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hunt-ntlm-info

Hunt NTLM/Negotiate information disclosure on internet-reachable IIS/SharePoint/Exchange. Anonymous NTLM Type-2 challenge capture leaks NetBIOS domain, internal DNS forest, computer name, AD timestamp via AV_PAIRS structure.

Install / Use

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-ntlm-info

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
πŸ“„

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

96/100

Supported Platforms

Zed

Our assessment of hunt-ntlm-info

hunt-ntlm-info scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 185th of 4,698 Development & Engineering skills we index (top 4%).

Its SKILL.md is 16 KB long, well organised into 14 sections with 6 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 5,198 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so hunt-ntlm-info is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit β€” read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-28. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk β€” read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

hunt-ntlm-info compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than hunt-ntlm-info; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
hunt-ntlm-info (this skill)by elementalsouls965.2k26d agoSKILL.md
taste-skillby Leonxlnx100116.8k8d agoCLAUDE.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k8d agoCLAUDE.md
ai-job-searchby ai-job-search-dev10072.1ktodayCLAUDE.md
claude-howtoby luongnv8910047.3k2d agoCLAUDE.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install hunt-ntlm-info?
Run npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-ntlm-info. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does hunt-ntlm-info work with?
It is written for Zed, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is hunt-ntlm-info safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is hunt-ntlm-info still maintained?
The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so hunt-ntlm-info is actively maintained.

name: hunt-ntlm-info description: "Hunt NTLM/Negotiate information disclosure on internet-reachable IIS/SharePoint/Exchange. Anonymous NTLM Type-2 challenge capture leaks NetBIOS domain, internal DNS forest, computer name, AD timestamp via AV_PAIRS structure. Default Windows-installer hostnames (WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX pattern) signal lazy provisioning. Use when target advertises WWW-Authenticate: NTLM or Negotiate headers anonymously." sources: github, authorized-engagement report_count: 1

Crown Jewel Targets

NTLM info disclosure is a Medium-severity finding when chained to context β€” the leak itself is intentional protocol behavior (RFC-compliant NTLMSSP challenge), but on internet-exposed enterprise infrastructure it provides exact reconnaissance for the next stage of an attack. Highest-value targets:

  • Internet-reachable IIS / SharePoint / Exchange / OWA with dual-auth (Forms + NTLM, or NTLM + Kerberos)
  • Citrix NetScaler / VMware Horizon View internet-facing gateways with NTLM-backed AD auth
  • Lync / Skype for Business / Teams On-Prem edge servers
  • WSUS / Windows Update Services with NTLM-protected admin paths
  • CIFS-style fileshare proxies (HCL Sametime, IBM Notes Domino) that proxy NTLM
  • Legacy SharePoint farms that left NTLM enabled on the public-zone IIS binding

What makes this pay:

  • Internal AD domain disclosure (parent-forest mapping, e.g. customer.parent-corp.example β†’ tenant inside corporate-AD tree)
  • Default-Windows-hostname disclosure (WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX pattern signals rushed provisioning β†’ likely default service-account passwords)
  • Timestamp leak (used in NTLMv2 hash cracking acceleration)
  • Direct attack-map enrichment for credential spraying combined with hunt-auth-bypass Legacy-Protocol Matrix

Attack Surface Signals

Response headers signaling NTLM availability:

WWW-Authenticate: NTLM
WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM, Negotiate
WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate, NTLM

URL patterns where NTLM is commonly exposed:

/_api/web/CurrentUser                  (SharePoint REST)
/_vti_bin/*.asmx                       (SharePoint legacy SOAP)
/EWS/Exchange.asmx                     (Exchange Web Services)
/Autodiscover/Autodiscover.xml         (Exchange autodiscover)
/owa/                                  (Outlook Web App)
/Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync           (ActiveSync)
/PowerShell                            (Exchange Mgmt Shell over HTTPS)
/api/v3/                               (TeamCity, Atlassian)
/wsus/                                 (Windows Server Update Services)
/manager/html                          (some Tomcat behind IIS)
/iisstart.htm                          (default IIS, sometimes reveals NTLM upstream)

Tech-stack signals:

  • IIS on the public internet (almost always NTLM-capable, even if Forms is the front)
  • SharePoint Web Front End (almost always dual-auth Forms + NTLM)
  • Exchange edge transport
  • Server header Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0, Microsoft-IIS/*, IIS/*

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

  1. Probe every anonymous endpoint for WWW-Authenticate: NTLM. Send a vanilla GET and inspect response headers. If NTLM is offered, proceed.

