Authenticate: NTLM on /_api/web/CurrentUser → dual-auth (Forms + NTLM); use hunt-ntlm-info for AD-topology disclosure
  • *.test.<customer>.tld → test/staging mirror of production SharePoint; data often mirrored from prod

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

  1. Fingerprint the SharePoint version. Build number leaks anonymously through several paths. Map the result to the CVE matrix immediately.

    # Method 1: _vti_inf.html (always anonymous, always present)
    curl -sk "https://target.example/_vti_inf.html"
    # → FPVersion="15.00.0.000" (15.x = SP2013, 16.x = SP2016/2019/SE)
    
    # Method 2: _api/contextinfo POST (anonymous on most farms)
    curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_api/contextinfo" \
      -H "Accept: application/json;odata=verbose" \
      | jq -r '.d.GetContextWebInformation.LibraryVersion'
    # → "15.0.5545.1000" (full build number)
    
    # Method 3: /_layouts/15/start.aspx body
    curl -sk "https://target.example/_layouts/15/start.aspx" \
      | grep -oE "15\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+|16\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+"
    

    Map to CVE matrix:

    | Build | Edition | Status | Notable unpatched-after-EoL CVEs | |---|---|---|---| | 15.0.5545.1000 | SP2013 final CU | EoL 2023-04-11 | CVE-2023-29357, CVE-2023-33160/33157/36941, CVE-2024-21318/30043/38023/38024/38094, CVE-2025-53770/53771, CVE-2025-29794 | | 16.0.10416.x | SP2016 | EoL 2026-07-14 | depends on patch level | | 16.0.10417.x+ | SP2019 / SE | active | check Microsoft's monthly Patch Tuesday |

  2. Anonymous-endpoint matrix probe. Walk every endpoint in the table below in one pass. Anything anonymous becomes part of the attack chain.

    /_vti_inf.html                                          → version disclosure
    /_layouts/15/start.aspx                                 → version disclosure + session minting
    /_layouts/15/blank.htm                                  → benign anchor for smuggling probes
    /_layouts/15/error.aspx                                 → request-validator behaviour probe
    /_layouts/15/Authenticate.aspx?Source=                  → redirect-chain behaviour
    /_layouts/15/AccessDenied.aspx?Source=                  → redirect-chain behaviour
    /_layouts/15/SignOut.aspx                               → logout — anonymous OK
    /_layouts/15/closeConnection.aspx                       → anonymous OK
    /_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=SP.Res  → 35KB localised strings
    /_layouts/15/scriptresx.ashx?culture=en-us&name=core    → 277KB localised strings
    /_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit             → ToolShell precondition (THIS IS THE BIG ONE)
    /_layouts/15/Picker.aspx                                → SafeControl recon (see step 6)
    /_layouts/15/<CustomerName>/pages/login/customlogin.aspx    → custom Forms login (replace `<CustomerName>` with target's customer name)
    /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx                           → legacy SOAP login — anonymous brute-force (CRITICAL)
    /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx?WSDL                      → WSDL — confirms Login + Mode ops
    /_vti_bin/SharedAccess.asmx                             → often anonymous
    /_vti_bin/spsdisco.aspx                                 → SP service discovery
    /_api/contextinfo (POST)                                → anonymous FormDigest mint (HIGH)
    /_api/$metadata                                         → 381KB API surface enumeration
    /_api/Search                                            → search service descriptor
    /_api/web/CurrentUser                                   → 401 anon BUT WWW-Authenticate: NTLM leaks AD info (see hunt-ntlm-info)
    
  3. Legacy SOAP login bypass via Authentication.asmx. Cross-reference hunt-auth-bypass Legacy-Protocol Matrix. The standard probe:

    # First: confirm Mode = Forms (else this attack vector is N/A)
    curl -sk -X POST "https://target.example/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx" \
      -H "Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8" \
      -H "SOAPAction: http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/Mode" \
      -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soap:Body><Mode xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/" /></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>'
    # → <ModeResult>Forms</ModeResult>  ← target is exploitable
    # → <ModeResult>Windows</ModeResult>  ← target uses Windows auth only; this vector N/A
    
    # Then: confirm no rate limit / no lockout (synthetic non-existent users ONLY)
    # Send 10 bursts at "burst-test-synthetic-zzz" with distinct wrong passwords
    # If all 10 return 200 / 431 bytes / uniform timing → confirmed unlimited brute-force surface
    

    Severity: Critical when anonymous + no rate limit + no lockout. Submit as bug-bounty even before demonstrating successful auth — the unbounded credential validation is the bug, not "I cracked X credential."

  4. ToolShell precondition chain probe (CVE-2025-53770 class). Three sub-requests:

    # Sub-step a: anonymous GET on ToolPane.aspx
    curl -sk "https://targ
    

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars5.2k
CategorySecurity
Updated26d ago
Forks796

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions