offensive-oauth
OAuth 2.0 attack checklist: authorization code interception, redirect_uri bypass, CSRF on OAuth flow, state parameter abuse, open redirector chaining, token leakage via Referer, PKCE bypass, and scope escalation. Use when testing OAuth implementations in web apps or bug bounty.
Install / Use
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-oauthInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of offensive-oauth
offensive-oauth scores 95/100 on our quality scale, 294th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 27%).
Its SKILL.md is 15 KB long, well organised into 35 sections with 3 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 6,850 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-oauth is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
No issues foundOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-28. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
offensive-oauth compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than offensive-oauth; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| offensive-oauth (this skill)by SnailSploit | 95 | 6.8k | 58d ago | SKILL.md |
| Agent-Reachby Panniantong | 100 | 112.3k | 8d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install offensive-oauth?
- Run
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-oauth. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does offensive-oauth work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is offensive-oauth safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is offensive-oauth still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-oauth is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubSKILL: OAuth Security Testing
Metadata
- Skill Name: oauth-attacks
- Folder: offensive-oauth
- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/oauth.md
Description
OAuth 2.0 attack checklist: authorization code interception, redirect_uri bypass, CSRF on OAuth flow, state parameter abuse, open redirector chaining, token leakage via Referer, PKCE bypass, and scope escalation. Use when testing OAuth implementations in web apps or bug bounty.
Trigger Phrases
Use this skill when the conversation involves any of:
OAuth, OAuth 2.0, authorization code, redirect_uri bypass, OAuth CSRF, state parameter, PKCE bypass, scope escalation, token leakage, open redirector, OAuth attack
Instructions for Claude
When this skill is active:
- Load and apply the full methodology below as your operational checklist
- Follow steps in order unless the user specifies otherwise
- For each technique, consider applicability to the current target/context
- Track which checklist items have been completed
- Suggest next steps based on findings
Full Methodology
OAuth Security Testing
Shortcut
- Check for improper redirect validation (open redirects)
- Test state parameter manipulation/absence
- Manipulate OAuth flows to bypass authentication
- Try URL path traversal in redirect_uri
- Hunt for client secret leakage in source code/repos
- Look for improper scope validation
Mechanisms
- OAuth 2.0 authorizes limited access to resources via tokens; pair with OIDC for identity.
- Core Flows:
- Authorization Code (with PKCE for public clients)
- Client Credentials (service-to-service)
- Avoid Implicit and ROPC where possible
- Key Components:
- Resource Owner (user)
- Client (third-party app)
- Authorization Server (issues tokens)
- Resource Server (hosts protected resources)
- Tokens (access and refresh)
- Hardening Extensions:
- PAR (Pushed Authorization Requests), JAR (Request Objects), JARM (JWT-secured responses)
- Sender‑constrained tokens (DPoP, mTLS)
private_key_jwtor mTLS client authentication for confidential clients
OAuth/OIDC Considerations
- PKCE everywhere: Even with confidential clients/native apps;
code_verifiermust be required and validated. - Nonce/state binding: For OIDC, ensure
nonceis present and matched;stateshould be unguessable and tied to session. redirect_uriexact match: Enforce exact string match against pre-registered allowlist; no wildcards/path traversal.aud/azp/issenforcement: Validate tokens strictly, including clock skew and JWKSkidrotation behavior.- Front-channel logout/login CSRF: Validate logout CSRF; defend forced login to attacker accounts.
- ID Token vs Access Token: APIs must not accept ID tokens; check
token_typeand audience. - Device Code & CIBA: Validate polling rate limits, code expiry, and binding of device/user codes.
- Refresh Token Rotation: Enforce reuse detection and global invalidation chains.
- PAR/JAR/JARM: Use to pin exact redirect_uri and inputs and to protect front-channel parameters.
OAuth 2.1 Updates
- Implicit Flow Deprecated: Authorization servers should not support
response_type=token - Password Grant Deprecated: ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) considered insecure
- PKCE Mandatory: Required for all OAuth clients including confidential clients
- Exact Redirect URI Matching: No more substring or prefix matching allowed
- Refresh Token Sender Constraint: Refresh tokens should be sender-constrained via DPoP or mTLS
Financial-grade API (FAPI) Security
FAPI 1.0 Advanced Profile
- Signed Request Objects (JAR): Authorization requests as signed JWTs
- Hybrid Flow: Uses
response_type=code id_tokenfor additional security - MTLS Client Authentication: Certificate-bound tokens
- JARM: JWT-secured authorization response mode
- Request Object Encryption: Sensitive parameters encrypted
FAPI 2.0 Security Profile
- Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR): POST request parameters to dedicated endpoint
- DPoP (Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession): Token bound to client's key pair
- Client Authentication:
private_key_jwtor MTLS required - Grant Management: Rich authorization requests and grant management API
graph TD
User[Resource Owner] -->|Initiates flow| Client
Client -->|Authorization Request| AuthServer[Authorization Server]
AuthServer -->|Authentication| User
User -->|Approves access| AuthServer
AuthServer -->|Authorization Code| Client
Client -->|Code + Client Secret| AuthServer
AuthServer -->|Access Token| Client
Client -->|Access Token| ResourceServer[Resource Server]
ResourceServer -->|Protected Resource| Client
style User fill:#b7b,stroke:#333,color:#333
style Client fill:#aae,stroke:#333,color:#333
style AuthServer fill:#9f9,stroke:#333,color:#333
style ResourceServer fill:#e9a,stroke:#333,color:#333
Hunt
- Intercept OAuth flows with proxy (Burp/ZAP)
- Manipulate redirect_uri parameters
- Remove/tamper state parameter
- Test PKCE implementations
- Inspect token handling in browsers
- Check for client secret leakage
- Analyze scope handling logic
- Test account linking/unlinking
- Review token validation procedures
- Examine refresh token security
Native/Mobile
- Verify App Links/Universal Links to prevent hijacking callbacks.
- Ensure OAuth proxy components in mobile apps validate issuer and JWKS; do not ship client secrets in binaries.
SPA/Browser
- Use Authorization Code + PKCE; avoid Implicit/Hybrid unless justified.
- Store tokens in memory; if cookies are used, set
__Host-prefix withHttpOnly; Secure; SameSite.
Authorization Code Flow
- Initial authorization request has
response_type=code - Request format:
/authorization?client_id=12345&redirect_uri=https://client-app.com/callback&response_type=code&scope=openid%20profile&state=ae13d489bd00e3c24 - Callback contains authorization code:
/callback?code=a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8&state=ae13d489bd00e3c24 - More secure, backend exchanges code for tokens
sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant Client
participant AuthServer as Authorization Server
participant API as Resource Server
User->>Client: 1. Click "Login with Service"
Client->>AuthServer: 2. Authorization Request (response_type=code)
AuthServer->>User: 3. Login & Consent
User->>AuthServer: 4. Approves Access
AuthServer->>Client: 5. Redirect with Authorization Code
Client->>AuthServer: 6. Token Request (code + client_secret)
AuthServer->>Client: 7. Access & Refresh Tokens
Client->>API: 8. API Request + Access Token
API->>Client: 9. Protected Resource
Implicit Flow
- Initial authorization request has
response_type=token - Request format:
/authorization?client_id=12345&redirect_uri=https://client-app.com/callback&response_type=token&scope=openid%20profile&state=ae13d489bd00e3c24 - Access token returned directly in URL fragment:
/callback#access_token=z0y9x8w7v6u5&token_type=Bearer&expires_in=5000&scope=openid%20profile&state=ae13d489bd00e3c24 - Higher vulnerability potential due to frontend token handling
sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant Client as Client (Browser)
participant AuthServer as Authorization Server
participant API as Resource Server
User->>Client: 1. Click "Login with Service"
Client->>AuthServer: 2. Authorization Request (response_type=token)
AuthServer->>User: 3. Login & Consent
User->>AuthServer: 4. Approves Access
AuthServer->>Client: 5. Redirect with Access Token in Fragment
Note over Client: Token stored in browser
Client->>API: 6. API Request + Access Token
API->>Client: 7. Protected Resource
Vulnerabilities
- Improper redirect_uri validation
- Open redirects
- Subdomain/path validation bypass
- CSRF attacks (missing/improper state parameter)
- Token leakage (URL fragments in referrer headers)
- Scope elevation (improper authorization)
- Account takeover via improper linking/unlinking
- JWT vulnerabilities (weak signatures, lack of validation)
- Client secret exposure in source/git repositories
- Authorization bypass in misconfigured implementations
- Session fixation attacks
- Access token theft via XSS/Man-in-the-Middle
Authorization Code Injection / Code Substitution
- Attacker injects victim authorization code into attacker session to bind victim account. Mitigate with state-nonce binding and PKCE.
Method 1: Auth Bypass in OAuth Implicit Flow
- Locate POST request containing user info (email, username) and access token
- In implicit flow, servers often don't properly validate access tokens
- Try changing user parameters (email, username) while keeping the token
- Potentially impersonate other users if server trusts client-provided identifiers
Method 2: Forced Profile Linking
- Target OAuth profile linking functionality
- Check for missing
stateparameter in auth requests - Create CSRF attack by copying auth URL before code/token use
- Deliver as direct link or embedded iframe to victim
- Can link attacker's social media to victim's account
Method 3: Account Hijacking via redirect_uri
- Identify authorization request with redirect_uri parameter
- Test redirect_uri manipulation (external domains or open redirects)
- Modify redirect_uri to attacker-controlled endpoint (webhook)
- Deliver modified auth URL to victim to capture their authorization code
- Use stolen code to complete OAuth flow and access victim's account
Methodologies
- Tools:
- Burp Suite (OAuth Scanner extension)
- OWASP ZAP
- OAuth 2.0 Threat Model Toolkit
- Postman for API testing
- JWT_Tool for token analysis
- OAuthSecurity Cheatsheet Scanner
- Techniques:
- Flow manipulation
- Parameter tampering
- Token analysis
- Replay attacks
- Social engineering (phishing for tokens)
- DPoP proof validation testing
- MTLS certificate validation testing
- PAR endpoint exploitation
- Token exchange flow testing
Chaining and Escalation
OAuth → Full Account Takeover
-
Open Redirect → Authorization Code Theft:
- Discover open redirect on trusted domain
- Craft OAuth flow with redirect_uri pointing to open redirect
- Victim clicks malicious link, completes OAuth flow
- Authorization code redirected through open redirect to attacker
- Attacker exchanges code for access token
-
CSRF → Account Linking Attack:
- Initiate OAuth flow to link social account
- Capture authorization callback URL before code is used
- Deliver URL to victim via CSRF
- Victim's account linked to attacker's social account
- Attacker logs in with social account to access victim's account
-
XSS → Token Theft:
- Find XSS vulnerability on application
- Inject script to steal access tokens from localStorage
- Use stolen tokens to access victim's API resources
- If refresh tokens stolen, maintain persistent access
OAuth → Lateral Movement
-
Token Exchange → Service Impersonation:
- Obtain low-privilege access token
- Use RFC 8693 token exchange to request token for different service
- Weak validation allows unauthorized service access
- Move laterally across microservices
-
Scope Elevation → Privilege Escalation:
- Obtain token with limited scope
- Manipulate refresh token exchange to request broader scopes
- Weak scope validation grants elevated permissions
- Access privileged API endpoints
-
IdP Confusion → Cross-Tenant Access:
- Multi-tenant application with multiple IdPs
- Obtain authorization code from Tenant A's IdP
- Exchange code at Tenant B's token endpoint
- Weak issuer validation grants cross-tenant access
OAuth →
Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