  2. Send a valid NTLMSSP Type-1 message anonymously. The Type-1 base64 below requests NetBIOS-domain and Workstation info from the server:

    Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAbEdAAAADw==
    

    This is the standard test Type-1 with negotiate flags NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO. The OS Version field (06 01 B1 1D 00 00 00 0F) is Windows 7 build 7601 β€” accepted by virtually every NTLM responder.

  3. Use a keep-alive raw socket, not Python requests / curl one-shot. Most HTTP libraries close the connection between the Type-1 send and Type-2 reception. Use one of:

    • Burp Repeater with Connection: keep-alive set explicitly
    • Burp mcp__burp__send_http1_request (handles keep-alive natively)
    • Python raw socket + ssl.wrap_socket (see Payload section)
  4. Parse the Type-2 challenge from the WWW-Authenticate: NTLM <base64> response header. Base64-decode the value. The structure is NTLMSSP per MS-NLMP:

    • Bytes 0-7: literal NTLMSSP\0
    • Bytes 8-11: MessageType = \x02\x00\x00\x00
    • Bytes 12-19: TargetName SecurityBuffer (len, alloc, offset)
    • Bytes 20-23: NegotiateFlags
    • Bytes 24-31: Server Challenge (8 bytes β€” useful for offline cracking)
    • Bytes 40-47: TargetInfo SecurityBuffer (len, alloc, offset)
    • TargetInfo body: AV_PAIRS array of (AvId u16, AvLen u16, Value)
  5. Decode the AV_PAIRS. The AvIds you care about:

    • 1 = NetBIOS Computer Name
    • 2 = NetBIOS Domain Name
    • 3 = DNS Computer Name (FQDN of the responding server)
    • 4 = DNS Domain Name (the AD domain)
    • 5 = DNS Tree Name (the AD forest root)
    • 7 = Timestamp (FILETIME, useful for NTLMv2 hash relay / cracking)
    • 9 = Target Name (in newer NTLMSSP)
  6. Map findings to severity tier:

    • Internet-exposed + default WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX hostname + corporate-AD-tree disclosure β†’ Medium
    • Internet-exposed + named-server hostname (SPWEB01.corp.example) + corporate-AD-tree β†’ Low-Medium
    • Intranet-only + any disclosure β†’ Informational
    • Combine with hunt-auth-bypass Legacy-Protocol Matrix findings on the same host β†’ upgrade the auth-bypass finding's severity since the attacker has UPN/SAM format ready
  7. Check the timestamp. If AV[7] returns a current FILETIME within ~5s of Date: header, the system clock is synced β€” useful intel for Kerberos golden-ticket forging (out of bug-bounty scope but red-team relevant).

  8. Cross-reference with subdomain enum. The DNS Tree name often reveals the parent forest β€” e.g. customer.parent-corp.example reveals the customer is a sub-domain INSIDE corporate-parent AD, not a separate tenant. This is a privacy / topology-disclosure escalation that programs sometimes accept as Medium.


Payload & Detection Patterns

Generic NTLM Type-1 anonymous probe (curl + raw socket fallback):

# Most one-shot curl runs DON'T return Type-2 because the connection closes.
# Use this as a quick probe to confirm NTLM is offered:
curl -sk -I -H "Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAbEdAAAADw==" \
  "https://target.example/_api/web/CurrentUser" 2>&1 | grep -i "WWW-Authenticate"

Burp send_http1_request (recommended for full Type-2 capture):

GET /_api/web/CurrentUser HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAbEdAAAADw==
Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Python raw socket + AV_PAIR decoder:

import socket, ssl, base64, struct, re
from datetime import datetime, timezone

HOST = "target.example"
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE

s = ctx.wrap_socket(socket.create_connection((HOST, 443)), server_hostname=HOST)
s.sendall(
    f"GET /_api/web/CurrentUser HTTP/1.1\r\n"
    f"Host: {HOST}\r\n"
    "Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAbEdAAAADw==\r\n"
    "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\n\r\n".encode()
)
data = b""
while True:
    chunk = s.recv(8192)
    if not chunk: break
    data += chunk
    if b"\r\n\r\n" in data: break

m = re.search(rb"WWW-Authenticate:\s*NTLM\s+([A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,})", data, re.I)
if m:
    b = base64.b64decode(m.group(1).decode("ascii"))
    assert b[:8] == b"NTLMSSP\x00"
    tn_len, _, tn_off = struct.unpack_from('<HHI', b, 12)
    ti_len, _, ti_off = struct.unpack_from('<HHI', b, 40)
    print(f"TargetName: {b[tn_off:tn_off+tn_len].decode('utf-16-le', errors='ignore')!r}")
    av_types = {1:'NetBIOS Computer Name', 2:'NetBIOS Domain Name',
                3:'DNS Computer Name', 4:'DNS Domain Name',
                5:'DNS Tree Name', 7:'Timestamp', 9:'Target Name'}
    i = 0
    ti = b[ti_off:ti_off+ti_len]
    while i < len(ti):
        av_id, av_len = struct.unpack_from('<HH', ti, i)
        if av_id == 0: break
        val = ti[i+4:i+4+av_len]
        if av_id == 7:
            ts = struct.unpack('<Q', val[:8])[0]
            secs = (ts - 116444736000000000) / 10000000
            vs = datetime.fromtimestamp(secs, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
        else:
            vs = val.decode('utf-16-le', errors='ignore')
        print(f"  AV[{av_id}] {av_types.get(av_id, '?'):28s}: {vs!r}")
        i += 4 + av_len

Burp Collaborator NOT needed for this finding class β€” the data leak is in the synchronous response, not via OOB.


Common Root Causes

  1. Dual-auth IIS bindings on the public zone. Administrators leave NTLM enabled on the public-facing IIS site even when Forms auth is the intended entry point. Internal users get SSO; external attackers get the AD topology leak.

  2. Default IIS Application Pool identity left as ApplicationPoolIdentity. Combined with default hostname, signals provisioning never went past first-boot.

  3. Server never renamed from Windows-installer-generated hostname. Microsoft's default WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX 11-character pattern is the immediate tell. Sometimes also WORKGROUP\WIN-... in older boxes.

  4. Sub-domain joined to corporate forest without zone-isolation. European-integrator case: a a European importer's SharePoint test environment is a child domain inside a corporate global AD, disclosed via NTLM DNS Tree Name. The customer probably intends customer.parent-corp.example to be operationally separate but the NTLM Type-2 reveals the forest membership to anyone who probes.

  5. IIS Extended Protection NOT enabled. When <system.webServer><security><authentication><windowsAuthentication extendedProtection> is None (the default), the NTLM challenge is sent to any anonymous client. When set to Required, NTLM is restricted to authenticated callers β€” and the AV-pair leak is mitigated.

  6. No WindowsAuthentication removed from applicationHost.config for internet-exposed sites. SharePoint Central Admin sometimes leaves this enabled even when SP zone configuration only enables Forms.


Bypass Techniques

This skill describes a disclosure leak, not an authentication bypass. The "bypass" question is: how do defenders block this AV-pair leak while still allowing legitimate NTLM auth?

| Defense | Effectiveness | |---|---| | Disable NTLM on the public IIS binding entirely (Forms-only) | Best β€” eliminates the surface | | IIS Extended Protection = Required | Restricts NTLM challenge to authenticated callers; AV-pair leak mitigated | | Reverse-proxy strip WWW-Authenticate from anonymous responses | Sometimes works but breaks legitimate clients | | Rate-limit the Type-1 β†’ Type-2 endpoint | Doesn't prevent disclosure, only slows enumeration | | Rename the Windows host from WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX | Removes the "lazy provisioning" tell; doesn't stop the leak | | Move the SP/Exchange farm to a child AD with no cross-trust to corporate | Mitigates the forest disclosure; doesn't stop the leak |

For the attacker: there's no "bypass" needed β€” the leak is the finding.


Gate 0 Validation

Before writing the report, confirm:

  1. What can the attacker do RIGHT NOW with this disclosure?

    • Internet-exposed + default hostname + corporate forest disclosed β†’ Medium: attacker has UPN format for hunt-auth-bypass matrix probes, plus knows server has likely-default service accounts.
    • Intranet-only or only NetBIOS name β†’ Informational.
  2. Does the program accept information-disclosure findings without a chained impact?

    • Many programs (Microsoft, large enterprise VDPs) DO accept this when the leaked info includes inte

Truncated for display β€” read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars5.2k
CategoryDevelopment
Updated26d ago
Forks796

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit β€” see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions
hunt-ntlm-info β€” Zed Skill: Install & Safety Check | SkillAgent