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offensive-mitigations

Security mitigation reference and bypass catalog: ASLR, DEP/NX, RELRO, stack canaries, CFI, sandboxing, seccomp. Covers both detection of enabled mitigations and known bypass techniques. Use when assessing target hardening or planning exploit mitigation bypasses.

Install / Use

npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mitigations

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

87/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of offensive-mitigations

offensive-mitigations scores 87/100 on our quality scale, 679th of 1,108 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 57 KB long, well organised into 199 sections with 5 code examples: long enough that it reads more like full documentation than a focused instruction file, which agents can find harder to follow.

With 6,850 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
21/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-mitigations is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-02 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-29. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

offensive-mitigations compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than offensive-mitigations; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
offensive-mitigations (this skill)by SnailSploit876.8k58d agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k8d agoCLAUDE.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install offensive-mitigations?
Run npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mitigations. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does offensive-mitigations work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is offensive-mitigations safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is offensive-mitigations still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-mitigations is actively maintained.

SKILL: Modern Kernel Exploit Mitigations

Metadata

  • Skill Name: security-mitigations
  • Folder: offensive-mitigations
  • Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/mitigations.md

Description

Security mitigation reference and bypass catalog: ASLR, DEP/NX, RELRO, stack canaries, CFI, sandboxing, seccomp. Covers both detection of enabled mitigations and known bypass techniques. Use when assessing target hardening or planning exploit mitigation bypasses.

Trigger Phrases

Use this skill when the conversation involves any of: mitigations, ASLR bypass, DEP bypass, NX bypass, RELRO, stack canary bypass, CFI bypass, sandbox bypass, seccomp bypass, mitigation detection, checksec

Instructions for Claude

When this skill is active:

  1. Load and apply the full methodology below as your operational checklist
  2. Follow steps in order unless the user specifies otherwise
  3. For each technique, consider applicability to the current target/context
  4. Track which checklist items have been completed
  5. Suggest next steps based on findings

Full Methodology

Modern Kernel Exploit Mitigations

Memory-safety & Isolation

Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR)

  • Randomizes memory addresses where the kernel and its components are loaded.
  • Makes it difficult for attackers to predict kernel code and data locations.

Bypass Techniques

  • Information Leaks: Exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g., uninitialized memory, side-channels) to leak kernel pointers and calculate the base address.
  • Side-Channel Attacks: Using timing, cache, or other microarchitectural side channels to infer memory layout.
    • Prefetch Cache Timing: Measures access speed across the kASLR range (0xfffff80000000000 to 0xfffff80800000000, ~0x8000 iterations with 0x100000 alignment). The fastest access indicates a cached address, revealing the actual kernel base. Uses rdtscp for timing, mfence for memory barriers, and prefetchnta/prefetcht2 for cache manipulation.
  • Targeting Non-Randomized Regions: Exploiting data or code segments that are not fully randomized.
  • Brute-Force: Feasible in environments with limited entropy (e.g., some 32-bit systems or specific configurations).
  • Intel LAM: Linear Address Masking support exists on recent kernels/CPUs but may be disabled by default. Verify with kernel config, boot params, and CPU flags on your target.

Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI)

  • Linux:
    • Separates user-space and kernel-space page tables.
    • Mitigates the Meltdown vulnerability by preventing user-space access to kernel memory.

Bypass Techniques

  • Side-Channel Attacks: Exploiting microarchitectural side channels (e.g., TLB timing, cache attacks) that leak information across the isolation boundary.
  • Hardware Vulnerabilities: Exploiting CPU vulnerabilities (e.g., L1TF, MDS) that can bypass page table separation.
  • Implementation Flaws: Bugs in the KPTI implementation itself.

Practitioner

  • Linux: check status via /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/* and dmesg | grep -i kpti.
  • Windows: verify meltdown/KVA shadowing with Get-SpeculationControlSettings PowerShell script from Microsoft.

Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP)

  • Linux:
    • Hardware feature preventing unintended kernel access to user-space memory.
    • Protects against attacks exploiting improper memory accesses.

Bypass Techniques

  • ROP/JOP Gadgets: Finding instruction sequences (gadgets) within kernel code that disable SMAP temporarily (e.g., via stac instruction) before accessing user memory.
  • Data-Only Attacks: Attacks that achieve their goal without directly accessing user-space data from the kernel inappropriately.
  • Kernel Information Leaks: Combining with KASLR bypasses to find suitable gadgets.

Practitioner

  • Linux: confirm with grep smap /proc/cpuinfo and cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep 'smep\|smap'.
  • Check CR4 at runtime with rdmsr/wrmsr tools or lscpu -e on supported systems.

Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP)

  • Linux/Windows:
    • Hardware feature preventing execution of user-space code when in supervisor mode.
    • Located in bit 20 of the CR4 control register.
    • Blocks certain privilege escalation attacks that rely on executing shellcode in user-mode memory.

Bypass Techniques

  • ROP/JOP Chains: Constructing code reuse chains entirely from existing kernel code, avoiding execution of user-space code.
  • Data-Only Attacks: Exploiting vulnerabilities without needing to execute shellcode (e.g., overwriting kernel data structures).
  • Disabling SMEP: Finding gadgets or techniques to modify the CR4 control register to disable SMEP.
  • Type Confusion Exploits: Using type confusion vulnerabilities to gain control flow and build ROP chains for SMEP bypass.
  • Page Table Manipulation: Modifying page table entries (PTEs) to change user pages to supervisor pages, making user-space code executable in kernel context.
  • Write-What-Where Primitives: Using arbitrary write vulnerabilities to modify CR4 register or page table structures.

Practitioner

  • Linux: grep smep /proc/cpuinfo; verify effective state via dmesg | grep -i smep.
  • Windows: SMEP is enforced when Memory Integrity/HVCI is enabled on modern systems.

Kernel Data Protection (KDP)

  • Windows:
    • Marks certain kernel memory regions as read-only.
    • Prevents unauthorized modification of critical kernel data structures.

Practitioner

  • Check with Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard and System Information → Device Guard properties for KDP/HVCI/VBS.

Memory Integrity (Core Isolation)

  • Windows:
    • Uses virtualization and HVCI to prevent malicious code alteration.
    • Guards against code injection or execution in kernel mode.

Practitioner

  • Enable/verify: Windows Security → Device Security → Core isolation details.
  • PowerShell: Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity | Select-Object Enabled.

Read-Only Data Sections (RODATA)

  • Linux:
    • Marks specific kernel memory regions as read-only.
    • Prevents modification of critical data structures and code.

Hardened Usercopy

  • Linux:
    • Adds boundary checks to memory copy operations between user and kernel space.
    • Prevents buffer overflows and memory corruption during copy operations.

Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)

  • Linux (ARM):
    • Hardware-assisted memory safety feature to detect memory corruption bugs.
    • Mitigates use-after-free and buffer overflows at a hardware level.
    • Adopted as a production security feature in Android 16 (March 2025) with both asynchronous and synchronous detection modes available for apps.

How MTE Works

  • 4-bit Tags: Each 16-byte memory allocation receives a random 4-bit tag (values 0-15)
  • Pointer Tagging: Upper bits of pointers store the allocation tag
  • Tag Checking: Hardware validates pointer tag matches memory tag on every dereference
  • Fault on Mismatch: Invalid access triggers SIGSEGV (sync mode) or logs asynchronously (async mode)

Bypass Techniques

  • Tag Collision (Probabilistic): With only 4-bit tags (16 possible values), collision probability is high
    • Increase entropy with larger allocation pools; Android 16 uses tag rotation heuristics.
  • Untagged Memory Regions: Not all memory is MTE-protected
    • Enable MTE on stack via prctl(PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC, PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE).
  • Asynchronous Mode Exploitation: Android's async mode delays fault reporting for performance
    • Use synchronous mode (MTE_mode=sync) for security-critical apps.
  • Integer Overflow in Tag Calculation: MTE tags are derived from allocation size; overflow can corrupt tags
  • Kernel-Space Bypass: MTE only protects userspace by default
    • Kernel allocations (kmalloc, vmalloc) don't use MTE (Android 16, Linux 6.8)
    • Kernel exploit primitives (KASLR leak, arbitrary write) unaffected
    • Syscall buffer handling may not validate tags
  • JIT Code Execution: JIT-compiled code can bypass MTE checks
; Assembly gadget to create untagged pointer
mov x0, xzr          ; Zero out tag bits
orr x0, x0, #0x1000  ; Set address without tag
ldr x1, [x0]         ; Load from untagged pointer (no MTE check)

Exploitation Workflow:

  1. Leak a tagged pointer
  2. Strip tag bits (mask upper 8 bits)
  3. Use untagged pointer for memory operations
  4. MTE doesn't validate untagged accesses in some contexts

Practitioner

  • Android: enable per‑app via Developer Options or adb shell setprop persist.device_config.runtime_native_boot.mte_mode sync (device‑specific).
  • Linux: compile with CONFIG_ARM64_MTE and use prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, ...) from user space.
  • Verify MTE status: cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep mte and check HWCAP2_MTE in getauxval(AT_HWCAP2)
  • Android 16+ apps: opt-in via manifest <application android:memtagMode="sync">

Intel Linear Address Masking (LAM)

Intel allows software to use upper address bits for metadata, similar to ARM's Top Byte Ignore (TBI).

How LAM Works

  • LAM57: Uses bits 62:57 (6 bits) for tags in 5-level paging
  • LAM48: Uses bits 62:48 (15 bits) for tags in 4-level paging
  • Hardware Masking: CPU ignores tagged bits during address translation
  • Use Cases: Memory tagging, capability systems, garbage collection metadata
  • Vulnerability Classes:
  1. Pointer Forge: Attackers can craft tagged pointers without validation
  2. Info Leak Bypass: Some sanitizers only check canonical addresses; LAM-tagged pointers pass checks
  3. Address Confusion: Software assuming canonical addresses may mishandle LAM pointers

Memory Sealing

  • Linux:
    • mseal() permanently seals selected VMAs so permissions/mappings can no longer change—even by the owner (verify kernel version and libc support on your target).
    • Adopted by projects such as Chrome/glibc/BPF tool‑chains to seal JIT pages, locking down GOT/PLT and eBPF JIT regions (version‑specific; verify).

Bypass Techniques

  • Time‑of‑use Window: Exploits must succeed before sealing.
  • Data‑only Abuse: Still possible if the mapping remains writable.
  • Kernel Flaws: Bugs in the mseal() path could bypass a seal.

Practitioner

  • Verify mseal availability via grep -R sys_mseal /proc/kallsyms or kernel symbols.
  • Userland: prctl(PR_MSEAL, ...) (glibc 2.41+ headers), check errno for ENOSYS on older kernels.

Privileged Access Never (PAN)

  • Linux (ARM):
    • Hardware feature preventing direct kernel access to user-space memory.
    • Similar concept to SMAP on x86, prevents certain data leakage/corruption bugs.

Kernel DMA Protection

  • Windows:
    • Uses IOMMU/VT-d to protect against malicious peripherals performing DMA attacks.
    • Prevents unauthorized memory access via hardware devices.

Pluton Security Processor

  • Windows:
    • Microsoft Pluton is increasingly deployed with newer platforms, replacing or augmenting discrete TPM 2.0 and hardware‑binding BitLocker keys, Secure Boot, and HVCI policies. Check OEM/SKU documentation for Copilot+ requirements.

Practitioner

  • Check Pluton state in Device Manager → Security devices, or tpm.msc shows Pluton‑backed TPM if present.

Memory Protection Keys (MPK)

  • Linux:
    • Provides per-page memory permissions using hardware keys.
    • Allows fine-grained control over memory access rights.

Bypass Techniques

  • PKRU Register Manipulation: Using gadgets to modify the Protection Key Rights Register.
  • Unprotected Memory: Targeting memory regions not protected by MPK.
  • Implementation Bugs: Exploiting flaws in the MPK implementation.
  • Side-Channel Attacks: Using side channels to infer protected memory contents.

Protection Keys for Supervisor (PKS)

  • Linux/Intel:
    • Extends PKU to supervisor pages; the kernel flip

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars6.8k
CategorySecurity
Updated1mo ago
Forks896

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions