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android-intent-security

Audits, detects, and remediates Android Intent and component security

Install / Use

npx skills add android/skills --skill android-intent-security

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

93/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Zed

Our assessment of android-intent-security

android-intent-security scores 93/100 on our quality scale, 354th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 32%).

Its SKILL.md is 23 KB long, well organised into 25 sections with 10 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 7,514 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
12/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so android-intent-security is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-10-26 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the Apache-2.0 license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-27. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-27. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

android-intent-security compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than android-intent-security; compare them before choosing.

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android-intent-security (this skill)by android937.5k54d agoSKILL.md
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Frequently asked questions

How do I install android-intent-security?
Run npx skills add android/skills --skill android-intent-security. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does android-intent-security work with?
It is written for Zed, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is android-intent-security safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is Apache-2.0-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is android-intent-security still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so android-intent-security is actively maintained.

name: android-intent-security description: Best practices for Android Intent security. Use this skill when auditing component configurations in AndroidManifest.xml activities, services, receivers) or source code handling incoming Intents (getIntent, getParcelableExtra) to prevent Intent Redirection and unauthorized access. license: Complete terms in LICENSE.txt metadata: author: Google LLC last-updated: '2026-09-25' keywords:

  • recipe
  • Android
  • Security
  • Intent
  • Redirection
  • PendingIntent
  • ContentProvider
  • Service
  • Signature
  • Verification
  • sanitizer
  • Vulnerability
  • Best Practices

This skill provides guidelines and patterns to secure Android components (Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers, Content Providers) and handle Intents safely, preventing privilege escalation and unauthorized access.

Glossary

  • Intent: An asynchronous messaging object used to request an action from another app component.
  • Exported component: A component (android:exported="true") that can be launched by other apps on the device.
  • Sticky intent: A broadcast intent that remains in the system cache after it's sent, allowing any app to retrieve its contents.
  • Signature permission: A permission whose protection level is set to signature, granted only to apps signed with the same developer key.
  • onNewIntent: An activity lifecycle callback invoked when an activity is launched with FLAG_ACTIVITY_SINGLE_TOP and is already running at the top of the history stack.
  • PendingIntent: A token granted to a foreign application (for example, system services) allowing it to execute a predefined Intent with the creator's permissions.
  • Mutable PendingIntent: A PendingIntent whose underlying Intent parameters can be modified by the receiving application.
  • ContentProvider: A component that encapsulates data and provides it to other applications via standard query/insert interfaces.
  • IntentSanitizer: A utility class in AndroidX Core used to build a safe, sanitized copy of an incoming Intent by filtering out unauthorized components, actions, or extras.
  • Intent redirection (forwarding): A vulnerability where an application receives an intent from an untrusted source and uses it to launch a private, non-exported component.

Prerequisites

  • The agent MUST be able to describe the function and security implications of onCreate, onNewIntent, and the singleTop launch mode.
  • The agent MUST be able to declare <activity>, <service>, <receiver>, and <provider> tags in AndroidManifest.xml and define their android:exported and android:permission attributes.
  • The agent MUST be able to implement signature verification checks using PackageManager.

Limitations

  • This skill focuses on local inter-component and inter-app communication security on the Android platform.
  • This skill doesn't cover network security, web integration, or host-to-server security.

Setup and dependencies

  • Android SDK: Minimum API Level 23 (Android 6.0) is required for standard hardware-backed keystore operations and component validation.
  • AndroidX Core Library: androidx.core:core:1.9.0 or higher is mandatory to leverage IntentSanitizer.
  • Standard API access: Standard Android PackageManager APIs are required for runtime component verification.

Intent security logic and decisions

1. Intent routing comparison

Evaluate the security features of different intent delivery methods:

| Intent Delivery Method | Scope | Recommended Use Case | |---|---|---| | Explicit Intent (Internal) | App Private | Launching internal activities/services | | Implicit Intent | System Wide | Launching system camera, dialer, or sharing | | Local Broadcasts (LocalBroadcastManager) (DEPRECATED) | App Private | Internal asynchronous event routing. Deprecated: Use in-app observers like Kotlin Flows/SharedFlow, LiveData, or reactive patterns instead. | | System Broadcasts | System Wide | Receiving system events (NFC, Bluetooth) |

2. PendingIntent mutability flag options

Evaluate the security implications of PendingIntent mutability flags:

| Flag Name | Mutability | Recommended Use Case | |---|---|---| | PendingIntent.FLAG_IMMUTABLE | Immutable | Default for almost all PendingIntents, such as alarms and notifications | | PendingIntent.FLAG_MUTABLE | Mutable | Inline notifications replies, slice actions (requires explicit target intent) |

3. Intent handling and redirection logic

IF (the component receives a nested Intent as an extra) { IF (AndroidX Core 1.9.0+ and higher is available) { MUST construct an IntentSanitizer to explicitly allowlist components, actions, data, and extras. MUST call sanitizeByThrowing() or sanitizeByFiltering() before launching. } ELSE { MUST verify that the nested Intent's target package matches the current application package. MUST verify that the target component of the nested Intent is publicly exported. } NEVER launch the nested Intent directly without validation. } ELSE IF (the component handles broadcasts) { MUST rely on the system's Protected Broadcast mechanism for system events (which guarantees the sender is the system framework). MUST protect custom receivers with signature-level permissions or use RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED for dynamic receivers to restrict the sender. IF (using ContextCompat.registerReceiver with RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED AND minSdk < 33) { MUST verify <permission android:name="${applicationId}.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION" android:protectionLevel="signature" /> and <uses-permission android:name="${applicationId}.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION" /> are declared in AndroidManifest.xml. } }

4. PendingIntent security logic

IF (a PendingIntent is created for delivery to another application) { MUST use PendingIntent.FLAG_IMMUTABLE by default. IF (the PendingIntent must be mutable) { MUST set the explicit target component or package name on the base Intent. NEVER create an implicit, mutable PendingIntent. } }

5. ContentProvider security logic

IF (the ContentProvider is only for internal app use) { MUST set android:exported="false". } ELSE { MUST protect it with android:readPermission and android:writePermission. MUST set android:grantUriPermissions="false" unless temporary URL access is strictly required. }

6. Service caller verification logic

IF (an exported service communicates with trusted sister/partner apps) { MUST retrieve the calling UID using Binder.getCallingUid() and resolve it to package names using PackageManager.getPackagesForUid(). MUST verify that the calling package signature fingerprint matches your trusted certificate hash. }


Code and configuration patterns

1. Safe intent redirection (manual verification)

Validate the target of a nested intent before launching it when modern sanitization libraries are unavailable.

  • Expected Inputs:
    • An incoming Intent containing a nested Intent extra named EXTRA_NESTED_INTENT.
  • Expected Outputs:
    • Launches the target component if safe; throws SecurityException if validation fails.
fun safeIntentRedirectionManual() {
    val nestedIntent = IntentCompat.getParcelableExtra(intent, "EXTRA_NESTED_INTENT", Intent::class.java)
    if (nestedIntent != null) {
        // 1. Check for URI permission grants to prevent URI permission bypass
        val hasUriPermissionGrants = (
            nestedIntent.flags and (
                Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION or
                    Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION or
                    Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PERSISTABLE_URI_PERMISSION or
                    Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PREFIX_URI_PERMISSION
                )
            ) != 0
        if (hasUriPermissionGrants) {
            throw SecurityException("Nested intent contains forbidden URI permission grant flags!")
        }

        val pm = packageManager
        val target = nestedIntent.resolveActivity(pm)
        if (target != null) {
            // 2. Verify target is within the same package
            if (target.packageName != packageName) {
                throw SecurityException("Cross-app intent redirection is forbidden!")
            }
            try {
                // 3. Verify target activity is exported
                val info = pm.getActivityInfo(target, 0)
                if (!info.exported) {
                    throw SecurityException("Target activity is private: ${target.className}")
                }
                // 4. Explicitly set the component to prevent intent interception
                nestedIntent.component = target
                // Safe to launch
                startActivity(nestedIntent)
            } catch (e: PackageManager.NameNotFoundException) {
                Log.e("Security", "Failed to resolve target activity", e)
            }
        }
    }
}
<br />

2. Safe intent redirection using IntentSanitizer

Filter or reject dynamic intents using AndroidX IntentSanitizer (AndroidX Core 1.9.0+).

  • Expected Inputs:
    • An untrusted incoming Intent.
  • Expected Outputs:
    • Intent: A sanitized copy containing only allowlisted components, categories, and actions. Throws SecurityException on violations if using sanitizeByThrowing().
fun safeIntentRedirectionSanitizer() {
    val untrustedIntent = IntentCompat.getParcelableExtra(intent, "EXTRA_NESTED_INTENT", Intent::class.java)
    if (untrustedIntent != null) {
        // Define the strict boundaries for allowed redirection target
        val sanitizer = IntentSanitizer.Builder()
            .allowComponent(ComponentName("com.example.app", "com.example.app.SafeTargetActivity")) // Explicitly allowed target
            .allowAction(Intent.ACTION_VIEW) // Explicitly allowed actions
            .allowDataWithAuthority("com.example.app.provider") // Allowed URI authority
            .allowType("text/plain") // Allowed mime type
            .allowExtra("user_display_name", String::class.java) // Safe type-enforced extras
            // Note: URI permission flags are NOT allowed, so the sanitizer will automatically strip or throw on them
            .build()

        try {
            // Option A: Throws SecurityException if the intent violates policies
            val safeIntent = sanitizer.sanitizeByThrowing(untrustedIntent)
            startActivity(safeIntent)
        } catch (e: SecurityException) {
            Log.e("SECURITY_ALERT", "Attempted launch of non-allowlisted intent blocked", e)
        }

        // Option B: Silently filter and launch only the authorized parts (no exception thrown)
        // val filteredIntent = sanitizer.sanitizeByFiltering(untrustedIntent)
        // startActivity(filteredIntent)
    }
}
<br />

3. Custom signature permission protection

Declare a custom signature-level permission in the manifest to secure family app communication.

  • Expected Inputs: Manifest configuration.
  • Expected Outputs: An activity that can only be launched by apps signed with the same developer certificate.
<permission
    android:name="com.example.snippets.permission.INTERNAL_COMMUNICATION"
    android:protectionLevel="signature" />
<br />
<activity
    android:name=".intents.InternalSharingActivity"
    android:exported="true"
    android:permission="com.example.snippets.permission.INTERNAL_COMMUNICATION">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="com.example.snippets.ACTION_SHARE" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
<br />

4. Safe onNewIntent lifecycle verification (warm boot protection)

Ensure that activities reusing dynamic intents (for example, in background launch paths) apply the same strict security filters inside onNewIntent.

  • Expected Inputs:

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars7.5k
CategorySecurity
Updated1mo ago
Forks488

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions