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name: bugcrowd-reporting description: "Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation." sources: bugcrowd, community

BUGCROWD REPORTING — Program-Specific Tactics

Companion to the generic report-writing skill. Use when working specifically on Bugcrowd submissions where VRT mapping, OOS-clause rebuttals, or per-program target selection matter.

This skill encodes patterns that apply specifically to Bugcrowd's submission flow. For the generic per-platform templates (HackerOne / Bugcrowd / Intigriti / Immunefi report bodies), use the report-writing skill. For the 7-Question Gate before deciding to report at all, use triage-validation.

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1. VRT Category Selection — Search & Fallback Strategy

Bugcrowd's submission form requires a single VRT (Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy) selection. The dropdown's default severity is bound to the chosen node — pick wrong and the form auto-suggests a lower priority (often P4) when the actual impact is P3 or P2.

Note: VRT default severities are not fixed constants. Bugcrowd revises the VRT schema across versions, and individual programs can remap defaults via their own priority configuration. The P-values shown in the examples below (e.g., "No Rate Limiting on Form → Login" defaulting to P4) are the typical baseline at time of writing — always read the severity the current form actually auto-suggests for this program rather than assuming the value here.

1.1 Search hierarchy (try in order, pick the highest-severity match that still describes the bug)

For any finding, search the VRT dropdown with these terms in this order:

1. The bug's primary class — e.g., IDOR, XSS, SSRF, auth bypass, 2FA bypass
2. The data category exposed — e.g., PII, sensitive data exposure, disclosure of secrets
3. The control bypassed — e.g., broken access control, authentication bypass
4. The endpoint type — e.g., no rate limiting on form > login, no rate limiting on form > change password
5. The generic parent node — e.g., Server Security Misconfiguration > Other, Broken Access Control > Other

1.2 Pick the highest-severity match that still accurately describes the bug

Never select a VRT that misrepresents the bug just to get a higher default severity. Triagers will reassign and may flag the misrepresentation. The discipline is: pick the most specific accurate VRT, then use §2 (Manual Severity Override) if the default is wrong.

1.3 Common mappings worth knowing

| Finding type | First-choice VRT | Fallback | |---|---|---| | ATO via missing 2FA on password change | Broken Authentication & Session Management → Second Factor Authentication (2FA/MFA) → Bypass | Broken Auth → Authentication Bypass → Other | | Password oracle without rate limit | Broken Authentication & Session Management → Authentication Bypass → Other | Server Security Misconfiguration → No Rate Limiting on Form → Login | | GraphQL introspection / APQ allowlist bypass | Server Security Misconfiguration → Other (justify in body) | Broken Access Control → Other | | Username → real name PII enumeration | Sensitive Data Exposure → PII Leakage / Disclosure of Secrets → Non-Corporate User | Broken Access Control → Other | | State desync on security-sensitive action | Application-Level DoS → Other (with state-desync framing) | Server Security Misconfiguration → Other | | Email/SMS pumping on auth-flow endpoint | Server Security Misconfiguration → No Rate Limiting on Form → Email-Triggering / SMS-Triggering | Server Security Misconfiguration → No Rate Limiting on Action | | Token brute-force (email-change OTP, password reset) | Broken Authentication → Authentication Bypass → Other | Server Security Misconfiguration → No Rate Limiting on Action |

1.4 If no good VRT exists

Pick Server Security Misconfiguration → Other or Broken Access Control → Other and lead the description body with a "VRT mapping note" explaining why the chosen node is the closest available match and what the bug actually is.

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2. Manual Severity Override

Bugcrowd's form lets you manually set Technical Severity separate from the VRT default. The form text itself states: "A severity rating suggested by the VRT is not guaranteed to be the severity rating applied to your submission."

2.1 When to override

Override the VRT default when:

• The chained outcome is a higher severity than the standalone bug class (chain → ATO)
• The VRT category is approximate and its default doesn't reflect the actual impact class
• The program's own Focus Areas explicitly list this outcome at a higher severity than VRT's default
• The data class exposed is more sensitive than the VRT's example uses (e.g., real-name PII vs. handle enumeration)

2.2 How to override (form mechanics)

1. Select the VRT that most accurately describes the bug (per §1)
2. Note the auto-suggested severity (P4, P3, etc.)
3. In the Technical Severity field, manually pick the severity you're requesting
4. Add a Severity Request paragraph as the FIRST section of the description body (per §3)

2.3 Don't over-claim

P1 inflation is the fastest way to lose triager trust. Reserve P1 for ATO without interaction, RCE, mass PII exfiltration, fund theft, and similar Critical-bucket impacts. If the chain to P1 requires a separate stolen-cookie premise, file the standalone primitive at P3 and discuss the chain explicitly with cross-references (per §4).

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3. Severity-Request Paragraph — Always First in the Body

When the VRT default underrates impact, the FIRST section of the description body should be a severity-request paragraph. This is the first thing the triager reads and it pre-empts the auto-close that often happens when triagers see "P4" in the form.

3.1 Template

## Severity request — please review carefully before applying VRT default

The closest VRT category for this finding is "[chosen VRT]," which Bugcrowd defaults to **P[N] ($X-$Y in [program]'s rubric)**. **I am requesting evaluation at P[M] [standalone | in chain with submission XXXX]** for the following reasons:

1. **[Impact axis 1]** — [specific reason this finding exceeds the VRT default's example]
2. **[Impact axis 2]** — [specific reason, often citing the program's own Focus Areas]
3. **[Impact axis 3]** — [specific reason, often comparing to historical bounty payouts for the same data class]

[Optional: one paragraph contrasting the VRT default's typical example with this finding's actual impact, e.g., "P4 = No Rate Limiting on Login Form" applies to ordinary login pages where brute force is bounded by lockout policies; this endpoint has neither lockout nor throttle.]

3.2 Worked example pattern

## Severity request — please review carefully before applying VRT default

The closest VRT category for this finding is "No Rate Limiting on Form → Login," which Bugcrowd defaults to **P4 ($XX–$YY in this program's rubric)**. **I am requesting evaluation at P3 standalone, P2 in chain with submission XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX** for the following reasons:

1. **[Endpoint] is a password-disclosure oracle, not a generic rate-limit gap.** The endpoint returns true/false for a supplied password — combined with cookie theft, it is the exact primitive an attacker uses to learn the victim's *durable* credential from a stolen *transient* session.
2. **The chained outcome is "Account Takeover,"** explicitly listed under the program → Focus Areas → Critical (P1) examples. This finding is one of two independent links that make that chain work; the other is submission XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX.
3. **The two findings have independent fix surfaces.** Per the program's "one fix = one bounty" rule they should be evaluated as two separate findings whose chain raises the joint severity.

The "P4 = No Rate Limiting on Login Form" default applies to ordinary login pages where brute-force is bounded by lockout policies. This endpoint has neither lockout nor throttle, and the result of brute force is the *user's actual password* (not a session) — making the impact significantly higher than the default VRT severity assumes.

3.3 Tone guidelines

• Open with "Severity request — please review carefully before applying VRT default" (literal phrase). Triagers recognize this and don't auto-close.
• Use bold sparingly; one or two phrases per reason at most.
• Never use "could potentially" or "may allow" — these are downgrade-bait.
• Cite the program's own Focus Areas / accepted-impact list by exact name.
• Cross-reference linked submissions by full submission ID (UUID format).

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4. OOS-Clause Rebuttals — Templates

Bugcrowd triagers sometimes auto-close findings by mapping them to an OOS clause without reading the report. Pre-empt this by including an In-scope justification section that quotes the OOS clause and explains why your finding doesn't fit it.

4.1 "Rate limiting on non-authentication endpoints" rebuttal

When the finding is on an authentication endpoint (login, password change, password verify, OTP verify, token validate):

## In-scope justification

The program OOS list excludes "Rate limiting or brute-force issues on **non-authentication** endpoints." `[endpoint name]` is the canonical authentication endpoint — it accepts a password/token/OTP and returns whether it matches the user's stored credential. By definition this is an authentication primitive. The OOS clause's "non-authentication" qualifier therefore does NOT apply.

4.2 "Debug information disclosure" rebuttal (for schema/introspection findings)

When the finding involves schema disclosure that's actually a control bypass (e.g., GraphQL allowlist bypass exposing the mutation surface):

## In-scope justification

This is not a "debug information" finding. The [persisted-query allowlist | introspection gate | etc.] is acting as an authorization control on the [GraphQL surface | API tree | etc.]. The bypass converts that gate into a no-op — multiple [mutations | endpoints] become reachable that the official clients cannot invoke. The schema disclosure is incidental; the impact is **mutation-surface unlock**, not information leakage.

4.3 "User enumeration with low-risk information" rebuttal

When the finding leaks more than just "this handle/email exists":

## In-scope justification

The program OOS list excludes "User Enumeration issues with **low-risk and insignificant** information being enumerated." The data leaked here is **neither low-risk nor insignificant**: it includes the matched user's [full real first name, last name, profile photo / SSN last 4 / phone number / etc.]. Real-[name | identity | etc.] knowledge is the same data class that gates the program's own [account-recovery flows / fraud-investigation interviews / support-call verification], which means this lookup directly defeats one of the program's own anti-fraud controls. This is PII disclosure, not handle enumeration.

4.4 "Theoretical issues / not exploitable" rebuttal

When the finding's exploitability has been demonstrated end-to-end:

## In-scop